

LIFE
AS A
WEAPON
THE GLOBAL RISE OF SUICIDE BOMBINGS
Riaz Hassan

‘To help us better understand suicide bombings Professor Riaz Hassan, one of the world’s leading sociologists, has brought together a wealth of knowledge on suicide, religion and the state, terrorism, politics and social conditions.

This masterful analysis takes us through two thousand years of history, and in recent decades across a wide geographical spread – from Sri Lanka to Chechnya, from Israel to Iraq, from Turkey to Pakistan and many places in between.

Hassan argues that suicide terrorism uses life as a weapon for altruistic purposes and is a global phenomenon which has seen more suicide bombings in Iraq alone since 2003, than in the whole world in the preceding 25 years. He shows this with the meticulous scholarship that has characterized his impressive scholarly work for decades.’

Adam Graycar, Professor, Rutgers University, USA

‘This is a marvelous book by an extraordinary and courageous scholar.

Throughout *Life as a Weapon* Professor Hassan challenges a number of taboos and if his data lead him that way he is ready to take politically incorrect positions. After the 9/11 tragedy (and the horror of suicide attacks wherever they occur) it is next to impossible for scholars in the West to take an objective view about who suicide bombers are, what their real motivation is, and how suicide bombing compares ethically with other acts of war. The Western media and often even Western scholars describe suicide bombers as fanatics, cowardly criminals who often commit the crimes drugged by their commanders.

Professor Hassan shows that all this received wisdom is false. Suicide bombing is hardly a fanatic, irrational act; it is actually a very effective political, military response, mostly carried out against occupying forces who have an overall military superiority and can only be challenged or even defeated by suicide terrorism.

There will be readers who will be upset when confronted by this book, but as far as I am concerned this speaks for Professor Hassan. He does not excuse suicide bombing but he understands it and provokes his readers to rethink their basic – and I am sure he is right: mostly false – assumptions.’

Ivan Szelenyi, William Graham Sumner Professor of Sociology and Professor of Political Science, Yale University, USA

Life as a Weapon

Suicide bombing has become a weapon of choice among terrorist groups because of its lethality and ability to cause mayhem and fear. But who carries out these acts, and what motivates them? By undertaking analysis of the information in the most comprehensive suicide terrorism database in the world, *Life as a Weapon* seeks to question and in turn undermine the common perception that the psychopathology of suicide bombers and their religious beliefs are the principal causes.

Instead, the book presents a cocktail of motivations that drive suicide bombers, and explains how their actions achieve multiple purposes – community approval, political success, liberation of the homeland, personal redemption or honour, refusal to accept subjugation, revenge, anxiety, defiance. Since the configuration of these driving factors is also specifically related to the circumstances of political conflict in each different country, it is only through gaining understanding and knowledge of these conditions that appropriate policies and responses can be developed that will protect the public and counter the scourge of suicide bombings.

Life as a Weapon is a pivotal text in the discussion surrounding suicide bombings, and as such it is of relevance to undergraduate students, postgraduates, and researchers working in areas such as Security Studies, Middle Eastern Studies, Terrorism, Criminology and Political Science.

Riaz Hassan is Emeritus Professor at Flinders University, Adelaide, Australia. His research interests include suicide terrorism, housing and Muslim societies. His recent books include *Faithlines: Muslim Conceptions of Islam and Society* (Oxford University Press, 2004) and *Inside Muslim Minds* (Melbourne University Press, 2008). He is a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia, and a member of the Order of Australia.

Life as a Weapon

The global rise of suicide bombings

Riaz Hassan

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Foreword

There are few topics that generate more public concern than terrorism. Since the 1960s, few of the established democracies have not at some time been preoccupied with the fear of terrorism. Across the world, terrorist organisations have seen the political concessions that can be extracted by threatening democratic governments with random acts of violence directed at their citizens. And among the types of terrorist methods that are commonly used, most fear is generated by the threat of suicide bombing. While this was once restricted to Middle Eastern countries, the July 2005 London underground bombings, which claimed the lives of fifty-six people, including the four bombers, showed that Western countries, too, are susceptible to this new form of terrorism.

The public's fear of terrorism stems from its totally random nature: a parked car, a knock on the door or a letter in the post can all deliver an act of violence with complete unpredictability and often fatal consequences. Such random violence has a major impact on patterns of human behaviour. This was aptly demonstrated in some of the earliest social science research, conducted in 1945–6 in Germany to assess the effectiveness of strategic bombing in the Second World War. The research confirmed the disruption that the bombing caused to the everyday lives of German citizens. More importantly, the greatest civilian implication was the impact on the morale of the German population of the apparently random nature of the bombing: no one could predict which towns or cities would be next to be bombed, and no one knew who might be killed or injured.

The threat of suicide bombing adds a further dimension of fear to the random nature of terrorist violence. Individuals can take steps in their personal security to minimise the possibility of falling victim to terrorism. But a person who uses his or her body as a weapon is almost impossible to guard against, since inter-personal contact is the basis of human society. In this pioneering book, Riaz Hassan analyses the causes and patterns of

suicide bombing, its origins and its implications for society. He destroys many myths about suicide bombers and their tactics, and in a series of case studies charts how suicide bombers are recruited and what motivates them. Most importantly, by bringing social theory to bear on the subject, he sheds much-needed light on an emotive and often misunderstood subject.

The popular response to terrorism is not a rational one, and that is even more the case with the popular response to suicide bombers. These acts are viewed popularly (and sometimes by more serious observers) as a form of madness, explicable only by the irrationality of those who carry them out. This is a standard emotional reaction which obviates the need to analyse, dissect and understand such acts of violence directed at innocent bystanders. For example, in the late 1960s and 1970s British public opinion largely dismissed the Northern Ireland conflict as simply the logical consequence of a culture that reifies violence. More considered judgements began to see Northern Ireland as a territorial conflict that is tragically all too common across the world. Once that realisation was reached, public policies could be directed at solving it.

Life as a Weapon challenges many myths about suicide bombing, and it does so elegantly and with scholarly rigour. One myth that is challenged is that suicide bombers are mad. Riaz Hassan shows that, on the contrary, suicide bombers are highly calculating rather than psychopathic, and they see their act of violence in the context of furthering a political goal. Suicide bombers are also likely to be of above average income and education, destroying the myth that ignorance and poverty is a motivation to use one's body as a weapon. Apart from their use of violence and their willingness to kill themselves as part of the political process, suicide bombers fit the profile of political activists who are found around the world.

Perhaps most importantly, Riaz Hassan challenges the myth that such acts of violence are religious. While he acknowledges that religion may often play a role in the recruitment of future suicide bombers, he argues convincingly that politics, not religion, provides the primary motivation for involvement. Suicide bombers make calculations about the impact their suicide may have in achieving a political goal – invariably a territorial one. Once again, Northern Ireland provides an apt analogy. The Irish Republican Army prisoners who mounted a hunger strike in 1981, which resulted in ten of them dying, did so as a rational political act which paved the way for the

electoral rise of Sinn Fein and its participation in government. These were precise political calculations that the hungers strikers made.

Riaz Hassan has written an important book, which deals with a misunderstood and regrettably common aspect of modern society. He has done so from a scholarly perspective, eschewing the rhetoric and emotion that necessarily accompanies the subject of suicide bombing. And not least, his work has incurred some professional costs, by dealing with a subject that preoccupies many government agencies around the world. Terrorism is a scourge that has destroyed many lives. But it is also a political act that is motivated by political goals, and our natural revulsion at suicide bombing should not obscure this basic fact. Once the subject is sufficiently illuminated, it is to be hoped that governments will cast aside emotion and seek lasting political solutions to the problem.

Ian McAllister, Professor of Political Science,
The Australian National University

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My research assistant Ms Jessica Sutherland worked tirelessly and with admirable commitment and dedication to compile the Flinders University Suicide Terrorism Database (FUSTD), now one of the most comprehensive databases on suicide bombings in the world. The fruits of her efforts are reflected throughout the book. My deepest and warmest gratitude goes to her for her support, assistance and dedication to the project – often under difficult conditions – which played a critical and vital role in achieving the research objectives. Mrs Carolyn Corkindale also deserves my sincere thanks for her support and assistance over the past five years. Ms Nadia Okar provided valuable assistance in 2006 by translating biographies of Iraqi insurgents from Arabic into English. I am very pleased that Routledge's Gerhard Boomgaarden's enthusiasm for the book matched my own. Jennifer Dodd, Sarah Enticknap, Richard Willis, Carol Fellingham Webb, Tamsin Ballard and Nena Bierbaum gave valuable support and assistance in the production of this book.

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Introduction

Life as a weapon

In an age when the Western world is preoccupied with worries about weapons of mass destruction in terrorist hands, in many parts of the world terrorist groups are turning to a more basic device as the weapon of choice – life itself. This use of life as weapon, or suicide bombing – now exercised mainly by Islamic insurgent groups – is frequently presented as the manifestation of Islamic fanaticism. But studies by serious scholars show that suicide bombing attacks are linked more to politics than to religion. Religion is used effectively by a number of Islamic radical groups to recruit suicide bombers and to raise operational funds, but the leaders of these groups have secular goals, such as expelling occupying forces from the 'homeland'. Thus, even if some suicide bombers are irrational or fanatical, the leaders of the groups that recruit and direct them are not.

Since Muslims professing religious motives have perpetrated most suicide attacks over the past few years, including those on 11 September 2001, it may be obvious to conclude that Islamic fundamentalism is the root of this phenomenon. This assumption has fuelled the belief that future September 11-type attacks can be prevented only through liberalisation and democratisation of Muslim societies. This was the key rationale used by the United States to mobilise public support for the war in Iraq. Ironically, such an assumption may foster the development of domestic and foreign policies in the United States that may well worsen the situation. Externally imposed policies of liberalisation and democratisation are likely to sharpen religious and ideological divisions in the recipient Muslim countries. Iraq and Afghanistan are two obvious examples that come to mind, but we can easily add more countries to the list.

The studies that have tried to explain the motivations of suicide attackers in terms of religious fanaticism have tended to focus on the attacker's

psychopathology, poverty and lack of education, or individual motives, such as religious indoctrination, especially Islamic fundamentalism (Paz 2002; Lester, Yang and Lindsay 2004; Kramer 1991; Berko 2007; Ganor 2002). These explanations have been found to be seriously flawed. A number of seminal studies have found that suicide terrorism is not caused by individual psychopathology, poverty or lack of education and that the role of the actual terrorist groups in the indoctrination may be overstated as many volunteers for suicide bombings do not undergo extensive training. The decision to participate in a suicide bombing is facilitated by bombers' internalised social identities, their exposure to asymmetric conflict and facilitating organisations, and their membership of a larger community in which martyrdom has high symbolic significance. After reaching the decision to carry out an operation, suicide bombers become extremely focused on committing the act. Both the organisations and individuals who engage in suicide terrorism are rational in terms of trying to meet instrumental goals and/or acting on their values (Atran 2003; Argo 2004; Bloom 2005; Pape 2005; Gambetta 2005; Crenshaw 2002; Merari 2005a; Silke 2003; Sageman 2004; Post, Sprinzak and Denny 2003).

Other studies have also emphasised that there is little evidence that supporters of suicide terrorism hate democratic freedoms, although they do tend to hate American foreign policy. Lack of civil liberties and US support for regimes that withhold them are related to the attacks on the USA. An important factor explaining the rise of suicide bombing attacks is the presence of recruiting organisations, which use various means to encourage loyalty to the cause and comrades. For the organisation itself, the tactic of suicide terrorism is rational, encourages retaliation on the part of the enemy and is successful in achieving its near-term goal of avenging the experience of humiliation – often resulting in broader societal support for the group's cause. It boosts members' morale and demonstrates a desperate situation to the international community. In societies based on the regulation of public and private behaviour through cultural codes of honour and shame, living under humiliating and demeaning conditions is no better than dying. Suicide attacks are attractive because they result in high levels of damage, are successful in reaching targets, are hard to deter, are cost-effective in terms of reaching their targets, don't require an exit strategy on the part of the attacker, don't leave perpetrators open to interrogation, and attract media attention.

Understanding the dynamics of suicide attacks also requires understanding what drives humans to suicide. In modern psychiatry and sociology suicide is generally regarded as an *end* – an exit from an intolerable personal pain and adverse social conditions. In my studies of suicide over the past forty years, however, I have questioned this characterisation. Suicidal behaviour in a variety of settings may be used *not as an end in itself, but as a means to achieve multiple ends*, including self-empowerment in the face of powerlessness, redemption in the face of damnation, honour in the face of humiliation. In my opinion, this is central to a more meaningful understanding and explanation of contemporary suicide attacks in the Middle East and elsewhere. History offers some compelling examples of the use of suicide as a proactive and empowering political act and not as a resolution of personal crisis. I have chosen the following to illustrate this point: the suicide of Roman soldier and statesman Cato; the crucifixion death of Jesus Christ; the martyrs of Cordoba; the Jewish Zealots and Sicarri; the Ismaillis-Nazari Assassins; and Japanese kamikaze pilots.

Cato's suicide

In the twilight of the Roman republic Cato had emerged as the most vocal, determined and incorruptible opponent of Julius Caesar. They had sparred for decades, and Cato became a lodestone for resistance in the civil war that followed Caesar's rise as dictator. Caesar had defeated one republican army after another on the battlefield. In his victories he had become magnanimous towards his defeated opponents and had planned the same for Cato after the republican army had been defeated in Africa. Cato would have none of it. In Caesar's clemency he saw a new Rome where all sides, victorious and defeated, would be in Caesar's debt. For Cato it was an utter defeat of the cause for which he had fought and the complete end of resistance to Caesar's rule. In his determination to fight this seemingly inevitable outcome he wanted to send a powerful message to the Roman world. As refugees fled in advance of Caesar's arrival, Cato retired to his chamber to read the *Phaedo* – the famous dialogue in which Socrates, on the day he is to drink the poison, discusses the immortality of the soul. Towards dawn Cato stabbed himself, and when his attendants tried to save him, he pulled open his wounds savagely until he collapsed dead.

It was a horrific death and a powerful political message, not only to Caesar, but also to the surviving republican forces and to Rome. ‘Cato, I grudge your death as you have grudged my power to keep you alive,’ was Caesar’s response when he arrived at the scene. Cato’s defiant suicide acted as a rallying call for further resistance to Caesar’s rule. Within two years of Cato’s death Caesar had been assassinated by his followers. Cato’s suicide could not protect the republic, but it succeeded in destroying his enemy. It was not a suicide to escape retribution but rather it reflected a desire for a political impact that Cato felt his continued life could not have (Holland 2003; Silke 2007b; Minois 1999).

Crucifixion death of Jesus Christ

Another historical example supporting my thesis that suicide might not be an end but a means to achieve multiple ends is the crucifixion of Christ. Was Christ’s death a suicide mission? John quotes Jesus as saying, ‘For these sheep I will give my life’ and ‘No one takes it from me; I lay it down freely myself’ (John 10.15 and 10.18). When Jesus entered Jerusalem for Passover he knew what awaited him; he deliberately moved towards death, and during his trial did nothing to avoid it. In the context of the Man-God and of redemption, Jesus’ suicide has a totally different significance and a totally different dimension from ordinary suicide, but the ambiguity remains (Minois 1999: 24). Christians are enjoined to follow Jesus as an exemplar in all things, including salvation and redemption. They are invited to sacrifice their own lives in the service of a higher cause, and in doing so they can invoke Jesus’ pronouncements, such as: ‘Whoever would save his life will lose it, but whoever loses his life for my sake will find it’ (Matthew 16.25); ‘The man who loves his life loses it, while the man who hates his life in this world preserves it to life eternal’ (John 12.25); ‘There is no greater love than this; to lay down one’s life for one’s friends’ (John 15.13).

The first generations of Christians understood these and similar injunctions, and during the period of persecutions they took them literally, willingly giving themselves over to martyrdom. Writing in the late first century, John tells us he places in heaven ‘the spirits of those who had been beheaded for witness to Jesus and the word of God’ (Revelation 20.4). In his Apology, written in the second century, St Justin praised Christians who seek death, and in the early third century Tertullian and the Montanists advocated voluntary martyrdom. The Acts of the Christian martyrs abound

in examples of Christians who turned themselves over to the civil authorities or who, by their actions and responses to interrogation, deliberately chose death (Minois 1999: 25). One of the best historical examples of this is the ‘Martyrs of Cordoba’ in ninth-century Spain.

The Martyrs of Cordoba

Almost a hundred years after the Ummayad prince Abd al-Rahman had established the Islamic emirate, the old Visigothic city of Cordoba had been transformed visually, socially and culturally. Cordoba was all bustle, a prosperous boomtown, new construction of every sort everywhere, its peoples, cultures and languages reshuffling themselves along with the changing landscape. A memorable description of this change was captured by Paul Alvarus, an erudite and widely respected Christian luminary of Cordoba, in his famous polemical book, *The Unmistakable Sign*:

> The Christians love to read the poems and romances of the Arabs; they study the Arab theologians and philosophers, not to refute them but to form a correct and elegant Arabic. Where is the layman who now reads the Latin commentaries on the Holy Scriptures, or who studies the Gospels, prophets or apostles? Alas! All talented young Christians read and study with enthusiasm the Arabic books; they gather immense libraries at great expense; they despise the Christian literature as unworthy of attention. They have forgotten their own language. For every one who can write a letter in Latin to a friend, there are a thousand who can express themselves in Arabic with elegance, and write better poems in this language than the Arabs themselves.
>
> (cited in Menocal 2002: 66)

Although he himself was a layman, Alvarus shared his horror at the spectacle of a world transformed with a small but highly visible group of conservative Christians. By the middle of the ninth century in Cordoba, the Church had come to successful terms with the Islamic polity within which it existed. The Islamic government had grown stronger, and the cultural life of the court had become vibrant. As a result Christians were increasingly drawn to Islamic culture, and the rate of conversions to Islam had accelerated, leading to changes and disruptions at every level of Cordovan society. The society itself had genuinely become tolerant and pluralistic in

ways that may be appealing to modern sensibilities but not to Christian conservatives (Menocal 2002; Coope 1995; Daniel 1979).

These changes were deeply alarming for some Cordovan Christians. They feared diversity and despised anyone who did not conform to their beliefs. They believed Muslims had no right to exist and depicted them only through the most hateful of stereotypes. As a symbol of the Christian resistance to assimilation between 850 and 859, a radical Christian group led by the Cordovan priest Eulogius and his friend Paul Alvarus launched a martyrdom movement, which led to the execution of around fifty Christians by the Muslim government of Cordoba. The supporters of the movement were mainly clerics and some laypeople from Cordovan monasteries and basilicas.

One by one, they indulged in conspicuous public declaration of the deceits of Islam and the perfidies of its Prophet. Some appeared before the Muslim *qadi* (high judge) of Cordoba, proclaiming that Muhammad was a magician, an adulterer and a liar and that his followers would certainly go to hell. Others made similar remarks on the streets of Cordoba. Islamic rulers were tolerant in matters of doctrine but not of disparagement of the Prophet Muhammad. The would-be martyrs knew for a certainty that they were forcing the hands of the authorities of Cordoba by expressly choosing to vilify Muhammad. Leaders on both sides made every attempt to head off their actions and their fatal consequences – in vain. These virulent blasphemous public attacks thus deliberately invited execution, and close to fifty offending Christians, including Eulogius, were beheaded in public.

The rationale of this martyrs' movement provided by Eulogius was publicly to assert the superiority of the Christian faith and the deceits and falsehood of Islam and its Prophet. He and other martyrs knew what the punishment for their repeated blasphemies would be, but they believed such actions would not only assert the superiority of their faith but also lead to their salvation. The martyrs' supporters understood the movement as a reaction to the horrors of Muslim rule, a radical but justifiable form of protest. In their writings they compared those executed to the early Roman martyrs. The facts, however, did not fully support such a comparison. The Cordovan martyrs brought about their own arrest and execution; the authorities did not seek them out. To the extent that Muslims in Cordoba did actively persecute Christians, they did so after the martyrdoms began, not

before, so that the martyrs' movement was more likely the cause of ill treatment than a response to it (Colbert 1962; Christys 2002; Makki 1992).

The Cordovan martyrs had expected their actions to lead to widespread civil unrest by both Muslims and Christians, but that did not eventuate. In due course the passion of the moment passed and life returned to thriving religious coexistence as before. But their martyrdom was not forgotten: they were eventually transformed from a thorn in the side of the Church into the 'Mozarab martyrs' and became the near-sainted symbols of a cause that served the purpose of Christian chroniclers and analysts of later periods as an easy enough touchstone: brave Christians resisting the forced conversion 'by the sword' that conventional history tells us was the way by which Islam spread, and suffering death for their heroism (Menocal 2002: 70–2; Coope 1995).

The Jewish Zealots and Sicarii

In the first century AD the Jewish sects of Zealots and Sicarii were active in stirring up rebellion against the Roman rulers of Jerusalem. They derived their inspiration from an ancient Jewish religious tradition of *herem* – holy war – against the Canaanites and other gentiles for the control of the Promised Land. The name Sicarii is derived from the dagger (*sica*) they used to carry out their terror missions. There is scant reliable information about their activities, but generally Sicarii targeted the Hellenised Jews who collaborated with the Romans in order to punish them for their immorality and to send a message that Romans could not protect the Jewish collaborators. The Zealots targeted the enemy occupiers. Both groups adopted a strategy of violent attacks designed to achieve three main goals: to cleanse Judea of foreign influences and bring about messianic redemption; to incite rebellion among the Jews against the Roman occupation; and to prevent any possible reconciliation between the moderate Jews and the Romans (Bloom 2005; Pape 2005).

They numbered in the 'hundreds' and, starting around AD48, carried out suicidal missions to kill prominent Jews, temple priests who had succumbed to Hellenistic culture and Roman soldiers. Their atrocities destroyed any prospect of a mutually agreeable solution and steadily expanded the conflict. According to Rapoport:

> The Zealots saw themselves as revolutionary catalysts who moved men by force of their audacious action, exploiting mass expectations that messianic deliverance was imminent. To generate a mass uprising, they escalated the struggle by shock tactics to manipulate fear, outrage, sympathy and guilt. Sometimes these emotional effects were provoked by terrorist atrocities which went beyond the consensual norms governing violence; at other times, they were produced by provoking the enemy into committing atrocities against his will.
>
> (Rapoport 1984: 670)

Zealots and Sicarii continued their attacks for a quarter of a century, provoking brutal Roman retaliatory reprisals. Their attacks succeeded in generating two large-scale uprisings that served as the trigger of the Jewish War of AD66. This lasted for four years and ultimately led to the destruction of the second Temple in Jerusalem and the massacre of Jews in Egypt and Cyprus, as well as triggering a traumatic exodus of the Jews from Judea. The Jewish War finally ended at Masada. When the Roman army attacked this fortress at the end of AD72, there were 960 insurgents and refugees within. Once the fall of the fortress became inevitable, Eleazar, the leader of the Zealots, persuaded Masada's defenders to engage in what remains one of the most famous group suicides in history. The Zealots in Masada preferred to die by their own hand rather than be captured by their Roman enemies. The symbolic act demonstrated their steadfast opposition to Roman oppression. The act of mass suicide was a political act. The Zealot leader Eleazar is said to have given the following speech as the Romans were preparing to launch their final assault on the fortress:

> This grace has been given to us by God, namely, to be able to die nobly and freely … Only our shared death is able to protect our wives and children from violation and slavery … we, who have been brought up at home in this way, should set an example to others in our readiness to die … This – suicide – is commanded by our laws. Our wives and children ask for it. God himself has sent us the necessity for it.
>
> (cited in Pape 2005: 34)

The Order of Assassins

From 1090 to 1256 a small secretive Shia Muslim sect in north-western Iran, known as Ismaillis-Nazari, created an effective organisation for the planned and systematic use of political terror that relied on self-destruction for success. The sect's name is derived from the Arabic word *hasshishiyyin* because its members reputedly smoked hashish before going on their missions. This was, however, a misconception, but their legacy lives on through the word *assassin* still used to describe a political murderer. For almost two centuries the assassins' daggers terrorised and demoralised the mainly Sunni rulers of the region. Their goal was to purify Islam by returning the Umma (Islamic community of believers) to one single community, as had been the case under the first four caliphs of Islam in the seventh century.

The Assassins carried out their missions through a network of secret cells in sympathetic neighbouring urban centres. They were highly trained and disciplined killers and used clever strategies to gain access to their victims. Most such victims were high public or military leaders who were so heavily guarded that even successful attackers would almost surely have to pay for their success with their lives. The attacks took place at venerated holy sites, on Muslim holy days and at the royal court when many witnesses were present. The assassinations were a form of communication to the witnessing public of the error of the ways and beliefs of their victims. What made the Assassins so lethal was that they were willing to die to accomplish their missions and often, rather than attempting to escape, revelled in their impending deaths in order to demonstrate the purity of their motives and to enter heaven. It was considered shameful to survive a mission (Pape 2005; Bloom 2005; Hudson 1999; Lewis 1987).

Japanese traditions of political and military sacrifice

Japanese culture offers highly instructive examples of voluntary political suicide. The Japanese samurai could commit two types of *seppuku* (ritual suicide) – *setsu-joku* and *kanshi* – for a variety of motives. In *setsujoku*, the motive was to avoid the disgrace of being captured by the enemy. The motive for *kanshi* was entirely political, this being a form of suicide carried out in protest at the action of a superior considered by the samurai as a grave mistake and also in order to influence political decisions and policy.

The case of Takamori Saigo in the nineteenth century has interesting parallels with that of Cato.

Following the collapse of the old Shogunal system in Japan with the Meiji Restoration, Takamori Saigo became profoundly disillusioned with the direction taken by the Japanese government. Saigo was a strong supporter of the emperor and thus favoured the Restoration, but viewed the new government as corrupt and indolent. He led 15,000 samurai in rebellion against Japan's new conscript army, which had been trained and equipped in Western style. At the battle of Shiroyama in 1877, the samurai were crushed by the conscripts. Saigo committed *seppuku* on the battlefield but, as with Cato, his ideology was quickly adopted by the conscript forces that defeated him. Thus in defeat Saigo won a great victory for those virtues of which he had feared the loss and which he had sought to defend. Suicide gave Saigo's ideology a potency that allowed it ultimately to prevail (O'Neill 1999).

The second example, the Japanese kamikaze suicide missions in World War II, is more widely known. Sacrifice is part of military heroism, and in World War II it was given a vivid imagery and meaning by the Japanese. Desperate to stop the advancing American naval fleet in the Pacific, the Japanese high command in the Philippines, beginning in July 1944, organised a variety of 'special attack' air force units whose pilots agreed to crash their planes, gliders and even torpedos into US naval vessels. This unit was given the name of Shinpu Special Attacks Corps. The characters for *shinpu* (divine wind) can also be read 'kamikaze', as did Japanese-American translators operating with the Allied fleet, and that is how we now know them.

Kamikaze raids operated for ten months, from 25 October 1944, until Japan surrendered on 15 August 1945. In all some 3,843 pilots gave their lives. Most were young, fairly well-educated men who understood that pursuing conventional warfare would likely end in defeat. These suicides attacks did not stop the Americans, but they were four to five times more deadly than conventional strike missions and imposed high costs on the invasion forces. In the battle of Okinawa (April 1945) two hundred kamikaze rammed fully fuelled fighter planes into more than three hundred ships, killing five thousand Americans in the most costly naval battle in US history (Atran 2003; Pape 2005; Hill 2005).

In all at least 375 naval vessels were damaged or sunk, 12,300 American servicemen killed, and another 36,400 wounded. The kamikaze were enshrined at Yasukuni Jinjo temple and thereby became national gods. They were lionised in the press and official communiqués in which they were referred to as god-heroes.

> Kamikaze pilots were posthumously awarded a two-rank promotion which entitled their families to increased pension rights and better rations, very important in war time. The families received the title of '*homare no ie*' (a household of honour) and places of honour at official ceremonies.
>
> (Larteguy 1956: 128)

Japanese officials rejected the assertion that kamikaze pilots committed suicide as illustrated by the comments of Lieutenant General Torashira Kawabe to Allied interrogators after World War II.

> We believe that our spiritual convictions and moral strength could balance your material and scientific advantages. We did not consider our attacks to be 'suicide'. The pilot did not start out on his mission with the intention of committing suicide. He looked upon himself as a human bomb which would destroy a certain part of the fleet … [and] died happy in the conviction that his death was a step towards the final victory.
>
> (O'Neill 1999: 130–1)

Similar sentiments and attitudes were expressed by many kamikaze pilots in their 'Last Testimonies', such as the one left by Flight Petty Officer Shimamura, aged twenty:

> I shall fall smiling and singing songs. Please visit and worship at Yasukuni Shrine this spring. There I shall be a cherry blossom, smiling with many other colleagues. I died smiling so please smile. Please do not cry. Make my death meaningful.
>
> (cited in Hill 2005: 36)

While the kamikaze pilots have been seen as fanatically devoted to the cause, there were detracters who did not support the strategy but went along with it because they felt *guilty* for not participating when others were sacrificing themselves. They undertook special attack missions and sacrificed themselves out of their sense of *solidarity*, a factor that was repeatedly stressed in their training (Kozu 2000: 316; Oknuki-Tierney 2002: 169).[1]

The above cases are illustrations of my thesis that under certain circumstances the act of deliberate self-destruction – suicide – is a *means* of achieving multiple *ends*. They show the instrumental use of life itself as a weapon. These ends may include the realisation of ideals valued by the actors. The notion of 'weapon' here implies the instrumental use of life as a means to communicate these ideals to the wider community and to inflict physical or symbolic pain and loss on the opponent. In all these cases, as is also true in the case of suicide bombing, the actions of the actors are seen by their reference group as rational and altruistic. In this respect these deeds belong to a family of actions in human society that include religious martyrdom, self-immolation, hunger strikes and war heroism, in which people go to extremes of self-sacrifice in the belief that by doing so they are furthering the interests of their reference group or the cause they value and strongly identify with.

In Durkheim's typology of suicide such actions would fall in the altruistic category: they are different from other suicidal actions caused by individual motives, personal catastrophes, hopelessness and psychopathologies that lead people to consider life as not worth living (Durkheim 1951). Altruistic actions, in contrast, involve valuing one's life less than one does a group's honour, religion, principles or some other collective interest. Altruism, generally seen as 'doing good', is not antithetical to aggression. In warfare soldiers risk their lives to help kin, comrades and country and also by killing enemies. It may be puzzling and unsettling but, as shown by the examples described above, and many more similar examples that can be extracted from history's pages, a human being's disposition to sacrifice oneself for the benefit and good of the group is an enduring behavioural feature that can manifest itself under a range of material, cultural and organisational settings. Modern suicide bombings fall into this conceptual map (Gambetta 2005; Leenars 2004).

There is another narrative, that of human destiny, which reflects on the nature of a phenomenon like suicide bombing. In this narrative, humanity's lot is one of intertwined pain and frustration, humiliation, injustice, emotional distress, unmerited defeat, interwoven hope and disappointment, and the scorn of the great and the powerful. It is beautifully captured in Hamlet's soliloquy by William Shakespeare:

> To be, or not to be: that is the question:
> Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer
> The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune,
> Or to take arms against a sea of troubles,
> And by opposing end them? To die: to sleep;
> No more; and by a sleep to say we end
> The heart-ache and the thousand natural shocks
> That flesh is heir to. 'Tis a consummation
> Devoutly to be wish'd. To die, to sleep;
> To sleep: perchance to dream: ay, there's the rub;
> For in that sleep of death what dreams may come,
> When we have shuffled off this mortal coil,
> Must give us pause; there's the respect
> That makes calamity of so long life;
> For who would bear the whips and scorns of time,
> The oppressor's wrong, the proud man's contumely,
> The pangs of despised love, the law's delay,
> The insolence of office, and the spurns
> That patient merit of the unworthy takes,
> When he himself might his quietus make
> With a bare bodkin? Who would fardels bear,
> To grunt and sweat under a weary life,
> But that the dread of something after death,
> The undiscover'd country from whose bourn
> No traveller returns, puzzles the will
> And makes us rather bear those ills we have
> Than fly to others that we know not of?
> Thus conscience does make cowards of us all;
> And thus the native hue of resolution
> Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought,

> And enterprises of great pith and moment
> With this regard their currents turn awry,
> And lose the name of action.
>
> (*Hamlet*, act 3, scene 1)

Outline of the book

This book is about a modern expression of the use of life as a weapon for altruistic purposes: suicide bombing. As mentioned earlier, altruistic actions involve valuing one's life less than one does a group's honour, religion or other collective interests. Furthermore, altruistic actions are not antithetical to aggression. Suicide bombings have increased dramatically over the past three decades. In the modern era this phenomenon began in Lebanon in the 1980s. It then spread to conflicts in Sri Lanka, Palestine, Chechnya, Turkey and Kashmir, and became a focus of international attention after the devastating attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States that shocked the world. After the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 incidents of suicide bombings have surged to extraordinary levels in that country and are rapidly spreading around the world. The impact of the Iraq war on the occurrence of suicide bombings can be understood from the fact that since 2003 there have been more suicide bombings in Iraq alone than there were in the whole world in the preceding twenty-five years. This book deals with the global rise of suicide bombings and the causes behind it. Chapter 1 provides an analysis of the global trends in suicide bombings between 1980 and 2006, followed by an overview in Chapter 2 of the main explanatory models accounting for their occurrence as well as their dramatic increase. These chapters are followed by five case studies of the main sites of the phenomenon. Subsequently Chapter 8 examines the question as to whether suicide bombings are weapons of war or homicidal killings and why certain types of deaths are regarded as 'good deaths' by society, while others are seen as 'bad' and generally regarded as repulsive.

The book concludes with a discussion of the main lessons which can be drawn from the findings and their implications for public policy.

1 Global trends in suicide bombing, 1981–2006

Contemporary studies and commentaries on suicide bombing do not offer a concise or even a commonly agreed definition of the concept. More often than not authors use definitions that highlight a certain feature of the act that emphasises the focus of their respective study and analysis. For example, Diego Gambetta and contributors to his edited volume use the term ‘suicide mission’ in order to extend the scope and coverage of their analysis (Gambetta 2005). Mia Bloom, Mohammad Hafez, Robert Pape, Ami Pedahzur and Shaul Shay explicitly use the term ‘suicide terrorism’ but with a nuance that emphasises one or more motivational attributes germane to their analysis (Bloom 2005; Hafez 2006, 2007b; Pape 2005; Pedahzur 2005; Shay 2004). In the case of these authors it tends to be political resistance and altruism. They all use the terms ‘suicide bombing’, ‘suicide terrorism’ and ‘suicide attacks’ interchangeably.

Others, like Raphael Israeli, on the other hand, insist that the term ‘suicide terrorism’ be used only to describe the violence of Muslim suicide bombers, implying that relatively neutral terms such as ‘suicide bomber’ are too weak and insufficiently condemnatory (Israeli 1997, 2003). He, along with Anat Berko, Anne Marie Oliver and Paul Steinberg, and Michael Walzer, sees suicide bombings as homicidal killing (Berko 2007; Oliver and Steinberg 2005; Walzer 2004). Farhad Khosrokhavar, Nasra Hassan, Talal Asad, Ivan Strenski, Scott Atran and Mohammad Hafez use the term ‘suicide bombing’ interchangeably with the altruistically coded terms ‘martyrdom’ and ‘sacrifice’ (Khosrokhavar 2005; N. Hassan 2001; Asad 2007; Strenski 2003; Atran 2003, 2006; Hafez 2006, 2007b). Christopher Reuter uses the term ‘suicide bombing’ but is critical of the indiscriminate labelling of its perpetrators as terrorists (Reuter 2004). He favours a definition that accurately describes the nature and causes of its occurrence. Similar tendencies are discernible in the works of other scholars and commentators (Crenshaw 2007).

There is general consensus, however, that suicide bombings are a form of militant resistance and an integral part of deadly violence between the state and nonstate actors in the modern world. They are mainly sponsored by the weaker non-state entities engaged in asymmetrical conflicts with well-armed state armies. They serve the political interests of the sponsoring organisations in two ways: by coercing an adversary, and by giving sponsoring organisations an advantage over their rivals in terms of moral and material support from sympathetic constituencies. The evidence and analysis presented in this chapter will show that the frequency and lethality of suicide bombings have increased significantly, along with their geographical range, over the past three decades, and they are now regarded as a major threat to national and international security around the world. The data and analysis of the trends are based on the Flinders University Suicide Terrorism Database.

The Flinders University Suicide Terrorism Project

The Flinders University Suicide Terrorism Project was established in 2005 through a grant to the author from the Australian Research Council. A key objective of the research project was to construct a database of suicide bombings between 1981 and 2006, using primary and secondary data. The secondary data involved a census of all suicide attacks during this period. The primary data were to be gathered by interviewing leaders and members of the terrorist organisations which use suicide bombings as a weapon (such as Tamil Tigers, Hezbollah, Hamas, Taliban, Al Qaeda and Laskar-e-Toiba) and supplemented by interviews with survivors, families, recruiters and trainers of suicide bombers.

But following the enactment of Australia's counter-terrorism laws in 2005 and the explicit advice of the then Australian attorney-general delivered to me in person at a meeting in Adelaide, Australia, on 15 November 2005, that I 'must follow the law', I was obliged to revise the research design and abandon interviews with the leaders of the terrorist organisations, suicide bombers, their recruits, trainers, families and survivors. The new strategy involved interviewing counter-terrorism officials and journalists in some of the major sites of suicide bombings. For logistical reasons, to do with time, expense, permissions and access to these people, this strategy could only be partially followed and produced only limited amounts of information that could be regarded as primary or reliable.

This development had a serious impact on the original objectives of the study. It also had obvious implications for 'academic freedom' as it prevented me from pursuing a *bona fide* publicly funded academic research project. The government stance over the research became a subject of national and international attention (Bonner 2006; Shepherd 2006; Edwards and Stewart 2006; O'Neill 2006; Healy 2008). It also became one of the first concrete examples of how Australia's counter-terrorism laws were limiting academic research (MacDonald and Williams 2007). Unfortunately Flinders University administration, the Australian Research Council and the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia did not offer any practical or strategic help to counter the government's interference in the research project. I was then forced to revise the study, which meant building the suicide bombing database as I had originally envisaged and largely relying on it for my investigation and analysis of the research problem.

This was a big setback as I had hoped that the primary interview material would allow me to explore rigorously not only the political dimension of the act of suicide bombing but, equally importantly, the ideas and motivations for the act of suicide on the part of the sponsoring organisations as well as individual perpetrators. As signalled in the Introduction, a key objective of this study was to explore the expression(s) of altruism, if any, in the act of self-destruction by the perpetrators of suicide attacks. Several studies routinely report claims of the leaders of the sponsoring organisations and individual perpetrators but without solid evidence to back up such claims. This issue would still be explored but not as comprehensively as I had originally envisaged.

The Flinders University Suicide Terrorism Database

The work on the Flinders University Suicide Terrorism Database (FUSTD) began in late 2005 and was completed by the end of 2007. However, the work of refining it continued throughout 2008. The remainder of this chapter provides an overview of the methodology used to construct the FUSTD and an analysis of suicide bombing attacks between 1981 and 2006, their geographical distribution, relative lethality and targets. Definitional issues are inextricably related to the data on suicide bombing. My initial conceptualisation of suicide bombing was 'the targeted use of self-destructing humans against a perceived enemy for political ends'. After reviewing the studies mentioned above and other related literature, it became

obvious that suicide bombing was a more complex and multidimensional phenomenon than described by this conceptualisation. This led me to rethink its nature and scope and revise my thoughts. The following conceptualisation of suicide bombing attempts to capture its various dimensions:

Suicide bombing is lethal violence involving the targeted use of self-destructing humans against a perceived enemy to create fear and alarm in order to undermine the state's ability to maintain public order. It is associated with conflicts caused by a configuration of individual and collective actors, public and private grievances, institutional conditions and opportunity structures sanctioned by religious and political philosophies/ideologies and special group affiliations. It has significant communicative and expressive dimensions and is aimed at changing the functional principles of (mainly democratic) political systems by coercing others into actions they would not otherwise take, or into refraining from actions they desire to take. Its effectiveness is augmented by the perpetrators' willingness to die. It is a weapon of the militarily challenged in asymmetrical conflicts and is becoming a weapon of choice among terrorist groups because of its lethality and its effectiveness in creating fear and mayhem amidst the ordinary rhythm of social life.

In this study the terms 'suicide bombing', 'suicide attacks' and 'suicide terrorism' will be used interchangeably. There is no comprehensive and reliable database as yet on suicide bombings or even on terrorism. A database that claims to be relatively comprehensive is the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) database, maintained by the Rand Corporation in the United States. Nevertheless this database is incomplete because of the definitions applied in the data collection. The MIPT database combines two different databases: one covering 1968 to 1997 (focusing only on international incidents, where terrorists travelled abroad to perform their acts or selected domestic targets associated with foreign interests) and the other covering the period from 1998 to date (including both international and domestic incidents). The MIPT database aspires to completeness, yet it ignores many suicide attacks that took place in Israel and in the occupied Palestinian territories especially between 1998 and 2002. From 31 March 2008, the MIPT database was closed, and its data were subsumed into the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (2008) managed by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). The GTD, while including the data contained in the MIPT's

database, is structured differently, and for the intents of this project, could be viewed as more limited in its analytical power.

The Iraq Body Count (IBC) is another database that is useful but restricted in its scope. This database is confined to all incidents in Iraq since the war began in March 2003 *in which civilians were killed*. A recent addition has been a database developed by Robert Pape of the University of Chicago using the online Lexis-Nexis data (Pape 2005). Other scholars, including Hafez (2006), Pedahzur (2005) and Gambetta (2005), have developed more specialised databases to suit their specific research purposes, although the Pedahzur database is more comprehensive than others.[1]

The Flinders University Suicide Terrorism Database is arguably the most comprehensive database on suicide bombings carried out globally between 1981 and 2006. The methodology to develop it involved using the existing databases – those of MIPT, Robert Pape, Mohammad Hafez, Ami Pedahzur and Diego Gambetta. The information from these databases was complemented by data and reports from the Federal Investigation Agency of Pakistan (FIA), the United States Department of State, the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, the South Asia Terrorism Portal, Human Rights Watch, Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group, Tamiltigers.net, Tamilnet, *Jerusalem Post*, the *Daily Star*, *Haaretz*, the Middle East Wire, the BBC and the *New York Times*. The analysis reported in this book relies heavily on the Flinders University Suicide Terrorism Database.

The database has information on a range of variables. These include the date, time, country and location of attack; name, age, gender, education, occupation, family background, nationality and marital status of the suicide bombers; the sponsoring group affiliation, description of the conflict, weapons used, the targets, and the number of fatalities and injuries. The database has gaps, because information on all of the above variables was not available in many cases. At the initial stages of data collection and analysis it became apparent that there have been many cases of suicide bombings in which more than one individual performed the attack (for example, the failed assassination attempt in 2006 on President Yusuf in Somalia in which six individual bombers were involved, and that in 2003 on the then President of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf, which involved three individuals; 9/11 is another example of a group suicide attack). These are usually referred to as ‘co-ordinated attacks’.

As the FUSTD collected data both on characteristics of individual bombers and on the attack itself (location, number of fatalities and injuries, etc.), it became important for reasons of data quality to distinguish individual attackers from individual incidents. For this reason, each individual bomber is allocated a unique identification number (Individual ID), and each case of suicide bombing is allocated an incident code (Incident ID). Several bombers can therefore share an incident ID but never an individual ID number. This facilitated the aggregation of the data into a new file called 'Suicide Bombing Incidents', upon which most of the analysis was performed. Where analysis was required on the characteristics of individual bombers, the 'Suicide Bombing Individual' dataset was used. As stated above, there are significant gaps in the data relating to individual bombers.

There are two exceptions related to the above discussion: the 7 July 2005 attacks in London and the 11 September 2001 attacks in New York and Washington, DC. These are classified as co-ordinated attacks according to the criteria applied by the sources from which data have been collected and which have been adopted in the FUSTD. However, owing to the significance of these attacks in the public mind and discourse, the composite attacks have been treated individually: four attacks for London and three for the USA. The database has records of 1,200 suicide bombing attacks carried out worldwide between 1981 and 2006 (Appendix A). These 1,200 suicide bombing incidents involved 1,327 individuals who took part in them as suicide bombers.[2]

Incidence of suicide bombings and fatalities, 1981–2006

Suicide bombings were rare occurrences in the 1980s. As Figure 1.1 and the data in Table 1.1 show, by the late 1990s the number of annual suicide bombing attacks had increased significantly, and for 2006 the number stood at 255. In other words there were more attacks in 2006 than there were in the twenty years between 1981 and 2000. A total of 1,200 incidents of suicide bombings between 1981 and 2006 had killed between 14,600 and 16,729 people, mostly civilians.




Figure 1.1 Suicide attacks worldwide by year, 1981–2006

The analysis of the annual incidents shows minor peaks in 1985, 1995, 2003 and 2005–6. These peaks are related to specific conflicts, which may have elevated the incidence of suicide attacks. The 1983–5 peak is related to the civil war in Lebanon in which a number of foreign countries were involved.

The attacks were largely carried out by Hezbollah and targeted the US and French multinational peacekeeping forces and the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) occupying southern Lebanon. These attacks led to the withdrawal of the US and French peacekeeping forces from Lebanon and forced the IDF to abandon most of the southern part of the country. The peak of the mid- to late 1990s is related to the first Palestinian intifada aimed at derailing the Oslo Peace Accord and the attacks were carried out by Hezbollah-trained members of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). This peak is also due to escalation of suicide bombings by Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. The peak in the early 2000s is related to the second or Al-Aqsa Mosque Palestinian intifada and attacks by Chechen insurgents in Russia. The dramatic increase from mid-2004 to 2006 is related primarily to the Iraq war but is also due to

the escalation of suicide bombing attacks in conflicts in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Table 1.1 Suicide attacks worldwide, 1981–2006

Year	*Number of attacks*	*Minimum killed*	*Maximum killed*
1981	1	31	61
1982	1	62	62
1983	6	408	447
1984	2	20	29
1985	25	224	263
1986	3	9	9
1987	3	36	56
1988	1	9	9
1989	3	4	4
1990	3	9	16
1991	7	227	253
1992	2	32	38
1993	7	33	35
1994	10	201	225
1995	24	317	358
1996	23	413	446
1997	10	57	160
1998	17	421	735
1999	19	56	102
2000	39	262	394
2001	76	3,324	3,420
2002	92	1,004	1,036
2003	75	795	889
2004	190	1,931	2,267
2005	306	2,572	3,026
2006	255	2,142	2,385
Total	**1,200**	**14,599**	**16,725**

Source: FUSTD (2008).

Note: For thirteen cases information on numbers killed was not available.

Analysis of the trends over time shows that suicide bombings have increased exponentially between 1981 and 2006 and, furthermore, as we will

see, the peaks and troughs during this period have occurred as a result of the escalation of certain types of conflict.

Suicide bombings by country

Suicide bombings have now become a global phenomenon affecting twenty-nine countries. But, as we will see later, this globalisation has occurred since the late 1990s. The major sites of suicide bombings before the start of the Iraq war were Israel/Palestine, Lebanon and Sri Lanka. The other countries with a significant incidence of suicide bombings were Turkey and Chechnya/Russia. The advent of the Iraq war has seen Iraq become the most prolific site of suicide bombings. There were no incidents of suicide bombings in that country during the long and brutal regime of Saddam Hussein. Although the Iraq war began only in 2003, it accounts for a third of all deaths resulting from suicide bombings in the twenty-five years to 2006. In the four years between 2003 and 2006 there were twice as many suicide bombings in Iraq alone as there were in all other countries listed in Table 1.2. While the three 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington, DC, which killed 2,988 people, remain the most lethal incidents of suicide terrorism, Iraq has suffered the largest number of casualties resulting from suicide bombings in the period under review.

The lethality of suicide bombings is largely a function of three factors, namely: hardening of targets through sound and effective counter-terrorism strategies; prompt, efficient and good medical and other emergency services; and deficient planning and execution of suicide bombings by poorly trained operatives. There is always a possibility that any suicide attack can cause horrendous numbers of casualties, as in the case of the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington. But even there the prompt and efficient rescue efforts of the emergency services must have saved thousands of lives.

In terms of the lethality of suicide bombings, as measured by the number of people killed, Iraq topped the list with between five thousand and six thousand casualties, followed by Israel/Palestine and Sri Lanka with more than a thousand deaths each. But in terms of lethality per suicide attack, the 11 September 2001 attacks were the most lethal, averaging 996 deaths per incident, followed by Kenya, Argentina and Bali/Indonesia. The attacks in Kenya targeted the US embassy and those in Argentina a Jewish synagogue. The victims of the Bali/Indonesia suicide bombings were international, mostly Australian tourists and Indonesians.

Israel/Palestine has endured the second largest number of attacks in the period under study. Since most of the attacks there are directed against Israeli Defence Force personnel and civilians, the authorities have taken steps to harden the targets, resulting in fewer (less than five) casualties per suicide attack. Another reason for the low number of casualties is the efficiency and effectiveness of Israel's emergency services compared with the quality of similar services in Sri Lanka and Indonesia. The low casualty rate in Afghanistan is most likely a result of the poor planning and execution of suicide bombings, but in Turkey it is most likely for the same reason as in Israel. It is probable that target hardening and poor execution of suicide bombings have kept the average casualty rate in some countries relatively low. The relatively high average number of deaths per suicide attack in Lebanon, Chechnya/Russia, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia is possibly due to the better execution and planning of suicide bombings and the poor quality of emergency services. This issue will be examined later in more detail.

Table 1.2 Suicide attacks by country, 1981–2006

Country	*Incidents*	*Minimum killed*	*Maximum killed*
Iraq	651	5,766	6,714
Israel/Palestinian Territories	217	1,016	1,143
Sri Lanka	93	1,172	1,647
Lebanon	48	802	912
Russia/Chechnya	28	660	798
Pakistan	49	680	708
Turkey	19	73	76
India/Kashmir	13	68	80
Afghanistan	35	198	205
Saudi Arabia	8	101	101
Indonesia	4	349	349
Egypt	4	8	8
Algeria	4	79	79
United Kingdom	4	55	57
United States	3	2,988	2,988
China	2	3	3
Kuwait	2	7	14
Kenya	2	231	231
Argentina	2	115	127

Morocco	1	47	47
Panama	1	42	42
Tanzania	1	12	251
Yemen	1	18	28
Tunisia	1	20	20
Qatar	1	1	1
Somalia	1	11	11
Jordan	1	63	63
Uzbekistan	3	12	20
Croatia	1	2	2
Total	**1,200**	**14,599**	**16,725**

Source: FUSTD (2008).

Note
For thirteen cases numbers killed were not available.

Suicide bombings and other forms of terrorism

How destructive are suicide bombings compared with other forms of terrorism? To answer this question data for all terrorist attacks and resulting casualties were extracted from the MIPT database and compared with the similar data for suicide bombings from the FUSTD. The data were grouped into five-yearly intervals, except for 2006 (see Table 1.3). Between 1981 and 2006 average yearly terrorist attacks increased almost nineteen times from 341 per year in 1981–5 to 6,653 in 2006. The corresponding increase for suicide bombings was 7 to 255 or thirty-six times. In other words, suicide terrorism has been increasing significantly faster than terrorism in the twenty-five years between 1981 and 2006.

Most of the increases in terrorism and suicide bombings appear to have occurred since 2001. There were 9,082 terrorist attacks in the twenty years to 2000, but between 2001 and 2006 this number had increased to 20,573. Suicide bombings in the same period increased from 206 to 995, a significantly higher rate of increase than the rate of non-suicide terrorism. This would suggest that suicide terrorism is becoming a weapon of choice among the terrorist groups. The reason for this preference appears to be related to the destructive power of suicide bombings.

Lethality of suicide bombings

Only 4 per cent of all terrorist attacks in 1981–2006 were suicide attacks, but they accounted for 32 per cent of all terrorism-related deaths. However, these global averages do not apply universally. For example, in Iraq and Lebanon suicide attacks constituted 9 per cent of all terrorist attacks with very different casualty rates. In Iraq deaths from suicide bombings were the same as the global average of 31 per cent, but in Lebanon the corresponding figure was more than double at 69 per cent. In Israel/Palestine suicide bombings were 7 per cent of all terrorist attacks resulting in 62 per cent of terrorism-related deaths (again, significantly higher than the global average). In Chechnya/Russia and Afghanistan suicide attacks constituted 4 per cent of all terrorist attacks but with very different death rates. In Chechnya/Russia suicide attacks accounted for 37 per cent of terrorism-related deaths, but in Afghanistan they accounted for only 13 per cent of deaths. In Pakistan 5 per cent of all attacks were suicide attacks, accounting for 38 per cent of all terrorism-related deaths.

Table 1.3 Deaths from suicide attacks and all forms of terrorism, 1981–2006

Year	*All terrorist attacks (n)*[a]	*Suicide attacks (n)*[a]	*Suicide attacks as % of all terrorist attacks*	*Deaths from all terrorist attacks (n)*[a]	*Deaths from suicide attacks* (n)*[a]	*Deaths from suicide attacks as % of all deaths*
1981–5	1,706	35	2	1,931	745	39
1986–90	1,755	13	1	1,926	67	4
1991–5	1,576	50	3	2,130	810	38
1996–2000	4,045	108	3	4,824	1,209	25
2001–5	13,920	739	5	22,940	9,626	42
2006	6,653	255	4	12,065	2,142	18
1981–2006	**29,655**	**1,200**	**4**	**45,816**	**14,599**	**32**

Sources: MIPT database (www.tkb.org); FUSTD (2008).

Note
a 'Deaths from suicide attacks' refers to the minimum number killed.

The country-specific analysis shows the significant differences among countries most affected by suicide terrorism both in the frequency of suicide bombings and deaths resulting from them. Iraq, Lebanon and Israel/Palestine are much more prone to suicide terrorism but have widely different casualty rates. Compared with Israel, suicide terrorism is significantly more lethal in

Iraq, Chechnya, Pakistan and Lebanon. The most likely reason for these differences lies in the relative effectiveness and efficiency of emergency services of various countries, and the planning and execution of suicide attacks. Unfortunately I can't offer similar analysis for Sri Lanka because of the unavailability of the terrorism attack data required for the analysis given above.

Another way to look at the comparative destructive power of suicide bombings and other forms of terrorism is to examine the average number of deaths caused by these two types. Table 1.4 shows that, globally, suicide bombings on average are twelve times more lethal than other forms of terrorism. The greater destructive power is one of the main reasons that suicide terrorism has become a method of choice among terrorist organisations.

Not only is it more destructive but it is also a relatively cheap weapon to manufacture. Some estimates put the cost of preparing the suicide belt/bag and carrying out a suicide bombing attack at less than a thousand US dollars. The most significant component is an individual volunteer, and the reports indicate that there is no shortage of volunteers in the sites of long-drawn-out military conflicts (N. Hassan 2001; Hafez 2007b; Trawick 2007).[3] The one promising development in the data reported in Table 1.4 is that over time the trend for the average number of deaths per suicide attack appears to be declining. This may be because the authorities in countries affected by this form of terrorism are learning how to harden the targets and making emergency services more effective and efficient in rescuing the injured after a suicide attack.

Table 1.4 Lethality of suicide attacks

Year	*Average yearly suicide attacks*	*Deaths per suicide attack*[a]	*Average yearly non-suicide terrorist attack*	*Deaths per non-suicide terrorist attack*
1981–5	7	21	334	0.7
1986–90	3	5	348	1.1
1991–5	10	16	305	0.9
1996–2000	22	11	787	0.9
2001–5	148	13	2,636	1.0
2006	255	8	6,398	1.6
1981–2006	46	12	1,094	1.1

Sources: MIPT database (www.tkb.org); FUSTD (2008).

Note
a ‘Deaths from suicide attacks’ refers to the minimum number killed.

The lethality of suicide bombings also varies significantly among countries. As the data in Table 1.5 show, suicide bombings in Lebanon and Chechnya/Russia on average cause seventeen to twenty-four deaths per attack which is significantly higher than the global average of twelve. In Iraq the corresponding figure is nine. But in Israel and Afghanistan the casualty figures are the lowest at five and six respectively. Again these outcomes are due to different reasons. In Israel the effective counter-terrorism measures and the efficiency of the state’s emergency services probably explain the low casualty rates, but in the case of Afghanistan the reasons are likely to be poor planning and execution of attacks.

What is really striking is that, notwithstanding all its counter-terrorism policies and efficient emergency services, Israel still suffers the highest rate of deaths from suicide terrorism attacks. The same applies to Lebanon. Iraq and Afghanistan, on the other hand, have only a third of the global average of twelve deaths per suicide attack, and that is, as mentioned earlier, most likely a result of poor planning and execution of such attacks. These figures provide some insights into why the Israeli government and society are so sensitive to suicide attacks and take very strong punitive actions against the perpetrators. In the cases of Israel and Lebanon suicide attacks pose a significantly greater threat to the social fabric of society and polity. But again the Israeli government’s policies towards the Palestinians and the Sri Lankan and Russian governments’ policies towards Tamil and Chechen populations respectively appear to be producing equally violent and ruthless responses.

Table 1.5 Suicide bombings and deaths arising from them as a proportion of all terrorism in selected countries, 1981–2006

Country[a]	*As % of all terrorist attacks*[b]	*Suicide bombings/ all terrorist attacks*	*As % of all terrorism deaths*[c]	*Suicide bombing deaths/all terrorism deaths*	*Deaths per suicide bombing*	*Ratio*[d]
Iraq	9	651/7,400	31	5,767/18,865	9	1: 4.5
Israel/Palestine	7	217/3,167	61	1,016/1,664	5	1: 22.3
Lebanon	9	48/540	69	802/1,162	17	1: 22.9
Chechnya/Russia	4	28/792	37	660/1,791	24	1: 14.4
Pakistan	5	49/952	38	680/1,784	14	1: 11.4
Afghanistan	4	35/962	13	198/1,582	6	1: 4.1

Sources: MIPT database (www.tkb.org); FUSTD (2008).

Notes
a Sri Lanka was omitted because the lack of data on 'all terrorist' attacks.
b Suicide bombing as a percentage of all terrorist attacks.
c Deaths from suicide bombing as percentage of all terrorism-related deaths.
d Ratio of average deaths from non-suicide bombing terrorism to average deaths from suicide bombing.

Targets and types of suicide bombings

Tables 1.6 and 1.7 report analysis of data pertaining to targets and the weapons used in executing suicide bombings, both globally and in the six main sites: Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Sri Lanka, Lebanon, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The FUSTD data pertaining to the targets were classified into broad categories: infrastructure (pipelines, buildings, merchant vessels, oil tankers, radio stations, official buildings); local security and public officials (police, checkpoints, local military patrols and vehicles, government officials and ministers); foreign military forces/contractors (military personnel, vehicles, bases, embassies, foreign private security companies and personnel, foreign private contractors); civilians (individuals, shops and restaurants, civilian vehicles, public transport, etc.); and others (multiple/indistinguishable targets, UN, Red Cross, religious sites).

The data about the weapons used (i.e. the type of suicide bombing) were classified into four broad categories, namely: vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED, or car and truck bomb); improvised explosive device (suicide belt/bag) carried by the suicide bomber; other (suicide shooting attack); and conflicting (where data sources differ as to the weapon used). The data for targets and weapons used for many incidents of suicide bombings were not available. Tables 1.6 and 1.7, therefore, report only the

suicide bombing incidents for which the data on the target of the attacks and weapons used were available.

Globally the local security forces were the target of 45 per cent of suicide bombing incidents and, if foreign security forces and contractors are included, then 54 per cent of attacks were launched against them. The other two main targets were infrastructure (11 per cent) and civilians (30 per cent). As for the weapons used, globally vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices were the most common followed by improvised explosive devices. In 4 per cent of cases other types of weapons such as firearms and grenades were used. One inference that can be drawn from the data pertaining to targets is that weaker groups involved in asymmetrical endemic conflicts use suicide bombings as a weapon of war. The stronger groups in the conflict do not resort to these weapons.

How do countries that are the main sites of suicide bombings differ from the global pattern? Iraq, the primary site of such attacks in the world now, follows closely the global pattern, suggesting that insurgents in Iraq are actively seeking to destabilise the country by targeting its security forces, public officials, infrastructure and the coalition supporters of the new government. As Cordesman (2005) and Hafez (2007b) have pointed out, the main aims of the Iraqi insurgents are to drive the US and coalition forces out , overthrow the new Iraqi government and deprive it of popular legitimacy, keep Iraqi forces from becoming effective, and create a climate of general insecurity in the country. The choice of targets for the insurgent attacks would support this strategy of destabilisation. Iraqi civilians are most likely the targets because of the sectarian nature of the evolving war in the country in which Iraqi Sunnis, Shias and Kurds are targeting each other to avenge past and present injustices, grievances and religious antipathies.

Table 1.6 Targets of suicide bombings by selected countries, 1981–2006 (%)

Targets	*Global*	*Iraq*	*Israel/Palestine*	*Sri Lanka*	*Lebanon*	*Pakistan*	*Chechnya/Russia*	*Afghanista*
Infrastructure	11	13	5	12	6	–	31	3
Local security/public officials	45	50	29	69	42	44	35	38
Foreign forces/contractors	9	11	1	–	46	9	4	12
Civilians	30	21	63	12	6	24	31	24
Others	5	4	2	8	0	24	0	24
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**	**101**	**100**	**101**	**101**	**101**

Source: FUSTD (2008).

Note
Percentages are rounded up.

The analysis of the Israeli and Palestinian conflict follows a strikingly different pattern. The Palestinian suicide bombers fighting for the political destiny of their homeland are no match for the overwhelming superiority of the Israeli Defence Force. Additionally, over the years of its drawn-out and violent military conflict with the Palestinians, Israel has developed effective strategies to protect its soldiers. Palestinian fighters see civilians as legitimate targets, as indeed does the Israeli state when it punishes the families and communities of suicide bombers. It is almost impossible for any government to protect its civilian populations from terrorist attacks all the time, thus rendering them a soft target for suicide bombings. Given this type of configuration it is not surprising to find that Israeli civilians are the most frequent targets of Palestinian suicide bombings.

The Sri Lankan situation is almost the mirror image of the Israeli situation with local security and public officials being the main targets of Tamil Tiger suicide bombings. The conflict in which the Tamil Tigers are fighting for a separate homeland for Sri Lankan Tamils is typical of a formal war between two adversaries.

The data for Lebanon, Pakistan and Afghanistan are comparatively less robust than those from Iraq, Israel/Palestine and Sri Lanka. The distribution of targets in Lebanon has some affinity with the Israel/Palestine situation. In the case of Lebanon, foreign forces were the main targets. It reflects the situation in this country where for twenty years the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) occupied a large part of the south, thus making the IDF not only a convenient but also a strategic target of suicide bombing missions sponsored by Hezbollah and other insurgent groups. The distributions of targets in Pakistan and Afghanistan are similar to the global patterns as well as to Iraqi patterns. The use of suicide bombings in the conflicts in Pakistan and Afghanistan is comparatively new and is likely to change as fighting between adversaries evolves further.

In terms of the weapons employed in committing suicide bombing attacks, the two main types are VBIED and IED. The other forms of weapons used refer mainly to suicide shooting attacks. In a significant number of suicide bombings it was not possible to determine the type of weapon used in the attack from the available information.

Globally 56 per cent of suicide bombings used VBIEDs, and in 40 per cent of incidents IEDs were used. The analysis of data shows significant differences among countries. In Iraq 72 per cent of suicide attacks were carried out by VBIEDs and 28 per cent by IEDs. It is not clear why, but in Iraq the use of the two main weapons differs according to the intended target. According to one study, 70 per cent of all coalition casualties are caused by IEDs but 60 per cent of all Iraqi casualties are caused by VBIEDs. According to some estimates, 50 per cent of all VBIEDs in Iraq were suicide attacks (Cordesman 2005).

In Israel/Palestine the distribution of weapons used was almost the opposite of that in Iraq with the most common method appearing to be the IED. Unfortunately, there are big gaps in the data pertaining to the weapons used, and it is difficult to say this conclusively. However, given the security and surveillance exercised by the Israeli army in the Palestinian territories, it is not surprising that this kind of weapon is the most frequent method used by the perpetrators. It is relatively inexpensive and logistically easier to manufacture and use. These two conditions would make it the preferred weapon in the context of Israel/Palestine. In Sri Lanka the attacks for which data are available reveal that both VBIEDs and IEDs are more or less equally used. Tamil Sea Tigers use boats to carry out suicide attacks against the Sri Lankan navy, but on land they mostly use both methods.

Table 1.7 Types of suicide bombing by selected countries (%)

Weapon	*Global*	*Iraq*	*Israel/ Palestine*	*Sri Lanka*	*Lebanon*	*Pakistan*	*Chechnya/ Russia*	*Afghanistan*
Suicide vehicular attack	56	72	19	43	90	20	39	37
Suicide belt/bag attack	40	28	66	46	10	77	61	57
Others[a]	4	0.4	15	11	0	3	0	7
Total	**100**	**100.4**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**101**

Source: FUSTD (2008).

Notes
a ‘Others’ includes conflicting reports.

In Lebanon the attacks were overwhelmingly carried out using VBIEDs, but in Pakistan it was the opposite. The data for both Lebanon and Pakistan

are relatively incomplete, and therefore at best only tentative conclusions can be drawn at present about weapons used. In the case of Afghanistan the data are a little more robust, and they show that IEDs are the most common weapon used in suicide attacks. The usefulness of the data about weapons is that they can be applied to develop appropriate strategies for prevention by disrupting the supply chain and manufacturing of such weapons.

Concluding remarks

Suicide bombing is the fastest-growing form of terrorism, now affecting at least twenty-nine countries worldwide. In the twenty-five years to 2006 suicide bombings have increased fifty times whereas incidents of terrorism have increased nineteen times. The Flinders University Suicide Terrorism Database (FUSTD) is the most comprehensive database available to analyse this growth and its consequences. The analysis reported in this chapter shows that 1,200 incidents of suicide bombings between 1981 and 2006 caused between 14,600 and 16,729 deaths and injured as many as ten times more people. While constituting only 4 per cent of all terrorist attacks in the period covered by this study, suicide bombings accounted for 32 per cent of all terrorism-related deaths, making this type of attack on average twelve times more lethal than other forms of terrorism. It is this destructive power that has made suicide bombing the weapon of choice among the terrorist groups.

The other reasons for the increasing popularity of suicide bombing among the terrorist groups include its major psychological impact and high media coverage; its symbolic significance and appeal as an act of exceptional dedication, commitment, martyrdom and sacrifice for one’s political community; its importance for the political and financial mobilisation of the sponsoring groups in the community; and finally, its effectiveness in attracting potential suicide bombers.

The observed variations in the lethality of suicide bombings can be attributed to the level of sophistication of each country’s counter-terrorism measures, the emergency response services, including medical, fire brigade and the police, and the quality of planning, training and delivery of the suicide attacks. The Iraq war has given a boost to suicide terrorism, and it appears to be spreading rapidly to other countries in the region, particularly Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The main targets of suicide bombings, except in Israel, are the security forces and public officials, suggesting that it is a weapon of war used by the non-state actors in an endemic and violent conflict. In Israel civilians are the main target of Palestinian suicide bombings. I have argued that Palestinian groups fighting Israel are militarily weak and unable to attack the well-equipped and highly trained Israeli army, and thus they attack softer targets. The Palestinian groups also see civilians as an integral part of the conflict arising from Israel's occupation of Palestinian territories.

Globally VBIEDs (or car and truck bombs) are the main weapon used by suicide terrorists. This is largely a result of the high numbers of suicide bombings taking place in Iraq. In Israel/Palestine, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Afghanistan, IEDs (or suicide belts/bags) are the most commonly used weapon. The data pertaining to the targets and weapons are not sufficiently robust to conduct a more thorough and grounded analysis. This information could be useful in developing appropriate strategies to counter suicide terrorism by destroying or disrupting the supply chain of material for the production of these weapons.

2 Explaining suicide bombings

Explanations of suicide bombings can be grouped into three broad categories. The first category would include explanations that frame causes of suicide bombing in terms of personal characteristics and motivations of the individual perpetrator. Such explanations are influenced by two dominant perceptions of suicide and terrorism. Suicide is generally viewed as a psychopathological behaviour and treated and studied as such. Terrorism is framed as criminal violence perpetrated by individuals suffering from psychopathic and paranoid personality disorders, religious fanaticism, poverty and lack of education. The combination of these two phenomena has biased the perceptions and explanations of suicide bombing within a broad pathological and criminal framework in which suicide bombers are seen neither as rational or reasonable nor as ordinary individuals. They are instead portrayed as bizarre, sick and crazy homicidal killers. The causes are thus located within the affected individual and not in the wider society, and public responses are framed in terms of killing, restraining and incarcerating the deranged individuals in order to remove them from society.

The second category includes explanations that conceptualise suicide bombing attacks as instrumental and strategic weapons used by sponsoring organisations representing the weaker party in asymmetrical conflicts. They serve the political goals and interests of the non-state sponsoring organisations opposing well-armed state armies. Suicide bombing is seen as mechanically simple, versatile and tactically efficient in reaching well-guarded targets, and as possessing high symbolic value by signalling the resolve and dedication to the cause indicated by the perpetrator’s willingness to die. Suicide bombings mobilise support by responding to popular demand among sympathetic constituencies that legitimises the action and generates financial support for the organisation and new recruits for suicide missions. They are seen as benefiting the political organisations that use them in two

ways: by coercing an adversary, and by giving an organisation an advantage over its rival in terms of support from constituencies.

The third category includes explanations that overlap with the above two but self-consciously focus on societal conditions. These conditions may include oppressive occupation of the 'homeland' by a powerful enemy. The occupation is characterised by policies and practices that seek to devalue cultural codes of honour and shame of the subject group, creating widely felt experiences of humiliation. Humiliation can inspire willingness to obey the humiliating authority, or overt rebellion or simmering resentment. Under conditions in which people observe that the 'others' have violated social norms and widely observed cultural rules, they tend to violate other norms or rules, which causes the disorder to spread. Such societal conditions are conducive to the rise of altruistic sacrifice for the honourable survival of one's community and social movements that are non-institutionalised spontaneous social alliances of people protesting about widespread grievances. These three explanatory frameworks, along with some of the studies that fall in the purview of each, will be discussed in the rest of this chapter.

Explanations focusing on individual characteristics and motivations

Explanations of suicide bombings focusing on the characteristics and motivations of individual perpetrators cover factors ranging from socioeconomic characteristics, such as poverty and lack of education, to psychopathology. They view suicide bombings as a pathological phenomenon carried out by individuals suffering from serious social and psychological impairments. The confluence of two widely held Western perceptions of suicide and terrorism appears to be an important cause underpinning such explanations. Suicide is commonly viewed as psychopathological behaviour and not as an outcome of rational calculations by the victim. This view is related to increasing medicalisation of suicide as an illness. Suicide has come to be seen first and foremost as pathological and psychologically deviant behaviour and treated and studied on those terms. (For a general discussion see Silke 2007a; Hassan 1995; Grimland, Apter and Kerkhof 2006; Townsend 2007; Lester, Yang and Lindsay 2004.)

In much the same way, the study of terrorism has been dominated by widely held perceptions that terrorists are mad and bad men and women.

Many psychological theories postulate that terrorists suffer from various forms of mental deficiency and personality disorder. Terrorists are widely portrayed as psychopaths, paranoids, homicidal criminals and narcissistic. These stereotypes continue to dominate contemporary debates and find, in the imagination and expectations of the general public, a receptive and satisfied audience. The combination of two apparently pathological phenomena has heavily biased the contemporary consideration of suicide bombers as sick, crazy, criminal, homicidal killers and deranged fanatics, dismissing the possibility that suicides and terrorists might be rational, reasonable and ordinary individuals. Consequently, the causes of the problem are attributed to pathological predispositions of individual perpetrators and not to the wider society. Suicide terrorists are labelled as crazed cowards bent on senseless destruction. Societal responses to the phenomenon consequently have focused on restraining, incarcerating, proscribing and, if need be, killing the offending individuals (Silke 2003, 2007a, 2007c; Atran 2003; Berko 2007; Gilligan 2000; R. Hassan 2001; Gupta and Mundra 2005; Israeli 2003; Reuter 2004; Rapoport 2002).

The modern era of suicide bombings began in the 1980s in Lebanon, where bombings were carried out by Shia Muslim organisations, Hezbollah and Amal, and by secular nationalist parties, the Syrian Nationalist Party, Lebanese Communist Party and Lebanese Baath Party. The tactic then spread to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), who spearheaded the Tamil insurgency against the Sri Lankan government, and was then adopted by the Palestinian groups Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), who were fighting Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories. The predominantly Middle Eastern origin of suicide bombing has played a significant role in the formulation of the individualistic and pathological explanations offered in some of the early studies of the phenomenon. This may have been influenced by stereotypes of Arabs/Muslims in the Israeli media and society as being irrational, violent, dangerous, manipulative, helpless, inefficient and passive (Orbach 2004; Barzilai 2001). Much of the early psychological research on terrorism instructed that the main causes of terrorism ‘must be sought in the psychopathology of the assassin’ (Kaplan 1981: 36).

Others found the genesis of the phenomenon in psychopathic and paranoid personality disorders (Post 1986; Pearlstein 1991; De Mause 2002). Such views have had a powerful impact on government policy decisions around the world. Personal risk factors feature prominently in studies by clinical

theoreticians (Kobrin 2002), which, on the basis of analysing the backgrounds and documents left by the 9/11 attackers, report that Mohammad Atta's father was a stubborn control freak and Atta was possessively close to his mother until college. Such personal background factors, together with his prohibition on women touching his dead body or attending his funeral, led Kobrin to conclude that a regressed emotional state contributed to his motivation for carrying out the 9/11 attacks as they fulfilled a latent wish to fuse with the pre-Oedipal mother through death. Symbolically, America (and Israel) is the bad mother who rejects the child (the Palestinian/Muslim) who is yearning for her. America (and Israel) is the maternal object whom the suicide attacker wishes not only to destroy but also to fuse with in a wedding of blood. Kobrin claims that the dynamic of yearning for fusion with a loved and hated mother could be clearly identified in some of the 11 September attackers. While Kobrin emphasises the dynamics of fusion with a rejecting but loved mother, Stein (2002) focuses on the wish to fuse with a powerful and feared father. To Stein, the suicide attack is a blood wedding with the ultimate paternal figure who demands the ultimate sacrifice.

Popular images of crazed terrorists embarking on a killing spree through suicide terrorism encouraged public support for this approach (Atran 2003: 5). Sections of the popular Israeli press continue to push the idea that Palestinian suicide bombers take drugs or alcohol before they are sent on their suicide missions. As in the case of assassins mentioned in my Introduction, such stories are incorrect. Extensive tests on the remains of suicide bombers by Israel's Institute of Forensic Medicine has led the Institute's authorities to declare that suicide terrorists were free from the influence of drugs and were fully lucid at the time of their death, and that their actions were driven by psychological motives prior to the suicide attack (Goldenberg 2002).

According to the Israeli psychologist Ariel Merari:

> Culture in general, and religion in particular seem to be relatively unimportant in the phenomenon of terrorist suicide. Terrorist suicide, like any other suicide, is basically an individual rather than a group phenomenon: It is done by people who wish to die for personal reasons.
>
> (Merari 1990: 206)

Merari's view is echoed in the studies of R. Israeli, another leading Israeli academic at the Hebrew University's Truman Institute for Peace, who maintains that suicide bombers are individuals with low self-esteem who have emerged from broken families (Israeli 1997). Yet other commentators have suggested that motivation of Islamist suicide bombers 'is firmly embedded in collective psyche' (Gunaratna 2002: 10).

The tendency for people to explain and interpret behaviour exclusively in terms of individual personality and personal factors is found to be especially prevalent in 'individualistic' cultures of the West (Atran 2003: 1535–6). In the case of suicide bombing it arises from the prevalent proclivity of intellectual workers (including journalists, scholars and researchers) to explain suicide terrorism by assembling the life narratives of individual and often specific suicide bombers.

> These life narratives follow a familiar pattern. Typically, the writer begins by interviewing the suicide bomber's immediate family, friends, and other close associates, asking detailed questions about the personal history and psychological conditions of the individual. From these interviews, the suicide attacker's life history is stitched together, often with painstaking effort to identify the key moments of transition that 'caused' the person to wish to die and so to willingly accept a suicide terrorist mission. Finally, there is a summary of the statement – often to the effect that, much to the writer's surprise, no clear 'moment of transition' could be found.
>
> (Pape 2005: 171)

This method is called psychological autopsy and is used by psychiatrists and psychologists to explain causes of ordinary suicides. But there is a conceptual gap that confounds efforts to explain what motivates individual suicide bombers because of the underlying assumption of this approach that all suicides arise from similar causes (Davis 2003; Victor 2003; Berko 2007; Schweitzer 2007). In modern psychiatry, suicide is regarded as an end, an exit from unbearable existential conditions accompanied by acute emotional pain that drive people to take their own lives. Our personal experiences, and the contents of media reports that highlight the personal trauma or mental illness of the suicide victim, reinforce this common understanding. Such understanding of ordinary suicide leads to common misunderstanding about suicide bombers: that they are seeking to end their lives to escape from a

personal emotional pain in a dramatic manner. This is called a ‘fundamental attribution error’, a tendency to explain behaviour in terms of individual traits, even when significant situational factors in the larger society are at work (Atran 2003: 1536; Pape 2005: 172; Silke 2007a).

The attempts to develop psychological profiles of suicide bombers have not produced many fruitful results. Macro-level studies that have examined a commonly held stereotype, popular with politicians and even some scholars, that the root cause of terrorism was poverty and economic deprivation, have found no connection between poverty and terrorism. In fact, the results point in the opposite direction: a higher living standard is positively associated with support for or participation in terrorism (Maleckova 2005; Krueger and Maleckova 2003). Micro-level studies have failed to find a stable set of demographic, socioeconomic, religious and psychological variables that can be causally linked to terrorist personality. In fact such studies have often produced contradictory results (Victoroff 2005). Still this line of inquiry remains attractive around the world, especially in psychologically oriented studies. Labels like mad and bad, fanatics, homicidal killers or insane may or may not serve a useful function for legal purposes. But if the purpose is to learn and understand the causes and prevention of suicide terrorism, then the labels simply enable us to close our minds and diminish our desire to understand its real nature and purpose (Gilligan 2000; Horgan 2003; Silke 2007a; Victoroff 2005).

Studies and literature on Islamic radicalisation show that there was no clear link between individual factors, including age, gender, education, career, marital status, religion, and becoming a terrorist. In relation to Islam, evidence shows that ‘individuals were not becoming radicalised because of the efforts of an Al Qaeda recruiter, but rather the process occurring independently of the established jihadis’ (Silke 2007a: 111). Societal processes such as social marginalisation appeared to be a common factor in the backgrounds of most jihadi recruits in the West, but that did not mean that *all* or even most marginalised people were members of terrorist groups.

The involvement in terrorism is a gradual process – typically occurring over a period of years. Most terrorists become radicalised as members of a small group of like-minded individuals. The relative isolation of the individuals from the surrounding society beforehand appears to play an important role in creating group cohesion, solidarity and sense of common purpose. The existing social science evidence makes it clear that terrorists cannot simply be regarded as typical: on the contrary they are a distinct

group, and in many ways the origins of their unconventional behaviour are exceptional. From a psychological standpoint, with the exception of a few rare cases, there is no apparent connection between violent militant activity and personality disorders (Ricolfi 2005; Silke 2003, 2007a; Sageman 2004; Hopgood 2005).

Becoming a terrorist involves a highly selective process, which explains why most terrorist groups have only a few pathological members. Candidates who exhibit signs of psychopathology or other mental illness are rejected in the interest of group survival. Terrorist groups need members whose behaviour appears to be normal and who would not arouse suspicion. A member who exhibits traits of psychopathy or any noticeable degree of mental illness would only be a liability for the group, whatever his or her skills. That individual could not be depended on to carry out the assigned mission. On the contrary, such an individual would be more likely to sabotage the group by, for example, botching an operation or revealing group secrets if captured. Nor would a psychotic member be likely to enhance group solidarity. This type of screening has been reported for a number of groups who sponsor suicide terror attacks in the modern world (Hudson 1999; Ricolfi 2005; Silke 2007a; Pape 2005; Argo 2004).

Suicide bombing as organisational imperative and strategic weapon

A number of studies explicitly or implicitly argue that non-state sponsoring organisations use suicide bombing attacks as an instrumental and strategic weapon in their conflicts with well-equipped state armies. Invariably the sponsoring organisations represent the weaker party in these asymmetrical conflicts, and this applies even to regular armies, like the Japanese army in World War II, when they resorted to using suicide missions as a tactical weapon. In almost all cases it is a weapon of last resort and a minuscule part of the sponsoring organisation’s arsenal of weapons. For example, Hezbollah, Hamas, Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelan, Taliban, Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and the Kurdistan Workers Party all have used other options.

Suicide bombings are not the exclusive domain of militant Islamic organisations either. They are used by organisations with diverse religious and ideological affiliations. Suicide bombers are not clad with clerical robes, but don flags, uniforms and revolutionary beards too. Between 1981 and

2003 only 34.6 per cent of suicide bombing missions were carried out by Islamic groups; 52.8 per cent were carried out by secular groups. The remainder were carried out by groups of unknown ideological and religious affiliations (Gambetta 2005: 261–2). As Figure 2.1 shows, in terms of targets, suicide bombings target enemy soldiers and equipment as well as political and symbolic objectives.

Commenting on the rationality of terrorist organisations, Martha Crenshaw has pointed out that efficacy is the primary standard used by terrorist organisations to achieve their political goals. Suicide terror is rarely, if ever, the strategy of first choice, rather tending to follow other strategies deemed less effective through the process of trial and error. 'Organizations arrive at collective judgements about the relative effectiveness of different strategies … on the basis of observation and experience, as much as on the basis of abstract strategic conceptions derived from ideological assumptions – allowing for social learning' (Crenshaw 1990: 8).




Figure 2.1 Types of suicide mission by organisational goals and relevance of agents' death

Suicide bombings are mechanically simple, versatile and tactically efficient for reaching well-guarded, high-value targets. Compared with non-suicide terrorist attacks they are significantly more lethal in terms of the casualties they inflict on the enemy (see Chapter 1). They are effective in terrifying the enemy and have high symbolic value in signalling resolve and dedication to the cause. They are difficult to deter because of the perpetrator's willingness to die. Researchers subscribing to this perspective believe that understanding the organisation's rationale is more important in explaining suicide attacks than understanding individuals' motivations (Gambetta 2005; Pape 2005; Bloom 2005; Gupta and Mundra 2005; Hoffman and McCormick 2004).

For the sponsoring organisations, suicide attacks serve multiple purposes. They mobilise sympathetic supporters and attract recruits and financial support. The death of the perpetrator is used to legitimise his or her action. These influences are reciprocal: organisations use suicide bombing attacks to generate support, but at the same time they respond to popular demand. The ultimate goals are political and not religious. Religion can mobilise both support and participation because of its emphasis on redemption and martyrdom, but is not required. When present it is often combined with nationalism and ethnic and community solidarity. The suicide attacks are driven by a cocktail of emotions including pride, anger, rage, humiliation, shame, hopelessness and honour. They convey the message that we may be materially weak but we are powerful because we do not fear death (Crenshaw 2007; Pape 2005; Khosrokhavar 2005; Gambetta 2005; Bloom 2005; Oliver and Steinberg 2005; Reuter 2004; Hoffman and McCormick 2004; Berman and Laitin 2005).

The work of two American political scientists, Robert Pape and Mia Bloom, best exemplifies the strategic logic approach to explaining suicide attacks and is discussed here in some detail. In their respective contributions they show that suicide attacks pay off for the sponsoring organisation in two possible ways: by coercing an adversary and by giving the sponsoring organisation an advantage over its rival in terms of support from constituencies. According to Robert Pape, modern suicide terrorism is mainly a response to foreign occupation of the homeland. He makes a strong claim that campaigns of suicide terrorism are carried out by organised groups for a specific political goal – to end this foreign occupation. So the core phenomenon to be explained is not an individual suicide attack but the existence of protracted suicide terrorist campaigns. The strategic logic of suicide terrorism is aimed at political coercion.

> The vast majority of suicide attacks are not isolated or random acts by individual fanatics but rather occur in clusters as part of larger campaigns by an organised group to achieve a specific goal. Moreover, the main goals of suicide terrorist groups are profoundly this-worldly. Suicide terrorist campaigns are primarily nationalistic, not religious, nor are they particularly Islamic – every group mounting a suicide campaign over the past two decades has had as a major objective – or as its central objective – coercing a foreign state that has military forces in

> what the terrorists see as their homeland to take those forces out. Further, all of the target states have been democracies, which terrorists see as more vulnerable to coercion than other types of regimes.
>
> (Pape 2005: 21)


Suicide attacks magnify the coercive effects of punishment because they are more destructive than other types of terrorism and they effectively signal future attacks. The evidence tends to support Pape. Hezbollah-sponsored suicide attacks compelled the American and French military forces to abandon Lebanon in 1983 and Israeli forces to leave that country in 1985 and the Gaza Strip and West Bank in 1994 and 1995. Similarly, in the late 1990s Tamil Tigers' suicide attacks in Sri Lanka and PKK attacks in Turkey won LTTE and the Kurds significant concessions from the Sri Lankan and Turkish governments. This displays what Pape calls the coercive logic of suicide terrorism and has led to its rapid increase because terrorists have learned that this strategy pays, i.e. is effective.

Two other characteristics of organisations sponsoring suicide terrorism increase their effectiveness. Unlike primarily criminal organisations or religious cults, suicide terrorism groups command broad social support within the national communities from which they recruit, because they are seen as pursuing legitimate nationalist goals, especially liberation of the homeland from foreign occupation. This also enhances social integration and creates a climate of altruism in their community that can lead normal individuals to volunteer for suicide missions out of a sense of duty. Few suicide bombers are social misfits, criminally insane or professional losers. Typically they are psychologically normal, have better than average economic prospects and are deeply integrated into social networks and emotionally attached to their national communities. They see themselves as sacrificing their lives for the nation's good. Figure 2.2 describes the causal logic of Pape's model of suicide terrorism.

For Pape:

> The bottom line, then, is that suicide terrorism is mainly a response to foreign occupation. Isolated incidents in other circumstances do occur. Religion plays a role. However, modern suicide terrorism is best understood as an extreme strategy for national liberation against democracies with troops that pose an imminent threat to control the territory the terrorists view as their homeland.

(Pape 2005: 23)



Source: Pape (2005:22).

Figure 2.2 Causal logic of suicide terrorism

Pape's model has received a number of criticisms. Martha Crenshaw has criticised it for arbitrarily excluding isolated attacks so that such incidents that 'would be inconvenient to explain are thus omitted' (Crenshaw 2007: 142). She is also critical of Pape for lumping different groups together in a common campaign, such as Iraqi rebels, and not distinguishing between Al Qaeda and local affiliates or start-ups. She also questions whether suicide terror campaigns actually pay. Pape marshals evidence showing that six of thirteen completed campaigns between 1983 and 2001 resulted in 'no change' in the foreign occupation and five other campaigns were continuing (Pape 2005: 40). For Pape, a 50 per cent success rate would be remarkable, since in general coercion works in international politics only one-third of the time. In particular the success rate of campaigns may be not as realistic as he claims. His conclusion that Sri Lanka would grant Tamil autonomy in 2001 was premature, especially in view of the routing of LTTE by the Sri Lankan army in early 2009. Others have also criticised Pape along similar lines (Moghadam 2006, 2008; Brym and Araj 2006, 2008; Roberts 2007).

The Flinders University Suicide Terrorism Database (FUSTD) for major campaigns between 1980 and 2006 also provides only partial validation of Pape's hypothesis (see Table 2.1) and supports Crenshaw's observation that even if we accept (a) the idea of a campaign as the unit of analysis, (b) the coding of the outcomes of the completed campaigns, and (c) the cost-benefit ratios as something under 50, Pape's conclusion at best receives only qualified support. But perhaps the most serious problem not dealt with by Pape is that suicide bombings have high costs (arrests, assassinations of leaders, collateral damage, destruction of houses, roadblocks and checkpoints), which are not offset by concessions and have lasting psychological, social and economic costs.

More recently Hafez's study of suicide bombers in Iraq has also raised issues about the universal applicability of Pape's theory (Hafez 2007b).

Hafez agrees that the strategic logic of suicide attacks appears to conform to the facts in Iraq. Suicide terrorism did not exist in Iraq before the US-led invasion. The link between suicide attacks and occupation of 'homeland' is apparent but far from being a causal one. As evidence presented in Chapter 3 of this book shows, while a majority of the Iraqi insurgents are Iraqis, a large percentage of suicide bombers are not Iraqis. Furthermore most suicide attacks in Iraq are directed not at the foreign forces but at the Iraqi security forces and civilians. One can explain their presence and actions by accepting that their worldview rejects nationalistic borders and deems Muslim unity as the sole legitimate basis for their identification and jihad, which means 'religion matters' (Hafez 2007b: 215).

This also raises the question of the nature of suicide terrorists' altruism since they are not integrated in the reality of Iraqi society. Most Iraqis are Shia Arab and Kurd, and most suicide bombers are Sunni militants. In Pape's defence one can argue that the altruism of suicide bombers in Iraq is derived not from local but from global Islam (Roy 2004; Khosrokhavar 2005). Their attacks are means to achieving multiple goals, which may include expulsion of foreign occupying forces from an Islamic land; establishing an Islamic state in Iraq; and sacrificing their lives for the realisation of these goals as a project of their identity grounded in a globalised Islam.

Table 2.1 selected suicide terrorism campaigns, 1981–2006

Region	*Dispute*	*Terrorist group*	*Terrorist goal*	*No. attacks*	*No. killed*	*Democracy a target?*	*Target outcome*
Lebanon 1981–2006	US/F/IDF military presence	Hezbollah	US/F/IDF withdrawal	48	802	Yes	Complete withdrawal
Israel/Gaza/West Bank 1993–2006	IDF military presence Various disputes	Hamas PIJ Al-Aqsa	IDF withdrawal/ national liberation	217	1,016	Yes	IDF withdrawal from Gaza/TBD
Afghanistan 2001–6	NATO/US military presence	Taliban	NATO/US withdrawal	35	198	Yes	TBD
Sri Lanka 1987–2006	SL military presence	LTTE Tamil Tigers	SL withdrawal	93	1,172	Yes	Negotiations/TBD
Turkey 1996–2006	Turkish military presence	PKK	Turkey withdrawal	19	73	Yes	Partial success cultural/political concessions
Iraq 2003–6	US military presence	Insurgent groups	US withdrawal	651	5,766	Yes	TBD
Chechnya 2000–6	Russian military presence	Chechen rebels	Russian withdrawal	28	660	Yes	TBD
India/Kashmir 2000–6	Indian military presence	Kashmir rebels	Indian withdrawal	13	68	Yes	TBD
Saudi Arab/USA 1996–2006	US military presence	Al Qaeda	US withdrawal	11	3,089	No	TBD

Source: FUSTD (2008).

Notes
TBD = to be determined.
a The LTTE was defeated by the Sri Lankan army in 2009 but the Tamil–Sinhalese conflict remains unresolved.

Gaining a competitive edge

In her book *Dying to Kill*, the American political scientist Mia Bloom offers the competitive outbidding hypothesis of suicide terrorism, which also focuses on the organisations sponsoring suicide terrorism and not on the individual perpetrator's proclivities and personal traits. Bloom agrees that the key objective of suicide terrorism is to end foreign occupation of the homeland and secure its autonomy and independence. She postulates that the main attraction of suicide terrorism for the sponsoring organisation is that it enhances its prestige and gives it an advantage in intra-movement competition for recruits, money and publicity. Effectiveness, then, is

dependent on mobilising constituencies in order to dominate the competition in a local power struggle.

> If multiple insurgent groups are competing for public support, bombings will intensify in both scope and number as they become both the litmus test of militancy and the way to mobilize greater numbers of people within their community. When competition is especially intense, multiple organizations have occasionally vied with one another to claim responsibility for a particular bombing and identify the bomber as their operative. Such spectacular 'heroic' attacks garner increased media attention and organizations vie to claim responsibility for martyrs. The more spectacular and daring the attacks, the more the insurgent organization is able to reap a public relations advantage over its rivals and/or enemies … This process of outbidding between the groups depends on the domestic politics of the minority group and the state counterterror strategies and responses to insurgent violence.
>
> (Bloom 2005: 77–8)

Bloom is supported by Atran and by Gupta and Mundra. According to Atran, charismatic leaders of terrorist groups tend to manipulate the organisation to achieve their desired political goals, therefore 'the key to understanding and parrying suicide terrorism is to concentrate more on the organizational structure, indoctrination methods, and ideological appeal of recruiting organizations' (Atran 2003: 13). Analysis by Gupta and Mundra of suicide bombings by Hamas and Islamic Jihad leads them to conclude that, contrary to the popular image of suicide terrorism as an outcome of irrational religious fanaticism, suicide attacks are part of an intensely political series of moves by the two groups (Gupta and Mundra 2005). They are produced within a complex cauldron of political calculations, where the major insurgent groups sometimes compete and sometimes co-operate with each other with the specific objective of increasing their base of support within the Palestinian community. 'These attacks are well timed strategic uses of human sacrifice for specific nationalistic and religious goals by the leadership of the dissident groups' (Gupta and Mundra 2005: 591). They also found that political provocations were the best predictor of future suicide attacks.

Analysis by Brym and Araj of Palestinian suicide bombings in the second intifada (2000–4) also offers a partial support for the outbidding hypothesis.

At the beginning of the second intifada in July 2000, almost four times more Palestinians supported Fatah than Hamas, 37 per cent versus 10 per cent respectively. Around the same time 26 per cent of Palestinians supported suicide bombings. As Israel introduced more repressive policies with strong resistance coming from Hamas, the support for suicide bombings soared to 66 per cent in December 2000, and support for Hamas began to increase while that for Fatah decreased. 'Thus, in the period July to December 2000, increasing support for suicide bombings was associated with falling support for Fatah and rising support for Hamas, as the outbidding thesis predicts' (Brym and Araj 2008: 497). However, they also point out that in the later stages of the second intifada the outbidding hypothesis was inapplicable because it failed to account for variation in public support for suicide operations.

In general, Bloom's outbidding hypothesis is most persuasive in the Palestinian case. In the post-2000 Al-Aqsa intifada, the internal politics and competition among the three main Palestinian insurgent groups were dominant when secular and religious organisations competed for control over the Palestinian insurgency. But it is also well known that Palestinian factions co-operate as well as compete (Ricolfi 2005; Crenshaw 2007). Bloom's case study of Sri Lanka offers only partial support for her theory because, by the time LTTE began its suicide attacks in 1987, the other Tamil militant groups had largely been destroyed (Reuter 2004: 150; Pape 2005: 139). Following Bloom's framework, suicide attacks should have occurred between 1983 and 1987 when LTTE faced the most intense competition from its rivals. But the first suicide attack in Sri Lanka occurred in 1987 (Pedahzur 2005: 242).

The outbidding thesis does not appear to hold in Iraq either. While the Islamist insurgents and Baathists, who are most involved in suicide attacks in Iraq, are politically marginal and need extraordinary tactics to influence insurgency, their primary motivation is not to compete with other political factions. Their goal is to cause chaos and spark a sectarian civil war to hasten the collapse of the political system and create an environment conducive to their survival. Multitudes of groups involved in the Iraqi insurgency rarely compete with each other. Most of the insurgent groups have not adopted suicide attacks as a tactic in a consistent way to compete with AQI and other groups that deploy suicide terrorism. Key to Bloom's escalatory dynamics is the diffusion of the tactics from one group to another. In the case of the Palestinians, the initial wave of suicide bombings by

Hamas and Islamic Jihad prompted other secular groups, such as Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and PFLP, to adopt this tactic. This contagion effect, generally speaking, has not taken place among the insurgent groups in Iraq (Hafez 2007b: 217).

The role of terrorist organisations has also been highlighted by the Israeli psychologist Ariel Merari, who has interviewed suicide bombers arrested before they could carry out their missions. In his evidence before a special committee of the US Congress on suicide terrorism he rejected the notion that suicide bombers were crazy or that they carried out the attacks primarily for religious reasons.

> To put it in a nutshell, suicide terrorism is an organizational phenomenon … it was an organization that decided to use this tactic, found the person or persons to carry it out, trained them, and sent them on the mission at the time and place that the organization chose.
>
> (Merari 2000: 10)

Palestinian groups put a great deal of effort into preparing and training potential suicide bombers, which was construed as brainwashing by the Israeli authorities and public. Merari rejects this construction. Once the organisation decided that a certain person was suitable for the suicide mission he/she was put through a training process that might last in most cases from weeks to months.

> This training process involves two important elements. One element is strengthening the already existing willingness to die by giving that person additional reasons … in this phase of the training if the organization is religious the trainer also speaks about the religious justifications for this kind of act, about paradise, about the right or actually the need to carry out an act in the name of God, in the name of religion.
>
> (Merari 2000: 12–13)

The organisation creates points of no return by having the bombers write last letters to their families and often also videotaping candidates saying farewell. In the Palestinian organisations from this point onward the person is referred to as *al-shahid al-hai*, ‘the living martyr’, meaning the individual is already dead and is only temporarily in this world. After this phase it is

very hard for a person to change their mind. Indeed there have been practically no cases of changes of mind by suicide candidates in the case of Palestinians and very few in the case of Tamil Tigers and Hezbollah (Merari 2000; Silke 2003; Atran 2003). The existence of this strategy underlines the fact that the motivation to carry out an attack is not necessarily absolute.

In his study of suicide bombings in Iraq Hafez combines elements from altruistic explanations and organisational strategies to develop a social movement theory of suicide terrorism (Hafez 2007b). Social movements are non-institutionalised spontaneous social alliances of people protesting against widespread collective grievances. Hafez postulates that societies experiencing endemic, violent, asymmetrical conflicts involving state and non-state actors create opportunity structures to frame collective grievances as threats to identity and for articulating claims against the opponents. This framing forges networking among activists and their constituencies and creates individual motivations for volunteering for suicide bombings as a resistance strategy and its diffusion. He then uses this theory to explain suicide bombings in Iraq. Whereas Pape, Bloom and others take the sponsoring organisations and their strategic logic as given, Hafez offers an explanation of their emergence as social entities performing the functions and roles stipulated in his social organisation theory. One can argue that social movement theory in fact strengthens the organisational logic and effectiveness perspectives rather then replacing them.

In conclusion, why do terrorist organisations engage in suicide violence? The studies summarised above would suggest that their decision to adopt this strategy is based on rational calculations. The organisations take decisions to maximise their ideological and political goals. Thus adoption of this strategy reveals an organisation’s preference for maximising ideological aims as well as its need to compete for power and prestige within its constituency. More specifically, from the perspective of sponsoring organisations, suicide bombing attacks are motivated by (1) a carefully designed rational strategy of retaliatory actions by the weaker non-state actors facing well-armed states in an asymmetrical conflict to achieve their political goals; (2) efforts to achieve a competitive advantage for the sponsoring organisation over its competitors for moral, material and human support in the sympathetic constituencies; and (3) a strategy designed to weaken or destroy the middle ground of compromise.

Societal conditions: repressive occupation, humiliation and altruism

If the perpetrators of suicide terror are not psychopaths or sociopaths, then how can we explain their destructive actions? The preceding section has provided an overview of the studies that explain suicide attacks as instrumental or strategic actions of sponsoring organisations engaged in asymmetrical conflicts with well-equipped state armies. Suicide bombings mobilise support by responding to popular demand among sympathetic constituencies, which legitimises the action and generates moral and material support for the organisations.

This section deals with studies and explanations that extend the scope of the analysis to societal conditions created by endemic conflicts characterised by oppressive policies and practices that cause widespread physical, economic, social and cultural dislocations. These dislocations undermine and even destroy the social bonds that glue the fabric of society, thus creating feelings of humiliation, resentment and revenge in the subject population. Sociologically such conditions are conducive to the rise of altruism in which some individual members are willing to sacrifice their lives for the honourable political survival of their community. Studies and explanations that are broadly grounded in this perspective will be discussed in this section. It begins with a brief overview of Durkheim's typology of suicide.

In his famous study of suicide more than a century ago, Emile Durkheim brought together a number of insights to identify the areas and growing points of social dissolution in contemporary societies, putting these within the general theoretical framework which stated that suicide was related to the social integration of the individual's social group or society. 'Social integration' refers to the strength of the individual's ties to society and the stability of social relations within that society. In the lexicon of his theory, the relative degrees of integration, normlessness, social isolation and repression in society were the primary cause of the varying rates and types of suicide found in different societies (Durkheim 1951).

In Durkheim's typology the most common type is 'egoistic suicide' caused by the individual's weak social integration in society leading to excessive isolation, which inhibits the individual's access to social support networks of the family and religious community to help him or her cope with painful existential conditions.

The mainspring of egoistic suicide is excessive individualism. The individual is like the protagonist in Sartre's *La Nause*, a man with few social ties, all alone in his loneliness. Closely related to egoistic suicide is anomic suicide, which is caused by an abrupt change of circumstances, leading to 'social detachment'. The mechanisms leading to these two types of suicides are the same: personal trauma combined with social isolation. They differ only in the duration of detachment – chronic in egoistic suicide, acute in anomic. Another type of suicide in Durkheim's typol-ogy is fatalistic suicide, which is the converse of anomic suicide and occurs when the individual is subjected to oppressive and excessive regulation. The individual feels that he or she has no personal control or freedom and perceives the future relentlessly blocked and passions violently repressed by unavoidable and inflexible rules over which he or she feels powerless.

Durkheim identified a fourth type of suicide – altruistic suicide – in his aetiological typology. Unlike the anomic and egoistic types of suicides, which originate in extreme personal and social detachment, altruistic suicide emanates from the opposite condition: excessive integration of the individual into society. Altruism is to have utmost and unselfish regard for others in society as a principle of action. One acts unselfishly on the basis of the rules, expectations and dictates of others in society. Altruism, for Durkheim, is where the ego is not its own property, where it is blended with something not itself, where the goal of conduct is exterior to itself, that is, in one of the groups in which it participates. Altruistic suicide occurs with the concurrence of circumstances in which:

> Either death had to be imposed by society as a duty, or some question of honour was involved, or at least some disagreeable occurrence had to lower the value of life in the victims' eyes. But it even happens that the individual kills himself purely for the joy of sacrifice, because, even with no particular reason, renunciation in itself is considered praiseworthy.
>
> (Durkheim 1951: 223)

Under conditions of intense attachment society can exert pressure on the individual to make personal sacrifices, including sacrifice of his or her life as a validation of that attachment. Such action would confer prestige, public praise and recognition on the individual. Unwillingness to make the supreme sacrifice in such conditions would cost the individual public respect. Unlike

egoistic, anomic or fatalistic suicides, altruistic suicide is likely to be a public act. Accordingly, the more a person values their community, the more likely he or she is to commit suicide for the sake of the community, 'because it is his duty' (Durkheim 1951: 219). The nature of altruistic suicide was summed up by Albert Camus in his essay *The Myth of Sisyphus*: 'What is called a reason for living is also an excellent reason for dying.'

The social construction of altruism

Human society is a living and vibrant organism integrated through a complex set of social networks grounded in historically generated cultural and social codes. It confers identities on its members, and its institutions invest these identities with meanings. When the social fabric of a society is threatened it produces serious consequences ranging from political and social upheavals to emotional responses, including collective trauma, revenge, humiliation and rage – a kind of 'social pain'. These consequences are most visible in the 'war zones' of a society. Below is a description of the Sri Lankan situation.

> In the war zones, violence and war gradually permeated all aspect of daily life, family and community processes. It was not certain a person going for work would return in the evening. A home could be suddenly searched, someone brutally killed, a mother raped or father taken away. A shell could land anywhere destroying everything around. Sounds of gun shots, machine-gun fire, exploding shells, diving planes and rounding helicopters were present. People had to adapt to frequent checks, getting down from bikes, showing ID cards, waiting while military looked you over, body searches, the pushing and slaps, intimidation, women taking the sexual overtones and harassment as part of their daily ordeal all in the atmosphere of possible arrest. This kind of pervasive atmosphere of violence, rather than breaking down the resistance and spirit of the population, in times creates resistance and defiance, particularly in the youth. Thus within each breast would grow, small at first, a rage, hate which could transform into a militant. Thus these kinds of counter-insurgency policies and strategies would spawn a whole generation of rebellious youth.
>
> (Nordstrom 1994, cited in Somasundaram 2008b)

The counter-insurgency strategy of the Sri Lankan government against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) employed torture routinely. Under the pretext of obtaining information, it was used to break the individual personalities of those who tried to resist, as well as being an encompassing method to coerce a community into submission. Many individuals did not survive torture; those who did were released in a broken condition, or, when dead, their maimed bodies were conspicuously exhibited to act as a warning to others. Thus torture became an institutionalised aspect of state terror and a method of social control. Laws legitimising torture and death in custody were passed. Similarly, torture was used by the militants but without any legal veneer (Doney 1998; Amnesty International 1986; Somasundaram 2008b).

These conditions of sustained acute social and psychological trauma and chaos also created conditions for altruistic actions that attracted volunteers to LTTE and to the Black Tigers (LTTE's suicide squad). This is borne out by what little material exists on personal motivations for joining Tamil Tigers. According to Father Harry Miller, a Jesuit priest who headed a Peace Committee at Batticaloa, in eastern Sri Lanka, 'The abuse that ordinary people suffer at the hands of the army becomes the primary motivating factor to join the Tigers' (Hopgood 2005: 70: Joshi 2000).

One of the most respected observers of the Sri Lankan situation, Peter Schalk, uses a 1993 LTTE-produced film to highlight the altruism behind a young Tamil's decision to join the Black Tigers. The film is called *Tayakkanava* or 'The Dream of the Motherland'. It spends a significant amount of time establishing the main character's motivation. It starts by showing a happy family consisting of parents, a daughter and a son, the *tiyaki* (martyr to be). They are all happy, sitting in a garden celebrating a birthday. They feed each other with hands as signs of intimacy. They also have good relations with their neighbours. The son takes a neighbour's young daughter to school on his motorbike. One day the Sri Lankan air force drops bombs on the school, and the boy can only take the body of his young friend to her parents. In his inner vision, he perceives that this could have happened to his own younger sister, and he decides he will enter the squad of Black Tigers, having obtained his father's permission. The film shows the hard training given to a Black Tiger and spends much time describing the comradeship that develops within the group, especially between our hero and his comrades. One day he is selected for a vehicle-borne suicide mission. Before going on the mission he divides his property between

comrades and bids farewell to his family and finally to the LTTE leader, Prabhakaran. The following day the mission is carried out as planned. The enemy camp is eliminated, and he is killed. The next day all read and talk about him. His picture is put up on a commemorative altar. Then his parents are informed by two officials from LTTE that he has reached *viramaranam*, 'heroic death' (Schalk 1997b, quoted in Hopgood 2005).

The above account, although fictional, is a good description of the reality on the ground. It shows that the social construction of the altruistic martyrdom of Tamil Tigers is well supported by the Tamil population of Sri Lanka. Since the mid-1990s all observers to Tamil-held areas of Jaffna, the LTTE stronghold in the northern region of the country, have reported strong support for suicide operations and commemoration of the LTTE martyrs among the local population. Each year on 5 July thousands attend the 'Heroes' Day' celebration, commemorating the first Black Tiger, whose mission occurred on 5 July 1987, and others since. There are also hundreds of shrines to individual suicide attackers, kept with flowers and with special trees planted to represent the martyrs who 'planted' their lives for the land. Although at the time of writing (February 2009) the LTTE has been routed by the Sri Lankan army, while they ruled the Jaffna peninsula they contributed to the social and economic life of the local society by devoting the groups' limited resources to social services. LTTE was the only insurgent group in the world that ran a de facto state within a state for almost twenty years. LTTE provided thousands of people with all social, health, economic, judicial and security services normally provided by the state as well as with interest-free loans. In 1993 the Tigers established Tamil Eelam Bank to help local small businesses to stimulate the local economy (Hopgood 2005; Bloom 2005; Roberts 2007, 2008).

The LTTE's discourse on martyrdom emphasises the altruistic motives and instrumental value of self-sacrifice to liberate the Tamil 'homeland' from Sinhalese occupation. According to the LTTE leader, Prabhakaran, 'our martyrs die in the arena of struggle with the intense passion for the freedom of their people, for the liberation of their homeland and therefore the death of every martyr constitutes a brave act of enunciation of freedom' (Prabhakaran 1993). Black Tigers seek to overcome conventional inferiority against the Sri Lankan army through self-sacrifice. According to a female LTTE fighter, Nandani:

> As Black Tigers, they are a physical embodiment of self-determination and liberation. They employ their lives as missiles armed with the kind of determination and purpose that is unmatched by any conventional weapon that the Sinhala forces may deploy. There lies the strength and honor of our black Tigers.
>
> (see Pape 2005: 194)

In the past thirty years the LTTE has succeeded in building strong bonds with the local Tamil community, creating opportunities for individuals willing to sacrifice for the community through suicide attacks. A study of LTTE describes this support in the following words:

> Why does the LTTE have so much support among the population? It is the only group that is accepted by the population as 'one of our own', 'our boys', even 'our sons' … The LTTE are the one militant group that has managed to build up grassroots support and loyalty among the population for reasons both ideological and organizational and got a grip on the political and social structure of Jaffna.
>
> (Hellmann-Rajanayagam 1994, cited in Pape 2005: 195)

After an extensive analysis of suicides in the modern world informed by Durkheim's typology, Pape concludes: 'Overall, egoistic and anomic motives are insufficient to account for the individual logic of suicide terrorism. Altruistic motives either alone or in conjunction with others, likely play an important role' (Pape 2005: 184). Virtually all ordinary suicides are private acts of solitary individuals. Suicide bombings, on the other hand, are always public acts, and a large proportion are either team attacks or part of joint missions against the same target or targets in close proximity, indicating the presence of altruistic motives among many suicide attackers. This does not preclude the absence of personal motive to die, but suicide attackers who work together in teams must also be motivated to achieve a collective purpose, the completion of a group mission that serves a cause beyond their own personal death. This of course does not imply that single-person suicide missions do not involve altruistic motives. Martyrs' videos and other last testaments often claim that the suicide attack was motivated by altruism. The existence of team attacks and martyr videos and other testaments left by individuals suggests that most suicide terrorists are motivated partly or wholly by a collective purpose and not by personal

aguish and pain (Pape 2005: 186–7; Orbach 2004; Reuter 2004; Oliver and Steinberg 2005; Dabbagh 2005).

Almost all terrorist organisations sponsoring suicide bombings are bound to their societies by virtue of pursuing political goals seen as legitimate by the society at large, and by their participation in extensive networks of social services and charities for the benefit of the society. They are also involved in elaborate ceremonies and rituals that identify the death of a suicide bomber with the good of the community. These are evident from the activities and organisational structures of Hezbollah, Hamas, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and Lashkar-e-Toiba. The purpose of such activities is to demonstrate to the community that the sacrifice and martyrdom of suicide attackers is justified by its instrumental value in protecting the community from foreign occupation and is not an end in itself. The survival of the community, they argue, demands self-sacrifice. Hezbollah, Hamas, LTTE, Laskar-e-Toiba, Taliban, Ansar al-Islam, Mujahidin Shura Council, Al Qaeda and AQI claim that the purpose of suicide missions is to end foreign occupation of the ‘homeland’; suicide missions are needed because of the imbalance in conventional military power between the combatants, and the suicide mission will put coercive pressure on the enemy to make concessions. In other words, suicide missions are framed in altruistic terms not as an end in themselves but as a means of achieving multiple ends for the good of the community.

In short, under conditions of massive disruption in the society, altruism and altruistic motives can be cultivated to garner support for suicide bombing. Communities that have endured a long and painful conflict with a more powerful enemy eventually react to perceived inferiority and the failure of other efforts by supporting suicide attacks. Religiously coded attitudes towards acceptance of death stemming from long periods of hopelessness and suffering enable political organisations to give people suicide bombing as an outlet for expressing feelings of deprivation, injustice, despair and hostility. Paradoxically, an enemy’s brutal response reinforces these feelings (Pedahzur 2005; Pedahzur and Perliger 2006; Pape 2005; Hafez 2006, 2007b; Atran 2003; N. Hassan 2001).

An investigation of the role of altruistic motivation in the Palestinian territories shows that suicide terrorism was an outcome of altruistic and fatalistic motivations. Countering some popular depictions of suicide bombers as unsophisticated young men who either were artfully recruited or became suicide bombers at the instigation of charismatic imams (mosque

prayer leaders), the study found that conditions in the Palestinian territories were such that the would-be martyr's decision to embark on his or her journey of destruction was reinforced by the approval of the community and its honourable survival. The tendency of terrorists to offer themselves for suicide missions was a result not just of operational organisational advantages but also of individuals' strong affinity to the goals and values of their society. Two main factors influencing the decision to become a suicide terrorist were to help Palestinian society achieve its political goals and to escape from a hopeless situation that prevailed in Palestinian society (Pedahzur, Perliger and Weinberg 2003).

Palestinians have endured harsh and oppressive occupation by the Israeli army. Studies of the social and political consequences of Israeli occupation on Palestinian society have found that the conditions of the occupation were a significant cause of suicide bombings in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. Findings of a recent study of this problem indicate that state repression in conflicts where suicide bombing has been used should not be perceived only as reaction to the bombings; it often precedes and is a major cause of such attacks. Harsh repression at the micro-level was found to be a major contributor to the rise in suicide bombings. The study found that revenge for Israeli actions against the bomber, his/her family or friends or Palestinians in general was the main motivation for the majority of the bombers in the second intifada. In addition, public support turned individual bombers into heroes and thus encouraged more volunteers. Without individuals, organisations cannot conduct their suicide attacks, and without enough volunteers suicide 'cam-paigns' are not possible. In a society characterised by strong social solidarity, individual members are prone to altruistic suicides in an attempt to achieve collective political goals (Araj 2008: 66–7). A strong relationship between repression and collective action in Palestine was also identified by Khawaja, who found that, instead of deterring protest, repression increased subsequent collective action. Provocations or violations of 'honour' and established moral codes induce people to adopt a confrontational stance towards authorities and turn them into supporters of the collective cause (Khawaja 1993).

These findings are echoed in another study of Palestinian resistance and suicide bombings, which found that the main motivations for acts of self-sacrifice by young Palestinians lay in the heavy repression of Israeli occupation experienced in Palestinian everyday life. The martyrdom operations in the form of 'intelligent human bombs' represented a tactic of

asymmetrical warfare seeking to equalise superior Israeli military power and to shake Israeli society and morale. The misery and personal traumas arising from a brutalising occupation created immense anger, bitterness and hatred that justified the extreme response. For Palestinians, suicide bombings were acts of ultimate despair, a horrific reaction to extremely inhuman conditions in a seriously damaged environment of hopelessness (Ahmed 2005).

A collective sense of unjust persecution can quickly build up in aggrieved communities and creates a sense of moral outrage that provides motivation as well as justification for extreme violence. Interviewed in prison, one Palestinian terrorist expressed his sense of outrage to two Israeli academics in the following words:

> You Israeli are Nazis in your souls and in your conduct. In your occupation you never distinguish between men and women, or between old people and children. You adopted methods of collective punishment, you uprooted people from their homeland and from their homes and chased them into exile. You fired live ammunition at women and children. You smashed the skulls of defenceless civilians. You set up detention camps for thousands of people in sub-human conditions. You destroyed homes and turned children into orphans. You prevented people from making a living, you stole their property, you trampled on their honour. Given that kind of conduct, there is no choice but to strike at you without mercy in every possible way.
>
> (Post and Denny 2002)

Suicide bombing is a new phenomenon in Palestinian society. Palestinian psychiatrist El Sarraj attributes its rise to the hopelessness that comes from a situation that continues to worsen: a despair where living becomes no different from dying propels people to unthinkable actions (El Sarraj 2002). Life under occupation is psychologically traumatic and one continuous experience of humiliation for Palestinians:

> [Palestinians] need to feel respected. They want status within their society. Today the martyr is glorified. The martyr for them is the power of the people, the power to take revenge on behalf of the victims … They see a martyr as courageously sacrificing himself or herself for the sake of everyone, as a symbol of the struggle for freedom, because this is what these people are fighting for.

(Butler 2002: 72)

A number of studies claim that Hamas used the Islamic concept of jihad to frame suicide attacks as martyrdom operations, a concept that had not been formulated in these terms previously in Palestinian society. Palestinians have come to venerate martyrdom because of a confluence of perceived threats and a sense of victimisation. The public sought both revenge and empowerment in response to harsh Israeli occupation and actions. Islam presented a cultural and theological rationalisation for framing suicide operations as martyrdom, but the failure of secular Palestinian Authority leaders to counter or condemn such constructions allowed Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad the political opening they sought. The sponsoring organisation can mobilise altruistic support for suicide attacks using not only religion but also nationalism, foreign occupation, repressive and brutal policies of the occupying force, long periods of occupation, severity of conflicts, civilian casualties, failure effectively to counter the tactics and failure of alternatives (Hafez 2006; Khosrokhavar 2005; Crenshaw 2007; El Sarraj 2002; Margalit 2003; Pape 2005; Bloom 2005; Pedahzur 2005).

In short, altruistic motives are significant in explaining the moral logic of suicide missions. By their very nature, suicide missions involve collective motives and are sponsored by organisations that go to great lengths to embed themselves in the surrounding communities and pursue socially acceptable political objectives. Through their political and social activities these organisations create altruistic conditions and opportunities for their members to volunteer to sacrifice for the community if they wish to do so. The individual may be driven to self-sacrifice by social and psychological traumas arising from the conditions of the war zone and/or the absence of recourse to solutions to perceived injustices. Under such conditions the feelings of rage and revenge act as the means to set the scales of justice right. The individuals who wish to sacrifice for their community can be confident that the act is understood as such. The weight of existing evidence suggests that self-destruction can be actively induced by society and does not exclusively grow out of personal anguish and pain (Orbach 2004; Pape 2005; Hafez 2007b; Gambetta 2005; Bloom 2005; Battin 2004; Abdel-Khalek 2004).[1]

In conclusion, this review reveals a multitude of explanations of suicide bombing and little consensus on its conceptualisation, causes and

consequences. Studies that focus on explaining the phenomenon in terms of individualistic motivations conceptualise suicide bombings as acts of abhorrent illegal violence against civilians perpetrated by psychopaths and sociopaths. Studies seeking to develop social and psychological profiles of the perpetrators of suicide bombing have not produced much in the way of fruitful results and have failed to find a stable set of demographic, socioeconomic, religious and psychological variables that can be causally linked to the suicide bomber's personality. Results of studies of commonly held stereotypes, especially among politicians and even among some scholars, that see the root cause of suicide terrorism as social and economic deprivations have found no correlation between poverty and suicide terrorism. In fact the evidence shows that a higher standard of living was positively associated with support for or participation in terrorism. Still this line of inquiry remains attractive among scholars around the world. Labels like mad, bad, fanatics, homicidal killers and insane may serve a useful function for legal purposes, but if the purpose is to learn and understand the causes and prevention of suicide terrorism, then these labels simply prevent us from discovering its real nature, purpose and causes.

Studies of the role, function and nature of terrorist organisations and altruistic motives as the driving force behind suicide bombings provide holistic and rounded explanations. In general they show that suicide bombings are a weapon of the weaker non-state entity engaged in asymmetrical conflicts with well-armed state armies. The conflict invariably involves liberation of the homeland. The non-state organisations employ suicide attacks for mobilising support among sympathetic constituencies. Suicide attacks have symbolic and instrumental values: they mobilise moral and material support and at the same time respond to popular demands. The ultimate goals are political and not religious, but religion can mobilise both support and participation because of its emphasis on redemption and martyrdom. Individuals may be driven to self-sacrifice by a cocktail of emotions including pride, honour, anger, rage, humiliation, shame, powerlessness and hopelessness. Suicide bombings benefit the sponsoring organisation in two ways: by coercing an adversary and by giving the sponsoring organisation an advantage over its rival in terms of support from sympathetic constituencies. But these claims are assertions and not always supported by evidence. Sponsoring organisations go to great lengths to embed themselves in their communities in order to pursue socially acceptable political goals. By pursuing their political goals they create

altruistic conditions for individuals to volunteer to sacrifice for their community.

3 Suicide bombings in Iraq

Terrorism is not new to Iraq but in the form of suicide bombing it is. Under Saddam Hussein's regime, state-sponsored terrorism was used to subdue and control the restive Kurd and Shia dissidents, causing thousands of deaths. Suicide terrorism began soon after the American-led invasion and the ensuing Iraq war, and within months it had become an integral part of the Iraqi insurgency. Suicide bombing is not a new phenomenon in Middle Eastern conflicts, but never before has the Arab world witnessed it on this scale. In the aftermath of Israel's occupation of Lebanon in 1982, one Hezbollah suicide bombing a month was considered remarkable. During the Palestinian intifadas of the 1980s and 1990s, four per month were regarded as unprecedented. In Iraq, suicide attacks in the first five years after the Anglo-American invasion averaged four per week or about two every three days.

The first suicide bombing attack in Iraq took place as American troops were advancing towards Baghdad. An off-duty Iraqi policeman drove an explosiveladen car into an American roadblock. In the dying days of Saddam's regime the vice president of Iraq, Taha Yassin Ramadan, warned that all that Iraqis could do was to turn themselves into bombs. 'If the B-52 bombs can now kill 500 or more in our war, then I'm sure that some operations by our freedom fighters will be able to kill 5000' (Fisk 2008). Ramadan even referred to 'the martyr's moment of sublimity', an Al Qaeda-like phrase that ill fitted a secular Baathist. Only two days after the US occupation of Baghdad, a woman killed herself while trying to explode a grenade among a group of American troops outside the capital.

Within months of the occupation of Iraq, the insurgency emerged as an effective force with significant support in Arab Sunni areas and steadily developed a sophisticated mix of tactics. A nationalist and Islamist division also developed that deliberately tried to divide Iraq's Sunnis from its Shia, Kurd and other communities to instigate a sectarian civil war. Militarily,

Iraqi insurgents were no match for the well-trained and professional Anglo-American forces and their technologically sophisticated arsenal of weapons. This military asymmetry forced Iraqi insurgents to improvise weapons that the enemy did not have. Suicide bombings were one such weapon. They were very effective, lethal and also had a big psychological impact because of their exceptional media coverage. An audio recording of Abu Musab al-Zarqwai, the leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), provides an insight into the development of suicide bombing as a weapon of resistance.

> [The holy warriors] faced the strongest and most advanced army in modern times. They faced its arrogance, tyranny and all its big numbers and advanced weapons … When the holy warriors noticed this huge disparity in numbers and armaments between them and the enemy, they looked for alternatives to amend this deficiency and fill this gap so that the light and the fire of jihad would not be extinguished. Brigades of martyrs, whose sole goals are to please God and rush to the heavens, have set out and attacked the sanctuaries of infidelity and broken its armies. They inflicted severe punishment and injuries on the enemy and hurt its reputation. They mobilised the sons of this nation against this enemy and revived hope in the souls once again, praises and gratitude be to God.
>
> (cited in Hafez 2007b: 121)

The following sections provide an overview of the insurgency and its nationalist and Islamic protagonists, as well as an analysis of various aspects of suicide bombings in Iraq.

Iraqi insurgency

The Iraqi insurgency is a complex phenomenon with multiple sources including the Sunni Arabs, Al Qaeda-affiliated Islamist-jihadist groups, Shia militias and organised criminality. But almost all suicide bombings are carried out by groups largely comprising elements of the Saddam Hussein regime, disaffected Sunni Arab Iraqis and Al Qaeda-affiliated Islamist groups. The insurgency has no single leadership structure and, according to the Iraq Study Group Report, ‘is a network of networks’. It relies on participants’ detailed knowledge of Iraq’s infrastructure, and arms and financing are supplied primarily from within Iraq. While insurgents have

different goals, nearly all share the following: they oppose the presence of US forces in Iraq; they seek to deprive the new Iraqi government of popular legitimacy; they wish to prevent Iraqi forces from becoming effective; and many want to restore Sunni Arab rule in the country. Islamist groups, whose goals also include instigating a sectarian war between Iraq's Sunni and Shia communities, are responsible for a majority of suicide attacks, and are seeking to establish an Islamic state (Baker *et al*. 2007; Cordesman 2005).

Suicide bombing attacks are only one of the tactics used by the insurgents. The two main instigators and promoters of this tactic are the Iraqi nationalists (including the ideological Baathists) and the Islamists (including the foreign jihadists). Both strands employ Islamic symbols and vocabulary but for very different purposes. The following section profiles these two main elements of Iraqi insurgency.

Iraqi nationalists

The Iraqi nationalists consist of groups fighting to oust the occupying coalition forces from Iraq and overturn the political arrangements imposed by the occupying forces and their local collaborators. These arrangements have altered the Iraqi power structure by privileging Shia and Kurdish communities at the expense of Sunnis. The Iraqi insurgency began in the form of small brigades of localised groups consisting of disenfranchised Baathists, members of the Iraqi army disbanded by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), Saddam loyalists and some local Islamists.

The main developments contributing to the nationalist insurgency were the disbanding of the Iraqi armed forces without any financial compensation and the de-Baathification policy, which began soon after the occupation. These two developments effectively disempowered the Sunni Arabs and at the same time privileged Shia and Kurdish communities in post-Saddam Iraq. This shift in state power ended the old regime's patronage system, depriving Sunni tribes and tribal leaders of their many privileges, and also made Sunni Iraqis a target of Shia and Kurdish militia violence. Perhaps the most significant event that galvanised the insurgency was a sense of personal and collective humiliation arising from indiscriminate and culturally insensitive transgressions by the occupying coalition soldiers, powerfully represented by the treatment of Iraqis in Abu Ghraib prison (Hersh 2004; Carter 2004; Human Rights Watch 2006; Zernike and Rohde 2004; Zangana 2006). In a society with a strong tribal ethos of honour, many Iraqis felt

dishonoured, shamed and humiliated, and resorted to the prescribed codes of revenge.

Over time many of these groups have merged to form larger constituencies all seeking to restore the traditional Sunni power base. The main groups in this category include the Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI), 1920 Revolution Brigades of the Islamic and National Resistance Movement (1920 RB), Mujahidin Army of Iraq (MAI) and Salah al-Din al-Ayoubi Brigades of the Islamic Front for Iraqi Resistance (SDAB).

The Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI) was formed in 2004 and has been involved in kidnapping and attacks on coalition forces. The 1920 Revolution Brigades is a Sunni clerical group linked to the Association of Muslim Scholars that first appeared in mid-2003. IAI's manifesto approves of suicide attacks, first, if they are approved by an Islamic leader, second, if they are beneficial to Muslims, third, if they are motivated by beliefs in God and not personal despair, and fourth, if the act weakens the enemy. The Mujahidin Army of Iraq is a middle-of-the-road group that brings together former military personnel and some Salafi religious scholars. SDAB formally appeared in 2004 with the declared aim of ending occupation. These four groups now have a strategic partnership through the Joint Co-ordination Bureau of jihad groups (JCB). They see resistance to foreign occupation as their main objective and derive their inspiration from Sunni Islam and nationalism. To achieve their objective they target coalition and Iraqi forces, Shia and Kurdish militias. They normally do not attack civilians and rarely use suicide bombing as a weapon (Hafez 2007b: chapter 1).

The aims of nationalist groups appear to coincide with those of the ideological Baathists, who also seek the dismantling of the new political system in order to regain their political and economic position. The Baathists are associated with the Mujahidin Central Command, and their cadre consists of former army officers, prominent members of the deposed Baath Party and members of Saddam Hussein's clan. Two female members of the Baathists were among the first suicide bombers in Iraq. The Baathists joined the Fedayeen Saddam and the Faruq Brigades to carry out suicide missions. They see the Iraqi invasion and the overthrow of the Saddam regime as a continuation of colonial imperialism and are committed to expelling the occupying coalition forces from Iraq. Like the Islamists, Baathists are opposed to Shia domination. But unlike the Islamists, who want to install an Islamic state, they are committed to restoring the political role of the Baath Party.

Notwithstanding their divergent aims, the Iraqi nationalists and Islamists are coordinating their formidable insurgency efforts against the foreign occupying forces to trigger a collapse of the present Shia- and Kurd-dominated, pro-Western Iraqi government. In 2004 the insurgent fighters put up a highly sophisticated and coordinated resistance to the US forces during their siege of Fallujah. US forces discovered a huge bunker filled with arms and ammunition, suggesting that the insurgents were acting like an organised army with supplies, shelter, food and arms. The bunker contained living quarters, showers, air-conditioners, huge supplies of ammunition, weapons and logistical equipment, which included machine-guns, mortars, rockets, ski masks, log books, video cameras, night-vision goggles and satellite phones (Wong 2005). Insurgents also launch joint and co-ordinated attacks on prisons to free captured insurgents.

But this apparent unity and co-operation masks the ideological and strategic divides among the main insurgent groups. According to Hafez, insurgents diverge along two continua: strategy (system reintegration versus system collapse) and ideology (Islamism versus nationalism). The indigenous Iraqi nationalists and Baathist insurgent groups consisting of disaffected Sunnis are pursuing the goal of the reintegration of marginalised Sunnis in any future Iraqi regime on an equal footing with the Shia and Kurds. They see the coalition occupation of Iraq as illegal and seek a non-sectarian and united Iraq. They use Islamic rhetoric to mobilise popular support and not for global jihad. The Baathists, on the other hand, are pursuing a system collapse strategy that seeks to install a regime which has been rejected by a majority of Iraqis (Hafez 2007b: 35–56).



Islamists
• Islamic Army in Iraq
• Mujahidin Army in Iraq
• Mujahidin Shura Council
• Ansar al-Sunna Group
System reintegration
System collapse
• 1920 Revolution Brigades
• Salah al-Din al-Ayoubi Brigades
• General Command of the Mujahidin of the Armed Forces (Baathists)
Nationalists
Source: Hafez (2007b:56).

Figure 3.1 Strategic and ideological orientation of insurgents in Iraq

Iraqi Islamists

While nationalists and their allies invoke Islamic vocabulary to mobilise resistance against Iraqi occupation, their struggle is not aimed at establishing an Islamic state or waging global jihad as advocated by Islamists. The Islamist groups embrace Salafism, a puritanical form of Sunni Islam with close theological links to Saudi Arabian Wahhabism. Salafism seeks to idealise and emulate the virtues, piety and practices that characterised the formative years of the foundation of Islam. The aims of Islamists range from expelling the foreign occupying forces from Iraq to pave the way for an Iraqi Islamic state to establishing a universal Islamic *khilafat* (Islamic political system) through global jihad. They reject democracy and Shia rule. In 2006 two major groups representing Islamists were Mujahidin Shura Council (MSC), which is an umbrella organisation consisting of several groups with AQI as its core, and Ansar al-Sunnah Group (ASG).

The Mujahidin Shura Council and Ansar al Sunnah have been involved in carrying out numerous suicide attacks against the coalition forces, Iraqi security forces and government officials, Iraqi collaborators (translators and drivers), intellectuals, artists, foreign humanitarian organisations and civilians. MSC has two suicide wings, al-Bara Bin-Malik Martyrdom Brigade and a Martyrs' Brigade. ASG's suicide attacks are carried out by the Martyrs' Brigade of Ansar al-Sunnah. The operators of these Martyrdom

Brigades are drawn from the jihadists trained in Afghanistan in the 1990s and foreign jihadists linked to AQI. The AQI suicide attacks have strategically targeted Shia mosques, religious festivals, funeral processions and Shia civilians in markets in order to spark a sectarian war.

Most of the Islamist insurgents are Iraqis, but a small minority consists of foreign jihadists. They are mostly associated with AQI, which was formed by the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. According to some estimates, of the fifteen to twenty thousand insurgents in 2006, around seven hundred to two thousand were non-Iraqis (Brookings Institution 2006b; Cordesman 2005). Foreign jihadists are the main arsenal of suicide bombers in Iraq (Hafez 2007b; Cordesman 2005; Chichizola 2005; al-Ashhab 2005; Schmitt 2005; Beaumont 2005; Rozen 2006; Paz 2005; Obaid and Cordesman 2005). The Islamists do not see Iraq in isolation from other conflicts in Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia, Chechnya and Afghanistan. They view these conflicts as connected episodes of a campaign or ‘crusade’ against Islam and Muslims.

They also see ascendancy of the Shias in Iraq as heretical. The operators of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s AQI, through their targeted attacks against the Shias, have been successful in precipitating a sectarian civil war in Iraq. Containing this emerging civil war has become the number one priority of the Iraqi government and the US-led coalition. Ironically, the political marginality of Islamists has meant that they are less constrained by the concerns of the broader Iraqi public. This margin-ality has made their violence particularly lethal (Hafez 2007b: 77; Baker *et al*. 2007).

The nationalists and Islamists display significant differences in their insurgency, rhetoric and violence. For the nationalists the illegitimacy of the Iraqi regime stems from its collaboration with the occupying forces, but the Islamists see this illegitimacy as stemming from its failure to follow the Islamic law, which makes it an apostate regime that must be fought. Unlike the nationalists, Islamic revolutionaries regard the Shias as apostates and are thus active in fermenting sectarian violence between the Iraqi Shias and Sunnis. The Islamists also couch their struggles within a larger narrative of Arab and Muslim resistance in Palestine, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Kashmir and Chechnya.

The ideology of Islamists emphasises Muslim oppression and theology. Muslim oppression, around the world as well as in Iraq, is seen as arising from a conspiracy of the Crusader–Zionist alliance and their local collaborators, against Islam and Muslims. Theological justifications are constructed around Islamic traditions of jihad against infidels, apostates and

heretics. Using selective texts, narratives, symbols and myths, Islamists legitimise the morality of suicide bombing and civilian killing by arguing that, just as soldiers go to war and kill for their country, jihadists engage in violence to promote their cause. Just as soldiers are trained to overcome inhibitions against killing and are venerated and rewarded in public ceremonies and idealised for their heroic sacrifice when they are killed in action, jihadists' actions are framed as moral acts in the service of their people, country and God. Such reconstructions present unethical behaviour as socially and morally acceptable (Hafez 2007b: 119; Bandura 1999; Waller 2005).

In Islamic history, martyrdom is central to Shia ethos, theology and commemorative rituals, but not to Sunni tradition. However, recent conflicts in Palestine, Lebanon, Kashmir, Chechnya, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan have reversed the martyrdom paradigm and made it part of Sunni orthopraxy. The traditional prohibitions against suicide and civilian and non-combatant killing are justified by Sunni scholars by invoking the doctrine of apostasy and the role of human intentionality in action. In suicide the intention of the person is to kill oneself; in suicide bombing the intention is to kill the enemy. They also employ analogous reasoning based on historic Islamic traditions and rulings concerning killing civilians in battle and killing Muslim human shields (see Hafez 2007b: chapter 4; Hafez 2007a; Gambetta 2005: chapter 8; Elster 2005; Hassan 2008: chapter 3).

Another plank of the Islamists' strategy is to mobilise support for insurgency and martyrdom to avenge Muslim oppression and humiliation in Iraq and around the world. The Islamists' struggle and martyrdom are seen as a means of erasing the shame of defeat and redeeming Muslim honour. Islamists and their supporters again use selective interpretations of Islamic texts and traditions to support their position. They use insurgent videos, audio recordings and online magazines to frame insurgency and martyrdom operations as the heroic response by their Muslim fighters to transgressions such as female dishonour, treasonous collusion and collective humiliation. By weaving the narratives of oppression, humiliation, collusion and redemption, the main Iraqi Islamist group, AQI, portrays a deleterious situation that requires immediate action and which motivates and inspires its heroic Muslim fighters to make the ultimate sacrifice to redeem their nation and avenge the personal suffering inflicted on helpless Muslims, especially women. These narratives are also employed to demonise the enemy and reduce psychological inhibitions against killing oneself and fellow Muslims.

A document, *Biographies of Eminent Martyrs*, posted on an AQI-affiliated website, highlighted several of these themes, including sincere devotion to Islam, willingness to sacrifice one's wealth and personal ties with God, eagerness to carry out a martyrdom operation, success in such an operation, and confirmation of martyrdom through dream visions.[1]

A video clip of a suicide attack released in 2004 by the Mujahidin Shura Council in Iraq vividly illustrates some of these themes. The clip is entitled 'Fatimah's Fiancé' and shows Abu Muawiyah al-Shamali, a young Saudi male, who declares that his mission is in direct response to a letter allegedly sent by Fatimah, a female detainee in the Abu Ghraib prison, in which she called upon the holy warriors to come to rescue all female prisoners who were subjected to daily rape, torture and humiliation at the hands of the 'sons of the pigs and the monkey', meaning Jews and Christians. After describing torture and humiliation Fatimah is quoted as imploring, 'Brothers, I tell you again, fear God! Kill us with them so that we might be at peace. Help! Help! Help.'

Abu Muawiyah al-Shamali then appears with a big smile on his face, reading a poem with a gun and the Quran nearby. After reading the poem, he entreats God to grant him Fatimah's hand in marriage in paradise: 'Oh, Lord, marry me to Fatimah who was martyred after they had violated her honour.' The suicide bomber smiles broadly throughout the taping of his farewell message. As he sits in the booby-trapped car, he smiles and pats the explosives that are going to end his life: 'This is Fatimah's dowry.' Waving to his friends who are taping the operation, Abu Muawiyah drives his car towards an unidentified target (SITE Institute 2006).[2]

A poem recited by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in one of his audio recordings weaves themes of oppression, humiliation, impotence and redemption through faith and martyrdom and at the same time demonises the enemy:

> Bagdad, we are shedding tears of sorrow and grief for you
> A Muslim town struck with humiliation at the hands of the worst of mankind, the Crusaders.
> I grieve for a girl as pure as snow, who is crying,
> Her chastity was violated by a dog and a pack of wolves.
> We go where thunder strikes but no Harun [al-Rashid] to stop them,
> And the heart is full of grief
> We go where thunder strikes while the Arabs bend their heads to them,
> But how can mice ever rise up?
> Woe unto my people, for they have strayed from the [right] path,
> By falsehoods and idols.
> Alas, there is no peace to unite us toward the great One,
> Nor do we have leaders among the people.

> Baghdad, do not be astonished, for the Arabs have no shame any longer;
> They live in sin and when the war heats up they abandon the battle.
> Dry your tears, for the people have strayed;
> The ammunition of war is faith before the sword.
> Where are the voices of the evil clerics whose rubbish we hear only when
> They are speaking against the holy warriors? Where are they? Why are
> They not defending the honour of Muslim women?
> I wish they would at least fight out of pride for the honour of Muslim women,
> Since they do not fight for religion.
> And I wish they would at least join the battlefield even for material gains,
> Since they do not care to gain God's blessings.
> Here I am, oh mother,
> Here I am, oh sister,
> Here I am, oh honourable and pure one,
> By God, we shall not rest, nor sleep, nor put our swords back in their sheaths,
> Until we avenge your honour and dignity.
>
> (cited in Hafez 2007b: 160)[3]

As mentioned earlier, a large majority of the insurgents are local Iraqis, and only a small proportion, estimated to be around 10 to 15 per cent, are from other countries (see Table 3.1). The available evidence, however, shows that a large number of suicide bombers in Iraq are foreign Islamist jihadists. This may be due to the fact that the identities of more than 80 per cent of suicide bombers are not known to the authorities, and most of the suicide attacks remain unclaimed. However, according to one reliable study of the names, gender and nationalities of 102 known suicide bombers in Iraq, all but three were men and the majority of them were foreigners. Their countries of origin were: Saudi Arabia (44), Italy (8), Kuwait (7), Iraq (7), Syria (6), Libya (3), Jordan (3), Belgium (2) France (2), Egypt (2) and one each from Tunisia, Morocco, Britain and Turkey. Nationalities of eleven suicide bombers were unknown (Hafez 2007b). Similar findings have been reported in an earlier study (Paz 2005). But these 102 suicide bombers are only 15 per cent of the 651 suicide bombers who carried out their suicide missions between 2003 and 2006. This means that we don't know with certainty the nationalities of the majority of suicide bombers in Iraq and probably never will know.

However, recruitment of suicide bombers from overseas requires pre-existing social and organisational networks. Again, on the basis of the above-mentioned study by Hafez, Islamist-jihadist networks in various countries serve as the conveyor belts for moving jihadi militants to Iraq. Most of these networks had their origins in Afghanistan following the Soviet invasion of that country, which brought Arab and Muslim fighters (*mujahidin*) from around the world, mainly under the sponsorship of the intelligence agencies of the United States, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. After

the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in 1989, many mujahidin returned to their countries but remained active, drawing inspiration from Al Qaeda and other Islamist movements fighting in different theatres of conflict in the Muslim world. This has allowed the diffusion of jihadist ideology, strategy and tactics (Hassan 2008: chapter 3; Hoodbhoy 2005).

Table 3.1 A profile of Iraqi insurgency, 2003–6

	May 2003	*June 2004*	*May 2005*	*September/October 2006*
Coalition troops US/other	150,000/23,000	138,000/23,000	138,000/23,000	162,000/18,000
Estimated numbers Iraqi/foreign fighters	3,000/100	15,000/300	16,000/1,000	20,000+/800–2,000
US aid disbursal	0	$2.5 billion	$7.7 billion	$15.9 billion
Iraqis wanting near-term US withdrawal	30% (July 2003–January 04)	65% (July 04)	82% (January 05)	71%
Average daily insurgent attacks	10	52	70	180
Suicide bombings	27	154	275	193

Sources: Cordesman (2005); De Albuquerque and O'Hanlon (2005); suicide terrorism data from FUSTD (2008).

In the case of Iraq, Hafez identifies four networks that played a vital role in the recruitment of jihadi volunteers for suicide terrorism. These are the Jordanian network associated with the Salafi movement in the towns of al-Zarqa and Salt; Saudi and Kuwaiti networks associated with Al Qaeda in the Arabian peninsula; Syrian and Lebanese networks associated with Salafis in Hums, Dayr al-Zayr, al-Ladhikiyah, the Ayn al-Hilwa refugee camp and

Majdal Anjar; and European networks led by North African dissidents from Morocco and Algeria. These networks have direct links to the second generation of jihadists trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the 1990s (Hafez 2007b: chapter 8; Hafez 2007a; Le Figaro 2007). These networks, along with others, were further sustained by Muslim anger against the War on Terror following the 9/11 attacks in the United States. During my travels in different Muslim countries in connection with a study of Muslim religiosity, I was often told by my respondents that the War on Terror was war on Islam, and many saw this as evidence of a US-led Western conspiracy against Islam (Hassan 2008: chapter 3).

There is growing evidence that the jihadist networks serve only as a conduit for assisting young Arabs radicalised by the media coverage of the atrocities of the Iraq war. This was illustrated by a trove of documents and computers discovered in September 2007, when American forces raided an insurgent camp in the desert town of Sinjar, near the Syrian border. They found US$18,000 in cash, assorted weapons and five terabytes of data, which included detailed questionnaires filled out by incoming fighters. The raid's target was an insurgent cell believed to be responsible for smuggling foreign fighters into Iraq. In the document, the Americans discovered a collection of biographical sketches of more than seven hundred foreign fighters brought into Iraq. The records underscored the fact that, notwithstanding the flow of foreign fighters, the Iraqi insurgency remains overwhelmingly Iraqi and Sunni.

The Sinjar documents revealed that the largest numbers of fighters on the records − 305, or 41 per cent – were from Saudi Arabia. Libyans accounted for 137, or 18 per cent, followed by individuals from Yemen (68), Algeria (64), Syria (56), Morocco (50), Tunisia (38), Jordan (14), Turkey (6), Egypt (2) and France (2). The records were so detailed that for the first time Americans were able to piece together the personal circumstances of foreign fighters. Previous attempts to do so had relied on the foreign fighters among the inmates in the American detention centres in Iraq. Of more than twenty-five thousand suspected insurgents in these detention centres, only a fraction − 290, or 1.2 per cent – were foreigners. About 80 per cent of the detainees were Sunni Arabs who constituted only 25 per cent of Iraq's population.

According to these documents the Sinjar cell smuggled the foreign fighters through the border with Syria that stretches about two hundred miles from Qaim in Anbar to the border with Turkey. American intelligence sources had estimated that around 10–13 per cent of foreign fighters came

from North Africa. But the Sinjar material showed that 39 per cent, or 291, of foreign fighters came from North African Arab nations in 2006. Each foreign fighter was self-funding his jihadi mission and brought in about US$1,000 with him, mostly to finance the operations of the smuggling cell. The Saudi fighters brought in more money than fighters from other countries.

The documents also included information on the hometowns of the fighters. For example, among the Saudi Arabian fighters 45 came from Mecca, 38 from Riyadh, 20 from the Buraidah area, 15 from Jawf and Sakakah, 13 from Jidda and 12 from Medina. But what surprised the Americans was the record showing that the largest foreign fighter hometown was Darnah, Libya, which provided 52 fighters (Oppel 2007).

Darnah, Libya: a mini Martyrdom Central

Darnah is a city of fifty thousand people on the Mediterranean coast in eastern Libya, nestled in the shadow of rust-coloured limestone bluffs overlooking the coastline. It is in a relatively poor region of Libya with high unemployment and a stagnant economic base. In March 2008 a *Newsweek* correspondent, Kevin Peraino, travelled to Darnah to investigate the specific local dynamics that were motivating such a large portion of the town's young men to fight the Americans in Iraq. He found that economic desperation alone did not fully explain their readiness to join the insurgents in Iraq. There are millions of impoverished Muslims in the world, but only a few hundred at any given time travel to Iraq to fight. In their interviews the family members of the local recruits spoke of young men with bleak lives in search of redemption. Far from being universally motivated by one global ideology, the local jihadist recruits often seemed to have been driven by personal factors like psychological trauma, sibling rivalry, a sense of outrage and sexual longing.

Darnah's jihadists also shared an almost obsessive devotion to their town's history. Greek and Roman ruins dot the town's surroundings. The United States left its own lasting mark on the town's collective memory. During the Barbary wars of the early 1800s President Thomas Jefferson ordered the American warship USS *Philadelphia* to capture the pirates menacing American merchant ships in the Mediterranean shipping lanes. Things went badly for the Americans, and USS *Philadelphia* was captured. The US government ordered General William Eaton to attack Libya to free the ship.

Eaton's forces marched overland from Alexandria, Egypt, to Darnah in 1805. At the gate of Darnah's old city, General Eaton demanded the town's surrender. The local Ottoman governor replied: 'My head or yours.' Eaton took the city. The battle for Darnah inspired the 'Shores of Tripoli' line in the US Marines' *Hymn*.

Today relics and reminders of the 1805 battle for Darnah are all over town. On the road into Darnah there is a set of four giant yellow concrete numerals advertising the 1805 Resort. One popular eatery on the corniche is the Philadelphia fast food restaurant. Libyan schools teach the capture of the *Philadelphia* as a great national victory, and the Libyans refer to the conflict as 'the First Libyan–American War'.

A century later, in 1911, Italy began its ruthless colonial occupation of Darnah, which lasted until the end of World War II. Italian occupation was fiercely resisted. The hero of the resistance was a charismatic Muslim warrior named Omar al-Mukhtar. He was a disciple of the secretive and conservative Senussis order of Islamic ascetics with close affinity to Saudi Arabian Wahhabism, which had spread to much of eastern Libya, primarily because of its extensive social welfare services for the local population. For twenty years, Mukhtar harassed the Italian forces with a small band of guerrillas. He was eventually captured by the Italians in 1931, and the insurgency was brutally crushed. This historical backdrop has infused the town's memory with a homegrown tradition of Islamic martyrdom and has become part of Darnah's folklore.

When Peraino asked the town's mayor what was driving so many of Darnah's young men to Iraq, the mayor denied that his town was sending so many of its young men there. After Peraino showed him the evidence, including photos of local fighters, he relented and said:

> We have no idea about that … this is a huge number … if this number is true, it's very bad. It's very bad for politics. But it's not bad for Muslims to do their duty. America said that this war is for freedom. And it's not. What we see on Al-Jazeera is not what we've been told by the Americans. I can't stop them from going. What we've been taught by the Qur'an is jihad.
>
> (Peraino 2008)

When Peraino asked him about the town's history of rebellious militants, the mayor told him with a grin, 'Those are the people who used to stand up and

fight for their land. We have to remember that' (Peraino 2008).[4] Peraino was able to see profiles of some of the fifty-two Libyan Islamic jihadists whose names appeared in the Sinjar documents, including Abd al-Salam bin Ali and Ashraf al-Hasadi.[5]

Abd al-Salam bin Ali

Twenty-year-old Abd al-Salam bin Ali disappeared in September 2006. Pale, lanky and blind in one eye, the unobtrusive young man did not leave much of an impression in Darnah. In school he had studied to become a veterinarian, but the economic situation in Darnah was so bad that after graduation he could not find a job. According to his older brother, sometimes he would set up a folding table in Darnah's Old City and hawk cheap perfumes. Unmarried and with few prospects, Abd al-Salam lived with his mother. For entertainment he would sprawl in front of the family television and watch *Lion of the Desert*, the 1981 epic of Libyan resistance fighters starring Anthony Quinn. He had watched the film over and over. As the war in Iraq dragged on, he also tuned in to Al-Jazeera. Nobody in his family had supported the American invasion, but Abd al-Salam was particularly affected by the bloody images he was seeing on the Arabic cable news channel.

He sometimes teased his mother that he wanted to run away to fight the Americans. When she protested he always backed down and told her, 'Mom, don't worry. I'll get married instead.' His brother was not so sure and thought that he would go because he 'was always talking about it'. According to his older brother, Abd al-Salam was also growing more devout and spending more and more time in the mosque. Then one day in late September 2006, Abd al-Salam disappeared. 'Where is he?' his anxious mother asked when he didn't show up for dinner. His brother reassured her that Abd al-Salam had gone to Benghazi to buy perfumes, but he did not believe his own story. Abd al-Salam had probably hitched a ride to Cairo, and then flown on to Damascus. He later crossed the border into Iraq with US$100 cash in his pocket, and joined a cadre of insurgents led by a co-ordinator he knew as 'Hamad'. Shortly after Abd al-Salam disappeared, he telephoned home. 'I'm in Ramadi,' the voice on the end said. 'I'm in Iraq.' That was the last his family heard from him.

Ashraf al-Hasadi

Another Darnah jihadi was Ashraf al-Hasadi. According to the Sinjar documents, eighteen-year-old Ashraf left Darnah for Iraq in 2006. He worked in his family's spice shop in the Old City. He was tall and clean-shaven, the youngest of four brothers of a local prosperous Hasadi family. According to one brother, he 'was the quietest in the family'. Ashraf was still a bachelor, and his family had been urging him to get married. Because a wedding ceremony is expensive and Darnah is relatively poor, most men in town don't marry until they are at least in their late twenties. But Ashraf was considerably better positioned than most of his friends. After his mother's death in 2006, it was up to his brothers to set him up. Ashraf already had a job, a car and an apartment – all the prerequisites for marriage. Even so, his brothers were worried about him. Ashraf was a little tightly wound, sensitive and severe at the same time. He recoiled at the images of the Iraq war that he saw on Al-Jazeera. According to his elder brother, he never watched movies; the only program he watched was the news. After work, Ashraf liked to drive his Hyundai around the tight warrens of Darnah's Old City. He showed no interest in marriage. According to his brother, 'He had every thing except for the girl.'

Ashraf began to spend more and more time at the mosque. Darnah is a religious town; at prayer times during the day the shops in the Old City's main street roll-lock their front doors as the mosques fill for prayers. Even by Darnah's religious standards Ashraf became 'seriously religious' and began to live in the mosque. One day in the summer of 2007, Ashraf went to see his brothers and told them he was leaving on a trip with a friend. They did not make much of the conversation. Then about a week later, the phone rang. Ashraf told them that he was in Iraq. That was the last phone call he made to his family. His brothers feared the worst and did not know for sure whether they would ever see him again.

The answer to the question why so many of Darnah's young men have joined the insurgents in Iraq lies not in a global jihadi ideology but in an explosive mix of desperation, pride, anger, sense of powerlessness, local traditions and memory of resistance, and religious fervour. These factors, present individually in many parts of the Islamic world, are found collectively in Darnah. The Sinjar documents indicate that the Iraq insurgents had several local co-ordinators working in Darnah. There are few clues to how the young men were recruited, but after they signed up they

were sent to Iraq in small groups rather than singly. The Darnah pipeline passed through Egypt and Syria, where local co-ordinators arranged to have the enlistees smuggled across the border into Iraq. There is no way to know whether the pipeline is still flowing (Peraino 2008).

FUSTD suicide bombing profile: Iraq

Iraq is not new to terrorism. Under Saddam Hussain's regime, state-sponsored terrorism targeted dissident Kurd and Shia groups, especially after the first Gulf war, resulting in the deaths of thousands. But suicide terrorism is a new phenomenon and began after the US-led invasion of the country in March 2003. It has now become an important and integral part of the Iraqi insurgency fighting to expel the foreign occupying forces. In particular, as noted earlier, suicide bombing attacks are a strategic part of Islamist strategy compared with that of the nationalist insurgents. The frequency of suicide bombings is also correlated with the intensity of Iraqi insurgency and public opposition to Iraq's occupation. For example, between April and December 2003 there was a total of twenty-seven suicide bombings, an average of three per month. In the same period insurgent attacks averaged ten per day, and 70 per cent of Iraqis supported the presence of the US forces. Three years later, in 2006, the insurgency had become more intense, daily insurgent attacks increased to 180, and there were 193 suicide bombing attacks in that year. In 2006, 71 per cent of Iraqis supported the withdrawal of the foreign occupying forces (see Table 3.1).

The invasion of Iraq by the US-led coalition of Western countries and the ensuing war has led to a dramatic rise in suicide bombings. According to the American political scientist Robert Pape's suicide bombing database, there were 315 suicide attacks globally between 1981 and 2003 (Pape 2005). The Flinders University Suicide Terrorism Database (FUSTD) shows that there were 651 suicide bombing attacks between 2003 and 2006 in Iraq alone. This means that in four years between 2003 and 2006 there were *more* suicide bombing attacks in Iraq alone than in the whole world between 1981 and 2003. In 2003–5 there were 457 suicide attacks, averaging 152 attacks a year. But in 2006, the last year for which the data were complied in the FUSTD, their numbers had increased to 194. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 provide a statistical profile of suicide bombings in Iraq based on the analysis of the Flinders University Suicide Terrorism Database.

Of 651 suicide bombing attacks between 2003 and 2006 for which we have information about the insurgent groups responsible for sponsoring them, most were carried out by Islamist groups. There were around fifty-six insurgent groups in Iraq in 2007. The main perpetrators of the attacks were the main Islamist-Jihadi group, AQI, and its affiliates, Ansar al-Islam and Tawhid wal-Jihad, followed by nationalist–Baathist insurgent groups Islamic Army in Iraq, Mujahidin Army, Ansar al-Sunnah, Revolutionary Brigades of the Islamic and National Resistance Movement.

Globally only 4 per cent of all terrorist attacks tend to be suicide attacks (see Table 1.3), which account for a third of all terrorism-related fatalities. In Iraq they constituted around 9 per cent of all terrorist attacks and accounted for 31 per cent of all terrorism-related deaths. This means that compared with most other sites, suicide attacks constituted a much larger proportion of terrorism attacks in Iraq and accounted for about a third of all terrorism-related deaths. Their popularity appears to be a function of the supply of potential suicide bombers as well as their lethality compared with non-suicide terrorist attacks. On average in Iraq a suicide attack killed nine people compared with two from a non-suicide attack (see Table 3.3). The data also show that in the first three years of war suicide bombings were a popular weapon of the Iraqi insurgents. In these years 14 per cent of all insurgent terrorist attacks were suicide bombing attacks, accounting for 4,071 or 44 per cent of all terrorism-related deaths. By 2006, however, suicide attacks as a proportion of all terrorist attacks had declined to 5 per cent, a significant decline compared with the previous three years, although their lethality had remained unchanged. This decline was partly a function of the fact that insurgent terrorist attacks in 2006 had increased by a factor of 3.5 from an average of 1,121 per year in 2003–5 to 3,968 in 2006. The average yearly suicide attacks increased from 152 in 2003–5 to 194 in 2006.

Table 3.2 Deaths from suicide attacks and other terrorism in Iraq, 2003–6

Year	*All terrorist attacks (n)*	*Suicide attacks (n)*	*Suicide attacks as % of all terrorist attacks*	*Deaths from all terrorist attacks (n)*	*Deaths from suicide attacks (n)*	*Deaths from suicide attacks as % of all deaths*
2003–5	3,364	457	14	9,261	4,070	44
2006	3,968	194	5	9,497	1,696	18
2003–06	7,332	651	9	18,758	5,766	31

Sources: MIPT database (www.tkb.org); FUSTD (2008).

Note
a 'Deaths from suicide attacks' refers to the minimum number killed.


Table 3.3 Lethality of suicide attacks in Iraq, 2003–6

Year	*Average yearly suicide attacks*	*Deaths per suicide attack*[a]	*Average yearly non- suicide terrorist attack*	*Deaths per non-suicide terrorist attack*
2003–5	152	9	969	1.8
2006	194	9	3,774	2.1
2003–6	163	9	1,670	1.9

Sources: MIPT database (www.tkb.org); FUSTD (2008).

Note
a 'Deaths from suicide attacks' refers to the minimum number killed.

In terms of insurgent attacks, 2005 was the most violent year between 2003 and 2006 (see Figure 3.2). The average kill ratio of a suicide attack and a non-suicide terrorist attack was 4.7 in Iraq, a considerably lower figure than the global ratio of 11. A number of reasons may account for this comparatively low lethality of suicide bombing attacks in Iraq. These would include hardening of the potential targets, lack of preparedness of perpetrators, poor execution and the quality of emergency services. Between 2003 and 2005 there were 4,070 deaths from suicide attacks accounting for 44 per cent of all terrorism-related deaths. This proportion declined dramatically to 18 per cent in 2006. The insurgency was most intense in the Sunni provinces of Anbar, Baghdad, Salah al-Din and Diyala, which contained 37 per cent of the Iraqi population but accounted for 81 per cent of all insurgent attacks (Department of Defence 2006).



Source: FUSTD (2008).

Figure 3.2 Suicide attacks in Iraq by month

The cities of Baghdad, Balad, Baquba, Mosul, Hillah, Tikrit, Ramadi, Kirkuk, Tal Afar, Sammara, Fallujah and Basra were some of the main sites of insurgency and suicide bombings. But Baghdad was the magnet and accounted for 52 per cent of all suicide attacks as well as 25 per cent of all US military deaths (see Figure 3.3).

The frequency of suicide attacks is related to developments in the battlefield and the political arena. The major counter-insurgency operations by the coalition forces were generally followed by a rise in suicide attacks as insurgents were keen to show their enemies and supporting public that they would not be deterred in their struggle in the face of oppression. Furthermore, counter-insurgency operations invariably involved ‘excesses’ and collateral damage that captured media attention. Insurgents tended to capitalise on the public anger and emotions generated by such ‘excesses’, enabling them to execute their deadly attacks with little concern for the consequences.





Figure 3.3 Suicide attacks in Iraq, main sites

On the political front suicide attacks appeared to be provoked by developments that might be harbingers of political stability, such as elections. Suicide attacks increased significantly in the aftermath of the January 2005 elections for the assembly to draft a new constitution and after the December 2005 parliamentary elections. Creating chaos, fear and instability through suicide attacks is a way of showing all concerned that the insurgents and not the political establishment and the foreign occupying forces control the tempo of the struggle. Figure 3.4 further illustrates the relationship between the timings of suicide campaigns and major counter-insurgency operations (Hafez 2007b: 98–101).

Targets of suicide attacks

As shown in Table 3.4, between 2003 and 2006 half of all suicide attacks in Iraq targeted Iraqi security forces and public officials, followed by civilians, infrastructure, and foreign forces and contractors. The data also reveal that

attacks against local security forces and public officials and civilians increased and those against foreign forces and infrastructure declined in the same period. The decline against the foreign forces and contractors and infrastructure resulted from the hardening of these targets with greater security precautions and protection. With this hardening the suicide attacks on coalition forces and infrastructure became much more difficult and less effective, which led insurgents to shift to attacks against softer targets. Because of their ubiquity it is also difficult to provide watertight security for civilians, local security forces and public officials. Another reason behind this shift was the insurgent strategy to undermine the instruments employed to create political stability in Iraq by increasingly targeting the Iraqi security forces. The evidence shows, however, that the non-suicide attacks on coalition forces through mortars, rockets, snipers and IEDs remained constant (Brookings Institution 2006b).



Sources: Hafez (2007b); FUSTD (2008).

Note: COIN = Counter-insurgency operation.

Figure 3.4 Timeline of suicide attacks and major events in Iraq, 2003–6

Table 3.4 Targets of suicide attacks in Iraq, 2003–6

Target	*2003*		*2004*		*2005*		*2006*		
	N	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*Total*
Infrastructure	4	22.2	30	21.7	32	12.2	15	7.8	81
Local security/ public officials	8	44.4	62	44.9	124	47.1	114	59.1	308
Foreign forces/ contractors	2	11.1	25	18.1	41	15.6	2	1.0	70
Civilians	2	11.1	18	13.0	54	20.5	57	29.5	131
Others	2	11.1	3	2.2	12	4.6	5	2.6	22
Missing									39
Total	18	100.0	138	100.0	263	100.0	193	100.0	651

Source: FUSTD (2008).

The FUSTD statistics are similar to the figures reported by the British journalist Robert Fisk, except that his analysis covers the period until March 2008. According to Fisk, throughout the five years of war, suicide bombers have focused on Iraq's American-trained security forces rather than on US troops. At least 365 attacks have been staged against Iraqi police or military forces. Their targets included at least 147 police stations (1,577 deaths), 43 army and police recruitment centres (939 deaths), 91 checkpoints with a minimum of 564 fatalities, 92 security patrols with 465 deaths and numerous other police targets, including escorts and convoys accompanying government ministers, etc. One recruitment centre in Baghdad has been attacked on eight separate occasions. By contrast, suicide bombers have attacked only 24 US bases with 100 Americans fatalities, and 43 American patrols and checkpoints, killing 116 US personnel and around 56 civilians, 15 of whom appear to have been shot by American soldiers in response to the attacks, and another 26 of whom were children standing next to a US patrol (Fisk 2008).




Figure 3.5 Targets of suicide bombing in Iraq, 2003–6

According to first-hand accounts based on interviews with serving US military personnel, suicide attacks against US forces became ineffective because the Americans acquired better armour following the initial wave of attacks, thus making suicide attacks against them less lethal. Also, fixed US positions and checkpoints were fortified with concrete barriers, cement blocks and ‘dragon teeth’ (steel-reinforced concrete) defences to prevent the penetration of vehicle-borne suicide bombers. Other security measures that made it difficult to target the coalition forces included the building of dual exterior and interior gates and entry control points with guard shacks (Hafez 2007b: 105).

Types of suicide attacks

There are two main types of suicide bombing attacks in Iraq. Reliable information for the weapon used was available only for 508 suicide attacks, of which 56 per cent were car bombs or VBIED and 44 per cent were suicide explosive belts or bags or SBA (see Table 3.5; Figure 3.6 illustrates the distribution of all suicide attacks, including those where evidence for type of weapon is missing, and therefore the percentages shown are different from those in Table 3.5). Most car bombs are prepared in residential factories. Almost the entire vehicle is packed tightly with TNT, PE4 plastic or C4 and other explosives. Some car bombs are rigged to explode on impact, and others have switches or buttons controlled by the suicide bomber driving the car. There are also reports of car bombs operated by remote detonators


controlled by another person from a distance in case the suicide bomber has second thoughts about the mission.

Table 3.5 Weapons used in suicide attacks in Iraq, 2003–6

Weapon	*2003* *N*	*%*	*2004* *N*	*%*	*2005* *N*	*%*	*2006* *N*	*%*	*Total*
Suicide vehicular attack	8	100.0	67	91.8	183	77.9	108	55.7	366
Suicide belt/bomb attack	0	0	5	6.8	51	21.7	86	44.3	142
Other[a]	0	0	1	1.4	1	0.5	0	0	2
Missing[b]									141
Total	8	100.0	73	100.0	235	100.0	194	100.0	651

Source: FUSTD (2008).

Notes
a Suicide shooting/grenade/mine attack or conflicting reports.
b Source could not confirm the weapon.



Source: FUSTD (2008).

Figure 3.6 Weapons used in suicide bombing in Iraq, 2003–6

In order to avoid detection, car bombs are manufactured at multiple locations. The explosives are prepared at one location and then taken to another where they are packed into the vehicle, which is then taken to the site of the planned attack. Operators are also briefed and trained for the mission. The biographies of martyrs and videos of operations reveal that

before the attacks are carried out, surveillance squads prepare elaborate briefings for the bombers and, in some cases, even practice runs are carried out to ensure the mission's success. Some videos show that the missions involve two or three bombers followed by a surveillance team. Some of the missions also involved more than one vehicle in order to achieve the desired objectives (Hafez 2007a).

Biography of an Iraqi suicide bomber

Marwan Abu Ubeida was a volunteer suicide bomber waiting to carry out his deadly mission when he was interviewed in 2005 by Aparism Ghosh, a correspondent for the magazine *Time*. The interview was the result of months of complex negotiations between Ghosh and an insurgent group. Marwan came to the interview on orders from his commander at a carefully arranged venue. He came unaccompanied, and no information was provided regarding where he lived or trained. During the three-hour interview, he talked freely of his motivations but without divulging any specifics about a prospective strike. He was candid and articulate, although he insisted on being photographed wearing a mask over his face to conceal his identity. He also chose both a pseudonym, Marwan, and a historical name, that of Abu Ubeida al-Jarrah, a seventh-century general who conquered Syria for Islam. The sincerity of his desire to make himself a 'martyr' was attested to by several figures – members of his organisation, AQI; a Baghdad area commander of an insurgent unit that provided logistical support for Al Qaeda suicide bombers; a Sunni imam who counselled bombers during their 'spiritual purifications', whom *Time* consulted through Iraqis with contacts inside the insurgency. Marwan's interview provided a rare glimpse into the mindset and preparation of an aspiring suicide bomber in Iraq.

A Sunni Muslim, Marwan was born and raised in Fallujah in a financially well-to-do family of six brothers and four sisters. His father was a successful businessman who was able to provide his large family a comfortable life. In high school Marwan was an average student but he excelled in the Quranic studies he pursued at a local mosque. At the time of the interview he was twenty years old and already a battle-hardened jihadi foot soldier in Abu Mousab al-Zarqawi's Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) insurgent group. He had been training for months to carry out a suicide mission. He did not know where and when he would be ordered to climb into an explosive-laden vehicle or strap on an explosives-filled suicide vest but was eager for the moment to

come. On that fateful day he would offer a final prayer and ask Allah to bless his mission with a high rate of casualties among the American and Iraqi soldiers. He would ask Allah to purify his soul, to see Him and his mujahidin brothers who are already with Him. As he put it: ‘The most important thing is that He should let me kill many Americans.’

In his hometown, Fallujah, Marwan was known for his ferocity in battle and his piety. Marwan asked his commander to consider him for a suicide mission in autumn 2004 but had to wait until the beginning of April 2005 for his name to be put on the list of volunteers. The day that happened, he said, was ‘the happiest day of my life’. There were scores of names on the list and it can take months before a volunteer is assigned an operation. ‘I can’t wait,’ Marwan told Ghosh. ‘I am ready to die now.’

He did not stand out in the streets of Iraq. He was short and scrawny with a chin covered with wispy facial hair that made him look younger than his age. Few would notice his one distinguishing feature: outsized hands, heavily calloused from use of his favourite weapon, the Russian-made PKC machine-gun. Even his distinctive Fallujah accent was not uncommon amid the din of the Iraqi capital, where suicide bombings were most frequent. According to an informant close to several insurgent groups and a US official familiar with insurgent operations, small and nondescript fighters like Marwan are considered ideal bombers, since they can slip into crowds without attracting attention. He came to the interview wearing a black short-sleeved shirt hanging over black trousers – favoured by many Iraqi Shia Muslims – to blend in with the majority of Iraq’s population.

Marwan’s journey towards suicide bombing began just a few weeks after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Unlike many other Sunnis in Fallujah, he had little love for Saddam’s Sunni-dominated regime. Yet once the dictator fell, he turned against the Americans. ‘We expected them to bring Saddam down and then leave … But they stayed and stayed.’ Insurgents approached disaffected Fallujians like Marwan and urged them to join the resistance against the Americans. Many signed up, including one of Marwan’s older brothers. Marwan joined the insurgency in April 2003, when US soldiers fired on a crowd of demonstrators at a school, killing twelve and wounding many more. Marwan, who took part in the protest, escaped unharmed, but the event proved decisive. A few days later, he and a few friends collected grenades and small arms from a military site abandoned by the Iraqi army and mounted an attack on a building occupied by US soldiers. ‘They shot

back but couldn't hit any of us,' he recalled. It was his first taste of victory against the Americans.

Over the next year he participated in dozens of assaults on the US troops who were struggling to control the city. Marwan became an expert with machine-guns, a skill that brought him to the attention of al-Zarqawi's group, then called Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jihad. Marwan's piety apparently impressed the foreign jihadists as well. In April 2004 he was approached by Al-Tawhid's spiritual guide, Palestine-born Abu Anas al-Shami. Al-Shami was a powerful orator and motivator, and had a deep influence on Marwan. (Al-Shami was killed in a rocket attack by US forces near Fallujah in late 2004, and his biography can be found on numerous Islamist-jihadi websites.) Like other Iraqis who have joined extremist religious groups during the insurgency, Marwan severed all connection with his family when he joined up. He would call his family once before his suicide mission to say goodbye. Even though one of his brothers fights for another insurgent group and other siblings help the rebels with money and shelter, he believed they thought he had gone too far. 'My family are not happy with my choice but they know they can't change my path.'

For the deeply religious Marwan, his colleagues in Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jihad were now closer to his heart than his family or former friends. For him, 'Jihadists are more religious people. You ask them anything – anything – and they can instantly quote a relevant section from the Koran.' Like them, Marwan worked Quranic allusions into his speech. He had also embraced the jihadist worldview of one global Islamic state where there is 'no alcohol, no music and no Western influences'. He conceded that he had not thought deeply about what life might be like in such a state; after all, he did not expect to live long enough to experience it. Besides, he claimed, first of all he fights for Islam, second to become a martyr and win acceptance into heaven, and only third for control of his country. 'The first step is to remove the Americans from Iraq. After we have achieved that, we can work out the other details.'

For Marwan, waiting was the hardest aspect of a jihadi's transformation to a suicide bomber. Volunters like him have to undergo a programme to discipline the mind and cleanse the soul. The training, supervised by field commanders and Sunni clerics sympathetic to the insurgency, is mainly psychological and spiritual. Besides the Quran, Marwan read the history of jihad and its great martyrs. Such reading strengthened his resolve. One popular source of inspiration for suicide bombers was *The Lover of Angels*

by Abdullah Azzam, one of Osama bin Laden's spiritual mentors, which tells stories of jihadists who died fighting Soviet occupying troops in Afghanistan. He also listened to taped speeches that address subjects like the rewards that await warriors in heaven and watched insurgent videos of the successful suicide attacks. A US official familiar with suicide bombings said that volunteers even visit the sites of previous bombings for their inspiration.

While waiting, would-be suicide bombers may use their time to take care of business such as paying off debts, resolving family matters and saying farewells. Some even destroy any photographs because they are regarded as a sign of vanity. Others compile lists of the seventy people for whom they believe a 'martyr' can guarantee a place in paradise. Allowing himself a rare smile, Marwan told the interviewer, 'I haven't got my 70 names yet – I don't think I know that many people.' Some dig graves for themselves and leave instructions on the way they should be buried. Marwan did not believe he needed a grave: 'If I am lucky, my body will be vaporised. There won't be anything left of me to bury.'

He expected the final stage of his training to be far more rigorous. He would spend his last days in near-seclusion, probably holed up in a safe house with a few other suicide bombers-to-be. For non-Iraqis, the isolation can serve a practical purpose, ensuring that they keep a low profile and avoid arousing suspicion with their foreign accents. All would-be suicide bombers are expected to immerse themselves in spiritual contemplation and prayer, to free their minds of negative thoughts towards their fellow men – except Americans and their Iraqi infidel supporters. There would be no TV or music, and he would have to give up his one addiction: cigarettes. All this symbolically means giving up one's previous life and the start of a new one. Suicide bombers have little or no say in planning their operations. The logistics – choosing targets, checking out the site, preparing the bomb-laden vehicles or vests – are left to field commanders and explosives specialists. Usually a bomber is told about the mission just before it is to be executed.

Marwan mentored a friend intent on martyrdom earlier in the year. He expected his final weeks to be a period of euphoria rather than penance. 'My friend was happier than I had ever seen him. He felt he was close to the end of his journey to heaven.' His friend had blown himself up two months before the publication of Marwan's interview at a checkpoint manned by Iraqi soldiers near Ramadi, capital of the turbulent Anbar province, and six were killed. They had made a pact to meet in heaven. Unlike many other insurgents, Marwan admitted that he was a 'terrorist' because he believed the

Quran says it is the duty of Muslims to bring terror to the enemy, 'so being a terrorist makes me a good Muslim'. He quoted lines from the Surah Al-Anfal (Spoils of War): 'Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steed of War, to strike terror into the enemy of Allah and your enemy.'

Marwan was twice arrested by US patrols and detained for short spells, but because he did not speak English, he was unable to communicate with his captors and was released. He was troubled by the prospect that his suicide mission might kill Iraqi civilians. This contemplation appeared to reflect the fact that around the time of his interview a spate of suicide bombings in Baghdad had killed many innocent bystanders. 'I pray no innocent people are killed in my mission. But if some are, I know when they arrive in heaven, Allah will ask them to forgive me.' If he could choose, Marwan preferred his mission to be a car bombing targeting US soldiers or Iraqi security forces far away from any civilians. But if ordered to strap on an explosive belt and walk to his target on a downtown street, he said he would do so. In his mind only Allah knew the type of target he would be asked to attack. But in fact the decision would be made by a field commander of al-Zarqawi's group. Marwan hoped that he would be chosen for a high-profile hit, the dramatic, headline-grabbing kind that al-Zarqawi is said to direct personally. Although he had never met the terrorist mastermind, he revered him as a great Islamic hero.

Marwan did not think about his legacy or how others might regard him when he was gone. Unlike their Palestinian counterparts, Iraq's human bombs are not celebrated and memorialised by family and friends. At best, Marwan might be profiled on one of the jihadist websites, but even there, his identity would be concealed to spare his family harassment by the Iraqi authorities. 'It does not matter whether people know what I did,' he told his interviewer. 'The only person who matters is Allah – and the only question he will ask me is: How many infidels did you kill?'[6]

Baghdad Badr attack

The Iraqi insurgents often release videos of suicide bombing attacks in Iraq that receive wide media coverage not only on Islamist websites but also in the international media. In late 2005 AQI issued a fourteen-minute video entitled *Baghdad Badr Attack*, which showed the suicide bombing attacks on the Palestine Meridien and the Ishtar Sheraton hotels in Baghdad on 24

October 2005. The video contained clips from various stages of the operation, including intelligence-gathering missions, preparatory stages and final execution.

The following is a summary of the video and a translation of selected parts of the video. (The term ‘Badr’ seeks to evoke the memory of the battle of Badr in the month of Ramadan in AD624, in which Muhammad, with about three hundred men, overcame a force of about a thousand Meccans.) The video shows clips from different stages of the operation: how intelligence was gathered in advance and how the operation was planned out, and the future ‘martyrs’, before their death, reading portions of their testaments. It displayed pictures of the attacks themselves as well as pictures of the ruined hotels following the attacks. Throughout the video, Muslims are incited to join jihad. The video begins with a short clip in which Osama bin Laden is seen walking in a mountainous region, with a voice in the background calling on people to join jihad in order to prevent the infidels from destroying Islam.

The video contains a quote from the Quran: ‘They will not fight you even together, except in fortified townships, or from behind walls. Strong is their fighting spirit amongst themselves; thou wouldst think they were united, but their hearts are divided: that is because they are a people devoid of wisdom’ (Al-Hasher, 14). This quote is chanted over a background in which a car is seen driving down the street with the hotels in the background. Simultaneously, we hear the military commander pointing out, apparently to the suicide bombers, details concerning the road. As the car rolls to a stop, the camera focuses on the two hotels, and the commander points them out, explaining to the would-be ‘martyrs’ where they are to situate themselves. Placing his pointer on the first hotel, the commander says: ‘This is the Palestine Meridien Hotel, which will be the destiny of the brother Abu Juheiman,’ while with his pointer on the second he says, ‘And here is the Ishtar Sheraton Hotel, which will be the destiny of our brother Abu Dahham.’ The commandeer explains that Abu Dahham will be standing no more than twenty metres from the target, and will have the explosive charge that will be directed towards the left, in contrast to Abu Naim, who will be standing a bit further away with a smaller charge directed towards the right.

The video then moves to the section entitled ‘Will of Abu Dahham’. Here we hear and see Abu Dahham reading aloud a portion from his testament, in which he forecasts the doom of the renegades and speaks of his joy at departing from this world, adding: ‘Glory to Allah who has bestowed me this

operation in this month of Ramadan.' This is followed by the part entitled 'Setting Out'. Abu Naim, Abu Dahham and Abu Juheiman are shown entering their cars and waving farewell, apparently setting out on the attack. The last video section is entitled 'Mujahidin Watch the Attack'. Here we see a TV screen with a news broadcast on the attack on the hotels. As pictures are shown of the hotel exploding, the watchers are shown cheering and shouting: 'Allah is the greatest.' Pictures are shown of the explosion and of the smoke rising from the ruins following it.

The voice in the background then summarises the operation: 'Allah has enabled the Mujahidin of Al Qaeda in the Land of Two Rivers to attack the Palestine Hotel, in which stayed foreign journalists as well as security companies … whereas in the Ishtar Sheraton Hotel, in the three lower floors, stayed the Centre for Framing the Constitution … while in the sixth floor there stayed over fifty Americans.' The video ends with some inciting speeches of Zarqawi. He begins: 'The spark has been ignited in Iraq,' expressing his hope that it will continue to flame until victory over the crusaders is achieved. Zarqawi accuses the infidels of 'humiliating the men and violating the women' and of seeking to 'raise the cross over our lands and beneath our skies', but vows that this enemy will not prevail.[7]

Concluding remarks

The Iraq war has had devastating consequences for Iraq and significant parts of the world. Iraq of course has borne the brunt of the destruction unleashed by the war. A significant part of the country's infrastructure has been destroyed, and the loss of life has been horrendous. One study has estimated that between March 2003 and July 2006 more than 600,000 Iraqi civilians lost their lives (Burnham *et al.* 2006; Tavernise and McNeil 2006). But Iraqi authorities put the civilian deaths close to 100,000. The social and psychological impact has been equally devastating. Around two million Iraqis have become refugees in neighbouring countries, and ordinary patterns of social life have been severely disrupted. The occupying armies have suffered a significant loss of life, too. America alone has lost more than four thousand soldiers, and the economic cost of war has had a crippling impact on the American and global economies (Bilmes and Stiglitz 2008). The war has sown deep political divisions in the United States, and in 2008 a president was elected who was committed to withdrawing US forces from the country.

The war has had a far-reaching political impact on the Muslim world, the most obvious being increasing radicalisation, which, as we have seen, has become a conveyor belt for supplying jihadists to join the Islamist insurgents in Iraq. These foreign jihadists have become an important source of suicide bombers. The ethnic and sectarian divisions in Iraq have become sharper and are dangerously undermining the policies, unity and stability of the country. One senior Iraqi parliamentarian I interviewed in late 2006 told me that he and many of his colleagues felt very pessimistic about Iraq's future as one country. But perhaps no single example captures the tragedy of the Iraq war for the Iraqis more than the torture and humiliation suffered by the inmates of Abu Ghraib prison at the hands of the American prison guards. It was a humiliation felt not only by the Iraqis but also by Muslims all over the world, and it did irreparable damage to the moral and political standing of the United States in the Muslim world.

The torture and humiliation at Abu Ghraib had a major impact on the Iraqi psyche and the insurgency. In the eyes of the majority of Iraqis the insurgency became a struggle for the national liberation of the country from foreign occupation. Robert Pape's hypothesis that insurgency and the accompanying suicide terrorism is a response to the foreign occupation of the homeland could easily be applied to explain the phenomenon (Pape 2005). For eighteen months between June 2004 and December 2005 the daily insurgent attacks averaged between eighty and a hundred. Multiple suicide bombing attacks became a daily occurrence, and 2005 brought more suicide bombings than any other year since the occupation of Iraq began. Public opinion turned against the Anglo-American occupation, and a majority ranging between 70 and 80 per cent of Iraqis wanted foreign troops to leave.

For psychological and sociological reasons, group honour and dishonour become bound up with a deeply felt sense of honour and dishonour at the personal level. Close ties of kinship, shared history and collective memory create a strong and enduring bond between the individuals and the community, making individuals willing to die in the belief that the community will benefit from their deaths, admire their sacrifice and commemorate it. This is a perfectly secular way of overcoming the fear of death. It enables individuals to imagine death away, not by focusing on paradise, but by focusing on the honour to be enjoyed by their dishonoured community after the enemy responsible is humiliatingly drenched in its own

blood (Holmes 2005; El Sarraj 2002; Hoffman and McCormick 2004; Sageman 2004).

It was not religion but humiliation that powered the insurgency and suicide bombing attacks. Humiliation is a complex and intense emotional personal experience, when historically and culturally grounded definitions of self-image, selfworth, dignity and self-respect are destroyed and made out to be false and illegitimate affectations (Miller 1993; Lukes 1997). In traditional Arab society where private and public conduct is regulated by deeply ingrained cultural codes of honour and shame, Abu Ghraib was a relentless assault on these codes. Suicide attacks became a means of self-empowerment in the face of powerlessness and honour in the face of humiliation. Humiliation can inspire a willingness to obey the humiliating authority, but its assault on the individual and collective sense of dignity produces powerful feelings of overt rebellion or simmering resentment and rage.

As Hanna Arendt has pointed out, when a collective sense of justice is offended by outrageous events, and when there is no recourse to legitimate means to change conditions, people react with rage, which makes it enormously tempting to resort to violence because of its swiftness and inherent immediacy. Under such conditions, acting without argument or speech and without counting the consequences is the only way to set the scales of justice right. She calls this a ‘natural’ human emotion (Arendt 1969). The sense of outrage created by Abu Ghraib and other similar occurrences abundantly aided the activities and the agenda of Iraq’s insurgents and produced a relentless and unprecedented cycle of deadly and destructive suicide terrorism in the country.

4 Suicide bombings in Israel and Palestine

With 217 suicide bombings between 1993 and 2006, Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories provided the most fertile site for suicide bombings in the world before Iraq appropriated that designation after the war that started in 2003. The driver of these bombings was and remains one of the most intractable conflicts in modern times. In the public perception, particularly in the West, the cause of these suicide attacks is virulent Palestinian Arab anti-Semitism. It is true that anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist rhetoric appears prominently in the propaganda of the sponsoring organisations that follows the attacks in order to justify them. However, anti-Semitism is not the real cause but rather a consequence of the conflict. In fact, for fourteen centuries Jews have lived under Islamic rule in many Muslim lands, including Palestine, and, while they were never free from discrimination, they were rarely subjected to anti-Semitic persecution as they were in the Christian lands of Europe.[1]

The expression of anti-Semitism, anti-Jewishness and anti-Zionism that is now found in Palestine, and in the propaganda and pronouncements of organisations aiding and abetting suicide bombings, is a recent phenomenon and a product of Israeli–Palestinian conflict. This conflict arose first from the Palestinian resistance to large-scale Jewish migration in the early twentieth century, then from the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 under the United Nations mandate and the ensuing Arab–Israeli wars, and finally from the repressive occupation of Palestinian territories by Israel since 1967.

While the Jewish Israelis invoke the divine covenant in their religious texts to support their claim to the land, much of which is now the State of Israel, the Palestinians base their claim on their continuous occupation for the past two thousand years. Palestine had become a predominantly Arab

and Islamic land by the end of the seventh century, with small Christian, Druze and Jewish minorities. Under centuries of Muslim rule, religious communities by and large lived harmoniously (Said 1980; Smith 2004). Then, after the fall of the Ottoman Empire in the early twentieth century, Palestine became a Mandate territory under British rule. The population of Palestine then was around 700,000. Arabs made up 87 per cent of the population, 80 per cent of whom were Muslims; the remaining 13 per cent were Jews. But in a span of less than twenty years from 1922 to 1940, under intensive Zionist immigration and in the wake of the Balfour Declaration, the Jewish population had increased to 31 per cent of the total (Kossaifi 1980).

The intensive Zionist immigration of mostly young males became a source of great consternation, anti-Jewish agitation and resistance, which was led by the Mufti Hajj Amin al-Husayani, radical Islamist Imam Izz ad-Din al-Qassam of Haifa and the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, following the recommendation of the British Peel Commission in 1936 for the partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states. Their resistance and agitation was ignored by the British and failed to stop Jewish immigration, and this failure of their political resistance radicalised them to resort to armed struggle against the Zionists and their supporters. The Palestinian resistance included widespread strikes, mass protests and guerrilla attacks, but it was effectively dealt with by the British authorities and had no influence on British colonial policies, which largely favoured Jewish migration and the partition of Palestine. In a number of his books, and especially in his book *The Question of Palestine*, the late American Palestinian academic Edward Said shows how Zionism, a European imperialist idea, was imported to Palestine, how the native Palestinians were made to pay and suffer for it in very concrete ways, and why they protested and rebelled against it (Said 1980; also see Hurwitz 1968; Porath 1977; Kupferschmidt 1987; Smith 2004: 130–45).

Similar analysis of the ideology of occupation has been reported in a recent book by Neve Gordon, which shows that the underlying logic of occupation is, and always has been, the separation of the Palestinian people from their land, and not simply by means of expropriation of the land for colonising purposes. After the Six Day War Israel formulated a legal policy that rejected the applicability of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention to the occupied territories on the pretext that since neither the West Bank nor Gaza

had been a sovereign country prior to 1967, they should be considered disputed rather than occupied territories. The book shows that the legal framework of occupation was constantly modified to facilitate the exploitation of such resources as land and water of the occupied territories and at the same time to abdicate the responsibility for the well-being of the occupied population (Gordon 2008).

Zionists saw Palestine, as European imperialism did, as an empty land filled with ignoble and even despicable natives. Said quotes Chaim Weizmann, a leading Zionist and the first president of Israel, who acknowledged that Zionism allied itself with imperial powers in carrying out the Zionists' plans to establish a new Jewish state in Palestine. Zionists thought of the natives only negatively as a people who were expected to accept passively the plans made for their land. A number of Zionist historians, including Yehoshua Portah and Neville Mandel, have empirically shown that, well before World War I, the ideas of Zionist colonisers were fiercely resisted by the Palestinians, not because the natives thought that Jews were evil but because most people do not take kindly to having their territory settled by foreigners (Porath 1977; Mandel 1976).

Edward Said argues that in formulating the concept of the Jewish nation 'reclaiming' its own territory, Zionism not only accepted the generic racial concepts of European culture but also banked on the fact that Palestine was actually inhabited by a backward people, over which it ought to be dominant. This implicit assumption of domination led Zionism to ignore the natives, who for the most part they believed were not entitled to serious consideration. It led Zionism to develop a consciousness of itself but not of the natives. Palestinians became the victim of victims (Said 1980; Rodinson 1973). The constitutive energies of Zionism were premised on the excluded presence, that is, the functional absence of 'native people' in Palestine. A popular Zionist slogan of the time was: 'A people without land for a land without people'. Several Israeli leaders have denied even the existence of Palestinian people.[2]

The establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948 led to an Arab League-inspired invasion of the new state involving the Egyptian, Iraqi, Saudi Arabian, Syrian and Jordanian armies. The invasion was ill-conceived, fragmented and marred by the selfish political agendas of the Arab leaders. It was very effectively dealt with by the well-trained Israeli army, which routed the invaders. The war led to the first expansion of

Israel's boundaries beyond the 1948 partition lines (Smith 2004: 196–8, see map on p. 197). For the Palestinian Arabs the 1948 war had devastating consequences. During and after the war the Israelis embarked on a deliberate policy of ousting the Arabs from territories they had taken over, forcing around 400,000 to 450,000 of them across the lines to Arab-held territory. Of the approximately 800,000 Arabs who had lived in the area that became Israel, only 133,000 remained and the rest entered refugee camps in Jordan, Gaza and other neighbouring Arab countries, thus creating the Palestinian refugee camps that became the birthplace of the Palestinian national movement (Smith 2004: 200).

According to a study by Israel Shahak, of the original 475 Arab villages that existed inside Israel in 1948, only 90 remained at the beginning of the 1970s (Shahak 1975, cited in Kossaifi 1980: 22). Israeli authorities expropriated a million dunums (one dunum is equal to one-tenth of a hectare) of Arab land between 1948 and the 1960s through Israeli legislation and the laws of the military government (Jiryes 1973, cited in Kossaifi 1980). Israeli state institutions were built with the aim of deliberately shutting out the natives; laws were drafted when Israel came into being that made sure that natives would remain in their 'non-place' and Jews in theirs. One thing that unites Israelis is the 'problem' of Palestinians, whose negation is the most consistent thread running through Zionism. In the eyes of Palestinians this ties Zionism to imperialism. The exclusion of Palestinians from their own land is the main source of their 'anti-Jewishness'. The narrative of exploitation, dispossession and humiliation is a root cause of their anger and resentment.

The Israeli–Arab wars of 1967 and 1973 were also very consequential for the evolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. These wars expanded Israeli territory, demoralised Arab countries and created conditions for the emergence of Palestinian resistance organisations to fight for the political future of the Palestinian people. They also paved the way for peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) emerged as the political face of the Palestinians' struggle for their own state. The Israelis continued to develop as a strong democratic and economically prosperous industrialised society with one of the strongest armies in the world. The increasing economic prosperity also benefited the Palestinians through their employment in Israel.

The PLO under the charismatic leadership of Yasser Arafat began as the main umbrella organisation to mount resistance against the continued and harsh Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories. It carried out some of the most spectacular terrorist attacks against Israel and its citizens. It bore the wrath of Israeli military might and security agencies and came to be despised by Israel and its international allies as a terrorist organisation. But its struggle succeeded in forcing the world to recognise the plight of the Palestinian people and their sufferings. Gradually the PLO moved from being an international pariah to a partner for peace.[3]

On 8 December 1987 an Israeli tank-transport truck crashed into several Arab cars, killing four Palestinians and injuring several more. During the funerals of the victims spontaneous demonstrations erupted that rapidly spread to the West Bank, initiating a new phase in the Palestinian resistance to Israeli rule, which was widely seen by the Palestinians as depriving them of their land and liberties. It came to be known as the intifada (Arabic for awakening, uprising). The intifada was a spontaneous eruption of hatred and frustration directed not only against Israeli but also against Palestinian leaders. Much of the fury was fanned not by economic factors but by the humiliation of daily life experienced by Palestinians under Israeli occupation.

For Palestinians the intifada was a war of demonstrations and stone-throwing in support of an independent Palestine. The Israeli response was equally swift and resulted in the arrests, beatings and imprisonment of many Palestinians suspected of involvement in resistance activities. Paradoxically the prison experience was a turning point for many young Palestinians that gave them an opportunity to formulate strategies for their future activities. According to an Israeli army psychologist Anat Berko (2007: 8–9), in most cases young Palestinians were not uneducated religious fanatics. The process of becoming religious took place in Israeli prisons where they received religious instruction from other prisoners. The prison became an education centre. After 1987 Palestinian violence was inspired by daily existence under the reality of harsh occupation. The Israeli response also changed and included more frequent military retaliation to crush disturbances, which were also becoming more frequent. The daily confrontations were especially pronounced in Gaza where tension was rife.[4]

The intifada unleashed a vicious cycle of violence, terror and repression resulting in Israeli and Palestinian casualties. The situation became

gradually more tense and unpredictable. An important consequence of this situation was the growing disillusionment with the PLO and Arafat's party, Fatah. Islam has always been politically more significant in Gaza than in the West Bank partly owing to the influence of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim groups under its umbrella were active in providing social and health services as well as moral and social alternatives to the harsh conditions of life in Gaza. Paradoxically the Israeli military encouraged Islamic groups in order to counter the support and influence of the secular PLO. An offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood was Islamic Jihad, which opposed the activities of the Egyptian government and agitated for ending the reign of alien Western secular ideologies. Islamic Jihad had established branches in Gaza. The Islamic Jihad group in Gaza broke off from the Muslim Brotherhood, which espoused educational and social reforms as means of spreading Islam. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) advocated recovery of all of former Palestine by armed struggle and the creation of an Islamic state. It first co-operated with Arafat and Fatah in the struggle against Israel, but parted company with them when Arafat accepted the two-state policy. Palestinian Islamic Jihad activists were involved in numerous armed assaults on Israelis during the intifada.

In February 1988 a group called Harakat al-Maqawama al-Islamiyya (Islamic Resistance Movement), or Hamas, was formed as a direct result of the intifada. Its founders were also Muslim Brothers, such as Shaykh Ahmad Yasin, and its aim was to influence the political destiny of Palestine. Hamas and PIJ offered an alternative to PLO ideology in calling for the formation of an Islamic state covering the whole of Palestine. Hamas established a military wing called the Izz al-Din al-Qassam brigade, which was named after the radical Islamist imam from Haifa killed by the British in 1931, and was committed to the assassination of Israelis to avenge the killing of Palestinians. The militant activities of PIJ and Hamas against the Israelis increased their support among aggrieved Palestinians, especially in Gaza, and dented the prestige of the PLO (Smith 2004).

The Oslo Accord

The violence and repression of intifada made the Israeli–Palestinian conflict a significant issue in Israeli, Arab and international political arenas, which finally forced the need for a political solution. Successive Israeli governments have loathed entering into any negotiations with the PLO,

which is regarded as a terrorist organisation. But the situation in the Palestinian territories and its international ramifications forced the PLO and the Israeli government of Yitzhak Rabin to negotiate, resulting in the Oslo Accord in 1993. Under the Accord, the PLO recognised 'the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security', and Israel accepted the PLO as the organisation representing the Palestinian people. The PLO also renounced terrorism and the armed struggle as a means of achieving its objectives. In 1995 the Interim Agreement (Oslo 2) provided the framework for the establishment of the Palestinian Authority and its functions and for the gradual withdrawal of the Israeli army from the Palestinian territories. The Oslo Accord was hailed by the international community as a blueprint for lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians, but condemned by Hamas and PIJ, who regarded it as a capitulation of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. It also had serious repercussions for Israeli politics.

For rightist Israelis, a withdrawal from most of the West Bank, their Judea and Samaria, would deny them their biblical heritage, which they claimed by building numerous settlements with the active support of such Israeli leaders as Ariel Sharon. For the Palestinians, the Oslo Accord meant the loss of most of Palestine west of Jordan and the potential loss of Jerusalem – the third holiest city of Islam (Smith 2004: 445). The Palestinians opposed to the Accord responded by attacking Israeli settlers and the army. In response Israel sealed off Palestinian territories, and imposed curfews and restrictions on the travel of Palestinians workers to Israel. In Gaza this had a devastating economic impact. Almost all Gaza workers were not allowed to travel to work in Israel.

Then, in 1994, an American Jewish immigrant, Baruch Goldstein, enraged by Palestinian attacks on the settlers, killed twenty-nine Arab worshippers in Hebron before killing himself. In the Arab riots that followed this, Israeli troops killed twenty-five Palestinian protesters. Israel also initiated the policy of targeted assassinations of radical Palestinian leaders. Hamas and Islamic Jihad were the only groups that mounted potent resistance against Israeli actions through terrorism, riots and the abduction of Israeli soldiers, and they introduced the tactic of suicide bombings for the first time in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. These groups also seized the opportunity to undermine Fatah's legitimacy as representing the true interests of the Palestinian people. But the real motive was to undermine the Oslo Accord. The continuing riots and violence by the Palestinians

strengthened conservative politicians in Israel who wanted to make no concessions to Palestinians and favoured harsher conditions to control Palestinian violence, in which they were successful.


The Al-Aqsa intifada I

On the fifth anniversary of Oslo 2, the right-wing Likud party leader Ariel Sharon made a carefully staged visit to the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif accompanied by a thousand police, the media and Likud politicians. This stymied the ongoing negotiations over the future of Jerusalem and possibly the entire peace process. Sharon's visit inflamed Palestinian anger and triggered the second intifada, known as the Al-Aqsa intifada, and eventually led to Sharon's election as Israeli prime minister. Once elected, Sharon initiated policies aimed at the destruction of the Palestinian Authority as a governing structure, which targeted Palestinian leaders for assassination and which permitted the reoccupation of the West Bank. The second intifada unleashed unending cycles of violence, retaliation, mobility barriers, checkpoints and curfews that locked up almost the entire population of the West Bank in their homes for days. Palestinians responded by expanding the use of suicide bombings. Suicide bombings were adopted not only by Islamist groups Hamas and PIJ but also by secular organisations such as Tanzim, which had split from Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, an offshoot of Fatah. For the first time some of them began to use female suicide bombers.

Palestinian suicide bombings

The preceding, albeit sketchy, account of Palestinian resistance to Zionism shows that while it used all other forms of resistance and terror tactics, suicide bombing was not used until 1993.[5] As mentioned in Chapter 3, suicide bombing is a new phenomenon in Palestinian society. According to the two best-informed observers of the phenomenon, the rise of suicide bombing is directly related to the hopelessness that comes from a situation that keeps getting worse and from despair when living becomes no different from dying. Such conditions propel people to unthinkable actions (Butler 2002; Dabbagh 2005).

During the years of Oslo peace negotiations (1993–2000), Palestinians were encouraged by the prospect of achieving peace with Israel, which was reflected in the rejection of suicide bombings against Israel by a majority of Palestinians. In the polls conducted by the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research,[6] only 21 per cent of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza supported suicide bombing. The highest level of support during the peace process, 37 per cent, was reached in 1997 when the hawkish Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu was in office (see Figure 4.1). Once the peace process began to falter, Palestinians began to lose faith in the Palestinian Authority and its political face, Fatah. During the Al-Aqsa intifada, religious and secular factions succeeded in persuading the Palestinian public of the legitimacy of suicide bombings as a tactic and began to carry out ‘martyrdom operations’ in their insurgency against Israel. Thus in the Al-Aqsa intifada the culture of martyrdom entered the aggrieved and despondent Palestinian society. By October 2003 almost two-thirds of Palestinians supported suicide bombing. However, when the Palestinians and Israelis agreed on a mutual ceasefire support for suicide bombings declined significantly.



Sources: Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research; Hafez (2006:20).

Figure 4.1 Palestinian support for suicide bombings in public opinion data, 1996–2004

The conditions that have led to the adoption of suicide bombing are the harsh and oppressive conditions of occupation by the Israeli army, which has transformed the Palestinian territories into a ‘war zone’ characterised by cycles of retaliation and revenge and misery, of personal traumas, anger and bitterness, which drive people to undertake unthinkable actions. All these emotions and experiences were portrayed by the Palestinian terrorist interviewed by two Israeli scholars, Post and Denny, quoted in Chapter 2 and worth repeating here:

> You Israeli are Nazis in your souls and in your conduct. In your occupation you never distinguish between men and women, or between old people and children. You adopted methods of collective punishment; you uprooted people from their homeland and from their homes and chased them into exile. You fired live ammunition at women and children. You smashed the skulls of defenceless civilians. You set up detention camps for thousands of people in sub-human conditions. You destroyed homes and turned children into orphans. You prevented people from making a living, you stole their property, you trampled on their honour. Given that kind of conduct, there is no choice but to strike at you without mercy in every possible way.
>
> (Post and Denny 2002)

A United Nations humanitarian official, Nasra Hassan, worked in Gaza during one of the vicious cycles of suicide bombings in Gaza in the late 1990s. From 1996 to 1999, she interviewed nearly 250 people in the Palestinian refugee camps fighting for the Palestinian cause and involved in recruiting, training and carrying out suicide missions. She found that none were uneducated, desperately poor, simple-minded, suicidal or depressed, but their social contexts displayed the dynamics of their actions. The potential suicide bombers empowered themselves in the face of powerlessness. One of the interviewees told her, ‘If our wives and children are not safe from Israeli tanks and rockets, theirs will not be safe from our human bombs.’ In an interview in his small house on an unpaved lane in a crowded quarter of Gaza, the late spiritual leader and founder of Hamas, Sheikh Yasin, told her that martyrdom was a means of ‘redemption’: ‘Love of martyrdom is something deep inside the heart, but these rewards are not in themselves the goal of the martyr. The only aim is to win Allah’s satisfaction. That can be done in the simplest and speediest manner by dying in the cause of Allah. And it is Allah who selects the martyrs.’ Humiliation acted as a powerful magnet for recruiting suicide bombers. A senior recruiter told Hassan, ‘After every massacre, every massive violation of our rights and defilement of our holy places, it is easy for us to sweep the street for boys who want to do a martyrdom operation’ (N. Hassan 2001). Involvement in the intifada, including suicide bombings, was in many ways a means of self-empowerment in the face of powerlessness, redemption in

the face of damnation, and honour in the face of humiliations (Hafez 2006; Bloom 2005; Khawaja 1993; Moghadam 2006; Sprinzak 2000; Stern 2003).

A suicide dispatcher named Ismail who had worked closely with Yehia Ayyash (known as 'the engineer'), when interviewed in an Israeli jail about his terrorist activities, told Anat Berko, an Israeli army psychologist:

> The path before me was clear: there is the occupation and those who live under it, and something has to be done, I think everyone has to do something. When it came to that there was no dilemma[;] that was clear. I felt that crimes had been committed against me and that was my reaction … every person … it's natural … they did a lot of bad things and I couldn't sit quietly [and watch it happen] because I saw my father and mother and my friends and all of them were harmed.
>
> (Berko 2007: 37–8)

Main sponsoring organisations

The main drivers of suicide bombings have been religious organisations Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad and secular organisations Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Table 4.1 provides information about when they were founded, their leaders and ideology. Of the 217 suicide attacks, Hamas claimed responsibility for most (37 per cent) and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and PIJ 24 per cent each. The PFLP carried out about 2 per cent of the attacks, and the rest were joint operations by two or more organisations (see Figure 4.3).

Hamas

Hamas means 'zeal' in Arabic, but it is also the Arabic acronym for Harkat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya, or Islamic Resistance Movement. Hamas regards the historic Palestine as an Islamic trust (*waqf*) and regards the liberation of Palestine from 'Zionist usurpers' as a duty of all Muslims. It was formed in 1987 by Sheikh Ahmed Yasin, who was assassinated by the Israeli military in 2004, and it is an outgrowth of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers. The Muslim Brotherhood has existed in Palestine for more than seventy years and actively opposed the intensive Jewish immigration to

Palestine in the 1930s and 1940s. For much of its history in Palestine it was a quietist organisation focusing on charitable work and proselytising Muslims to become more pious. It believed that successful resistance against Israel required Muslims to return to their religion and fulfil their obligations to God. It has been active as a charitable organisation providing much-needed social and medical services to Palestinians under occupation, mainly in Gaza. But with protracted and repressive Israeli occupation of Gaza, Sheikh Yasin and others broke away from the quietist Islamic Brotherhood tradition and formed Hamas to oppose the Israeli occupation through armed struggle (Hafez 2006: 93–5).

Table 4.1 Organisations in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict resorting to suicide missions

Name	*Year founded*	*Founder*	*Leader*	*Ideology*	*Region of operation*	*Links*
Hamas/ Al-Qassam	1987–91	Yasin/ Zaccaria Walid Akel	Haniyeh +	Islam (Sunni)	Territories Israel	Iran, Syria
PIJ/al-Quds	1979	Fathi Shaqaqi	Abdallah Shalah	Islam (Sunni)	Gaza (West Bank)	Iran, Syria
Al-Aqsa	2001	Marwan Barghouti	?	Nationalist	West Bank (Gaza)	Al-Fatah
Al-Fatah/ Tanzim	1964	Arafat	Arafat	Nationalist Nationalist	Israel, Territories	—
PLFP	1967	Habash	Abu Ali Mustafa	Marxist Pan-Arab	International Israel	Syria

Source: Adapted from Ricolfi (2005).

There have been allegations, mainly by the PLO, that Hamas was created by Israel to counter PLO influence. It is true that until the first intifada Israeli authorities avoided interfering with Hamas operations. Because of its participation in this intifada and subversive activities, it was outlawed in 1989. It became active in terrorist attacks in the Palestinian territories and inside Israel. In 1991 Zaccaria Walid Akel, head of Hamas's military wing in Gaza, set up the militant Izz ad-Din alQassam battalions to target Palestinian collaborators. These activities increased Hamas's popularity at the expense of the PLO. But when Hamas leaders became convinced that military operations were the only option against Israeli oppression and counter-terrorism, it started suicide bombing operations. Hamas's charitable wing began to channel funds to support the martyrdom operations, which

underscored the institutionalisation of suicide bombing (Human Rights Watch 2002; Bloom 2005). Hamas is committed to a number of goals, which include destroying Israel, becoming the dominant and legitimate political force among Palestinians, promoting ties with the Islamic world and derailing the peace process (Bloom 2005: 33), although there appears to be strong evidence that since winning the 2006 Palestinian elections Hamas had started to revise its position in relation to Israel by indirectly accepting Israel's right to exist (Hroub 2006).

Palestinian Islamic Jihad

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) was founded in 1979–80 by Fathi Shaqaqi (who was assassinated by Israeli agents in 1995), Abdal Aziz Odah and Bashir Musa as an alternative to the secular PLO. It came into existence as a loose affiliation of groups after the Iranian Islamic revolution and drew its members from the Muslim Brotherhood, PLO factions and Palestinians in Israeli jails. Its aim is the destruction of the State of Israel through armed struggle and to establish an Islamic state in Palestine. It also regards historical Palestine as an Islamic trust. It regards the struggle for the liberation of Palestine not merely as nationalist but also as part of a larger struggle to break the hegemony of the West over the Muslim world, and it views Israel as an extension of Western imperialism. Consequently, besides Israel, its terrorist activities have targeted the USA and moderate Arab governments. Unlike Hamas, PIJ is not involved in social welfare services. It regards such activities as a diversion of valuable resources away from the struggle against Israeli repression. It is mainly concerned with developing a secretive and disciplined organisation capable of carrying out effective armed struggle for the liberation of Palestine. Like Hamas, PIJ has a military wing, known as Saraya al-Quds (Jerusalem Brigades), which functions as small cells of four or five members. PIJ was involved in some of the most spectacular attacks in the first and second intifadas. Its sole purpose was to give credence to the Islamic movements in attacking Israeli targets, including armed infiltrations, car bombings, rocket attacks and suicide bombings. Its standing among Palestinians rose rapidly as a result of these brazen attacks. PIJ actions embarrassed Arafat and Hamas, but they also increased its support among the Palestinians (Bloom 2004, 2005; Hafez 2006: 95–6).

Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades

The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (AMB), or Harakat al Tahrir al Falistinya, is the military wing of Fatah and is named after the September 2000 Al-Aqsa intifada. The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades defected from Fatah after the Palestinian Authority arrested Ahmad Sa'adat, secretary general of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), for the killing of Israeli Cabinet minister Rechavam Ze'evi in October 2001. The PFLP had claimed that Ze'evi was killed in retaliation for the killing of PFLP general secretary Abu Ali Mustafa in August 2001. The Al-Aqsa defection was also an indication of the declining popularity and isolation of Yasser Arafat. But some claim that the defection was only a political ploy and that the Palestinian Authority and Fatah maintained close logistical and tactical connections with the AMB (Bloom 2004: 33–34).[7] Unlike Hamas and Islamic Jihad, AMB accepts the two-state solution and wants only the liberation of Gaza and the West Bank, but its rhetoric frequently uses Islamic symbolism, although its members are largely secular. Some analysts contend that the AMB is a rebellion within a rebellion, meaning that its members are of a younger generation who are dissatisfied with the peace process not achieving its aims (Hafez 2006). AMB has emerged as a formidable fighting force capable of launching spectacular attacks, including suicide attacks carried out by Palestinian women. AMB has sometimes collaborated with PIJ and Hamas in its operations.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

The fourth major sponsor of suicide bombings is the Arab Nationalist-Marxist organisation Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Al-Jabha Al-Shabiyya LI-Tahrir Falastin). The PFLP was founded by George Habash in the late 1960s. It joined the PLO in 1968 but broke away in 1993 when the PLO agreed to a two-state solution with Israel. The PFLP was the first group to carry out aircraft hijackings in the 1970s. It sees the creation of Israel as part of Western imperialism's plan to dominate the Arab world and keep it divided, and its priority is to remove the reactionary Arab regimes. After the rise of such Islamic groups as PIJ and Hamas, it lost a great deal of support among Palestinians. According to some scholars, it resorted to suicide bombings in 2001 to boost its support and began using the language

of jihad to attract even more. However, it managed to capture only 3 per cent of Palestinian support after its operations in the autumn of 2001 and the creation of the militant wing named after its assassinated secretary general, Abu Ali Mustafa. It is now largely a marginal group involved in the armed struggle against Israel.

Since 1993 these four groups have carried out almost all the suicide bombing attacks. Figure 4.2 shows the occurrence of these attacks between 1993 and 2006, and Figure 4.3 provides the number of suicide bombing operations claimed by each.

The fluctuations between 1993 and 1998 are related to the opposition of Hamas, PIJ and PFLP to the Oslo Accord, and also to the first intifada. In these attacks Hamas and PIJ, supported by Hezbollah, aimed to terrorise Israeli public opinion and derail the peace process. They succeeded in achieving these objectives when the Peres-led Labour Party lost the Israeli election to the right-wing Likud Party and its leader, Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu's election inaugurated a long deadlock in the peace process and halted the implementation of the Oslo Agreements. According to some observers, Yasser Arafat's sweeping success in the Palestinian elections also contributed to the deadlock. The strength of Arafat's electoral success made the continuation of terrorist attacks less acceptable to the new Israeli government as the Palestinian Authority's failure to oppose terrorism could no longer be explained as weakness, being now perceived as reflecting a lack of will (Kydd and Walter 2002; Ricolfi 2005; Shaiqaqi 2002).




Figure 4.2 Incidences of suicide bombings in Israel and the Palestinian territories, 1993–2006




Figure 4.3 Organisations claiming suicide bombings in Israel and the Palestinian territories, 1991–2006

The Al-Aqsa intifada II

The inability or unwillingness of the Netanyahu administration to push for the peace process eventually persuaded Israeli voters to go for an alternative, and in 1999 they elected the Labour Party, under the leadership of Ehud Barak, to pursue it once more. There were some early diplomatic successes, but Barak and Arafat's failure to reach an agreement in 2000 had a devastating effect on future developments. Israeli and Palestinian public opinion polarised and radicalised. Despite these setbacks, terrorist activity was at a low ebb. Then, in 2000, a highly orchestrated visit by Ariel Sharon to the Esplanade of the Mosques in Jerusalem inflamed Palestinian public opinion. There was wide support among Palestinians for a unilateral declaration of the State of Palestine, but owing to international pressure Arafat refused to do so. A cocktail of frustration over the failed declaration of the State of Palestine, Sharon's visit to the Al-Aqsa mosque, the

harshness of Israeli occupation and admiration for Hezbollah's successes in winning its twenty-year war against Israel in Lebanon contributed to the eruption of the Al-Aqsa intifada. This intifada produced the most violent waves of terror from both sides and saw an unprecedented increase in suicide attacks between 2001 and 2003 (Ricolfi 2005).

The adoption of suicide bombings was primarily due to the Palestinians' unwillingness to be content with symbolic expressions of protest through stone-throwing, as was the case during the six-year intifada starting in 1987, which intensified Israeli policies of targeted assassination, brutalising reoccupation, mass incarceration and starvation. Palestinians apparently were no longer willing to be the passive recipients of death and terror. This is reflected in the ratio of Israelis to Palestinians killed. It had narrowed dramatically from 1:10 to 1:3 between 1997 and 2001 (Ahmed 2005; Gupta and Mundra 2005). The first wave of suicide bombing attacks came not from the Islamist groups but from the secular organisations associated with Fatah. Hamas and PIJ started their suicide missions in mid- to late 2001, almost a year after the start of the intifada. The latter part of the 33-month Al-Aqsa intifada was dominated by suicide attacks by these two groups. The competition between secular and religious organisations to achieve political control over the Palestinian insurgency played a significant role in the escalation of the attacks. Public support for Islamic groups had also been boosted by the failure of the peace process (Ricolfi 2005; Bloom 2005).

The process of recruiting, training and executing suicide bombing attacks appears to have some common features shared by all sponsoring organisations. Hamas and PIJ follow a three-cell structure for their 'martyrdom operations'. One cell is responsible for surveillance and intelligence-gathering on targets to determine the best or the most appropriate strategy for executing the attack. These activities include videotaping the potential target. A report is then prepared for the military committee, which approves the operation. The second cell is responsible for recruiting and mentally preparing the potential suicide bomber(s) for the mission. Hamas and PIJ follow five criteria in selecting the suicide bombers, which are that (1) they must be pious Muslims; (2) they must be able to pass as Israelis to go through security checks; (3) they must be over the age of eighteen and usually unmarried; (4) they must not stand out in any significant way that raises suspicion at security checkpoints, such as

being wanted for prior activism, and must be discreet in discussing the mission with family and friends; and (5) they must have siblings and not be the main breadwinner for their family (Hafez 2006: 21).[8] It is not known how the operations of the AMB and PFLP differ in selecting the suicide bombers. The recruiters use such sites as religious study groups to identify potential recruits and befriend them. According to Nasra Hassan, during the Al-Aqsa intifada after major Israeli attacks on mosques and other holy places, the volunteers for suicide missions actually sought out the recruiters (N. Hassan 2001).

After having identified a potential suicide bomber, recruiters prepare a detailed personal history, including information on personal habits, political affiliation and emotional stability. Recruits are then placed under varying periods of discreet surveillance to determine their suitability for suicide missions. Some recruits and volunteers are rejected at the end of this period. For those selected, a period of indoctrination and psychological preparation follows, which involves intensive political and religious discussions over several weeks. Bombers view videos of earlier operations and are encouraged to discuss their martyrdom operations and the benefits of martyrdom in general in Islam (Hafez 2006; Regular 2002; Goldenberg 2002; Jabar 2002). The recruiters especially emphasise those chapters of the Quran that deal with faith, jihad and martyrdom.[9] A few days before the mission, the 'living martyr' goes into isolation along with close companions from the cell to strengthen their resolve. During this period, the bombers prepare their videotapes of last will and testament declaring why they have decided to become martyrs. In the videotapes would-be *shuhada* (martyrs) are usually wearing the sponsoring organisation's distinctive head covering with the organisation's flag in the background. The volunteers usually watch their videos again and again. These videos encourage the bomber to confront death and not fear it. According to one account, the bomber becomes intimately familiar with what he/she is about to do (N. Hassan 2001). From this stage onwards the suicide bomber is known as the 'living martyr' because retreat after this point constitutes a failure to meet one's obligation to God and to the nation (Hafez 2006; Saleh 2004).

FUSTD suicide bombing profile: Israel and Palestine

This section provides an overview and discussion based on the analysis of 217 suicide bombing incidents that occurred in Israel and Palestine between

1991 and 2006. Almost 90 per cent of the suicide attacks were carried out by Hamas, PIJ, Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and PFLP. The remainder were joint operations between two or more of these and other insurgent groups. The profile given in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 shows that 217 suicide attacks killed 1,016 people and injured about ten times more. Almost 84 per cent of the attacks were carried out during the Al-Aqsa intifada. The period between 2001 and 2005, which included the most turbulent years of the Al-Aqsa intifada, was the most violent in terms of both suicide and non-suicide terrorist attacks and deaths caused by them. During these five years, the incidence of suicide attacks was on average nine times greater than during the previous ten years. By 2006 the situation had changed dramatically, with suicide attacks accounting for only 1 per cent of all terrorist attacks.

Table 4.2 Deaths from suicide attacks and all forms of terrorism in Israel and the Palestinian territories, 1991–2006

Year	*All terrorist attacks (n)*	*Suicide attacks (n)*	*Suicide attacks as % of all terrorist attacks*	*Deaths from all terrorist attacks (n)*	*Deaths from suicide attacks (n)*[a]	*Deaths from suicide attacks as % of all deaths*
1991–5	89	13	15	207	75	36
1996–2000	280	19	7	142	120	85
2001–5	2,122	182	9	1,163	803	69
2006	455	3	1	39	18	46
1991–2006	**2,946**	**217**	**7**	**1,551**	**1,016**	**65**

Sources: MIPT database (www.tkb.org); FUSTD (2008).

Notes
a 'Deaths from suicide attacks' refers to the minimum number killed.

Table 4.3 Lethality of suicide attacks in Israel and the Palestinian territories, 1991–2006

Year	*Average yearly suicide attacks (n)*	*Deaths per suicide attack*[a] *(n)*	*Average yearly nonsuicide terrorist attack (n)*	*Deaths per non-suicide terrorist attack (n)*
1991–5	3	6	15	0.7
1996–2000	4	7	52	0.04
2001–5	36	4	388	0.2
2006	3	6	452	0.1
1991–2006	**14**	**5**	**171**	**0.2**

Sources: MIPT database (www.tkb.org); FUSTD (2008).

Notes
a ‘Deaths from suicide attacks’ refers to the minimum number killed.

Since the early 1990s suicide attacks have been declining as a proportion of all terrorist attacks. This is in spite of the fact that sponsoring organisations were becoming operationally more ‘efficient’ through better planning and execution of the attacks, and is due to Israeli authorities’ success in thwarting many suicide bombings before they are carried out.[10] Still, compared with the global benchmark of suicide bombings constituting 4 per cent of all terrorist attacks, in Israel and Palestine they were significantly higher at 7 per cent of all such attacks. Suicide attacks accounted for 65 per cent of all terrorist-related deaths, a figure significantly higher than the global norm in this period of 32 per cent.[11] In the period of sixteen years from 1991 to 2006, suicide bombings killed 1,016 people, mostly Israeli civilians. But compared with the global benchmark of on average 12 deaths per suicide attack, in Israel and Palestine the average was 5. This was mainly due to the efficiency of the emergency services. Again compared with an average of 0.20 deaths from a non-suicide terrorist attack, the ratio of deaths from suicide bombing and non-suicide bombing terrorist attack was 1:25, which is almost three times the global norm.

Type of suicide attacks and targets

In two-thirds or 66 per cent of all suicide bombings the weapon used was suicide belt or bag, and 19 per cent were suicide car bombs. Fifteen per cent of the suicide bombings were classified as using other methods, meaning that it was not possible from the available evidence to determine the exact type of weapon used, and this pattern has more or less remained the same, except in 2006, when all three suicide bombings used a suicide belt or bag. The other notable feature of the data about the type of weapon used was that such data were not available for seventy attacks, or for about a third of all suicide attacks. Table 4.4 reports data on the types of weapon used in suicide bombings and their targets. The information on the intended targets was available for 204 attacks, and it revealed that two thirds targeted Israeli civilians and 30 per cent targeted security forces and/or public officials (Table 4.5). Only 5 per cent targeted infrastructure.

All Palestinian suicide bombing sponsoring groups have maintained that targeting civilians is legitimate because all Israelis are required to do military service. The rationale offered by Hamas, PIJ and AMB is very instrumental. They regard Israel as an armed, militarised society with a 'citizen army'. Therefore, it is legitimate to attack its people anywhere in historic Palestine, even if they are not in military uniforms. They also claim that attacking Israeli civilians is justified on the grounds that they are revenge attacks for killing Palestinians civilians.[12] It is still difficult to explain how the killing of children could be justified since that logic could not be applied to them. Killing of children and women also raises questions about Islamist groups like Hamas and PIJ invoking Islamic theology to justify their martyrdom operations since all four schools of Islamic jurisprudence prohibit the killing of children (Peters 1979; Kelsay 1990).

Table 4.4 Weapons used in suicide bombings in Israel and the Palestinian territories, 1991–2006

	1991–5		*1996–2000*		*2001–5*		*2006*		*Total*	
Weapon	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*
Suicide vehicular attack	5	39	2	15	21	18	0	0	**28**	19
Suicide belt/ bomb attack	8	62	11	85	75	64	3	100	**97**	66
Other[a]	0	0	0	0	22	19	0	0	**22**	15
Missing[b]									70	
Total	**13**	**101**	**13**	**100**	**118**	**101**	**3**	**100**	**147**	**100**

Source: FUSTD (2008).

Notes
a Suicide shooting/grenade/mine attack.
b Source could not confirm the weapon.

Table 4.5 Targets of suicide bombings in Israel and the Palestinian territories, 1991–2006

Target	*1991–5*		*1996–2000*		*2001–5*		*2006*		*Total*	
	N	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*
Infrastructure	0	0	3	18	8	5	0	0	**11**	5
Security/ public officials	5	39	5	30	50	29	0	0	**60**	30
Foreign forces/ contractors	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	**1**	1
Civilians	8	62	9	53	108	63	3	100	**128**	63
Others	0	0	0	0	4	2	0	0	**4**	2
Missing									**13**	
Total	**13**	**101**	**17**	**101**	**171**	**100**	**3**	**100**	**204**	**101**

Source: FUSTD (2008).
Note: Percentages are rounded up.

As mentioned above, the main purpose of targeting civilians appears to be to create a climate of terror in order to undermine Israel's economy and society. The major sponsoring organisations maintain that suicide bombings inside the Green Line (that is, the 1949 borders) of the country is more effective because they terrorise the population, destroy the economy, drive away immigrants and tourists, and force Israelis to choose between peace and war with the Palestinians.[13] A report attributed to Hamas states that as a result of suicide bombings the growth of Israeli settlements in the Palestinian territories has slowed down, immigration to Israel has declined and emigration from Israel has increased. It claims that suicide bombings have contributed to the decline in tourism and increased unemployment. The report also mentions that despite the low number of Israeli soldiers killed during the uprising, the psychological impact of insurgency on the Israeli military has been significant in that as many as 11,200 soldiers have deserted or refuse to serve in the occupied territories. Such claims are questionable, but they do indicate the instrumental reasoning behind the use of suicide bombings.[14]

In a 2002 report, Amnesty International has also analysed the reasons for targeting civilians. The report summarised its findings of the reasons given by the Palestinians for doing so: 'that they are engaged in a war against an occupying power and that religion and international law permit the use of any means in resistance to occupation; that they are retaliating against Israel killing members of armed groups and Palestinians generally; that striking at civilians is the only way they can make an impact upon a powerful

adversary; that Israelis generally or settlers in particular are not civilians' (Amnesty International 2002; see also Margalit 2003).

Two case studies of suicide bombers

What drives Palestinian suicide bombings? Some informed and some not so well informed discussions of this question are now available. I have found the discussions by Hafez (2006), Bloom (2005), Ricolfi (2005) and Berko (2007) particularly useful, although Berko's interpretations are highly subjective. The main motivating force for suicide bombings appears to be the desire for spectacular revenge. What is also significant is the knowledge that this revenge will be recognised and celebrated by the community to which the bomber belongs. In many cases in their last testament and will the bombers mention that they are avenging the death of someone close to them, a member of their family or friend. They may also mention a specific event or incident that may have acted as the tipping point in their decision to perform a 'martyrdom operation'. They also appear to be motivated by the divine rewards that await them in paradise.

According to Margalit, vengeance through suicide has an additional value: that of making yourself the victim of your own act, and thereby putting your tormentors to moral shame: 'The idea of the suicide bombing, unlike that of an ordinary attack, is, perversely, a moral idea in which the killers, in acting out the drama of being the ultimate victim, claim for their cause the moral high ground' (Margalit 2003). The following two case studies illustrate the personal trauma and rage driving individuals to become suicide bombers and their own and their community's perception of the morality of their deadly actions.

Hiba

On 19 May 2003, around 5 p.m., Hiba, a ninteen-year-old female Palestinian university student majoring in English literature from the West Bank village of Tubas, detonated her shrapnel-packed suicide belt at the entrance to a shopping mall in Afula, Israel, killing three Israeli civilians and herself. At least four dozen more were injured. Her attack was one of five occurring within the forty-eight hours surrounding the announcement of the Middle East Roadmap. She was the fifth female suicide bomber during the Al-Aqsa intifada, and her attack was claimed by Palestinian

Islamic Jihad. PIJ generally did not recruit female suicide bombers unless they were insistent on performing a suicide attack. The media reports at the time suggested that Hiba had insisted on performing a ‘martyrdom operation’ as a result of her life and experiences under the Israeli occupation.

Hiba was known as a very devout Muslim who often wore a veil that revealed only her eyes. She had started observing a strict Islamic dress code, including wearing the veil, when she turned sixteen. This was unusual because it is not common practice among young Palestinian women. Even her grandmother told her to throw her veil away, telling her she was too young and it was too hot. She was considered to be more religious than any other family member. She was shy and refused to talk with men or drink tea and coffee with fellow students at the university. Some of her friends saw her face for the first time on a poster released by Islamic Jihad after her attack.

On the day of the attack Hiba prayed at dawn and then prepared her family’s breakfast and cleaned up afterward. Her mother watched her watering plants outside afterwards, and she was smiling. When her mother queried this, she told her, ‘I feel that I am a new person. You will be very proud of me.’ Then she dressed in casual clothes, an unusual action for her but consistent with the protocol of PIJ, which required that on the day of the operation the suicide bomber should dress ‘normally’ in order not to draw unusual attention to herself/himself. She then went to visit her two sisters, Jihan and Mariam, returned a book she had borrowed from a friend and then visited her grandmother. She then headed to Ha’amakim Mall but was stopped by a security guard for a security check, at which time she detonated her suicide belt.

Hiba had decided to volunteer for a ‘martyrdom operation’ to avenge the death of her brother, who was shot in Nablus during a demonstration to commemorate the 1948 Palestinian Nakba (day of the catastrophe) against the establishment of the State of Israel. Her brother had been previously arrested on charges of weapons possession and for carrying out terrorist attacks for the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. On that occasion the Israeli soldiers stormed their house and tore up Hiba’s textbooks and a copy of the Quran. One week before carrying out the suicide attack she had been stopped and searched during a curfew from which the students who had to attend the university were specifically exempted. She was very upset by the

harassment and humiliation she experienced when the soldiers in an IDF jeep stopped her on her walk to the university, searched her and forced her to remove her veil. With the exception of her grandmother, her family, despite not knowing anything of her plans prior to the attack, were extremely proud of her. Her grandmother blamed recruiters and thought she was too young to be involved in such an attack. Her cousin called her brave and herself a coward. As part of IDF policy, the family home was demolished after Hiba's attack.[15]

Ahmed

In August 2001, following a string of suicide bombing attacks carried out by Palestinian militants, mostly associated with Hamas, *Al-Majalla*, a leading Arabic-language news magazine, published an interview with a suicide bomber in Gaza awaiting the call from his handlers to launch his strike against Israeli targets. His name was Ahmed, and he was a twenty-year-old unmarried male high school graduate. A transcript of his responses to some of the main questions about his motivation and purpose for carrying out the suicide bombing is given below:

Al-Majalla: Do you really intend to carry out a suicide bombing?
Ahmed: If God wills it.
Al-Majalla: Why?
Ahmed: Because Zionists are [expletive deleted] who only understand force. They are strong but they use their force against the Palestinian people, against the future of the Palestinian people, and aim to send them into exile yet another time. We realise today, more than at any time in the past, that the trials of 1948 shall not be repeated. The land belongs to us and we need to assure Zionists and the rest of the world that we are prepared to die to defend the land and that we won't depart from it except as corpses.
Al-Majalla: Why haven't you carried out an operation before now?
Ahmed: Because the brothers have not permitted me to up to now.
Al-Majalla: Would you ever change your mind?
Ahmed: Praise God, if I were able to, I would this very day scatter the pieces of my body over the dust of Palestine as a way of

taking pleasure in this land. So, I think about how to carry out this operation all the time and about how the gains outweigh the losses.

Al-Majalla: What if you don't succeed in killing any [Israelis] as has happened with more than one of your fellow suicide bombers?

Ahmed: God have mercy upon all of them, I don't know the circumstance in which they found themselves. I don't know what they could have been thinking at the time. Don't forget that the Jihad fighters act under extraordinary circumstances.

Al-Majalla: What do you mean by 'extraordinary circumstances'?

Ahmed: I mean that while on the way to carrying out an operation, one's final thoughts are of the success of the operation inflicting the maximum losses on the brutal Zionist, not of being thwarted.

Al-Majalla: Do you know what you will be doing in that moment? Are you prepared for it?

Ahmed: I have complete faith in God, praise to Him in the highest. My aim is not just to inflict losses upon the conqueror, but also to secure victory for my people, my family, and my country.

Al-Majalla: Is there any way you could justify abandoning your position and you opinion?

Ahmed: My friend, I heed the honourable Brothers and my training and trust in their reasons for postponing my mission. I would rather carry out my mission today than tomorrow. And, here I say truthfully to you that the mission could be carried out at any moment, perhaps before we finish this conversation, and I have resolved to put my trust in God.

Al-Majalla: I appreciate your zeal and your exuberance, but what if you carry out your operation while negotiations are resuming between Palestinians and Israelis? Don't you think you'd be shedding your blood in vain?

Ahmed: I beg God's forgiveness, my brother, whatever happens today is up to God. For God has commanded us to carry out jihad to defend His religion and our land. Zionists must understand that Palestinians are prepared to die defending

their land and defending their beliefs and their survival. As I have told you, the Palestinian Authority has gotten to the point that it is unable today to deny or disregard the bloodshed of its people. The coming negotiations will not be over kilometres, but will be about eliminating the occupation completely and the return of the stolen al-Aqsa mosque. No Palestinians can today give concessions or negotiate merely for the sake of negotiations.

Al-Majalla: With respect to Israel's occupation of Orient House [Palestinian headquarters in Jerusalem] and its imposition of Judaization upon all of Jerusalem, will your martyrdom play a role in getting Orient House back to the Palestinians?

Ahmed: It's strange how you reporters think. I tell you martyrdom is an obligation and it is the truth. There is no worse disgrace than living beneath the shadow of occupation by arrogant Zionists. We, as the Palestinian people, have up to now wished to live either submissively in the Zionist domain or in Arab camps. But God has forever promised that we will enter the al-Aqsa mosque as our ancestors have done before us.

Al-Majalla: Has it been determined where you will carry out your operation?

Ahmed: I wouldn't tell you even if I knew.

Al-Majalla: Is your training designed to succeed in a particular kind of place?

Ahmed: I assure you, as God has made clear to us in the Holy Quran, 'Say, nothing befalls us except what God has decreed for us.'

Al-Majalla: Do you visit your family?

Ahmed: The only thing that governs my thinking, apart from my sisters, is that I would love to give them what no one else has: to be able to live with honour and dignity and pride and glory by my becoming a martyr they can be proud of.

Al-Majalla: How many in your family?

Ahmed: Three sisters, one of whom is married and the other two are children.

Al-Majalla: What do you do in your spare time?

Ahmed: I work in one of the bakeries. I buy some old bread and resell it elsewhere. As you know, the Zionists control all the labour markets and have confiscated our right to live in freedom and honour.

Al-Majalla: What would you like to say in conclusion?

Ahmed: We do not possess equipment or technology of any kind capable of standing up to the cudgels of this tyrannical, authoritarian aggression propped up by ugliness, by modes of killing, bloodshed, and stockpiles of American arms. So, we know our bodies are the only things we have with which to confront the rhetoric of supremacy. With these bodies we will defeat the occupation and its supporters, if God chooses. I hope He grants me success.[16]

Concluding remarks

This chapter has attempted to give an overview of the nature of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the emergence of suicide bombings as a tactic in this conflict, the rationales of the sponsoring organisations, lethality of suicide bombings and insights into the motivations of suicide bombers. There is more that could be included in the discussion but, given that many good studies now exist on some of these topics, the discussion was confined to the key issues. In this concluding section I will attempt to highlight the sociological implications of some of the issues raised by the data and subsequent discussion.

The historical and contemporary contexts of suicide bombing in Israel and Palestine clearly show that Palestinians have turned to one ideology after another in their struggle for a free and independent Palestinian homeland. They launched a political movement to protest against the intensive Zionism-inspired immigration in the 1930s and 1940s and turned to Pan-Arabism in the 1950s and 1960s in the belief that Arab countries would force Israel to recognise their status as a nation. After the 1967 Six Day War they turned to nationalism to fight themselves for their national liberation. They used aircraft hijackings, terrorism and guerrilla attacks to draw world attention to their plight and in the 1990s entered into negotiations with Israel to create an independent and sovereign homeland.

Their disillusionment with these approaches grew because of their failure to make Israel sympathetic to their national aspirations. As life under an

oppressive occupation became intolerable, many Palestinians finally lost faith in the secular nationalist path and turned to radical Islamism for their political destiny. In the 2006 Palestinian elections, held in an environment in which ordinary Palestinians felt completely powerless, Hamas's acts of resistance and tough rhetoric gave them a sense of empowerment that delivered Hamas the electoral victory over its rival, Fatah. In this case, as in many others when secularism failed, notions of martyrdom and jihad gained ascendancy (Brym 2007). Suicide bombing became a metaphor for and a symbol of this latest phase of their struggle. I have argued in this chapter that the driving force behind Palestinian suicide bombings was not religion but politics. Religious ideology and symbolism were adopted to galvanise their resistance. The historical background of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict indicates that it is not religious but fundamentally a territorial dispute. But, as has been suggested by a number of observers of this conflict, both parties have used religion as a marker of their identity, entitlement, struggle and destiny (Pape 2005; Bloom 2005; Atran 2003; Brym 2007; Hafez 2006).

That suicide bombing is a tactic driven primarily by political and not religious considerations is evident in the strategic logic of the sponsoring organisations. They justify the adoption of the tactic for expediting the goal of achieving liberation of the homeland. Equally compelling evidence can be gleaned from the motivations of both the sponsoring organisations and the individual suicide bombers. The motivations driving suicide bombings as enumerated in this chapter and in several other studies include intolerable existential conditions in the West Bank and Gaza; memories passed on from one generation to another of dispossession and injustices that followed the establishment of Israel; family history of arrest, imprisonment or death at the hands of Israeli occupation forces; empowerment in the face of powerlessness conferred by religious and cultural notions of jihad, martyrdom, glory and sacrifice; feelings of collective retaliation, revenge and the trauma of daily humiliations of checkpoints and restrictions on basic mobility.

Retaliatory actions by Israeli authorities against Palestinian militants and their supporters can be regarded as 'altruistic punishment'[17] in response to their violation of the norms vital for the maintenance of public and social order and social cohesion. But recent studies have shown that when 'altruistic punishment' is seen as 'unfair' it becomes counterproductive and loses its legitimacy. Under such circumstances, instead of reducing or

controlling violence that threatens the social order, such punishment can lead to its escalation. This may explain why repressive Israeli action, such as inflicting collective punishment on the family and community of a suicide bomber, not only reinforces radical opposition but also intensifies suicide campaigns. Suicide missions are thus prompted less by strategic cost-benefit calculations than by human emotions of revenge and retaliation, which also explains why attempts to suppress them often do not succeed. The following observation by Israeli philosopher Margalit would tend to support this conclusion:

> Having talked to many Israelis and Palestinians who know something about the bombers, and having read and watched many bombers' statements, my distinct impression is that the main motive of many of the suicide bombers is revenge for acts committed by Israelis, a revenge that will be known and celebrated in the Islamic world.
>
> (Margalit 2003)

As the volunteer suicide bomber Ahmed profiled in this chapter says, 'My aim is not just to inflict losses upon the conqueror, but also to secure victory for my people, my family, and my country.'

Suicide bombings are deadly and destructive, but their real impact is the intrusion of fear into everyday life that makes public spaces insecure and subjects the ordinary rhythms of daily life to what Walzer has called 'the endless coerciveness of precaution' (2004: 51). Surveys of the Israeli public show that levels of both personal fear and national fear rise and fall with the frequency of suicide bombings. The more attacks, the more fearful the Israeli public becomes. When Israelis express heightened fears they respond by advocating the use of stronger measures by the military and security services to defeat the perpetrators. Thus a cycle of violence and retaliations sets in (Weinberg, Pedahzur and Canetti-Nisim 2003). Suicide bombings have succeeded in damaging the democratic and humanitarian credentials of Israel, which has obvious implications for the legitimacy of Israeli retaliatory actions against the Palestinians for carrying out suicide bombings. In many parts of the world the suicide bombings are often seen as more a sign of the desperation of the Palestinians than as acts of terror.

5 Suicide bombings in Pakistan

Suicide bombings, a recent phenomenon, are a stark reminder of Pakistan's drift into religious extremism and sectarian strife. This drift is a consequence of several global and local developments which have profoundly influenced the trajectory of political, religious and social developments in the country. Here I will focus on three of them: the Islamisation programme of General Zia ul Haq's government; the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979; and the post-9/11 policies of the Pakistani government of President Pervez Musharraf.

The Islamisation programme

Zia's Islamisation programme began soon after his military coup overthrew the elected government of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1977. Lacking political support from the country's main political parties, Zia turned to Islamic parties, mainly the Jamaat-i-Islami, to legitimise his martial law administration. In return he adopted the Jamaat's Islamisation programme of institutional reform and introduction of sharia (Islamic law) in the country. The main aim of this programme was to enhance the role of the state in giving direction to the religious discourse in the country. Zia was also attracted to the Islamisation programme because it suited his own religious background and personal inclinations.[1]

The Islamisation policy was set in motion in 1979 with the introduction of the *hudood* laws, with the express purpose of bringing existing laws into conformity with the injunctions of Islam as set out in the Quran and Sunnah, which are obligatory for Muslims to follow. The policy was presented as necessary to fulfil one of the fundamental obligations of the Islamic state to create a just and equal society. Behind these platitudes, however, the real reason was to bolster the regime's legitimacy among Pakistani masses, and it was widely regarded as a cynical attempt to exploit the common people's devotion to Islam (Hassan 2008: chapter 1; Shafqat 2002).

The Islamisation programme claimed to make manifest a universal Islamic vision, but in reality it was based on a narrow interpretation of Islamic theology and law propounded by the orthodox Sunni Deobandi-Hanafi school and consequently was vigorously opposed by the Shias.[2] Buoyed with pride from the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Pakistani Shias, constituting around 20 per cent of the population, asserted the validity of their own religious interpretations. The Shias were deeply suspicious of the Islamisation programme and saw it as a threat to their social position and religious status. In fact, the programme produced a siege mentality among the Shias and led to their rejection of Sunni prescriptions in matters of religious conduct such as laws pertaining to inheritance and *zakat* (tax for the poor) (Nasr 2002).

In the face of this ardent opposition, Zia's regime capitulated and granted Shias exemption from all those aspects of the Islamisation programme that contravened Shia law. The capitulation to Shia demands was seen by Zia's Sunni political allies, including the Jamaat-i-Islami, as nothing short of constricting their vision of a universal Islamic state based on Sunni theology. This perception exacerbated the latent sectarian divisions in Pakistani society and paved the way for the rise of militant sectarian organisations, such as Sunni Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP, or Pakistan's Army of the Prophet's Companions),[3] Sunni Tehrik (Sunni Movement), Tehrik Nifaz Shariat-i-Muhammadi (Movement for the Protection of Muhammad's Religious Law), Laskhar-e-Jhangvi (Jhangvi Army), Laskhar-e-Taiba (the Army of the Pure), the Shia Tehrik-i-Jafaria Pakistan (Pakistan's Shia Movement) and Sipah-i-Muhammad (Army of Muhammad). More details of Shia and Sunni divisions and organisations are provided in Appendix B.

Over time these organisations splintered into various groups and became involved in sectarian violence to safeguard and assert the interests of their respective communities. Zia's Islamisation policies politicised sectarian religious identities in Pakistan and gave rise to sectarian activism and violence, including suicide bombing (Nasr 2002; Abbas 2005). Except for the Shia Sipah-i-Muhammad Pakistan, all main militant sectarian organisations are of orthodox Sunni-Deobandi-Wahhabi theological persuasion. Table 5.1 provides an overview of the manpower, affiliation, and aims and objectives of the main militant sectarian Islamic organisations in Pakistan.

Possibly the most significant development arising from the Islamisation policies was the privileging of the orthodox and puritanical sects Deobandis and Ahle Hadees. These had close theological affinity to Wahhabism and their political parties, Jamaat-i-Islami and Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam, and received funding and government patronage at the expense of the moderate sufi sect, the Barelvi, which represented popular Islam (Islam of the masses). The government patronage sought to strengthen the orthodox Sunni institutions by providing government funds to their existing madrasas and for the establishment of the new ones. Zia's government saw the expansion of the orthodox madrasa sector as an instrument of entrenching Sunni identity in the public sector, especially in government institutions. The madrasas and their students were part of the government strategy to contain Shia political activism and the political and geostrategic threat of Shia Islamism, which was linked to the Islamic revolution in Iran (Nasr 2002; Malik 1989; Abbas 2007).

This policy accelerated the growth of madrasas across Pakistan. The number of madrasa students (who mainly come from poorer backgrounds) increased from approximately 100,000 in 1975 to 570,000 in 1998. Many madrasas began to provide their students with military training, combining sectarian vigilance with a jihadist outlook (Nasr 2002: 90). Consequently this led to a serious escalation in sectarian, especially Shia–Sunni violence, in Pakistan. From 1990 sectarian organisations started to employ suicide bombing as a weapon in terrorising and killing their opponents. The sectarianism received a further boost from the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979.

Table 5.1 Main militant organisations of Pakistan

Militant organisation	*Sect*	*Manpower/ trained*	*Affiliation*	*Aims and objectives*	*Links*
1. Laskhar-e-Omar (LeO) (Group of Mullah Omar)	Sunni Wahhabi/ Deobandi	Approx. 500	Taliban, Al Qaeda	To kill Shias, Christians and foreigners	Al Qaeda, Jamat-i-Ulema Islam (JUI; group of religious clerics)
2. Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) (Soldiers of Prophet Muhammad's Companions)	Sunni Wahhabi/ Deobandi	20,000	Taliban, Saudi Arabia, Al Qaeda	To kill Shias, other members of non-Wahhabi sects and minorities	Al Qaeda, JUI
3. Tehrik-e-Nifaz-i-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law)	Wahhabi	10,000	Taliban, Saudi Arabia	Promulgate Islamic laws; those who oppose them are worthy of death; restricted to North-West Frontier Province	JUI, Jamaat-i-Islami, Tablighi Jamaat (Preacher of Islam)
4. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)	Wahhabi	400	Taliban, Saudi Arabia, Al Qaeda	To kill Shia, Ahmadis and Christians	SSP, JUI, Taliban, Tablighi Jamaat, Al Qaeda
5. Sipah-i-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP)	Shia group	1,500	Iran	To kill activists of SSP and Lashkar e Jhangvi	TJP (Tehrik e Jafaria Pakistan)
6. Hizb-e-Tehrir	Wahhabi group	2,000	ArabsStates, Central Asia	To kill Americans, foreigners, Shia Muslims	Al Qaeda, Jaish-e-Muhammad
7. Hizb-ul-Mujahidin	Wahhabi	3,000	Taliban, Jamaat-i-Islami	Militant activities in Indian-held Kashmir	Jamaat Islami Pakistan
8. Harkat-ul-Mujahidin	Wahhabi/ Deobandi	6,000	Taliban, Saudi Arabia (Al Qaeda)	To kill all opposing sects and other minorities, Kashmir	SSP, Laskhar-e-Jhangvi, Al Qaeda
9. Jaish-e-Muhammad (the Soldiers of Prophet Muhammad)	Wahhabi/ Deobandi	8,000	Taliban, Al Qaeda	To kill foreigners belonging to Allied forces, Pakistani Christians and opposing sects, Kashmir	SSP, Laskhar-e-Jhangvi, Al Qaeda, Jamaat-i-Islami
10. Laskhar-e-Taiba (now changed into Al-Dawah)	Wahhabi Ahl-e-Hadith	20,000	Sharja, Qatar, UAE (Al Qaeda)	To kill Indian forces and innocent people including Muslims who oppose them, Kashmir	Al Qaeda
11. Jamiat-ul-Mujahidin	Wahhabi/ Deobandi	2,500	Saudi Arabia, Taliban (Al Qaeda)	To kill foreign people and forces of Indian-held Kashmir	Al Qaeda volunteer

Source: Federal Investigation Agency, Islamabad.

The occupation of Afghanistan

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan angered the United States, which was already concerned about the growing influence of Iran and the spread of Iran's Islamic revolutionary zeal in the region. The USA found a willing ally in Zia to implement its dual containment policy, that is, containing the influence of Iran and expelling the Soviets from Afghanistan. The United States, the UK, Saudi Arabia and many other Muslim countries began to provide huge resources in the form of men, material and money to organise

resistance to Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Pakistan's intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), was co-opted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to prepare, organise, regulate and support operations of Islamic resistance groups (known as mujahidin) fighting the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, and they turned Pakistan into a 'jihadi hub' (Abbas 2005).

The CIA used its global network to recruit thousands of mujahidin from around the Islamic world to fight the Russians, but much of the manpower came from Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Pakistanis. Using the existing network of deeni madrasas (Islamic religious seminaries) and providing the funds to establish hundreds of new ones, the ISI trained and equipped more than 85,000 mujahidin between 1980 and 1988 to fight in Afghanistan. The ISI officers were attached to the mujahidin guerrillas in their operations against the Soviet forces. The madrasas of Pakistan's Sunni sectarian Islamic groups and parties supplied thousands of volunteers for the Afghan jihad. A large number of training camps were set up along the Pakistan–Afghan border to impart religious indoctrination and military training to such volunteers (Mir 2004; Abbas 2005; Roy 2002). The mujahidin led a generously funded Afghan war and finally succeeded in forcing the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan in 1989.

The USA and Pakistan had mobilised thousands of mujahidin to outsource their proxy war with the Soviet Union. After the Soviet withdrawal, Pakistan was left with thousands of highly motivated and militarily trained Islamic militants who were now looking for new theatres for their jihadi missions. Many Pakistani-based militant groups became increasing involved in the Kashmir insurgency and were generously supported by the ISI, Saudi Arabian and Pakistani donors. In the early 1990s the ISI was accused of operating thirty-nine military training camps for jihadi militants from the Sunni sectarian groups, including Hizbul Mujahidin, Laskhar-i-Taiba, Jaishe-i-Muhammad, Harkat-ul-jihad-i-Islami and Harkatul Mujahidin (Mir 2004).

Realising that it was proving to be a profitable business venture, many groups (including some criminal elements) hitherto involved only in sectarian battles in Pakistan also joined in the Kashmir jihad. Rivalries soon developed among these groups for financial and political reasons, and they started outbidding each other in their use of violent methods in order to gain favours from the ISI and private donors. Suicide bombing was one of the tactics adopted by some of the militant groups in their subversive operations against the Indian forces. By the late 1990s these groups had matured into

armies of dedicated men willing to give their lives in pursuit of the aims and honour of their cause. Their leaders were battle-tested veterans of the Afghan war who were anti-Indian and anti-Western.

They came from a cross-section of Pakistani society that reflected the country's militarisation in the aftermath of the Afghan war. In their military confrontations with the Indian army in Kashmir they suffered frightful losses because of their fearlessness. On the news of the martyrdom of a son, the family of the deceased would celebrate the event by distributing sweets and then offer another son to the cause. According to Abbas:

> The unemployed youth of Pakistan had found an occupation, an ideology, and a new family in which they found bonding and brotherhood. They had motivation, dedication and direction … One can call them by any name one desires, but they consider themselves the elite in the cause of Allah, and they had developed the infectious pride to inspire thousands of others into following them.
>
> (Abbas 2005: 202–3)

The mujahidin also found in post-Soviet Afghanistan another arena in which to fulfil their jihadi mission. The withdrawal of the Soviet forces unleashed a brutal and violent factional war among the Afghan mujahidin, which finally came to an uneasy end when in 1996 the Taliban succeeded in expelling the Northern Alliance forces, taking control of Kabul and setting up an Islamic emirate in Afghanistan led by their leader, Mullah Omar. The Taliban was an ISI-raised militia of highly motivated young Afghan Sunni fighters. These men were the product of madrasas run by the orthodox Sunni organisation Jamiat-i-Ulem-i-Islam of Maulana Fazlur Rahman in Pakistan's North West Frontier and the Baluchistan provinces bordering Afghanistan. The leadership of the Taliban came from two major Islamic seminaries of Pakistan: Darul Uloom of Maulana Abdul Haq at Akora Khattak, and the Binori Madrasas in Karachi. (For more on the rise of the Taliban see Chapter 6, 'Suicide bombings in Afghanistan'.)

Post-9/11 developments

Following the momentous events of 11 September 2001, under intense pressure from the USA, the Pakistan government, led by another military

general, Pervez Musharraf (who had assumed power following a military coup against the elected civilian government in 1999), withdrew its support of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and of the Kashmir insurgency. Eventually the Taliban government of Afghanistan was overthrown by the US military in 2002. Thousands of Taliban fighters fled to Pakistan, and hundreds more were arrested by the new Afghan government headed by US allies the Northern Alliance, who were deeply resentful of the Taliban and hostile to it on ethnic and religious grounds.

According to media reports, countless ordinary people were being killed or injured by indiscriminate American bombings. Many returning militants, especially those with beards, were arrested by Pakistani authorities, which angered militants and strengthened their resolve to resist US interests in Pakistan. They felt it was preferable to being jailed for no good reason. Similarly the loss of Pakistani support for Kashmiri jihadis led to disillusion and resentment among them. The Taliban and Kashmiri fighters were deeply anti-American and anti-West. They regarded President Musharraf as a US lackey and consequently deeply resented him.

Suicide bombing campaigns

Jaish-e-Muhammad leaders including Maulana Abdul Jabbar, Saifur Rehman Saifi and Muhammad Asif returned to Pakistan in October 2001 following the US-led assault on Afghanistan. They held a meeting at their Balakot training camp to hammer out a strategy for countering US designs in Pakistan. One of the leaders, Saifur Rehman Saifi, who was later arrested, told his interrogators that at that meeting they resolved to prepare themselves for a fitting response and decided to fight the USA with all means at their disposal, including suicide bombing attacks (Abbas 2005).

A spate of suicide bombing attacks followed the Balakot meeting. Saifur Rehman Saifi was involved in most of them. On 17 March 2002 Saifi helped a suicide bomber named Sarfraz to get ready for a suicide mission by taping explosives to his body and hand grenades to the belt of his trousers. Sarfraz travelled to his target, the Protestant International Church in Islamabad, and blew himself up, killing five people, including two Americans, and injuring forty. Two months later an explosives-laden car driven by nineteen-year-old Asif Zaheer rammed into a bus and blew up in front of the Sheraton Hotel, killing fourteen and injuring thirty-four people, including eleven French engineers working on a Pakistan naval project. The following month

seventeen-year-old Hameed Pathan detonated his car bomb outside the US Consulate in Karachi, killing twelve. Two months later three suicide bombers, Rehan Baber, Qari Zarrin and Nawaz Gujjar, carried out a deadly attack on a Christian school near Murree. The next target of suicide bombing was the Christian Hospital in Taxila, where four female nurses were killed and twenty-five people injured. It was carried out by a suicide bomber from Rawalpindi, Kamran Butt. The telephone retrieved from Kamran Butt's body gave police a break and led to the arrest of a number of militants, including Saifur Rehman Saifi. Persons involved in a number of other suicide bombing attacks are still unknown (Mir 2004: chapter 2; Ansari 2004).[4]

The police investigations revealed that all these attacks were carried out by active members of Jaish-e-Muhammad. Their execution was planned after careful surveillance of the intended targets. It was the first time the authorities realised the gravity of the situation: that these attacks were the work of home-grown terrorists and Pakistani terrorist organisations. Previously, most of the terrorist attacks were seen to be the work of operatives affiliated with international terrorist organisations. During interrogation Saifur Rehman Saifi confirmed that there were hundreds of mujahidin prepared to carry out suicide missions in Pakistan and that, while they derived inspiration from the Palestinians and the Chechens, they had easy access to manpower and explosives. The only problem they faced was finding appropriate foreign targets (Abbas 2005; Ansari 2004).

President Musharraf's backflip also created deep divisions in the Pakistani army and the air force, which had been politicised by Zia's Islamisation policies. Many officers were committed to the Sunni Jihadi Islamic agenda of anti-Indian and anti-Western Islamic states in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The faultlines of Islamic and sectarian divisions had reached all ranks of the Pakistani armed forces, and therefore it was not surprising that a number of officers of the Pakistan army and the air force were arrested in 2002 for involvement in an assassination attempt on President Musharraf. Islamist extremists and their ideological partners in the armed forces were acting in unison to eradicate this key American ally in the US-led war against terror (Mir 2004: 27).

The deadliest attempt on Musharraf's life was a suicide attack on 25 December 2003. Two suicide bombers rammed his motorcade with their bomb-laden cars in Rawalpindi, two kilometres away from his army residence, killing sixteen people and injuring fifty-four. Miraculously,

Musharraf survived. The investigation reports of the attack revealed that a Pakistani Al Qaeda operative with extensive contacts within Pakistani Jihadi groups, the Pakistan army, air force and Rawalpindi police, masterminded the attack. One of the two suicide bombers was Jameel Ahmad, a 23-year-old Jaish-e-Muhammad activist from Pakistani-controlled Kashmir. The other suicide bomber was Hazir Sultan, a Harkat-al-Jehad al-Islami operative from Panjshir valley in Afghanistan. The evidence revealed that suicide bombers were receiving live information on the president's motorcade from their contact, Mohammad Naeem, a police officer, in the special police squad in charge of presidential security. These contacts were revealed by the phone call records from one of the suicide bombers' mobile phone SIM card.

The two suicide attackers and their collaborators had links with Pakistani intelligence agencies before they went to fight in Afghanistan a few years earlier. They were among hundreds of Pakistani and Afghan jihadis captured in Afghanistan by the Northern Alliance troops and subjected to severe torture and humiliation. They were released after negotiation with Islamabad. On their return to Pakistan they were set free by their intelligence minders, who may have instigated the attack. They and their contacts in the army, the air force and the police were part of a network resentful of Musharraf's capitulation to US demands for reversing Pakistan's Kashmir and Afghan policies (Mir 2004).

The evidence further revealed that five of Pakistan's leading Sunni militant organisations (Harkat al-Jihad al-Islami, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Laskhar-e-Taiba, Laskhar-e-Jhangvi and Harkatul Mujahidin) and their supporters in the military establishment were working in tandem with each other to physically eliminate General Musharraf. The planning was led by the five-member Brigade 313 (the number of companions with the Prophet Muhammad in the battle of Badr), an offshoot of these organisations, which was launched in 2001 after the US-led Allied Forces attacked Afghanistan. The existence of Brigade 313 was revealed by Akram Lahori, a leader of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, after he was arrested along with several hardcore terrorists belonging to another radical sectarian organisation, Harkatul Mujahidin al-Islami, for their involvement in bombing of the US Consulate in Karachi and several sectarian killings in the Punjab.

During his interrogation Akram Lahori revealed that more than a hundred members of the Brigade had sworn on the Holy Quran in Karachi in May 2002 to assassinate Musharraf and other key Pakistani leaders who in their opinion were damaging the cause of jihad to further the American agenda in

Pakistan. He also revealed the names of potential suicide bombers belonging to the Jaish-i-Muhammad (now known as Khudam-ul-Islam) and Jamaat-ul-Furqan suicide squads. As mentioned earlier, after the US-led attacks on Afghanistan in November 2001, leaders of Jaish-i-Muhammad had decided to resist the increasing US influence in Pakistan through any means possible, including suicide bombings.

Table 5.2 lists the date, location, brief facts and casualties of suicide incidents in Pakistan from 2002 until March 2007. This table, compiled from the information gathered by the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) of Pakistan, shows that suicide bombings in Pakistan are largely a post-9/11 phenomenon. In about half of the cases the primary motive was sectarian differences, and in the other half the main motives were political. There were twenty-eight suicide bombing incidents, which killed 336 and injured 727 persons. The Federal Investigation Agency officers have discovered sixty-five suicide bombing networks and have arrested fifty-one network members, but a significant number have escaped arrest so far. The main weapon used in the attacks was suicide jackets; four were car bombs, and one was carried out using a bomb in a briefcase.

Table 5.3 provides profiles of the suicide bombers. Data were available for only seventeen of the twenty-eight bombers. The majority were unmarried males aged twenty to twenty-five years old. According to the Federal Investigation Agency, 48 per cent had ‘average financial status’. Educational attainment data were available for only fourteen suicide bombers. Of these, most (eleven) had a secular education with high school diplomas. Only three had religious education as their sole educational experience. This indicates that Pakistani youth participating in secular public education are not immune from the influence of radicalisation. A study of the social class origins of the most wanted terrorists in Pakistan showed that about 47 per cent of terrorists came from the middle and 53 per cent from the lower socio-economic groups (Kazmi 2006).

What attracts young Pakistanis to militancy?

There is no single reason that explains why young Pakistanis choose to join Islamic militant organisations. A comprehensive explanation, therefore, must include a range of social, cultural, economic and religious factors. Unemployment, poverty, social rejection, an unhappy family environment, lack of education, a romanticised notion of jihad, a sense of alienation and

powerlessness pervasive among marginalised youth and the growing influence of the mosque and seminary network, all play a role in the indoctrination and radicalisation of young men.

Table 5.2 Brief facts about the incidents of suicide bombing in Pakistan, 2002–March 2007

Date	*Place*	*Brief facts*	*Casualties*		*Suicide bombers*
			Killed	*Injured*	
17/3/2002	Islamabad	Attack on a church, killed five people, and injured the High Commissioner of Sri Lanka to Pakistan.	5	40	1
08/5/2002	Karachi	Nine French nationals and five Pakistanis, including the suspected suicide bomber, are killed and 34 more injured in a bomb explosion opposite Sheraton Hotel, Karachi.	14	34	1
05/8/2002	Murree	Attack on a Christian school in Murree.	n/a	n/a	1
09/8/2002	Taxilla	Attack on the Christian Hospital in Taxila.	n/a	n/a	1
04/7/2003	Quetta	Attack on a Shia Muslim mosque in Quetta during Friday prayers.	53	57	1
25/12/2003	Rawalpindi	Assassination attempt on President Pervez Musharraf in Rawalpindi.	14	46	2
28/2/2004	Rawalpindi	A suicide bombing attack on a mosque in the satellite town area of Rawalpindi.	1	4	1
07/5/2004	Karachi	A powerful bomb exploded at Hyderi Mosque, situated on the premises of the seminary Sind Madrasa-tul-Islam, in the Mithadar area of Karachi.	15	200	1
31/5/2004	Karachi	A high-intensity bomb explosion during evening prayers at a Shia mosque situated on M.A. Jinnah Road in Karachi.	24	34	1
30/7/2004	Fateh Jang	Suicide bomb attack on the car of Finance Minister and Prime Minister-designate, Shaukat Aziz, at village Jaffar in Fateh Jang.	7	n/a	1
10/1/2004	Sialkot	Suicide bombing at a Shia mosque at Sialkot in the Punjab province during Friday prayers.	31	75	1
10/10/2004	Lahore	A suspected suicide bomber reportedly blew himself up at a Shia mosque in the Mochi Gate area of Lahore.	5	6	1
19/3/2005	Jhal Magsi	A suicide bombing at a crowed gathering near the shrine of a Shia saint at Fatehpur village in the Jhal Magsi district of Baluchistan province.	50	100	1
28/4/2005	Swat	Two suspected terrorists blew	2	nil	2

		themselves up while planting a bomb in the Baidara village of Swat Valley.			
27/05/2005	Islamabad	Suicide bombing attack at Bari Imam.	25	100	1
30/05/2005	Karachi	An explosion in the courtyard of a Shia mosque at Gulshan-e-Iqbal in Karachi.	6	19	2
09/02/2006	Hangu	A suspected suicide attack on a Muharram procession of Shia Muslims in the Hangu.	40	50	1
02/03/2006	Karachi	US diplomat and his Pakistani driver and a Rangers official were killed and 54 persons injured in a suicide car bombing near the US Consulate in Karachi.	3	54	1
11/04/2006	Karachi	Killed and injured include prominent Islamist clerics, in a suicide bomb attack at Nishtar Park in Karachi.	57	200	1
06/02/2006	Bannu	A car laden with explosives rammed into a military vehicle in the Bakakhel area of Bannu in NWFP. The army convoy was proceeding from Mirali in North Waziristan to its base camp in the Bannu district when the attack occurred.	7	7	2
14/7/2006	Karachi	An unknown suicide bomber blew himself up near Allama Hassan Turabi, a Shia scholar and leader, and his nephew Ali Imran died in this attack.	3	n/a	1
11/8/2006	Dargai	A suicide bomber blew himself up at an army training centre at Dargai in North-West Frontier Province, killing and injuring recruits of the Punjab Regiment Centre and their instructor.	43	38	1
17/11/2006	Peshawar	A suicide bomber killed himself and injured two police personnel when he targeted a police van in Peshawar in North-West Frontier Province. The bomber, identified as Nadeem Khan, blew himself up near the police patrol van parked beside a temporary police post at the Bara intersection on the Ring Road at around 7.15a.m.	1	2	1

26/1/2007	Islamabad	A security guard was killed when he was attempting to stop a suicide bomber from entering the Marriott Hotel, Islamabad.	2	nil	1
29/1/2007	D. I. Khan	A teenage boy (aged about 16) walking from the south on the main road reached the police post. A police constable on duty stopped him and performed a body search. The boy triggered the SVA, which killed him and the police constable. The manager of the Shell fuelling station also died as a result of the blast. Seven others were injured.	3	7	1
2/3/2007	Tank	A military convoy consisting of four vehicles was proceeding from D.I. Khan Cantt to South Waziristan. It was 6 kilometres short of Tank City when a suicide bomber driving a Pajero jeep coming from the opposite direction collided with army pick-up at the front of the convoy. The collision, followed by a big explosion, resulted in the death of two army personnel as well as the bomber. Eight army personnel were injured.	3	8	1
29/3/2007	Kharian	Reportedly a suicide bomber attacked the Army Driving School adjacent to Kharian Cantt at about 11.45 a.m. Two army personnel from 30 Cavalry Armour Unit were killed and six were injured.	2	6	1

Source: Federal Investigation Agency, Islamabad. Partial list only. Suicide attacks with incomplete data were excluded from FUSTD.

An important motivation is the sense of empowerment that joining a militant organisation confers on marginalised young people. It gives them a strong sense of identity in an increasingly fragmented structure. Studies of jihadi culture and organisations confirm the above-mentioned observation that a vast number of recruits come from public and formal schools and lack any real religious knowl-edge and motivation. Interestingly, a number of militants admitted fondness for Indian films and film actors, indicating that

underneath their dogmatic surface lay ordinary people. Most of the suicide bombers in Pakistan are members of jihadi groups involved in conflicts in Kashmir and Afghanistan. To prevent people from becoming suicide bombers would require stopping them from joining such groups, and that appears to be the biggest political challenge facing Pakistan (Abbas 2005).

Table 5.3 Profile of suicide bombers

Name	*Age*	*Education*	*Marital status*	*Financial status*
Qari Jameel				
Ahmad (killed)	25/26	Religious education	Single	Poor
Khalique @ Omar @ Shafique (killed)	25/26	Middle	Single	Average
Hafiz Irfan @ Shani (killed)	22	Matriculation/religious education	Single	Average
Sultan Sikander @ Ashraf (at large)	24	Matriculation	Single	Average
Ameer Sohail Sajid (arrested)	24	Matriculation	Single	Average
Sarfraz Ahmad	19/20	Matriculation	Single	Poor
Kamran Mir @ Ali	22	Matriculation/religious education	Single	Average
Muzaffar-Ur-Rehman	27/28	Primary/religious education	Single	Poor
Muhamad Nawaz	18/19	Religious education	Single	Average
Muhammad Rehan Babar	18	Matriculation/religious education	Single	Average
Muhammad Zarin @ Gul Zarin @ Saif Ullah Akhtar	20/22	Religious education	Single	Average
Abdul Shakoor @ Waqas	19/20	Middle	Single	Poor
Noor Ahmad	35/36	n/a	n/a	Poor
Muhammad Khan	33/34	n/a	n/a	Poor
Abdul Nabi @ Sajjad	29/30	Matriculation	n/a	Poor
Hidayat Ullah	19	Middle	n/a	Poor
Abdul Hameed	20/21	n/a	n/a	Poor
Akbar Niazi	22/23	n/a	Married	Average
Javed @ Jabbar @ Ghaffar	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Hassan	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Raja M. Tahir	21	Intermediate	Single	Poor
Nadeem Khan	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

Source: Federal Investigation Agency, Islamabad
Notes
n/a = not available.
@ = alias.

The interrogation of arrested suicide bombers by FIA officials shows that suicide bombers are all volunteers who joined the suicide squads of their own free will. They are not emotionally unstable or suffering from obvious psychopathology. They are carefully recruited and indoctrinated by the terrorist organisations. The motivations for suicide attacks are not so different in many ways from motivations for other types of terrorism, including commitment to the cause of jihad, personal notoriety, anger, revenge and retribution against a perceived injustice. But the effective pedagogic skills of the charismatic leaders of jihadi organisations play a vital role in mesmerising the young militants and enhance their motivation to give their lives for the cause of Allah.

The contents of videos and their 'will letters' show that the suicide bombers were very committed to carrying out their missions and that their decisions were politically motivated and religiously sanctioned (Rana 2004 and 2006).

Learning to be suicide bombers

Master trainers known as 'persuaders' play a crucial role in recruiting and motivating potential suicide bombers. Most of the 'persuaders' come from the tribal areas and belong to mosques and madrasas. They are chosen because of their special facility in communication and interpersonal skills, and they are trained in assembling bombs and making suicide jackets. The 'persuaders' use madrasas and mosques to identify potential recruits as it is easier to motivate these attendees. They usually look for inhabitants from the country's northern tribal regions and southern Punjab as the people from these areas tend to be less well educated and more religiously inclined.

The 'persuaders' target youth who have turned to religion following a personal shock or traumatic experience such as the death of a loved one. They exploit the emotional state of such individuals and invite them to specially arranged religious lectures in a mosque or at a private home. These sessions focus on the afterlife. Potential recruits are told that life in this world is ephemeral and are asked to think about what they need to do to ensure their place in heaven. Martyrdom is then presented as a way of

achieving this goal. Once the potential suicide bombers have been identified, their training starts. All potential recruits are told that they are the elite and should not mingle with the common people in society. In most cases they are asked to sever their ties with their friends in order not to be polluted by them. They are advised to obey their parents to the extent religion allows and, if parents give orders that hamper their 'noble mission', they are free to disobey them. The recruits are subtly indoctrinated into believing that their parents are not true Muslims.

Once the 'persuader' is satisfied that he has convinced a person, it is up to him to assign the recruit a task or send him for further training, as happened in the case of Sohail, whose biography is given below. Once the recruits are ready for the mission they are told to wait for further instructions. When a target has been identified and the recruit informed about it, the suicide jacket and explosives are given to him. Normally the bomber, unless he is a 'persuader' or master trainer, is given only one option – to blow himself up. Some suicide bombers do have second thoughts and hesitate, and they are the ones who tend to be unsuccessful and get caught (Ahmad 2007).[5] To minimise the rate of unsuccessful attacks, terrorist organisations have issued strict instructions to the attackers. A two-page manual, 'A Guide to Mujahidin', written in Arabic and Urdu, was recovered by police in a raid in Karachi in 2005. It starts with the Islamic concept of martyrdom and urges that this should be every Muslim's biggest desire. The content of the manual included the following salient points:

1. If arrested, avoid meeting family members; don't keep organizational material and mujahidin addresses during travel; don't rely on 'Punjabis'; and always use code names.
2. Don't discuss personal matters with your companions and try not to get in touch with your family. You are chosen in the way of Allah and family relationships and friendships should not remain important in the way of God.
3. Don't stay more than one day at a place.
4. Don't discuss organizational matters with your companions at public places, and don't tell your family about your activities, especially about your party friends.

(Rana 2004)

It advises Afghan and Arab militants not to rely on the ‘Punjabis’ if they are on a mission or moving from one place to another, because most intelligence officials are from the Punjab. Ironically, the manual directs the bombers to be law-abiding in daily life, always to keep vehicle papers up-to-date and not to quarrel with the police at checkpoints. The booklet provides guidance to the militants on what to do when arrested:

> Investigators usually give the impression that they know every thing about you and your organization but in fact they do not know anything, be careful and don’t fall in their trap … law enforcement agencies could insult your father, mother, and women, don’t be provoked and always remember you are in the way of God and he should be your family.
>
> (Rana 2004)

Biographies of a suicide bomber and a recruiter/facilitator

The following two biographies provide important insights into the recruitment, motivation and training of suicide bombers in Pakistan. The first profile is that of an important recruiter and handler of suicide bombers for Jaish-e-Muhammad, and the second profiles a young suicide bomber who was arrested before he could carry out his operation.

Saifur Rehaman alias Saifi

Saifur Rehaman Saifi was born in 1976 in Layyah in central Punjab. He matriculated from a public high school, then completed two years of college for his certificate in commerce. He received some religious education in a local mosque but did not learn the whole Quran. He was unable to find a decent job after completing his commerce certificate but eventually succeeded in obtaining work as a salesman at a bookstore earning a monthly salary of 2,000 rupees. Dissatisfied with the low pay and lack of future prospects, he left the job to begin his life as a militant. In short, he was not a product of a religious seminary and was not a religious person before starting his life as an Islamic militant.

Saifur Rehaman Saifi was introduced to the doctrine of jihad in 1995 by Abdul Qadir, a Harkatul Ansar mujahid who had fought in Afghanistan. With a handwritten note from Qadir, Rehaman travelled to the Afghan–Pakistan

border town of Miran Shah where he met up with potential militants at the Harkatul Ansar office. This was the start of a long association for the unemployed young man. The militant life brought not only regular meals and pocket money but also the revered status of a mujahid. After completing a thirty-eight-day training programme, Rehaman returned home for a few days before deciding to go back to Miran Shah, where he joined the Harkatul Ansar and worked at their office for six months as a record-keeper. He was later transferred to the Khalid bin Waleed training camp in Khost before being deployed to the front line on the outskirts of Kabul. He was injured in a clash with the Northern Alliance and was hospitalised for three months, first in Afghanistan and subsequently in Pakistan.

Upon his recovery he returned to Khalid bin Waleed camp and worked in the publication section. There he attended several military courses and also worked as a trainer. He remained at Khost until August 1998, when he shifted to safer ground following the infamous US missile attack. In August 1999 he was made commander of a platoon of seventy pro-Taliban fighters stationed at Bagram airbase. He returned to Pakistan in December 1999 for several months, and in March 2000 he was married. Soon after his marriage he was called to Islamabad by Maulana Abdul Jabbar, supreme commander of the Jaish-e-Muhammad. He accepted the invitation to join Jaish-e-Muhammad and took charge of the organisation's publication section. Later he was assigned the task of overseeing the construction of a training facility in Balakot, near Mansera. From there he went back to Afghanistan to fight against the Northern Alliance. Following the US-led war in Afghanistan beginning in October 2001, Saifi, along with other Jaish-e-Muhammad leaders, returned to Pakistan.

In November 2001 he joined the Jaish-e-Muhammad leaders at the Balakot camp to discuss how to counter the growing US influence in Pakistan. At that meeting it was decided to mount resistance against the United States through any means possible, including suicide bombing. A month later at a meeting in Bahawalpur, Saifur Rehaman Saifi was made head of Jaish operations in northern Punjab. He was asked to identify potential partners, acquire weapons and explosives, and initiate surveillance of likely targets. In 2002 Saifur Rehaman Saifi's group unleashed deadly suicide attacks on the Protestant International Church in Islamabad (17 March 2002), the Christian school near Murree (5 August 2002) and the chapel of the Christian Hospital in Taxila (9 August 2002).

Immediately after the Islamabad church attack, Maulana Abdul Jabbar summoned Saifur Rehaman Saifi, along with other Jaish operators, to Jaish-e-Muhammad's Hyderabad Road seminary in Karachi and ordered them to halt suicide bombing operations immediately and shift to the Balakot camp. While agreeing to do so at the meeting, most of the leaders privately vowed to continue their jihad against the USA. Saifi was arrested at the house of Atiqur Rehman, another Jaish-e-Muhammad leader in Kot Addu, a few days after the suicide attack at the Christian Hospital in Taxila. The police were able to identify one of the suicide bombers, which led them to the organisers of the attack. In the final analysis, Saifur Rehaman Saifi was a professional jihadi and became a skilled recruiter, motivator and organiser of suicide operations as a salaried employee of Jaish-e-Muhammad (Abbas 2003).

Sohail

Sohail is a nineteen-year-old Pashtun male from the tribal areas of Pakistan. He belongs to the prominent Masud tribe. His father is a successful businessman in Rawalpindi who lives with his second wife and Sohail's four step-siblings in an upmarket area of Islamabad. Sohail's mother lives in Tank, a major town in the tribal areas. Sohail has a brother who is studying in the Government College in Tank, and a married sister. His extended family includes his uncles, one of whom is a medical doctor and another who is a very senior government engineer. Sohail has completed Faculty of Arts (FA) in the Government College in Tank and also a certificate in computing. He also attended a two-month Islamic religious studies course at the Deeni Madrasa in Tank under the guidance of a noted Islamic scholar.

He is a member of Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam and has also been a member of Laskhar Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba. He has four very close friends who are also members of Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam. He told the interrogators that he was inclined towards religious teaching while he was studying, and during that time he met Abid who took him from Tank to Azam Warsek in the Wana region. He was taken to Kenza Pengaa training camp. His training commanders included Baitullah Masud, Abdullah Masud and Haji Omar. Initially he was given three books to read, which were *Rehbar Ki Talash* ('Search for the Guide'), *Fidayee Hamle* ('Suicide Attacks'), and a book referring to a specific sect. At the training camp recruits were indoctrinated into believing that performing a suicide attack would lift them to the rank of martyr and their soul would rest in peace in heaven. His training included

daily rigorous physical exercises, use of guns and the manufacturing of explosives.

Their training centre was located in a big house with around thirty rooms. Each room was occupied by two to three trainees. The trainees were provided three meals a day of meat, poultry, fresh vegetables and fruits. Each trainee had their own sleeping bag. The house was spacious and had a tube well, which was operated by a generator because there was no electricity in the area. The tube well supplied water not only to the training camp but also to other residents in the area. The centre had its own mosque with a dedicated imam whose name was Faize Ullah Sheikh. The imam had a large family and multiple wives who lived in a safe house in Wana. He had a computer, which had maps of many Pakistani cities and also instructions about manufacturing suicide vests and bags. In addition the computer had videos of how to prepare for suicide missions and three ways to detonate the explosives. Communication at the camp was through wireless sets. Out of curiosity Sohail inquired where the money for the camp came from, and most people mentioned a name that sounded like ‘Osama’.

Sohail spent two months at the training camp and was then permitted to go home. After a few days Abid phoned to ask him to collect two suicide vests from a car with tinted windows, parked in the Tank station. He was told to keep one of those vests with him and hand over the second to a local man whom he was to meet in a mosque. The Dera Ismail Khan police caught him while he was taking the second vest to that man. He also told the interrogators details of the designs of the suicide vest and the fifteen components, including electrical wiring and the explosives used in the making of these vests. At the interrogations he was remorseful about his actions (Rana 2004).[6]

FUSTD suicide bombing profile: Pakistan

In the above discussion I have relied on research material collected mainly from Pakistani intelligence agencies and other published and unpublished secondary research material gathered during fieldwork visits to Pakistan. As discussed earlier, however, the Flinders University Suicide Terrorism Database (FUSTD) also has data on suicide bombing attacks in Pakistan. These data are reported in Tables 5.4 and 5.5. They show that between 1991 and 2006 there were forty-nine suicide bombings in Pakistan but that forty-

five of these attacks occurred between 2001 and 2006. The lethality of Pakistani suicide bombings attacks is similar to the global profile of lethality.

Suicide attacks constituted 4 per cent of all terrorist attacks but accounted for 680 deaths or 33 per cent of all terrorism-related fatalities in that period. On average a suicide attack in Pakistan is twelve times more lethal than a non-suicide terrorist attack. The weapon most commonly used was suicide explosive vest/bag. The main targets were the security forces and public officials, followed by civilians. These findings are consistent with what has been reported earlier. In the context of Pakistan most of the civilian deaths resulted from suicide attacks that had sectarian motivations. It would be important to monitor how these trends hold up in the attacks that have occurred since 2007. One gains the impression that non-suicide terrorist attacks are targeting infrastructure and security forces, whereas the suicide attacks are increasingly targeting security forces and public officials. In terms of suicide bombing it appears that the situation in Pakistan is becoming very serious.

Table 5.4 Deaths from suicide attacks and all forms of terrorism in Pakistan, 1991–2006

Year	*All terrorist attacks (n)*	*Suicide attacks (n)*	*Suicide attacks as % of all terrorist attacks*	*Deaths from all terrorist attacks (n)*	*Deaths from suicide attacks[a] (n)*	*Deaths from suicide attacks as % of all deaths*
1991–5	24	2	8.3	74	63	85.1
1996–2000	124	2	1.6	305	70	23.0
2001–5	444	17	3.8	777	277	35.7
2006	657	28	4.3	907	270	30.0
1991–2006	**1,249**	**49**	**3.9**	**2,063**	**680**	**33.0**

Sources: FUSTD (2008); MIPT database (www.tkb.org); Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (2007).

Note
a 'Deaths per suicide attack' refers to the minimum number killed.

Table 5.5 Lethality of suicide attacks in Pakistan, 1991–2006

Year	*Average yearly suicide attacks*	*Deaths per suicide attack[a]*	*Average yearly non-suicide terrorist attacks*	*Deaths per non-suicide attack*
1991–5	0.4	31.5	4.4	0.5

1996–2000	0.4	35.0	24.4	1.9
2001–5	3.4	16.3	85.4	1.2
2006	28.0	9.6	629.0	1.0
1991–2006	**3.1**	**13.9**	**75.0**	**1.2**

Sources: FUSTD (2008); MIPT database (www.tkb.org); Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (2007).

Note
a 'Deaths per suicide attack' refers to the minimum number killed.

Table 5.6 Targets of suicide attacks in Pakistan, 1991–2006

Target	*1991–5*		*2001–5*		*2006*		
	N	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*Total*
Infrastructure	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Local security/public officials	0	0	4	25	16	57.1	20
Foreign forces/ contractors	1	50	1	6.3	2	7.1	4
Civilians	1	50	5	31.3	5	17.9	11
Other[a]	0	0	6	37.5	5	17.9	11
Missing[b]							3
Total	**2**	**100**	**16**	**100**	**28**	**100**	**49**

Source: FUSTD (2008).

Notes
a Suicide shooting/grenade/mine attack.
b Source could not confirm the weapon.

Table 5.7 Weapons used in suicide attacks in Pakistan, 1991–2006

Weapon	*1991–5*		*2001–5*		*2006*		
	N	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*Total*
Suicide vehicular attack	1	100	0	0	5	19.2	6
Suicide belt/bomb attack	0	0	2	66.7	21	80.8	23
Other[a]	0	0	1	33.3	0	0	1
Missing[b]							**19**
Total	**1**	**100**	**3**	**100**	**26**	**100**	**49**

Source: FUSTD (2008).

Notes
a Suicide shooting/grenade/mine attack.
b Source could not confirm the weapon.

Concluding remarks

The wave of suicide attacks in Pakistan has intensified since 2005. The latest figures show that the country endured at least sixty completed suicide attacks in 2007, which killed 770 and injured 1,574 people. These attacks were accompanied by an alarming increase in terrorist incidents. In 2007 there were 1,442 terrorist attacks and incidents of political violence, which killed 3,448 and injured 5,353 persons. The fatalities were 128 per cent higher than in 2006 (Wasim 2008; Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies 2007). The majority of attacks were aimed at the security forces and politicians. Two of the most lethal and high-profile attacks targeted the former Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto. The first suicide attack on her welcoming procession in Karachi on 18 October 2007 killed more than 145 and injured 350 people, and the second attack, on 27 December 2007 during her election procession in Islamabad, killed 50 (including Benazir Bhutto herself) and injured 100.

While the suicide attacks on Benazir Bhutto made world headlines, the main targets of the majority of attacks are military and police personnel, religious processions and mosques. The attacks on state security personnel are creating serious morale problems, and many senior officers admit that the problem is becoming worse because they are ill equipped in terms of infrastructure, expertise and training. The threat of terrorism in general and suicide terrorism in particular is strikingly visible in the mobility of the country's political elite. All intra-city travel by the President and other senior ministers is planned well in advance, and roads are blocked to general traffic for hours as a precautionary measure, causing great inconvenience to the public. I observed some of this myself during travel for field-work in Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad, Rawalpindi and Peshawar in 2006 and 2007. These protective precautionary measures themselves are becoming a form of coercion.

The suicide attacks on religious processions and mosques have accentuated sectarian tensions and often start a vicious cycle of revenge attacks and counter-attacks by militants from the opposing sides. The tribal areas bordering Afghanistan and the North West Frontier Province are now the locations for several training camps for suicide bombers. Under pressure from the United States and NATO, as well as from Pakistanis themselves, the Pakistani army is heavily involved in counter-insurgency actions against the militants and their infrastructure in these regions, which are home to

fiercely independent Pashtun tribes. Given the demographics of Pakistan, around 70 per cent of army personnel tend to be from the Punjab. This is creating ethnic tensions, and there is growing resentment in the tribal areas against the 'Punjabi army', which is making the counter-insurgency problem complex and more dangerous.

In the tribal regions, and especially in Waziristan, Pakistan's intelligence agency, ISI, and the US Special Forces, which include operatives from the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency, are involved in joint covert operations to apprehend or eliminate high-value militant leaders. These operations rely on a network of local informants who provide intelligence on the movements of the suspected militant leaders and their activities. (This has also been mentioned in a recent *New Yorker* article by the noted American journalist Seymour Hersh [2008].) On the basis of this information, counter-terrorist operations are mounted, sometimes involving missile attacks on the suspected targets from unmanned predator aircraft. Invariably some of these attacks go wrong and end up killing innocent civilians. One such attack took place in January 2007 and created a furore in the country and violent protest in the tribal areas. Some of my informants expressed deep concern about these covert operations. They are believed to be creating serious security problems, including the risk of more suicide attacks, as well as alienating the people of tribal areas. There are reports of militant leaders ordering the public executions of scores of suspected 'American spies' to show people the consequences of such collaboration.

The clandestine counter-terrorism operations of Pakistani and foreign intelligence operatives against Islamic militants are being used by militant organisations as a propaganda weapon against the government for supporting America's War on Terrorism. This propaganda is part of the reason for a growing chasm between the government and the Pakistani public. I was surprised to hear anti-government, anti-Western and anti-US sentiments being expressed at the highest level of the government. An often-cited reason for this was that Pakistan's counter-insurgency is being driven, not by its own national interests, but by the USA and other Western countries. Many security personnel subscribed to the view that the US-sponsored War on Terror in reality was a war on Islam and that Pakistan should follow the path of reconciliation and not confrontation with its Islamic militants.

There is little doubt that the scourge of religious extremism and sectarian violence is a product of government policies followed by the military regime

of General Zia ul Haq in the 1980s and after 1990 by the government of General Pervez Musharraf. In both cases these polices were an outcome of international geostrategic developments that involved the United States and some of the neighbouring Arab countries. Pakistan and the United States colluded with radical Islamist groups to train jihadis to fight their proxy wars in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Since 9/11 the strategic shift in US policy has demanded that Pakistan rein in Islamic militants. This has made Pakistan itself 'Jihad Central', turning militants on their erstwhile masters, funders and supporters. The spread of suicide terrorism is one manifestation of this development. My efforts in 2007 to interview some of the jailed militants involved in masterminding suicide bombings in Pakistan were unsuccessful. I was told informally that this was to protect Pakistan's national and international interests. While it was never explicitly stated, my impression was that the ISI and CIA had embargoed interviews by outsiders like me in order to prevent the incarcerated Islamic militants revealing who their former masters and protectors were.

The militants involved in terrorism are religiously motivated, but their agendas are manifestly political. The fragments of evidence available suggest that they sincerely believe that they are fighting for a just and 'holy' cause. In this respect they have much in common with the puritan saints of the Reformation in Europe who waged 'constant warfare' against the Devil and his worldlings. They warred in order to fulfil their vision of a rightly ordered society and government and to improve their chances of divine salvation. By linking military action and politics to scripture, puritan Christians were transformed into political revolutionaries, instruments of God for whom action in pursuit of the Holy Commonwealth on earth became the ultimate expression of faith (Walzer 1965; Euben 2002). The Islamic militants by most accounts are 'ideological warriors' fighting the coercive institutions of a powerful state, believing that they will ultimately come out of this fight victorious. This is highly improbable. The only possible way for victory to occur is if these institutions themselves become torn apart by ideological divisions. There is no sign of that happening as yet. But it is not something that can be completely ignored either.

A recent development in Pakistani jihadi culture, which also signifies religious differences, is the rise of the 'fidayeen attacks'. A 'fidayeen attack' (like the one launched on the heavily guarded Pakistan military headquarters near Rawalpindi on 10 October 2009) is one in which a group of highly trained and motivated armed individuals launch an attack with the intention

of inflicting heavy damage and casualties and of dying in the process of fighting the adversary. Some Pakistani jihadi groups believe that the ‘fidayeen attack’ is more holy and Islamic than the suicide bombing attack in which the individual blows himself up instead of fighting his enemy (Abbas 2009).

6 Suicide bombings in Afghanistan

On 9 September 2001, two young Moroccan men posing as television journalists secured an interview with the Northern Alliance commander, Ahmad Shah Masoud, at Khwaja Bahauddin and detonated their bomb hidden in a camera while conducting the mock interview. The attack killed Masoud and his two associates along with the 'interviewers'. Masoud was the leading adversary of the Taliban and its leader, Mullah Omar. The attack occurred two days before the momentous events of 9/11 to which it appeared to be intimately related. It is believed that, anticipating a prompt United States military response to the 9/11 attacks, Al Qaeda assassinated Mullah Omar's arch-enemy in order to secure Osama bin Laden's relations with his Taliban protectors, and to eliminate the most likely partners of the United States in any retaliatory attack on Afghanistan (Bergen 2006).

It was the first suicide attack in Afghanistan. The tactic of using suicide attacks to kill adversaries had no precedents in that country. Even after Masoud's assassination the tactic remained a rare occurrence until 2005. The Flinders University Suicide Terrorism Database (FUSTD), which gathered data from publicly available databases of suicide terrorism, recorded only thirty-five suicide attacks in Afghanistan until the end of 2006. But according to data compiled by the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) for Afghanistan, a source not publicly available when FUSTD was being constructed, after the first attack that assassinated Masoud in 2001, there were no attacks in 2002, two in 2003 and three in 2004. In 2005, with the rise of the Taliban as a serious insurgent group in Afghanistan, suicide attacks escalated, rising to 17 in 2005 and 123 in 2006. In the first six months of 2007 there were 77 attacks, bringing the total number of suicide attacks between 2001 and the end of June 2007 to 223 (UNAMA 2007).

There is much debate among analysts and the media over the sudden rise of suicide attacks in Afghanistan. Many Afghans believe that suicide

bombing has no antecedents in Afghan culture and blame foreigners for importing it. But the continuing expansion of suicide assaults has compelled analysts to conclude that while the practice may have started as an imported tactic, the suicide missions have become an integral part of the resurgent Taliban strategy, using local attackers as well as those from outside the country. From the perspective of the Taliban, the key objectives of suicide missions are to compel the Americans and the citizens of countries contributing to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to pressure their governments to leave Afghanistan and to undermine confidence in the new Afghan government and its ability to provide security to its citizens. They are also aimed at outbidding the opponents of the Taliban and possibly eliminating opposition to them. They are symbols of the Taliban's dedication and commitment, which hopefully (in their view) help the cause by attracting new recruits and financial resources.

Protagonists in the Afghanistan conflict

In many significant ways the current conflict in Afghanistan is a continuation of the Afghanistan–USSR war of 1979–89. That conflict became a proxy war between the then two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The latter had occupied Afghanistan ostensibly at the request of the communist regime that it had helped to install in 1979. The occupation made the country a battleground between the Soviet Union and its allies, the Afghan government armies, and the Islamic mujahidin ('warriors of the faith'). The mujahidin were an Islamic, largely Afghan militia, supported by the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, the United Kingdom and a host of other US allies. This support was instrumental in mobilising international Islamic solidarity in what has come to be known as the Afghan Jihad (Saikal 2004; Maley 2002).

Without US support through the CIA-funded Project Cyclone, which gave billions of dollars to fund the Afghan Jihad, the outcome would have been very different. The US support package included organisational, logistical, military, technological and ideological support for sustaining and encouraging Afghan resistance. The US and Saudi Arabian money gave impetus to the establishment of thousands of madrasas (Islamic religious schools) in Pakistan, which ensured a continuous supply of mujahidin. The war between the mujahidin and the Soviet Union lasted almost a decade until 1989 when the Soviet Union, facing huge military losses, was forced to

withdraw its forces under a negotiated accord signed in Geneva in 1988 (Saikal 2004; Rais 1999).

After the withdrawal of the Soviet Union in 1989, US and Saudi funds for the Afghan Jihad ceased. When the Soviet Union finally stopped supporting the Afghan communist regime a year or so later, a wave of rebellion against this government began, led primarily by Uzbek and Tajik militia commanders in northern Afghanistan who joined prominent mujahidin commander Ahmad Shah Masoud of the Islamic Society (Jamiat-e-Islami). This society was a largely Tajik party headed by Burhannudin Rabbani. Rabbani became President in 1992, which set off a violent and destructive conflict between various mujahidin factions, including those supporting the nominal Prime Minister, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, a Pashtun, which brought more devastation and chaos to Afghanistan. Hikmatyar's radical Islamist Hizb-e-Islami (Islamic Party) had received a large proportion of the US aid during the anti-Soviet war. Four years of civil war (1992–6) created popular support for the Taliban movement that sought to deliver Afghanistan from the factional fighting (Katzman 2008; Saikal 2004).

In 1993 a group of Islamic clerics and their students, mostly of rural Pashtun origin, many of them former mujahidin who had become disillusioned with continued conflict among mujahidin parties, had moved into Pakistan to study in madrasas, and formed the Taliban movement. They practised an orthodox Sunni Islam akin to the Wahhabism of Saudi Arabia. They viewed the Rabbani government as corrupt, anti-Pashtun and responsible for civil war. There was an important ethnic dimension in this conflict. The Pashtuns have historically ruled Afghanistan, regard themselves as the founders of the country and are its dominant ethnic majority. The promise of the recovery of Kabul from Tajik Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Masoud helped unite the Pashtun tribes, despite their traditional rivalries, notably between the Durranis from the south and the Ghilzais from the east. Even those Pashtun who hated the Taliban for their extremism and intolerance gave them passive support. Many mujahidin commanders defected to the Taliban, and they were also actively supported by Pakistan's intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). According to some sources, they also received assistance from the CIA. Between 1994 and 1995, the Taliban had numerous victories against the Northern Alliance commanders, and eventually they took control of Kabul on 27 September 1996 and set up the Taliban government (Rais 1999; *The Economist* 2008; Saikal 2004: chapter 9).

The emergence of the Taliban accorded with the underlying logic of Pashtun culture. In one of the most remarkable ethnographic accounts of this culture, the eminent Norwegian anthropologist Fredrik Barth describes the role of lineage in shaping a political alliance that extends across ethnic frontiers. The procedure for resolution of conflict depends on the nature of the conflict. Revenge is regarded as a person's right along with compensation. In social conflicts, the Mians (descendants of saints), or other persons of saintly repute, frequently play a critical role by serving as arbitrators. In group conflict, 'where concerted punitive action is called for, groups of religious students (taliban) have proved more readily responsive than the larger community of villagers under the direction of the council' (Barth 1956: 4). The rise of the Taliban movement is an affirmation of Barth's insightful description of the resolution of conflicts in Pashtun society.

The Taliban regime was led by reclusive Uruzgan-born cleric Mullah Mohammad Omar, a former mujahidin commander and leader of the Hizb-e-Islami (Islamic Party of Yunis Khalis). His rise to power closely follows the cultural pattern described above by Barth (see also Rashid 2001: chapter 1). Omar forged close bonds with Osama bin Laden and refused US demands to extradite him. The Taliban regime progressively lost international and domestic support as it imposed a harsh Islamic regime on Afghanistan, using physical punishments to enforce strict Islamic practices, such as banning television and prohibiting women from attending schools and from most waged work. Their policies against Afghan women were especially oppressive and evoked international condemnation. Internationally the Taliban regime became isolated owing to its lack of recognition by the United Nations and all countries except Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and UAE. The Clinton administration was incensed by the Taliban support of Al Qaeda's leadership, which had moved to Afghanistan, and subsequently launched missile attacks on 20 August 1998 at the alleged Al Qaeda training camps in eastern Afghanistan (Saikal 2004).

The Taliban government's domestic policies and its international isolation caused different Afghan factions to ally with the ousted President Rabbani and Masoud, congealing mainly a Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek anti-Taliban opposition into a broader Northern Alliance. It was joined later by the Pashtun Mujahidin faction led by Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf. While the Northern Alliance received military and financial support from Iran, Russia and India, it continued to lose ground to the Taliban. By the time of the 11

September attacks, the Taliban controlled most of the country. The Alliance received a major setback when two days before 9/11 Ahmed Shah Masoud was assassinated by alleged Al Qaeda suicide bombers.

Following 9/11, the Bush administration decided to overthrow the Taliban militarily when it refused to extradite Osama bin Laden. Operation Enduring Freedom was launched on 7 October 2001. By way of the US- and UK-led aerial bombing campaign, and the land forces of the Northern Alliance and the Pashtun anti-Taliban group, by early December the Taliban regime had been overthrown. The city of Qandahar was the last to surrender, and most of the Taliban leadership, including Mullah Omar, fled into the countryside and went into hiding. A few months later the US and Northern Alliance forces conducted Operation Anaconda against Al Qaeda and elements of the Taliban forces. On 1 May 2002 the United States announced an end to 'major combat operations' (Katzman 2008).

The war paved the way for the formation of a broadly based Afghan government under the aegis of the United Nations. In December 2001, the United Nations-brokered Bonn agreement was signed by all Afghan factions bar the Taliban. It authorised the formation of an interim administration headed by Hamid Karzai and the establishment of an international peacekeeping force to maintain security in Kabul. In June 2002 a *Loya Jirga* (grand council or assembly) was convened to approve these measures. A constitutional commission drafted a permanent constitution, which was subsequently approved by a constitutional *Loya Jirga* in December 2003–January 2004. There was a widespread perception among the Pashtun that the interim government was dominated by the Panjshiri Tajik armed faction and that the *Loya Jirga*, which was expected to install a more broadly representative, and hence more legitimate, government, ended up reinforcing the Panjshiri monopoly over the control of the government's key institutions, especially those dealing with national security (International Crisis Group 2003 [hereafter ICG]).

Hamid Karzai was elected as first President in September 2004 by 55.4 per cent of the popular vote, and non-party-based parliamentary elections were held in September 2005. Soon after the parliament was convened, it elected a main opponent of Karzai as the parliamentary speaker, supported by the Northern Alliance bloc. The same Alliance, together with ex-communists and members of the royal family, formed a party called the National Front, which sought greater parliamentary power and direct election of the provincial governors. In spite of many contentious issues,

Afghanistan now has a functioning parliamentary government in which the executive and the legislatures are working together.

But the authority of the Afghan government is limited largely to the cities. According to the assessment of the Director of National Intelligence given before the US Senate's Armed Services Committee in February 2008, the Karzai government controls only 30 per cent of the country, while the Taliban controls 10 per cent, and tribes and local groups control the remainder. The US government and the international community is trying to bolster the Karzai government through extensive reconstruction and stabilisation programmes and assistance. The US and international supporters believe that stability and countering corruption and narcotics trafficking depend on expanding the capacity, proficiency and authority of the Afghan central government. To this end, from 2002 to 2008, the US government had provided a massive $23 billion in reconstruction aid, including assistance to 'train and equip' the Afghan army and police and counter-narcotics assistance. This is in addition to about 62,000 members of the NATO-led coalition ISAF, which includes 34,000 members of US forces. (The number of US troops was increased in 2009 and by the end of that year there were 62,415 in Afghanistan.) These forces are deployed around the country in eighty-eight bases. The details of these security-related indicators are given in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1 Major security-related indicators in Afghanistan to 2008

Force	*Current level*
Total foreign forces in Afghanistan	About 62,000 of which 50,000 are ISAF[a] (12,000 ISAF in 2005, and 6,000 in 2003); US forces: 34,000 total, of which 22,000 in ISAF and 12,000 in OEF. (US total was 25,000 in 2005: 16,000 in 2003; 5,000 in 2002.) US forces will increase further in 2009, according to President Bush on 5 April 2008, likely by about 7,000. US forces deployed at 88 bases in Afghanistan, and include one air wing (40 aircraft) and one combat aviation brigade (100 aircraft). About 1,000 coalition partner forces in Operation Enduring Freedom, but not ISAF.
US casualties in Afghanistan	431 killed, of which 298 by hostile action.
Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP)	55,000 trained, with about 40,000 on duty. 63,000 including civilian support. Organized into 33 battalions. Will add 13,000 soldiers by end of 2008; 80,000 is goal by 2009, endorsed in Afghanistan Compact.[b] 75,300 assigned. Authorized strength: 82,000.
Weapons collected by disarmament,	36,000 medium and light; 12,250 heavy.

demobilisation and reintegration	
Number of suicide bombings	21 in 2005; 123 in 2006; 160 in 2007.
Afghan casualties	About 6,000 in 2007 (including Taliban; all types of violence), 500 + in 2007.
Number of improvised explosive devices (IEDs)	

Source: Katzman (2008).

Notes
a ISAF = International Security Assistance Force
b 2006 agreement between Afghanistan, the UN and the International Community setting out the framework for international co-operation with Afghanistan for the next five years.

Resurgence of the Taliban

The level of violence from 2002 to 2004 was relatively low and this was attributed to the unpopularity of the Taliban around the country. But since mid-2005 there has been a gradual increase in insurgent violence, including suicide attacks. In mid-2006 the insurgence and the accompanying violence increased significantly, which took US commanders by surprise. The evidence showed that it was related to Taliban resurgence and that they were adapting suicide bombing characteristics of the Iraq insurgency. The suicide attacks have particularly increased in the Talibandominated provinces of Urzugan, Helmand, Qandahar and Zabol where foreign forces assumed responsibility in July 2006. The increased violence has been attributed to popular frustration with the pace of reconstruction, rampant corruption within the Karzai government and intimidation by the Taliban. In some areas the absence of government authority has increased lawlessness and people welcome any form of justice, even that administered by the Taliban. There is also evidence that support for the Taliban has been growing, especially in Pashtun areas. Besides suicide attacks the insurgents are also using other, more sophisticated weapons such as surface to air missiles against ISAF aircraft.

The Afghan government blames the Pakistan government for permitting the Taliban to have safe havens in its tribal areas. The ISAF forces have countered the violence by launching numerous military operations against the Taliban, but they have not had a major impact as evidenced by the increasing number of casualties and an increase in the number of suicide bombings, including some very high-profile incidents like the one in Kabul on 17 June 2007, which killed about thirty-five Afghan police recruits, and

another in early November that killed six parliamentarians. The most lethal attack since 2002 was the suicide bombing in Qandahar in February 2008 that killed sixty-seven civilians and thirteen Afghan police. The attacks are being launched at high-profile targets, such as the Serena Hotel in Kabul, and their frequency has been increasing.

Configuring the conflict

There is much more to the Taliban insurgency than its opposition to the 'foreign occupation' of Afghanistan, which is generally given prominence by Western analysts. Needless to say, the Taliban vehemently oppose the presence of Western troops they regard as an occupying force in Afghanistan (UNAMA 2007). However, the genesis of the insurgency is intertwined with the ethnic make-up of Afghan society and its historical relationship to state power.

The Taliban is a Pashtun-based political and religious movement that arose in response to the devastating violent conflict between the warring factions of mujahidin in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal in 1990. This factional conflict was very much shaped by ethnic factors and pitched mainly Pashtun against the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance. The conflict also has a sectarian dimension, with largely Sunni Pashtun tribes in opposition to the predominantly Shia Northern Alliance.

Table 6.2 Major Islamic factions and leaders in Afghanistan

Party	*Leader*	*Ideology/ethnicity*	*Regional base*
Radical Islamic groups involved in current insurgency			
Taliban	Mullah [Islamic cleric] Muhammad Omar (still at large possibly in Afghanistan), Jalaludin and Siraj Haqqani	Ultra-orthodox Islamic, Pashtun	Insurgent groups, in the south and east, and in Pakistan
Islamic Union	Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf, Islamic conservative, leads a pro-Karzai faction in parliament. Lived many years in and politically close to Saudi Arabia, which shares his Wahhabi ideology. During anti-Soviet war, Sayyaf's faction was a principal recipient of US weaponry. Criticised the US-led war against Saddam	Orthodox Islamic, Pashtun	Paghman (west of Kabul)

	Hussein after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990.		
Hizb-e-Islam Gulbuddin (HIG)	Mujahidin party leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar. Lost power base around Jalalabad to the Taliban in 1994, and fled to Iran before being expelled in 2002. Still allied with the Taliban and Al Qaeda in operations east of Kabul, but may be open to ending militant activity. Leader of a rival Hizb-e-Islam faction.	Orthodox Islamic, Pashtun	Small groups around Jalalabad, Nuristan and in south-east
Moderate Islamc groups			
Islamic Society (leader of Northern Alliance)	Burhannudin Rabbani, Yunus Qanoonis (speaker of lower house), Muhammad Fahim, Dr Abdullah Abdullah (Foreign Minister 2001–6). Ismail Khan heads faction of the grouping in Herat; now Minister of Energy and Water.	Moderate Islamic, mostly Tajik	Much of northern and western Afghanistan, including Kabul
National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan	Abdul Rashid Dostam. Best known for March 1992 break with Najibullah that precipitated his overthrow. Commanded about 25,000 troops, armour, combat aircraft and some Scud missiles, but was unable to hold off Taliban forces that captured his region by August 1998. Led successful assaults on Taliban positions at Shulgara Dam, south of Mazar-e-Sharif, leading to the fall of that city and the Taliban's subsequent collapse. Karzai rival in October 2004 presidential election, now his top 'security adviser'.	Secular, Uzbek	Mazar-e-Sharif, Shebergan and environs
Hizb-e-Wahdat	Karim Khalili is vice president; Mohammad Mohaqiq is Karzai's rival in the presidential election and parliament. Generally pro-Iranian. Fought unsuccessfully with the Taliban over Bamiyan city.	Shiite, Hazara tribes	Bamiyan Province
Pashtun leaders	Various regional governors; central government led by Hamid Karzai.	Moderate Islamic, Pashtun	Dominant in southern and eastern Afghanistan

Source: Katzman (2008).

Afghanistan is an ethnically heterogeneous country of more than 32 million people, of which Pashtun comprise 42 per cent of the population and the remainder comprise Tajik (27 per cent), Uzbek and Hazara (9 per cent each), Aimak (4 per cent), Turkmen (3 per cent), Baloch (2 per cent) and others (4 per cent). The largest group, the Pashtun, number around 14 million and are part of the larger Pashtun population of around 42 million, of which 28 million live in Pakistan. The Pashtun are divided into sixty major tribes and more than four hundred subclans. Their universal tribal code of honour, *pashtunwali*, governs nearly all aspects of Pashtun life ranging from tribal affairs to individual honour. Some of its key tenets include *melmastia* (hospitality and protection of guests), revenge, protection of *zun*, *zar* and *zaman* (women, treasure and land), and forgiveness (when guilt is admitted for wrong conduct). The Pashtun social and kinship relations and ties straddle the Afghan and Pakistan Pashtun. To ignore this social reality by treating the Pashtun ethnic group in Afghanistan as separate from their kin in Pakistan can lead to misleading and erroneous assessments of the current Taliban insurgency. It is already miring Washington's policies in Afghanistan (Rais 1999; Saikal 2004; ICG 2003).

Following the emergency *Loya Jirga* in 2002 and the subsequent presidential elections of 2004, many Pashtun leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan were dismayed by what they perceived as US partiality towards the Durrani Pashtun, who have traditionally been the privileged political elite in Afghan society and from whose ranks emerged President Hamid Karzai. The Ghilzai tribe, one of the most famous Pashtun tribes straddling Pakistan and Afghanistan, felt left out of the new Afghan power structure. The Ghilzai tribe is large and widespread; it occupies high plateaus north of Qandahar and extends eastward towards the Suleiman Mountains and westward towards the Gul Koh range. Its members are largely rural and uneducated peasantry, and they constituted a critical source of recruits for the Taliban cause.

The neglect of the Ghilzai Pashtun, whether intentional or unintentional, was deeply resented not only by them but also by their many supporters in the Pakistani government who believed that the continuing alienation of the Ghilzai was feeding the Taliban ranks. These supporters believed that by deliberately ignoring Pakistan's former clients in intra-Afghan politics and by weakening Pakistan's political stake in Afghan affairs, there would be implications for their own 28 million Pashtun (Tellis 2008; Rais 1999). Attacking the Taliban in residence in northern Pakistan, a move that is being

demanded by Kabul and Washington, would mean attacking the powerful Ghilzai tribe and its tribal allies. The danger of a heightened and targeted anti-Ghilzai campaign, it is feared, would lead to political mobilisation and renew the demand for an independent 'Pashtunistan' that will threaten the territorial integrity of the Pakistani state (Tellis 2008; Abbas 2007; Rashid 2001; Ali 2008). For Pakistani Pashtuns and their government, protecting the Taliban offers a buffer against either the failure of the Karzai regime in Kabul or the dreaded prospect of increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan.

Several elements can be identified in the current Taliban coalition: a leadership council centred on the Taliban leader Mullah Omar, the war council, Taliban cadres, tribal networks of former mujahidin commanders, and the Pakistani Taliban commanders. Many drug lords in eastern and southern Afghanistan contribute revenues willingly or under duress that are indispensable for current Taliban operations against Kabul and ISAF forces. Various former anti-Soviet commanders with their small groups of fighters are engaged primarily in criminal activities while offering their services as guns for hire. Disaffected Afghan Pashtun tribes, most conspicuously the Ghilzai, feeling disenfranchised in the current governing arrangements, are supporting the Taliban with manpower and sanctuary within Afghanistan (ICG 2003, 2006a).

The Taliban operations against Afghan and foreign troops are supported by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizb-i-Islami. Finally, Al Qaeda, although distinct from all the above-mentioned groups because the focus of its operations remains global jihad, nevertheless collaborates with the Taliban to assist the latter in recovering control of Kabul while continuing to preserve a sanctuary in the tribal areas of Pakistan in the interim (Tellis 2008). As a result of the above configuration, the Taliban has now become a much more difficult enemy because its previously weak hierarchical structure has become even more diffuse with diverse entities co-operating and co-ordinating as necessary, but each also carrying out its own local agenda. This diffused structure also makes it difficult to carry out military operations against the Taliban, at least for the time being.

The main belligerents appear to be the Taliban, Al Qaeda, IMU and Hizb-i-Islami, with a total of around 20,000 fighters, and on the other side, the Afghan government, the Northern Alliance, United States, ISAF forces with 52,000 members and Afghan security forces numbering 50,000. Taliban casualties from 2001 until the beginning of 2008 are estimated to have exceeded 20,000. The Afghan security forces and Northern Alliance have

suffered more than 6,000 casualties, and the ISAF has suffered more than 700 casualties. Civilian deaths are estimated to be between 7,000 and 14,000. The conflict between the Taliban insurgents and the ISAF appears to be increasing in intensity, and it includes the use of suicide bombings as a strategic tactic by the Taliban (Katzman 2008; Kaplan 2006).

FUSTD suicide bombing profile: Afghanistan

Afghanistan has been embroiled in conflict for three decades, but suicide attacks did not feature in the first two decades and came to prominence only in 2005. The Afghan mujahidin never used suicide attacks against the Soviet forces. The Taliban and Northern Alliance also refrained from their use in the conflict that followed the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

The absence of suicide attacks in the conflict with the Soviets can be explained by the fact that the mujahidin were supported militarily, logistically and financially by the United States, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia among others. They received billions of dollars in aid and modern weapons from the USA to fight the Soviet forces. There was a kind of symmetry among the combatants. But in the war against the Afghan and ISAF forces, the Taliban do not enjoy the same advantages. They are now involved in a completely asymmetrical type of warfare in which the foreign and Afghan forces have the most modern lethal weapons whereas the Taliban insurgents have mostly leftover weapons from the war against the Soviet forces. It is this asymmetry that is prompting the Taliban to make use of improvised weapons that they have but the enemy does not, and suicide bombing or the human bomb is one such weapon.

The incidence of suicide attacks, 2001–6

Here two sets of data will be reported and discussed. I will first examine the data from the Flinders University Suicide Terrorism Database (FUSTD) and then the data from the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) report entitled *Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan 2001–2007*, issued in September 2007. The UNAMA report provides data that have not been publicly available and therefore they could not be included in FUSTD. The UNAMA report will be given the greater coverage in the discussion that follows.

According to the FUSTD database there were thirty-five suicide bombing attacks in the period 2001–6. Of these, twelve occurred between 2001 and 2005 and twenty-three in 2006. As Tables 6.3 and 6.4 show, suicide attacks were 3.8 per cent of all terrorist attacks and accounted for 13 per cent of all terrorism-related deaths. On average a suicide attack produced 5.7 deaths compared with 1.5 per non-suicide terrorism attack. The majority of the attacks used the suicide belt/bag as the weapon, and 44 per cent of all attacks targeted Afghan and foreign security personnel. The suicide attacks are intended to destabilise Afghanistan to prevent it from providing security for its citizens. Any success in this would have a major impact on the efforts of the international community to stabilise and rebuild the country. The main aim of the suicide attacks is to compel Americans and citizens of other countries contributing to the ISAF to pressure their governments to leave Afghanistan. The Taliban also use suicide attacks to bolster their support or, at a minimum, to eliminate opposition as well as to garner additional recruits and funding for their suite of operations (UNAMA 2007: 18).

Table 6.3 Suicide attacks and other terrorism in Afghanistan, 2001–6

Year	*All terrorist attacks (n)*	*Suicide attacks (n)*	*Suicide attacks as % of all terrorist attacks*	*Deaths from all terrorist attacks[a] (n)*	*Deaths from suicide attacks (n)*	*Deaths from suicide attacks as % of all deaths*
2001–5	569	12	2.1	738	60	8.1
2006	352	23	6.5	755	138	18.3
2001–6	**921**	**35**	**3.8**	**1,493**	**198**	**13.3**

Sources: MIPT database (www.tkb.org); FUSTD (2008).

Note
a 'Deaths from suicide attacks' refers to the minimum number killed.

Table 6.4 Lethality of suicide attacks in Afghanistan, 2001–6

Year	*Average yearly suicide attacks*	*Deaths per suicide attack[a]*	*Average yearly nonsuicide terrorist attacks*	*Average deaths per non-suicide terrorist attack*
2001–5	2.4	5.0	111.4	1.2
2006	23.0	6.0	329.0	1.9
2001–6	**5.8**	**5.7**	**147.7**	**1.5**

Sources: MIPT database (www.tkb.org); FUSTD (2008).

Note
a ‘Deaths from suicide attacks’ refers to the minimum number killed.

The UNAMA report is based on data collected by the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS). According to UNDSS,

> a suicide [attack] event is one in which the attacker has no expectation of survival. Attacks using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) during which the attacker does not intend to die are excluded … Similarly, it does not consider as a suicide case an instance where the attacker, while setting up or preparing a normal IED, is killed through negligence or other factors. However, cases where an attacker is killed while preparing what is clearly a suicide bomb (i.e. vehicle-borne IED (VBIED), body-borne IED (BBIED), or motor-cycle conveyed vehicle-borne IED (VBIED [MC]), are counted as suicide events. Also counted are cases where a suicide device, according to the same criteria, is found before detonation. These events are included in the UNDSS – Afghanistan database, because the device would have been used imminently in a suicide attack. Simply finding a cache of explosives is not enough to include the event in the database; the test to commit one’s life to the attack is required. Suicide events are therefore either actual or failed attacks or clearly identifiable as potential events.
>
> (UNAMA 2007: 40–1)

For these reasons the UNAMA report claims that its database may differ from other databases that derive their data from popular accounts (e.g. the MIPT Knowledge Base, the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, START Global Terrorism Database, etc.).

According to the UNDSS database, the distribution of suicide bombing attacks since 2001 were as follows: 1 in 2001, 0 in 2002, 2 in 2003, 3 in 2004, 17 in 2005, 123 in 2006 and 77 from January to June 2007. In 2005–7 there was a continuous rise peaking in September 2006, which recorded 21 suicide attacks. The three main suicide target provinces have been Qandahar, Kabul and Khost, the traditional Taliban areas of influence. According to the UNDSS, in the main cities of these provinces there are multiple cells preparing explosives and bombers to carry out suicide bombings. The majority (68 per cent) of suicide attacks occurred in the early afternoon. The

evidence also suggests that more attackers and explosives are now readily available. The increasing tempo of suicide attacks indicates not only improved experience and logistical capability to execute attacks, but also that the Taliban now considers this tactic legitimate and useful to the overall insurgent strategy in the country. The rise in incidents has led to heightened security in all main centres. As a result, since 1 January 2007, thirty-six attackers have been arrested and thirty-four devices seized by the authorities, which may have disrupted the insurgents' operational planning. But UNDSS expects that in spite of these successes, the number of suicide bombings is likely to increase.

Table 6.5 Targets of suicide attacks in Afghanistan, 2001–6

Target	*2001–5*		*2006*		*Total*
	N	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*
Infrastructure	1	9.1	0	0	**1**
Local security/public officials	3	27.3	10	43.5	**13**
Foreign forces/contractors	4	36.4	0	0	**4**
Civilians	3	27.3	5	21.7	**8**
Others	0	0	8	34.8	**8**
Missing					**1**
Total	**11**	**100**	**23**	**100**	**35**

Source: FUSTD (2008).

The main targets are similar to the ones indicated by the FUSTD, namely, international and Afghan military and Afghan police (76 per cent) and government leaders, politicians and public officials (24 per cent) (see Tables 6.5 and 6.6). The UNRMA evidence also indicates that 'victim yields' (victims per suicide attack) for attacks against Afghan civilians are considerably higher than those for attacks against international military targets and the foreign reconstruction teams (UNAMA 2007: 44–7). In 2006 suicide attacks against civilian targets yielded 5.6 victims per attack, but in the first six months of 2007 this declined to 1.7. Victims per attack against international military and Afghan military/police have increased from 1.7 in 2006 to 2.5, but the majority of the casualties tend to be civilian bystanders. It is not possible to predict as yet whether the changes in targets between 2006 and 2007 indicate a permanent shift. On average the success rate against international military forces remains extremely poor with ten soldiers

being killed at the expense of thirty attackers. More details of victim yields for 2006 are given in Table 6.7 and 6.8.

Table 6.6 Weapons in suicide attacks in Afghanistan, 2001–6

Weapon	*2001–5*		*2006*		*Total*
	N	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*
Suicide vehicular attack	2	28.6	9	39.1	**11**
Suicide belt/bomb attack	3	42.9	14	60.9	**17**
Other[a]	2	28.6	0	0	**2**
Missing[b]					**5**
Total	**7**	**100.0**	**23**	**100.0**	**35**

Source: FUSTD (2008).

Notes
a Suicide shooting/grenade/mine attack.
b Source could not confirm the weapon.




Figure 6.1 Suicide attacks in Afghanistan, 2001–6

Table 6.7 Victim yield of suicide attacks in Afghanistan, 2006

	Incidents	*Attacker*	*Total victims*	*Attacker/ victim ratio*	*Victim event*
All events	123	126	305	1:2	2.48
All attacks (less pre-detonated and discovered)	115	118	305	1:3	2.65
Attackers vs coalition forces/ International Security Assistance Force	59	61	100	1:2	1.69
Attackers vs Afghan National Army/Afghan National Police	29	29	47	1:2	1.62
Attackers vs government/ political/civilian targets	27	28	150	1:5	5.56
Attackers vs civilians (all events)	123	126	237	1:2	1.93
Attackers vs Afghans (all events)	123	126	289	1:2	2.35
Pre-detonation and discovered	8	8	8	1:1	1.00
Successful BBIED attacks[a]	28	28	169	1:6	6.04
Successful VBIED attacks[a]	33	34	136	1:4	4.12
All successful attacks[a]	61	62	305	1:5	5.00

Source: UNAMA (2007).

Note
a 'Successful' implies attacks with victims, and not simply detonation.

Table 6.8 Successful suicide attacks by target in Afghanistan, to 30 June 2007

Target (2007)	*Attacks*	*%*	*Target (2006)*	*Attacks*	*%*
International military	31	43	International military	59	51
Government, political and civilian	17	24	Government, political and civilian	27	23
ANA/ANP	24	33	ANA/ANP	29	25
Total	**72**	**100**	**Total**	**115**	**99**
Successful vs unsuccessful			**Successful vs unsuccessful**		
Successful attacks	72	94	Successful attacks	115	93
Pre-detonation or discovered	5	6	Pre-detonation or discovered	8	7
Total	**77**	**100**	**Total**	**123**	**100**

Source: UNAMA (2007).

Weapons and regions of suicide bombing

Insurgents used both body-borne (BBIED) and vehicle-borne (VBIED) techniques to execute suicide attacks. There appears to be an increasing reliance on BBIEDs, possibly owing to their greater lethality. The casualty figures for BBIEDs in 2006 were 6.04 compared with 4.12 per attack for VBIEDs. The majority of attacks against foreign military personnel used VBIEDs whereas BBIEDs were commonly employed in attacks against Afghan security forces and public officials. The southern, south-eastern and central regions are the main sites of suicide attacks, accounting for 90 per cent. As mentioned above, Qandahar, Khost and Kabul are the most affected provinces, with most attacks occurring within or near their main cities. The UNDSS analysis also shows that the provinces of Nangarhar and Kunar became more vulnerable in 2007 because of their increasing political instability and proximity to Pakistan.

Who are Afghanistan's suicide bombers?

According to the UNAMA analysts, suicide bombers are instructed to tuck in their hands and head before detonating, which generally ensures the destruction of any means of identifying them, and consequently any chance of discerning their motivation for the attacks. Such difficulties in identifying them are further compounded by the lack of facilities and services in the country to collect, store and analyse DNA and other forensic evidence. The forensic analysis and autopsies are short and inconclusive. According to one forensic specialist, 'We have limited staff and equipment … The police would like the man's identity. But we have no facilities for DNA testing. We discover very little' (Bearak 2007).

Another problem making identification difficult is that the bodies of most attackers remain unclaimed by the family, ostensibly because their families were unaware of their involvement in a suicide mission. According to one report, families come to learn of their son's death only when the Taliban arrive to distribute their 'martyrdom payment' (Williams 2007). The Afghan police and intelligence officials from Gardez and Qandahar claim that some drug addicts are being used for suicide missions. The absence of reliable personal and family backgrounds makes analysis of the ethnic origin, motivation and intention of suicide attackers difficult. Some Afghan officials, including President Hamid Karzai, have claimed that Afghans do not commit suicide attacks because *pashtunwali* forbids them. The

implication is that they come from Pakistan. A senior military commander of the Afghan army was reported as saying that ‘the explosives come from Pakistan, and the drivers come from Pakistan and foreign countries. It is very difficult for an Afghan to persuade himself to commit suicide’ (Baldauf 2006).

Such denials downplay Afghan involvement in suicide attacks. In September 2006 the Kabul police arrested four persons belonging to a Kabul-based suicide cell and seized its explosives cache. The leader of the cell was a cleric in one of the city’s mosques, which served as storage for the explosives and as a recruitment centre for the operatives of the planned attacks. One of the other men arrested was also a cleric. Under interrogation one of the detainees admitted to obtaining explosives for suicide attacks and justified his actions on the grounds that Afghanistan was under the occupation of the United States and NATO; he declared, ‘I have not committed any kind of crime. I was doing jihad for God. They have arrested me as if I were some sort of criminal’ (Rahmani 2006b). In August 2006, police arrested a Taliban commander in charge of suicide attacks in Kabul. He was identified as Qari Hakim Mullah, a 25-year-old Tajik. He admitted to having spent some time in Pakistan. Afghan police have also discovered bomb-making factories in Kabul and Qandahar. These examples attest to the involvement of Afghans in suicide bombing operations (Rahmani 2006a: 2).

It is true that many suicide bombers have Pakistani connections, but the reason for that is that Pakistan has had more than two million Afghan refugees, many of whom have attended or still attend madrasas and are/were exposed to radical and militant ideologies. The general point is that the environment of the refugee camps seems to be conducive to producing a militant ideology. Pakistani madrasas certainly played a role during the anti-Soviet campaigns in the 1980s. According to a senior Taliban commander interviewed by UNAMA researchers, who had direct knowledge of the attitudes and priorities of the Quetta-based Taliban military Shura, more than half of the suicide bombers used by the Taliban in Afghanistan are foreigners who come from Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and other Arab countries. The Taliban go to great lengths to disguise the true identities of these attackers.

According to UNAMA, although initially non-Pashtun Pakistanis and other foreigners may have been involved in suicide missions, the perpetrators are now increasingly Pashtun. More than 80 per cent of suicide bombers pass through recruitment, training facilities or safe houses in north

and south Waziristan en route to their targets inside Afghanistan. Around three dozen Taliban groups in and around Quetta, Pakistan, are expected to produce one or more suicide attackers, although this requirement is not strictly enforced. The attackers are expected to be volunteers but, in the event, heavy-handed persuasion, misrepresentation of the mission and even coercion are often employed. There are several insurgent networks within Afghanistan that specialise in explosives and suicide attacks, particularly in the southern provinces. The overall co-ordinator for suicide bombing campaigns in southern Afghanistan – in succession to Mullah Dadullah, who was killed in counter-insurgency operations in 2007 – is Mullah Mansur, the shadow Taliban governor of Qandahar. (In April 2007, I obtained a propaganda video for suicide attacks in which the role of Mullah Dadullah in recruiting suicide bombers featured prominently. One of my informants with close ties to some Taliban commanders told me that Mullah Dadullah had more than five hundred suicide bomber volunteers on his register.)

In an effort to elucidate the motives and background of Afghanistan's suicide bombers, UNAMA analysts were permitted by the country's Ministry of the Interior (MOI) and the National Directorate of Security (NDS) to interview persons who had been arrested either because they were allegedly 'failed attackers' or because they were otherwise implicated in executing, organising or facilitating suicide attacks. The interviewees were selected from a list provided by the NDS and MOI according to their own criteria. This makes it difficult to determine how representative these people were of all suicide attackers who have been arrested in connection with suicide attacks.

The interviews were conducted by the UNAMA human rights officers in Afghanistan's Pul-e-Charki prison complex outside Kabul. As a result of the sample selection these interviews don't provide definitive insights into the motivations of suicide attacks, but the interviews converge on several religious, political and personal motivations and concerns regarding 'foreign occupation', dissatisfaction with the Afghan government and honour violations, which echo in the public opinion polls conducted in Afghanistan.

The UNAMA analysts interviewed twenty-three persons incarcerated or awaiting trial in connection with suicide attacks in Afghanistan. The lengths of the interviews ranged from thirty minutes to two hours. They reveal that, contrary to the popular contention that Afghans are not involved in suicide attacks, twenty-one of the twenty-three interviewees were Afghan nationals and two were Pakistani nationals. However, of the twenty-one Afghan

nationals, fourteen had spent time as refugees in Pakistan and two had been refugees in Iran. The youngest interviewee was fifteen years old and the oldest was in his fifties. The average age was around twenty-six. The profiles of two interviewees are reproduced below (the UNAMA report provides biographical sketches of five prisoners). To protect their identities all names have been changed.

Munir

Munir, who is nineteen, described himself as a member of the Deobandi (Pakistan-based) militant group Harkat-ul-Mujahidin. He is uneducated except for the four years he spent in a madrasa in Karachi. His father was a mullah who earned in his view an average income that was none the less inadequate for his family's needs. Munir explained that he was saddened by the defeat of the Taliban in 2001 because they were an Islamist party. He is accused of being a suicide attacker, and he admits to the same. He explained to the UNAMA human rights officer that he sought to kill Americans and other outsiders with a car that was loaded with a bomb. With little preparation and promises of nothing other than heaven (*janat*) he was willing to execute his attack. He had numerous grievances with the Afghanistan government and opined that there is 'interference of foreigners in the government. All affairs are done by the Americans and other foreigners. Now America is supporting this government and I hate invaders as well as foreigners.' He was adamant that his planned attack was jihad targeted against Americans who 'shouldn't have come to Afghanistan'. He continued, 'They are invaders … The war against them is jihad.' While intently interested in killing Americans and other armed outsiders, Munir claims that he would have been careful to avoid harming civilians. He was unrepentant and said that he would attempt his mission again if possible.

Munir offered explicitly Islamic arguments for his actions, explaining that instructors at his madrasa, Jamia Farooquia, taught that jihad and suicide attacks are obligations (*farz* in local pronunciation, *fardh'ain* in Arabic). Although his two friends encouraged him to become an *intahari* (suicide attacker), he explained that the views of his family were irrelevant to his decision. Therefore he did not inform them of his decision, and he held their opinions of the issue in low esteem. He explained to UNAMA staff that he had not told his parents 'because the jihad is *farz*. [There is] no need for questions. God would have [taken care] of them.'

When asked whether he understands his act to be suicide or martyrdom (*shahadat*), Munir averred that ‘this is jihad, not suicide. If a Muslim is killed, he is a *shaheed* [martyr]. If I’m killed, there is another life where there would be no accountability … and God will be happy because of this action.’ He saw little scope to achieve his cause beyond the suicide mission, noting that if ‘I perform my holy task, I will be happy.’ He embraced the persons who set up this mission for him as his ‘mission brothers’. He said that he would advise others to do as he did but to avoid harming civilians (UNAMA 2007: 70–1).

Tahir

Tahir, twenty-three years of age, was born in Pakistan’s Shamshatu camp near Peshawar, which he describes as ‘Hikmatyar’s camp’. His family is Afghan in origin (Spin Jumat, Zaji District, Paktya Province) and he speaks Pashto, Dari and Arabic. Tahir freely admitted involvement in suicide attacks, and he in fact purported to have been a group leader organising suicide attacks in Afghanistan. He was arrested in Kabul on Pul-e-Mahmood Khan (Mahmood Khan Bridge), allegedly while arranging explosives. While he denies this charge, he admitted that in December 2003 he had a remote-controlled bomb. He and a friend, Jalal, had received intelligence about ISAF movements, and they wanted to kill the ISAF commander. He explained, ‘We had fixed a point for [Jalal]. When he was about to plant the bomb and before we could detonate it, the Afghan government people arrested him.’ Tahir was in another vehicle a short distance away.

When Tahir and his associates saw Jalal being arrested, they tried to plant another bomb. When they heard two shots and an explosion, they left their car and ran away to a shelter in Kabul. He says, ‘Our friend had been killed as he had detonated the bomb. He was a faithful mujahid [holy warrior] with the decision to get rid of the United States.’ He claims to have been ‘Jalozai’s [Sayyaf’s] camp’. He says he was arrested because one of his friends was a ‘spy’ who provided photos and evidence against him to the NDS. He also admitted to conducting another operation against the United States, about which the NDS is unaware.

Tahir claimed that the same ISAF commander visited him in prison and inquired how he came to have information about ISAF movements. Tahir boasted that he refused to answer and confronted the commander, telling him that he should leave Afghanistan and that the United States came only to

occupy the country. The ISAF commander reportedly countered that they were there to bring peace and hunt Al Qaeda, not him. He retorted that ‘Al Qaeda is now in Waziristan. [The Americans] should go there.’

Tahir articulated firm anti-Russian sentiments as well as a strong sense of Afghan nationalism. He recounted how his village in Afghanistan was bombarded by the communist regime, forcing his impoverished father to go to Peshawar where he bought a rickshaw to earn money. His father ‘had no time to get involved with politics’ and ‘had no political links and was against his decision to join the party. He wanted me to be a merchant.’

Tahir opted to join Hizb-e-Islami (led by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar) in 1994. He believed that Hikmatyar acted in the best interests of Afghans compared with other groups. Tahir emphasised that ‘I am not a Talib’ and boasted that ‘I had the reputation of the zealous Afghan in the camp. I did not take any Pakistani citizenship, because I would then have to be a part of another’s country’s military.’

Hizb-e-Islami, in his view, has many positive attributes, one of which was that ‘it has no relations with foreigners and is run by Afghans … Hizb-e-Islami is totally against the ISI, which is another factor why I joined it.’ (Clearly, Tahir was illinformed about Hikmatyar’s long-standing relationship with the ISI or chose to engage in deception with the interviewer.)

Another reason for his affiliation was the large number of madrasas that Hikmatyar established. He claimed that there ‘were six hundred, up to seven hundred boys in the madrasa and there were separate schools for girls’. In fact, he graduated from the twelfth class from one of the madrasas run by Hikmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami. He claims that the madrasa taught many modern subjects (except science) and stressed English. Tahir noted with particular satisfaction that all the teachers were Afghans. This fact was important to him, and he again opined that ‘I am proud to be grown up an Aghan as I am sticking with my roots.’

While not a Talib, he supported some of the Taliban’s actions even though in general he was not supportive of their governance. He was, for example, satisfied with the ‘executions/punishments meted out by the Taliban’. Following their defeat in 2001, he was sad, as an Afghan, about their failure, and he was displeased with the arrival of the ‘Kafir’ (infidels). He was not open to a return to the Taliban but, consonant with his strong Afghan nationalism, he contended that they should adhere to real Islam, be true Afghans, control their own affairs, rather than being controlled by the ISI, and have ‘critical relations’ with other countries.

Like Munir, Tahir disparages the Afghan government: ‘Regarding the government, it is not an elected Afghan government. The voters who were brought there were not real Afghans. There is a difference between Karzai and Babrak Karmal. One came with US plans; the other with the USSR. Both are puppet regimes and they will be toppled.’ Unlike Munir, Tahir does not have an unqualified loathing of foreigners and their efforts in Afghanistan. For example, he was pleased with the construction of roads and schools, but he was irritated that the government of Afghanistan seemed to pocket much of the aid money, and the government in his view has failed to make good use of the aid received. He queried, ‘Who has asked the government where the aid money is?’ He also articulated a difference between ‘foreigners like the UN and Islamic entities and other diplomatic entities [who are good] … but those who are occupiers are not good’.

When pressed to say who the occupiers are, he identified the United States and those who support it. Interestingly, he observed: ‘[The Americans] are here to bring peace, but their presence has brought instability … [It’s] now clear that the Taliban and Hikmatyar want to talk to the government, but the United States is hampering this. NATO/ISAF are completely the people of the United States. But I am not against the unarmed foreigners.’ Tahir believed that if the United States were to leave ‘Afghanistan for Afghans and the international community [stops interfering with] political parties … then Afghans can come together’. He blames the ISI, the United States, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan for the disunity of present-day Afghanistan.

Also in contrast to Munir, Tahir did not detail at length any religious motivations for his actions. He consistently noted that his country ‘is invaded by the Americans and their friendly forces. I hate them and want them to leave the country.’ As noted, he drew visceral parallels between the American and Soviet presence. When pressed about the religious dimension of his actions, he argued cursorily that success in an operation would make the perpetrator a *shaheed*. (Note that he was not a suicide attacker himself.)

However, he quickly strayed from Islamic arguments to Islamist arguments, noting dilemmas confronting Muslims throughout the Muslim world. He explained that when a *shaheed* goes to heaven, he can intercede on behalf of seventy guilty people. He also noted that a *shaheed*’s parents have a high position in paradise. He also explained that according to the Quran and books that he had ‘from Beirut’, such attacks are legitimate in Islam. He also claimed that there is an order to kill Jews and others ‘if they invade you’. He cited the plight of the Palestinians who are ‘in a cage’ and

treated cruelly. He also identified Saudi Arabia where ‘there is Hajj but the reality is that it’s occupied by the United States. They killed innocent children and women. Even when the Taliban and al Qaeda operate in Afghanistan they had minimal civilian casualties.’

With respect to targeting in attacks, Tahir explained that his group of ‘pure Afghan Hikmatyar supporters’ are more discriminating in their attacks and focused upon the ‘occupiers’ (the United States and ISAF) than those groups whom he called ‘ISI supported’. He claimed that the ‘Government of Afghanistan is not our target but if they are present, they become our target. If we come to know they are slaves and mercenaries, then we will kill them. You UN people, you will lose prestige and you will be seen on the same side. You are supporting the United States. Hikmatyar and his son-in-law Baheer said time and time again that the UN should not support the United States.’

UNAMA staff asked him to explain his conflation of the UN with the United States. He proffered the case of the US military action in Nangarhar and Sangin where the ‘United States killed people’. He also noted that Dr Baheer gave a television interview and was arrested and sent to Bagram. He argued that Baheer spoke under UN principles of freedom but was arrested four years ago in Pakistan by the ISI and was handed over to the USA. He asked the UNAMA staff member, ‘Why do people stay silent?’ He later encouraged the UN to work to secure its prestige in Afghanistan by, among other things, encouraging the United States to leave Afghanistan.

Like Munir, Tahir had no remorse and spoke with relish about how he had hoped he would kill all the commanders of American forces and ISAF. He candidly described his group’s hidden military quarters where they train operatives for three to six months. He quipped: ‘Many of us do not need training.’ He expressed confidence that the jihad would continue and that they would prevail in defeating the United States. If given the opportunity, he would tell others to do this as it is ‘an order of Islam to do it and be proud of it’.

He was forthcoming about the criteria by which they selected recruits for suicide attacks. ‘Many people knew us in Peshawar … We do not pick them. They come to us. There is no power to stop them. They come from Jalalabad, Kuna, Gardez and there are too many. I swear to God I have never asked people to come to us to do this. Naturally Afghans are against occupation.’ He claimed that some 1,900 youth came to him without asking for money or support. He believed that candidates should be at least nineteen

or twenty years old, should act without coercion and should not be mentally retarded. He would dissuade a candidate if they were the primary earner for their family.While noting that this is for practical reasons, he cited an incident when a man came to the Prophet Muhammad asking to fight for Islam. When the Prophet understood from the man that his family was poor and that he was the sole earner, the Prophet turned him away.

Tahir said his group should aim for 'heavy enemy casualties' and that they carefully trained candidates. He claimed that seventy are really ready for the suicide mission, but he could not prepare them because of his arrest. While he suspects that 'everything fell apart' following his arrest, he has received some information that 'they are organizing themselves … [and] their numbers have increased and they are ready to do more suicide attacks'.

He cautioned the UNAMA staff member not to compare the 'Youth of Afghanistan to the plastic youth of Kabul who are without any zeal. [Previously] it was Arabs and a few Pakistanis [who were suicide attackers]. But it is all Afghans since December 2003.'

Tahir provided a lengthy treatise on civilian casualties in this conflict. First, he noted that 'in Islam, responsibility does not go to a *shaheed* if he kills civilians as collateral damage. Responsibility goes to the infidels because they positioned the public in a way [that put them in harm's way] because they are cowards.' He claimed that before Islam came to Afghanistan, there were Tartars.

> Ibn Tayamia was a famous scholar of Islam. The same case existed at that time … Tartars used Muslims as human shields and this is what is happening now. The United States push civilians into military attack areas. Three centuries after Muhammad, there was a fatwa that our target should be enemies. But if the public is amongst the enemies and are killed, responsibility goes to [the enemies].
>
> (UNAMA 2007: 71–7)

Insights from UNAMA interviews

The UNAMA interviews revealed a general disapproval of the foreign presence and scepticism about the legitimacy and competence of the Afghan government among most of the interviewees. They also indicate the religion-inspired motivations of the interviewees for their involvement in suicide terrorism, but also the interviewees' gullibility to religious propaganda

owing to lack of education, poverty and, in some cases, a degree of deception. The interviews also underscore the importance of Pakistan as a place for recruitment and training for suicide attacks. Most of the UNAMA interviewees came from poor backgrounds, had little formal education, believed that the Taliban could bring peace to Afghanistan and saw the Afghan government as corrupt and ineffective.

They disapproved of the presence of foreign troops as non-Muslim occupiers who were involved in mistreatment, dishonouring Afghan people, causing civilian deaths and failing to deliver peace. Most of the interviewees wanted the foreign forces to leave and allow Afghanistan to rebuild itself through the reconciliation of various factions involved in collective violence. In fact, many believed that peace can only be restored in Afghanistan through dialogue with anti-government elements and saw foreign forces as an impediment to this process. The government was perceived as anti-Pashtun, morally lax and un-Islamic, and its police forces as looting and robbing ordinary people. The searches by foreign troops were seen as humiliating. There was a perception that these troops were in Afghanistan not to rebuild but to kill and abuse. The civilian deaths were not seen as the fault of the attackers.

In January 2007, I conducted a number of interviews in Pakistan with Pakistani intelligence officials and well-placed journalists familiar with suicide bombing operations and operatives. Most of my interviewees felt that suicide bombing operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan were likely to become more serious in the fore-seeable future. A senior journalist with good connections in Pakistan's tribal areas, including the Taliban leaders, told me that when he reported in a newspaper article that the Afghan *ulema* (religious scholars) had declared that suicide bombings were against Islam, a prominent Taliban leader called him to express his annoyance for doing so and gave him the text of a fatwa from other *ulema* on the permissibility of suicide bombings in 'fighting for Islam and *watan* [country]'. My other respondents, who were also familiar with Taliban leaders' thinking on suicide bombings, told me that the Taliban believed suicide bombings were sanctioned under Islamic law when fighting for Islam and country and against the infidels such as the USA and ISAF.

Many Taliban leaders have also come to this conclusion because of the practice of this tactic by the Iraqi insurgents and the Palestinians. Taliban leaders have claimed that Iraqis and Palestinians are using suicide bombings in their struggles, and they are Arab Muslims and well grounded in Islamic

law and tradition. If they are using this tactic it must be permissible under Islamic law. The Taliban leaders are using the *ulema* sympathetic to them to lecture and indoctrinate new recruits for suicide missions in Afghanistan. Financial support for the Taliban insurgency is being funded by taxation imposed on traders, transporters and smugglers in return for allowing them to carry on their activities without harassment.[1]

Cross-border dimensions of insurgency

The ever-deepening militarisation of around 1,500 kilometres along the Afghan–Pakistani border is undoubtedly a factor aiding Taliban insurgency and resurgence. According to press reports, training camps are sprouting in and around the heavily forested Shawal region in northern Waziristan, and the Taliban are recruiting, training and raising money for operations in Afghanistan (ICG 2006a). Support for the Taliban insurgency is grounded in tribal relations and shared Pashtun identity. Pakistani Pashtun in these tribal border areas share the view that Afghanistan has been occupied and that Pashtun are being killed in the conduct of the national and international anti-Taliban operations. The commonly shared *pash-tunwali* and tribal bonds are important factors in moving the recruits to Afghanistan and in establishing safe houses between the point of recruitment and the point of deployment.

According to Seth Jones, a Rand Corporation researcher who has conducted extensive fieldwork in the tribal areas of Pakistan, some lower-level Pakistani intelligence officials are involved in directing suicide operatives into Afghanistan (Jones 2007; also see Scheuer 2006). It is also worth noting that suicide assailants enjoy support, which was indicated by the refusal of the Pakistani parliament on 3 August 2007 to adopt a proposal condemning suicide attacks, even within Pakistan. Some Pakistani parliamentarians, especially those from the Islamic parties, believe that suicide attacks are a response to the US occupation of Afghanistan, and they condemn the Pakistan government for supporting US actions (BBC 2007).

In the Pashtun tribal region of Pakistan the production of suicide belts has become a cottage industry. One household makes the detonator, another sews the belt, a third moulds ball bearings and so on. These are collected and paid for by the Taliban, who claim to have hundreds of volunteers ready for martyrdom missions. According to the Taliban, their main problems are the lack of sufficient explosives and finding good targets. While most of the suicide bombers are Pashtuns, there are some Punjabi-Pakistanis, Kashmiris,

Central Asians, Chechens and, most recently, a German-born Turk, Cuneyt Cifici, who on 3 March 2008, rammed his explosive-laden car into a US military outpost near Khost in eastern Afghanistan, killing two Afghan civilians and two American soldiers and wounding another fifteen (Rashid 2008b).

Concluding remarks

Suicide attacks are now a strategic tactic that is shaping public perceptions of the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. The Afghan government and the international community are seen as being unable to provide security in the country, and these perceptions are reinforced by the extensive media coverage of these events and detract from more positive developments being achieved through the collective efforts of the Afghan government and the international community. The strategic success of suicide attacks in undermining public confidence in the Afghan government and foreign forces means that it is unlikely that there will be any respite in the foreseeable future. Given the predominance in Afghanistan's population of young people, many of whom can only look forward to a bleak economic future, security problems in Afghanistan are likely to increase.

While as a strategic tactic suicide attacks are successful, in Afghanistan, in terms of their success, as measured by their victim yields and lethality, they are among the least successful in the world. According to the UNAMA data in 2007, thirty-one suicide attacks that targeted foreign forces killed thirty-one attackers and ten foreign soldiers. The attacks that targeted Afghan soldiers produced only slightly better outcomes (fifty-six Afghan soldiers and police casualties against twenty-five attackers). These outcomes more or less tally with figures from the FUSTD. These statistics show that although suicide attacks might have limited military utility, they are important in sustaining the coherence of the Taliban insurgency and helping them in raising funds and attracting new recruits for future operations.

Suicide attacks have negatively affected public perceptions of the ability of the Afghan government to provide protection and are proving a serious impediment to governance and national development. This in turn is adversely influencing the flow of international funds for development and reconstruction initiatives. The attacks are also having a demoralising influence on foreign staff and hampering programme delivery. Public opinion polls show that a large majority of Afghans support their

government and the international presence in Afghanistan and equally a large minority dislikes the Taliban. But the evidence showing that an increasing segment of the population is having serious misgivings about the current situation is growing. This is encouraging support for the Taliban and, paradoxically, the key reason for this is the belief that the Taliban can provide security. This belief resonated in the UNAMA Pul-e-Charki interviews as did its converse that the international troops not only fail to delivery security but also bring insecurity (UNAMA 2007: 99).

Suicide attackers in Afghanistan are markedly different from suicide attackers in other areas of conflict where this tactic is employed. In other theatres, such as Sri Lanka, Palestine, Lebanon and possibly Iraq, suicide attackers tend to be better educated and more employable relative to the societies from which they are recruited. In Afghanistan suicide attackers are younger (sometimes children), poor, uneducated, more likely to be exploitable by their recruiters and drawn heavily from madrasas across the border in Pakistan. Their motivations appear to stem from religious rewards and duties, and concerns with such issues as occupation, security and ethno-nationalism, as well as communal and personal concerns with such matters as dishonour and humiliation.

The recruitment cells supplying and training operatives and carrying out attacks are now well established in the main Pashtun-dominated cities and receive varying degrees of support from their kin from across the long porous border with Pakistan. The evidence from the UNAMA report and that from my interviewees concur in the view that support for suicide bombing is now higher in Afghanistan compared with Pakistan. Any mitigation of suicide attacks would require defeating the problem in both countries. Ultimately, however, it is the situation in Afghanistan that will be the final arbiter. If the security situation in Afghanistan does not improve significantly, if rampant corruption in public life is not brought under control and if confidence in the government's ability to deliver social and economic services to its citizens remains low, there will be a continuous erosion of legitimacy and public confidence in the national government and the international actors. That will give succour to anti-government elements and encourage them to expand their tactics including suicide attacks.

Unless the national security institutions are perceived as representing the population as a whole, the reconstruction, disarmament and demobilisation efforts being pursued by the Afghan government and its foreign supporters are unlikely to find popular support. A large majority of Pashtuns feel

alienated from the political process, and this sense of alienation is further compounded by the displacement of large numbers of Pashtuns in the north amid ethnically targeted violence after the collapse of the Taliban regime. Heavy-handed tactics now being used by the ISAF in search operations and inadequate responses to reports of civilian deaths from air strikes are fuelling discontent with the coalition forces and their presence. Besides the problem of Pashtun alienation, such factors as insecurity in the south and east, rampant corruption, which is impeding trade, and continued competition for influence by neighbouring countries are creating conditions similar to those prevailing at the time of the Taliban emergence. The key to the elimination of the scourge of suicide attacks is the credible reassurance to the population of a clear political goal of creating an inclusive state. The key to restoring peace and stability in Afghanistan lies not in making concessions to the violent extremists but in meeting the legitimate grievances of the population.

7 Suicide bombings in Sri Lanka

Certain events become defining landmarks in shaping history. The 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States were one such event. In Sri Lanka's simmering ethnic conflict between the Sinhalese-dominated state and its minority Tamils, 23 July 1983 was also such an event. A small band of young men belonging to one of several Tamil groups, known as the Tamil Tigers, led by its leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, ambushed an army convoy at Tinneveli outside Jaffna in which thirteen Sinhalese soldiers were killed. The attack was allegedly in retaliation for the murder of Charles Anthony, a Tamil Tiger commander, who was killed early in July 1983 by Sri Lankan forces.[1] The Tamil Tigers then had few civilian supporters among the predominantly Tamil population of Jaffna (Trawick 2007: 16).

News of the attack spread throughout the country the following day and triggered anti-Tamil riots after the army publicly displayed the soldiers' corpses. Tamil shops, houses and business premises were systematically targeted and burned. In Colombo hundreds of cars – some with drivers and passengers inside – and buses were burnt. Tamil patients in hospitals were attacked and brutally killed as they lay in their beds. In Welikade jail, Tamil detainees were brutally and cold-bloodedly murdered over two separate days. Thiry-five were killed on the 25th, another seventeen on the 27th in a prison riot (Sanmugathasan 1984). By the time the riots were brought under control as many as two thousand Tamil civilians had been massacred in Colombo and the hill countryside where many Tamils lived among the majority Sinhalese population, and thousands of Tamil-owned homes, shops and businesses were destroyed (Tambiah 1986: 22).

The catchcry of Sinhalese gangs spearheading the mob violence was 'The Tigers are coming to Colombo'. Every Tamil person not only became a suspected Tiger but was convicted of being a dangerous monster. The victims were attacked and cut down by clubs, knives and machetes, beaten to death or burned alive after being doused with kerosene. Some of the

Sinhalese youths carried voter lists to identify Tamil houses, suggesting that at least some of the anti-Tamil acts of destructive violence were planned in advance (Trawick 2007: chapter 2; Tambiah 1986; Bloom 2005: chapter 3; Pratap 2001). The aftermath of the riots left almost 250,000 Tamils as refugees in their own country and left a majority of Tamils believing that their very survival was possible only in a separate state (Pfaffenberger 1994; Sharma 1988). One important consequence of these riots was that influential politicians of the Indian State of Tamil Nadu became involved and began to offer assistance, including training facilities for the Tamil Tigers. This exacerbated tensions between the rival Tamil groups out of which eventually the Tigers emerged victorious (Hopgood 2005). This development also set in motion the process of eventual Indian intervention through the Indian Peacekeeping Force some years later.

These events were not the first manifestation of violence against Tamils in which the government was complicit, but they were the worst and went beyond whatever may have been centrally planned. The rioters, killers and looters by no means had the support of all Sinhalese, but they were able to carry out their actions with impunity. It has been well documented that many ordinary Sinhalese men and women took advantage of the chaos to rob, batter or destroy their own real or perceived enemies. The rioters converged upon groups of Tamils and killed them.

> When the killers saw people on the road, they murdered anyone, rich or poor, man, woman, or child, whom they determined (by speech or identity cards) to be Tamil. Police assisted in anti-Tamil violence, or stood idly by. In addition to the destruction of life, millions of dollars worth of property, owned by Tamils – homes, stores, hotels and industries – went up in flames.
>
> (Trawick 2007: 17)

Before July 1983, both Tamils and Sinhalese thought of their country as a tolerant, multi-ethnic, civilised place. After the riots most Sinhalese went into denial not only about the magnitude of the violence and killings but also about why they happened. Some even justified them as provoked by Tamils themselves for their unreasonable political demands for equality of citizenship. These riots were also a political watershed for the Tamils. Many Tamils who had previously been pacifists – from middle-class professionals

and wealthy businessmen to landless labourers – decided that war against the Sri Lankan government was the only option left to them if they wanted to be free of Sinhala domination and its accompanying horror. They mobilised all their human, material and intellectual resources towards that end and in doing so made the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam – the LTTE – as the vehicle of their struggle. The conflict between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government has been raging ever since (Trawick 2007: 17–18; Bloom 2005: chapter 3; Hopgood 2005; Tambiah 1986). Although with defeat of the LTTE by Sri Lankan armed forces in April–May 2009 the war has ended, this victory is unlikely to have secured peace between the two communities (*The Economist* 2009).

History of the conflict

To understand the events of July 1983 we need to know the historical context. The conflict between Sri Lankan Tamils and the Sri Lankan government is often framed as ethnic, between the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority, but its real genesis lies in the struggle for equality of citizenship by the Sri Lankan Tamils after the country's independence from Great Britain in 1948. Demographically Sri Lanka is an ethnically and religiously heterogeneous state. The basic divisions are linguistic, with 74 per cent categorised as Sinhala speaking, of whom 93 per cent are Buddhist and the rest Christians. The Tamil-speaking minority of 26 per cent is further divided into 13 per cent Lankan Tamils, 7 per cent Muslims and 6 per cent Hill Country Tamils (also known as Indian Tamils) and 0.4 per cent Burghers, Malays and Vedas (Somasundaram 2008a). Almost all Muslims speak the Tamil language but they don't regard themselves as Tamils. The Tamil 'traditional homelands' are in Jaffna, Vavuniya, Batticaloa, Trincomalee and the Central Highland districts of Nuwarar Eliya and Budulla. Tamils also make up around 11 per cent of the population of the Metropolitan Colombo area.

In pre-modern times, ethnic boundaries in Sri Lanka were indistinct and permeable, a historical aftermath of the fact that both Sinhalese and Tamils originated from northern and southern India. There was considerable ethnic accommodation and intermingling. Ancient Sinhala cities incorporated significant Tamil artistic and architecture influences, and the traditional monarchy was not rigidly determined by ethnicity. Many Sinhalese kings historically married Tamil women, resulting in significant degrees of ethnic

intermingling between the two communities. Ancient Sri Lanka, including the Sinhala heartland of Kandy, had also been ruled by Tamil kings, some of whom even converted to Buddhism. Ethnic, religious and linguistic differences were not used as the basis for exclusion from the polity. At various times, groups would speak alternative languages, adhere to alternative religions and claim alternative identities (Little 1999; Tambiah 1986; Chattoppadhyaya 1994; Nissan and Stirrat 1999).

The ethnic mixing and 'crossing' of ethnic boundaries is still continuing. Within each group there are members who are in the process of assimilating to that group from other groups while still retaining certain aspects of their other identity. Psychiatrist Daya Somosundaram provides an illuminating account of this phenomenon in modern-day Sri Lanka:

> In my practice as a psychiatrist, I have come across individuals who belonged to another group, for example were born Sinhalese with Sinhala parents and brought up as such, who have moved to the North for a variety of reasons (marriage, daughter's, son's or other kin's marriage, work, alienation from their original group) several decades ago and have adapted to living incognito amidst the Tamil community as one of them without the community realising their original identity, even in these polarised times.
>
> (Somasundaram 2008a)

The genesis of the present conflict between Sinhalese and Tamils is thus rooted not in the ancient historical past but in recent history, and more specifically in colonial and post-colonial developments in Sri Lanka. In the seventeenth century, the Portuguese were the first to colonise coastal Sri Lanka for trade and propagating Catholicism. They pursued both these activities aggressively and violently. They succeeded in converting considerable numbers of Tamils and Sinhalese, but they also encountered strong resistance to these conversions, especially from the Buddhist monks. The Portuguese also targeted the Muslim traders who held a near monopoly over commerce in the Indian Ocean and practised a religion hated by Catholics. These activities sowed the seeds of inter-religious and interethnic antipathies in the local population. An important feature of Portuguese colonial rule was that it promoted Catholic education as a good way of gaining converts. After about 150 years, the Portuguese were driven away

by fiercely protestant Dutch who were hostile to Catholics. Thus the local population was introduced to European-style religious persecution. After another 150 years, in the early nineteenth century, the British replaced the Dutch as the island's new colonial rulers (Trawick 2007: 37–8).

The British were interested in knowing the local society and people and instituted strategies to achieve these objects by classifying the local population according to caste, physical appearance, religion, language, region, kinship patterns, means of subsistence, level of savagery, manliness, etc. This supposedly scientific classification of people was aimed at ascertaining categories of people likely to be more useful to colonial administrators. Another aim of these policies was to maintain a clear distinction between the rulers and the ruled. The colonial polices of the successive rulers and especially of the British had a profound impact on what Trawick (2007: 39) has called 'materialities'. One such policy was the introduction of the European concept of nation, with its related concept of a bounded nationstate which had a profound impact on future development. Whereas previously a kingdom had a centre and somewhat imprecise outer periphery, the nation-state required clear and precise boundaries. And this also applied to sub-units of the nation-state. British colonialists made maps and drew lines so that every piece of land and every human settlement was accounted for. This emphasis on boundaries remains a factor exacerbating the conflict between ethnic groups on the island (Trawick 2007: 39; Dirks 2001). The British created animosities among birth categories of people against whole other birth categories where there were no such animosities before. They essentialised what they considered to be races and then, deliberately or otherwise, set them against each other. This concept of fixed and genetically determined qualities of different races gradually became part of the people's collective consciousness and that is what has made the war between Tamils and Sinhalese not only conceivable but a stark realty. 'After Sri Lanka attained independence, the island's prior history was reinterpreted as much as possible in terms of a conflict between Sinhalese and Tamil' (Trawick 2007: 42).

Other developments that have shaped the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka are the economic conditions in different regions of the island. In the nineteenth and early twentieth century relatively poor agricultural conditions in the Tamil majority areas forced more Tamils than Sinhalese to take advantage of educational opportunities offered by missionaries and the British, which

consequently allowed them greater access to civil service and other well-paid occupations. As a result of this, at the time of independence in 1948, Tamils were over-represented in the state civil service, the private sector and in the medical, legal and banking professions. The Sinhalese saw non-Sinhalese as thwarting their economic advancement which laid the foundation of both Buddhist revival movements and ethnic antagonisms in the early twentieth century (Tambiah 1986; Bloom 2005; Little 1999; Jayawardena 1987). While much of the antagonism was directed at the Tamils, Muslim Sri Lankans were also targeted in this agitation by Buddhist leaders such as Anagarika Dharmapala who in 1915 described Muslims

> as an alien people who by Shylockian method became prosperous like the Jews. The Sinhalese sons of the soil for over two thousand years had shed rivers of blood to keep this country free from alien invaders … the result is that the Mohammedan thrives and the son of the soil goes to the wall.
>
> (cited in Bloom 2005: 49)

The ethnic antagonisms gave rise to Sinhalese nationalism and Tamil ethnic chauvinism soon after independence, when the Sinhalese nationalists denied the multiethnic and multi-religious character of Sri Lankan society and refused to accept the collective rights of minority groups. Tamils were labelled as exogenous invaders. Both Sinhala-dominated parties UNP and the leftist-nationalist SLFP used Buddhist imagery to appeal to Sinhalese voters and Sri Lankan national pride was identified with Sinhala pride. Sinhalese were encouraged by both parties to direct their hostilities against Tamils, who in turn resisted their economic and political marginalisation (Trawick 2007: 43–4). The discrimination became institutionalised in the new constitution in the 1960s which disenfranchised Tamils from government and other positions of authority, reducing their recruitment to government jobs from 41 per cent in 1949 to 7 per cent in 1963, while increasing Sinhalese proportions in the same period from 54 per cent to 92 per cent. A quota system was imposed on Tamil students entering the universities.

Tamils responded politically through the Federal Party and through non-violent protests called *satyagraha*, but these efforts failed to bring redress to meet their demands. By the 1970s, Tamils had started to agitate for a

separate homeland and their protestations became increasingly violent. In the 1980s they won some concessions and political rights but discrimination remained palpable. Among the organisations which emerged in this period was a radical group called Tamil National Tigers under the leadership of Velupillai Prabhakaran, later renamed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The main aim of the LTTE was the establishment of a Tamil homeland in the north and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka.

The Sri Lankan government responded to increasing Tamil militancy by promulgating the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) in 1979, which permitted the army and the police to detain people for up to eighteen months without trial. It defined certain acts as unlawful, including speaking or writing words intended to cause religious, social or communal disharmony or feelings of ill-will or hostility between the communities or racial or religious groups. It also undermined an existing British law that no confession made in police custody was admissible unless made in the presence of a magistrate. The PTA allowed for confessions made under duress of torture to become admissible (Tambiah 1986: 42; Bloom 2005: 51).

Instead of mitigating it, the PTA escalated Tamil violence in the 1980s. The government responded with additional repressive counter-measures that led to a spiral of increasing brutality and tit-for-tat violence (Bloom 2005: 52). Then the events of July 1983, mentioned above, triggered widespread mob violence, killing hundreds of Tamils. New emergency regulations gave wide powers to security forces to kill and bury suspected terrorists without any judicial inquiries. The LTTE called these developments a pogrom against Tamils. After the riots the government banned the main Tamil political party, pushing Tamils to the LTTE as their main voice. The conflict garnered the support of Indian Tamils who supported LTTE in their struggle with the Sri Lankan army. Indian support eventually led to the arrival of thousands of Indian Peacekeeping Forces (IPKF) under the terms of the Sri Lanka–India Accord signed on 29 July 1987 (Hopgood 2005). This accord was not accepted by the LTTE and Prabhakaran personally felt betrayed by the Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Ghandi, which possibly was the reason for the latter’s assassination (Balasingham 2004). By October 1987, the tensions between the IPKF and the LTTE had exploded into a war in the north and east. The IPKF was as unwelcome among Sinhalese as it was among the Tamils, and it was forced

to withdraw in 1990 after the new Sri Lankan President Premadasa allied himself with the LTTE in order to force the IPKF to leave (Hopgood 2005: 49).

Once the IPKF had left, the warfare between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan state resumed. There was a short interruption between November 1994 and April 1995 during which the LTTE and the new government of President Chandrika Kumaratunga conducted unsuccessful peace talks. The failure of these talks raised the tempo of the war and in October 1995, the Sri Lankan army captured Jaffna, causing 400,000 Tamils to flee to the surrounding countryside as refugees. The war continued with increasing ferocity until a Norway-brokered ceasefire was agreed in February 2002, followed by peace negotiations (Hopgood 2005: 49–50). Both parties are known to have violated the terms of the ceasefire. During the twenty years of fighting both sides had suffered thousands of casualties and more than a million people were displaced. The LTTE has admitted to losing nearly 18,000 soldiers including more than 200 Black Tigers, its suicide bomber squad. The government casualties are not reported but are also estimated to be in the thousands.

Both parties in the conflict have been involved in targeted assassinations, political abductions, disappearances and extrajudicial killings in order to terrify the population. The internecine warfare among various Tamil militant organisations competing for the support and loyalty of the community has resulted in the elimination of many able and notable Tamil intellectuals and political leaders. Many Tamils have been intimidated into leaving the country or coerced into silence for fear of reprisals. The loss of these talents is likely to have far-reaching consequences for the community and the country. Both parties have been involved in civilian massacres that would be regarded as war crimes under the international conventions on the law of war. Table 7.1, compiled by one of the respected Tamil Sri Lankan academic psychiatrists, lists some of the massacres involving more than twenty civilian deaths, carried out in a planned and deliberate way to cause terror (Somosundaram 2008b).

Another technique employed has been mass displacement of the civilian population in order to purge opposition or as a terror tactic. Displacement from a familiar environment is a fundamental disruption which has profound implications for the social, economic and psychological well-being of communities. There have been mass displacements of Tamils

following anti-Tamil violence. Similarly Tamil militants have caused mass displacements of Sinhalese and Muslim populations. According to one estimate more than a million people, a large majority of them Tamils, have been displaced and almost the same numbers have fled to Western countries. One can gain an idea of the scale of these displacements from the population of Jaffna. The current population of Jaffna is around 400,000, while the projected population in 2004 was estimated to be around 1,200,000. Similarly, all fifty-two villages in Trincomalee have been emptied of their Tamil population for security reasons (Somosundaram 2008b).

Table 7.1 War in Sri Lanka – civilian massacres

Date	*Place*	*# Killed*	*Description*	*Possible perpetrator*
July 1983	Welikade Prison	53	Tamil detainees	State officials, prisoners
24 July 1983	Jaffna	60	Tamil civilians	Lankan army
April 1984	Jaffna	70	Church (Our Lady of Refuge)	Lankan army
20 Nov. 1984	Dollar and Kent Farm, Mullaithivu	62	Sinhala ex-convicts and settlers	LTTE
2 Dec. 1984	Iraperiyakulam army camp, Vavuniya	100	Young Tamil men	Lankan army
4 Dec. 1984	Mannar	107	Tamil civilians	Lankan state forces
May 1985	Valvetithurai	70	Civilians and school boys	Lankan state forces
14 May 1985	Anuradhapura	146	Bus stand and Vihare	LTTE
May 1985	Thambiluvil, Eastern province	60–3	Youth	Lankan state forces
15 May 1985	Northern seas off Delft	34	Passengers on Kumuthini (boat)	Lankan navy
3 June 1985	Pankulam	85	Civilian bus passengers	
3 May 1986	Katunayake Airport	16	Passengers with foreign tourists	Tamil militants
May 1986	Central Telegraph Office	14	Civilians	Tamil militants
April 1987	Colombo	113	Car bomb, central bus station	LTTE

2 June 1987	Aranthalawa	31	Buddhist monks and civilians	LTTE
22 Oct. 1987	Jaffna Hospital	70	Patients, doctors, nurses and staff	Indian army (IPKF)
Aug. 1987	Trincomalee	100	Sinhala villagers	LTTE
April 1989	Trincomalee	51	Car bomb	LTTE
2 Aug. 1989	Valvittithurai	63	Youth and boys	Indian army (IPKF)
1 Aug. 1990	Akraipattu	14	Executions of Muslims	LTTE
4 Aug. 1990	Kathankudi Mosque	103	Muslim men and children at prayer	LTTE
18 Aug. 1990	Eravur	121	Muslim men, women and children	LTTE
5 Sep. 1990	Vantharumoolai	158	Civilian refugees	Lankan state forces
10 Sep.1990	Saththurukkondan	184	Civilian refugees	Lankan state forces
12 June 1991	Kokkaddicholai	82		Lankan state forces
October 1991	Palliyagodella	109	Muslim men, women and children	LTTE
9 Aug. 1992	Mylanthanai, Batticaloa	32		Lankan state forces
2 Jan. 1993	Killaly Sea	52	Fleeing refugees	Lankan navy
18 April 1995	Nachchikuda	30		Lankan tate forces
25 May 1995	Kallarawa	42		LTTE
October 1995	Border villages in East	120	Hacked	LTTE
January 1996	Colombo	100	Truck with explosives, Central Bank	LTTE
11 Feb. 1996	Kumarapuram	24	Civilians	Lankan state forces
20 April 1996	Killaly Sea	42	Fleeing refugees	Lankan navy
24 July 1996	Dehiwala	56	Train bombing	LTTE
11 Aug. 1997	Mullaitivu (Manthuvil)	40	Civilians	Lankan state forces
10 June 998	Suthanthirapuram, Mullaitivu	32	Civilians	Lankan state forces
17 Sep. 1999	Gongala	52	Men, women and children hacked	LTTE
25 Oct. 2000	Bindunuwewa	31	Surrendered child, youth soldiers	? Lankan police,

				officials
15 June 2006	Kebethigollewa, Anuradapura	64	Mine attack on a civilian bus	LTTE
7 Aug. 2006	Muttur	17	French action against hunger workers	Lankan state forces
2 April 2007	Ampara	16	Bombing of civilian bus	LTTE
28 Nov. 2007	Colombo	18	Bombs	LTTE
5 Dec. 2007	Anuradhapura	16	Bombing of civilian bus	LTTE
16 Jan. 2008	Buttala	27	Bus passengers	LTTE
29 Jan. 2008	Palampiddi	20	School children	DPU
2 Feb. 2008	Dambulla	20	Bus passengers	LTTE

Source: Somasundaram (2008b).

The Sri Lankan army has long followed the policy of depopulating an area before military action, possibly to reduce civilian casualties, but once emptied the area usually becomes a security zone. Table 7.2 provides information on some of the major mass displacements of civilian populations between 1956 and 2007. The human cost of more than twenty years of warfare between the two protagonists in the Sri Lankan civil war has been horrendous. As brief descriptions of killings and displacements in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 indicate, the war has impoverished populations and cost many lives. These and other consequences of the war have been graphically described and analysed by anthropologist Margaret Trawick in her brilliant book *Enemy Lines* (2007). The cost for the Tamil community has been especially dreadful. The physical and economic infrastructures of predominantly Tamil regions have been totally destroyed and their economy now consists mostly of local and foreign aid and private remittances by the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora. The Tamil community has been depopulated, its leaders eliminated or intimidated and its people become silent, compliant and passive. Its once cohesive and functioning community and family institutions are now wrecked by communal and domestic violence (Somosundaram 2008b).

Table 7.2 War in Sri Lanka – mass displacements

Date	*Place*	*Numbers*	*Description*	*Possible perpetrator*	*Comments*
1956	Gal-Oya spread to other places	3,000	Widespread anti-Tamil violence	Mobs	Followed protests to Sinhala-only Act
1958	Colombo, Outstations	35,000	Mass displacement of Tamils following widespread anti-Tamil violence	Mobs	Followed Bandaranaike–Chelvanayagam pact and its abrogation
1977	Hill Country, Colombo	15,000	Mass displacement of Tamils following widespread anti-Tamil violence	Mobs	Followed UNP winning 1977 elections
1983	Colombo, South-west, Central	250,000	Mass displacement of Tamils following widespread anti-Tamil violence	Mobs and politicians	
Post-1983	Abroad	500,000 to 1,000,000	Mostly Tamils	Lankan state forces	Asylum abroad
August 1987			Sinhala villagers	LTTE	
October 1987	Jaffna	300,000	Indian army Pawan army operation	IPKF	
1988	North-east	253000	IPKF operations	IPKF	
October 1990	North	100,000	Muslims asked to leave in short threat	LTTE	Fear of the fifth column
October 1995	Jaffna	400,000	Advancing Lankan forces on Jaffna	LTTE	Engineered by LTTE
1996	North	335,000	Lankan forces operations	Lankan forces	
1997	North	255,000	Lankan forces operations	Lankan forces	
1999	North	51,000	Lankan forces operations	Lankan forces	
2000	North	192,000	Lankan forces operations		
2001	North	67,000	Lankan forces operations	Lankan forces	
Dec. 2006	North and east	520,000		Conflict	
April 2007	East	301,000		Conflict	
June 2007	Colombo	376	Tamils	Lankan authorities	Deportation to Vavuniya
August 2007	North	460,000		Conflict	

Sources: Somosundararm (2008b).

All these have reduced predominantly Tamil areas to war zones in which violence has gradually permeated all aspects of daily life, family and community processes. Predictability of daily routines, a precondition of normal communal life, has disappeared. It was not certain that a person going for work would return in the evening. A home could be suddenly searched, someone brutally killed, a mother raped or father taken away. A shell could fall anywhere destroying everything around. Sounds of gun shots, machine-gun fire, exploding shells, diving planes and circling helicopters were ever present. People had to adapt to frequent checks, getting down from bikes, showing ID cards, waiting while the military looked them over, body searches, the pushing and slaps, intimidation, women taking the sexual overtones and harassment as part of their daily ordeal, all in an atmosphere of possible arrest. This pervasive atmosphere of violence, rather than breaking down the resistance and spirit of the population, in time created resistance and defiance particularly in the youth. Thus within each breast would grow, small at first, a rage, hate which could transform into militancy. These kinds of counter-insurgency policies and strategies could spawn a whole generation of rebellious youth (Somosundaram 2008b).

The LTTE and suicide bombings

This environment fuelled the Tamil insurgency, spearheaded by scores of groups, but by the 1970s and early 1980s only five groups, known as the Tamil five, were active in their resistance activities. These five Tamil groups included the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO), formed in 1974 under S. Thangathurai, the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students (EROS), formed in 1975 under V. Balakumar, the People's Liberation Organisation for Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), formed in 1979 under Uma Mahaswaran, the Eelam Peoples' Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), formed in 1980 under K. Padmanabha, and the most radical Tamil National Tigers (TNT), started as a movement of mainly college students in 1972 and formally taking the name of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 1973. It was only one of dozens of new Tamil guerrilla groups.

The LTTE first supported the Tamil political party, the Tamil United Front (TUF), which championed the Tamil cause and campaigned for parity status for Tamil language and culture, but left TUF to fight for the establishment of an independent Tamil state (Bloom 2005: 50–1; Neelan 2000; O'Balance 1989). LTTE radicalism began with the assassination of the mayor of Jaffna, Alfred Durayappah, on 27 July 1973, by the future LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran. This act of terrorism cemented his position as the unquestioned leader and enabled him to formalise the TNT into the broader LTTE. The LTTE also claimed responsibility for numerous political assassinations in 1978. The tactic of targeted assassination was to become a LTTE strategy in the following years (O'Balance 1989). It was used relentlessly against rivals until all opponents in the Tamil community were eliminated and the LTTE became the dominant separatist group fighting for an independent Tamil homeland.

Following the 1983 riots, the LTTE and a few other Tamil militant groups surged in size. The LTTE grew from fewer than fifty armed militants engaged in various acts of violence to an organisation of several thousand militants and began to conduct large-scale military operations against a variety of Sri Lankan military and political targets within a span of a few years. At the same time the LTTE solidified its dominance as the main Tamil insurgent organisation, effectively destroying or co-opting its Tamil rivals by 1986. In response the Sri Lankan army began major operations against the Tamil militants, and especially against the LTTE, culminating in the attack on the LTTE headquarters in Jaffna in the first half of 1986 (Pape 2005: 142–3).

While the Tamil community is the LTTE's political base, its fighters are mostly drawn from the farmers, fishermen and labouring poor in the Jaffna peninsula, northern Vanni, and the eastern province. The LTTE's active cadre are drawn from the lower middle class and working class (Roberts 2005). In terms of caste it has been dominated by the Karaiya caste which has a reputation for toughness (Hellmann-Rajanayagam 1994). A significant segment of its leadership came from the northern coastal areas and from middle to lower middle classes. Most of these people had a vernacular education as opposed to the Western-educated Vellalar Jaffna elite, whose families are distributed in the middle, lower middle and working classes and who are heterogeneous in terms of religion. The Karaiya were careful not to alienate the Jaffna elite.[2]

The LTTE began to employ suicide bombings effectively from 1987. The very first suicide attack by the LTTE Black Tigers took place on 5 July 1987. Not unlike one of the first deadly Hezbollah attacks in the 1980s in Lebanon, Captain Miller, a LTTE officer, drove a truck packed with explosive into a Sri Lankan army camp at Point Pedro near Jaffna, killing between thirty-nine and a hundred soldiers. It was a well-planned LTTE military operation. Once the truck bomb had exploded, regular LTTE soldiers followed up, overwhelming the stunned Sri Lankan soldiers. This was a hugely successful attack, shocking the Sri Lankan government and stopping a major army offensive, Operation Liberation, in Jaffna (Hopgood 2005: 50). This attack is celebrated every year as a Black Tigers' Day on the anniversary of Captain Miller's death. The similarity of the first Black Tigers' attack to Hezbollah's attacks in Lebanon in the early 1980s is attributed to the training of the Black Tigers by Hezbollah operators in the 1970s and early 1980s (Hopgood 2005: 51; Balasingham 2004; Pape 2005: 140–2; Swamy 2002: 97–100).

The decision to embark on suicide bombings was the result of the intensification of the Sri Lankan government's military and economic campaign against the LTTE, including Operation Liberation. These campaigns made it extremely difficult for the LTTE to obtain new materials and heavy weapons to confront the superior might of the Sri Lankan army. In short, the Black Tigers unit was developed to compensate for the absence of heavy weaponry. In military terms Captain Miller's truck bomb attack was the equivalent of a massive artillery shell delivered with such precision and surprise that it devastated and demoralised the army. The LTTE has maintained that the main aim of the act of suicide bombing by the Black Tigers is its military impact. That the deliberate sacrifice of a life is a tactical decision not taken lightly is demonstrated by how relatively sparingly the Black Tigers have been used by LTTE (Hopgood 2005: 52).

Between 1987 and 2001, the LTTE carried out more suicide bombings than any other terrorist group in the world. According to the best available evidence LTTE has a highly specialised internal structure similar to the professional military. The general umbrella organisation is the Tamil Tigers, but the organisation is further subdivided between Black Tigers (suicide bombing division), Sea Tigers (naval attack unit), Baby Tigers (child soldier division), Air Tigers (air force division) and the Women's Military Units of LTTE. The Black Tigers' suicide attacks have targeted military, civilians

and civilian infrastructure, and politicians (Bloom 2005; Hopgood 2005; Gunawardena 2004; Ramasubramanian 2004).

The Black Tigers' nine-month long training was split into two phases. The first phase focused on physical and mental fitness and developing a baseline set of skills such as bomb construction, vehicular driving and counter surveillance. Phase two emphasised special mission-oriented training developed through simulation and test runs. No Black Tigers attack was carried out without extensive prior surveillance of targets which could last several weeks. The operatives were always under the supervision of specially designated handlers drawn from LTTE's intelligence unit. Attacks were videotaped for post-mission debriefings and for planning future attacks. As a result of this training, 80 per cent of suicide bombings were reported to have achieved primary targets. The LTTE soldiers were known as 'one-way soldiers'. The LTTE carried out research and development to develop suicide vests, car bombs and explosives. It is considered to be the largest and one of the most sophisticated and deadly terrorist insurgencies in the world (Chalk 2004; Hopgood 2005; Manoharan 2003). In the late 1990s, LTTE had about 15,000 armed cadres even after having suffered the loss of several thousands soldiers in fighting with the Sri Lankan army. According to an assessment by Jane's Intelligence Group in 2002, there was no guerrilla or terrorist group in the world with a stand-off capability equal to that of the LTTE. This stand-off capability had enabled the LTTE to hold ground and to fight like a conventional force until it was defeated by the Sri Lankan armed forces in early 2009 (Jane's Intelligence Review 2007).

The Black Tigers were known to emphasise camaraderie as part of their training in order to instil a sense of duty and commitment to the mission. The training to overcome the fear of death and willingness to die for their cause gave Tamil Tigers the fortitude and mental strength not only to live with this idea but to return repeatedly to a situation of great peril. All Black Tigers were armed with a cyanide capsule in case they were arrested. The reasons behind their decision to commit suicide when captured were to protect the LTTE from information that captured operators might divulge under torture and to show their commitment to the enemy that they did not fear death (Schalk 1997a; Hopgood 2005). Since the 1990s more than 600 Tamil Tigers have committed suicide through this method. Only a few have ever been captured alive. Many of these had their stomaches pumped before the poison took effect (Pape 2005: 143).

The majority of the Black Tigers were between eighteen and twenty-five years of age and in the 1990s around two-thirds of its membership was below the age of thirty (Gunaratna 2000; Oberst 2002). The Black Tigers attached great importance to how the community would view their actions. Their identity was a closely guarded secret, but after their missions their identities were revealed and publicised in the most public way by the Tamil media and by special commemorative ceremonies organised by the LTTE. On their missions Black Tigers carried a laminated identity card with their picture, name and designation as a Black Tiger. This information, written in English, Sinhalese and Tamil languages, reads: 'I am filled with a huge explosive. If my journey is blocked I will explode it. Let me go' (Hoffman and McCormick 2004: 259; Pape 2005: 143). The importance attached to community support for their sacrifice was also evident in the public interviews. An example is the following statement by a female Black Tiger:

> As Black Tigers, they are a physical embodiment of self-determination and liberation. They employ their lives as missiles armed with the kind of determination and purpose that is unmatched by any conventional weapon that the Sinhala forces may deploy. There lies the strength and honour of our Black Tigers.
>
> (cited in Pape 2005: 144)

In their speeches the Tamil Tiger leaders frequently linked the Black Tigers' operations to the general welfare of the Tamil community. The LTTE leader Prabhakaran was well known for saying, 'Tamil Eelam can be achieved in 100 years. But if we conduct Black Tigers' operations, we can shorten the suffering of the people and achieve Tamil Eelam in a shorter period of time' (Gunaratna cited in Pape 2005: 144). Perhaps the most striking of ways through which the Black Tigers were glorified were the cemeteries and burial ceremonies. Most Tamil Tigers are Hindus and in Hinduism the dead are cremated not buried. But this is not so in the case of Black Tigers. All Black Tigers are venerated as saints, given public burials and laid to rest in graves. In the LTTE cemeteries Black Tigers have pride of place, with granite tombstones over the graves that hold no bodies. Shrines built in their memory dot Sri Lanka's north-east. An eternal lamp was lighted in front of the tombstone of every Black Tiger who had lost his or her life.

Female Black Tigers were an important part of the Black Tigers suicide squad and they operated from six divisions – Jaffna, Wanni, Mannar, Mullaitivu, Vavunia and Batticaloa. These women were allegedly forced to suppress their femininity and sexuality. Marriage was not allowed for women cadres up to the age of twenty-five and for men up to the age of twenty-eight (Ramasubramanian 2004).

The LTTE was the only terrorist organisation in the world to have a de facto state. Until about the end of 2007, it controlled around 15 per cent of Sri Lankan territory in which it ran schools, hospitals, police forces, television and radio stations, and the judicial system. It raised taxes and had successful local and overseas-based businesses. By early 2009 the Sri Lankan army had retaken almost all LTTE-held territory and has effectively dismantled the de facto Tamil state.

FUSTD suicide bombing profile: Sri Lanka

Unfortunately reliable data on all terrorist attacks and deaths related to them for Sri Lanka were not available to provide comparable profiles to those of other countries covered in this book. Attempts to obtain these data were not successful and consequently the profile of suicide bombings for Sri Lanka presented here is confined only to the suicide attacks in the FUSTD and offers no comparison with the outcomes of non-suicide terrorist attacks. As mentioned above, the LTTE is the only insurgent group in Sri Lanka that has carried out suicide bombings. These attacks began in 1987 and were carried out by the Black Tigers suicide unit of the LTTE. Between 1986 and 2006 the Black Tigers carried out ninety-three suicide bombing missions which caused 1,172 deaths.

Table 7.3 provides a profile of these attacks and the deaths attributed to them. As far as suicide bombings are concerned the most violent period was between 1996 and 2000 which saw fifty-three suicide attacks. From then onwards there was a decline in such attacks. On average there were five suicide attacks per year between 1986 and 2006 and each attack killed thirteen people. This means that in Sri Lanka fatalities from suicide attacks were slightly higher than the global average of twelve deaths per suicide attack. Suicide attacks appeared to be declining after the Norway-sponsored peace talks between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE in 2002. In 2006 there was only one suicide attack. But with the commencement of fierce fighting between the LTTE and the government forces starting in

2007, the LTTE suicide attacks increased but these were not included in the FUSTD.

Information about the type of suicide attack was available only for seventy-two attacks: thirty-one of them were car bombs (VBIEDs) and thirty-three were carried out using a suicide belt. In the most violent period between 1996 and 2000, two-thirds of suicide bombings were carried out using suicide belts which appears to be the preferred LTTE weapon (see Table 7.4). Unlike the Palestinian suicide bombers, who mainly targeted civilians, 70 per cent of LTTE suicide attacks targeted security forces and public officials. Infrastructure and civilians were targeted by 24 per cent of the attacks in equal proportion (see Table 7.5). According to the LTTE propaganda, the Black Tiger suicide attacks are primarily to win the war and not to spread terror, consequently these attacks are not directed against civilian targets and this is what the FUSTD evidence appears to show.

Table 7.3 LTTE suicide attacks and fatalities, 1986–2006

Year	*Suicide attacks (n)*	*Deaths from suicide attacks(n)*	*Average yearly suicide attacks*	*Average deaths per suicide attacks*
1986–90	3	29	1	10
1991–5	27	451	5	17
1996–2000	53	628	11	12
2001–5	9	63	2	7
2006	1	1	1	1
1986–2006	**93**	**1,172**	**5**	**13**

Source: FUSTD (2008).

The Sri Lankan government had employed heavy-handed methods which included targeting specific villages suspected of supporting the insurgents. These actions resulted in indiscriminate killing of Tamil civilians, alienating the population of these villages and succeeding in pushing them to support the LTTE. For example, in the village of Kokkurill near Batticaloa during a 1990 crackdown on the Tigers, the Sri Lankan army arbitrarily arrested 183 people from the village, including women and children. This traumatised the village and since then, according to the Tamil Tigers, Kokkurill sacrificed more lives for the cause than any other in Sri Lanka: 100 men from this village with a population of 500 joined the Tamil Tigers and did not return (Joshi 2000). Such actions by the army helped the LTTE to

garner support among the local population and solidified their control of the Tamil-dominated areas, especially Jaffna.

Table 7.4 Weapons used in suicide bombings in Sri Lanka, 1986–2006

Weapon	*1986–90*		*1991–5*		*1996–2000*		*2001–5*		*2006*		*Total*	
	N	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*
Suicide vehicular attack	3	100	8	44	17	40	2	29	1	100	**31**	**43**
Suicide belt/bomb attack	0	0	6	33	22	51	5	71	0	0	**33**	**46**
Other[a]	0	0	4	22	4	9	0	0	0	0	**8**	**11**
Total	**3**	**100**	**18**	**99**	**43**	**100**	**7**	**100**	**1**	**100**	**72**	**100**

Source: FUSTD (2008).

Notes
In twenty-one cases weapons used could not be ascertained.
a Suicide shooting/grenade/mine attack.

Table 7.5 Targets of suicide bombings in Sri Lanka, 1986–2006

Target	*1986–90*		*1991–5*		*1996–2000*		*2001–5*		*2006*		*Total*	
	N	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*
Infrastructure	0	0	4	15	5	10	2	22	0	0	**11**	**12**
Local security/ public officials	3	100	20	74	34	65	6	67	1	100	**64**	**69**
Civilians	0	0	1	4	9	17	1	11	0	0	**11**	**12**
Others	0	0	2	7	4	8	0	0	0	0	**6**	**7**
Total	**3**	**100**	**27**	**100**	**52**	**100**	**9**	**100**	**1**	**100**	**92**	**100**

Source: FUSTD (2008).
Note
There were four cases where the target could not be ascertained.

The majority of the Tamils generally felt that they had little choice but to support the violent strategy of the LTTE against the Sri Lankan government (Bloom 2005: 62–3).

Evidence about the motives for becoming Tamil Tiger suicide bombers shows that revenge for sufferings and loss caused by the actions of army attacks against the Tamils, policies of the Sri Lankan government, ethnic nationalism and complete dedication to the leader of the LTTE, Velupillai

Prabhakaran, were the main motivational springboards. There was a strong connection between a personal sense of loss and humiliation and becoming a martyr. According to a Black Tiger interviewed by a journalist for the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 'The harassment that I and my parents have suffered at the hands of the army makes me want to take revenge . . . It is a question of Tamil pride, especially after so much sacrifice, there is no escape. One can't give up now' (Joshi 2000).

One method that the LTTE used to persuade and recruit young Tamils to become bombers was grounded in a complete dedication to its leader, Prabhakaran, who fostered a sense of community, and one of the highlights for an individual bomber was that they enjoyed a last meal with the LTTE leader himself prior to an operation (Bloom 2005: 64). Mindful of his impact on the individual soldiers, Prabhakaran himself has publicly stressed this point in a 1993 Black Tiger Day speech:

> I have groomed my weak brethren into a strong weapon called Black Tigers. They are the balls of fire smashing the military prowess of the enemy with sheer determination. The Black Tigers are different and are also unique human beings. They possess an iron will, yet their hearts are so very soft. They have deep human characteristics of perceiving the advancement of the interest of the people through their own annihilation. The Black Tigers have cast aside fear from its very roots. Death has surrendered to them. They keep eagerly waiting for the day they would die. They just don't bother about death. This is the era of Black Tigers. No force on earth today suppresses the uprising of Tamils who seek freedom.
>
> (Cited in Swamy 2003: 243–4)

The LTTE is also known to have exploited the very young for their idealism and adopted a deliberate strategy of using child soldiers as spies, couriers and suppliers in violation of international conventions and law (Bloom 2005: 219 n.100). Many of its child soldiers were deployed in fighting, including suicide operations. Since April 1995, 60 per cent of LTTE casualties have been under the age of 18 (Smith 1997: 36). According to some reports the LTTE recruitment drives in schools led many parents to withdraw their children from school in order to evade their recruitment. The destruction of the economic base of the Tamil areas was a potent factor in

motivating many young people to join the LTTE, which gave their young lives purpose, meaning and status. The institutionalised discrimination against their recruitment into public service jobs added to their frustrations. Tamils remain second-class citizens in their own country. Mia Bloom, an American political scientist and specialist on the civil war in Sri Lanka, noted the gloom expressed by the young when she visited colleges and schools in the Batticaloa area:

> This sentiment was echoed by the people I encountered at St Michael's College in Batticaloa and other schools throughout Malavi and Trincomalee. The students and their teachers demonstrated a love of learning and yet were cognizant of how few opportunities were available to them – even with an education. Many of the key programs by various international organizations like the CARE, have centered on transforming educational opportunities and career placements for a population that has only experienced war for a whole generation. Many young people are shockingly ill prepared for peace-time, and the international organizations have made this a priority in their efforts to build peace.
>
> (Bloom 2005: 66)

Tamil Tigers: two profiles

Narasch

In February 2009 as the war between the Sri Lankan forces and the Tamil Tigers raged in the north of the country, a 22-year-old Black Tiger cadre surrendered to the Sri Lankan army. He confessed to attempting to blow up the Iranamadu tank, which would have killed 5,000 Sri Lankan soldiers. His 'confession' to the authorities was given in Tamil and an English translation of the transcript was given to me by a senior counter-terrorism officer. The following is an edited version of this.

I was born in Jaffna and educated at a leading school in town. I wanted to work at a bank by the time I sat for my O-Levels. Since my father was a government employee, he wanted me to obtain a good education. I sat for the O-Level examination in 2004 and passed well. That was during the ceasefire period, when the LTTE had political offices in many places.

One day, I received a message to come to an LTTE office. When I went there, the head of the office told me to join the organisation and threatened to land me in prison if I refused. They took me to Kilinochchi. My dream of becoming a bank official was shattered. But I could not do anything against the LTTE, so I decided to resign to my fate. The LTTE kept me in Kilinochchi for six months and gave me training. Then they took me to the Mullaithivu jungles, where I was handed over to the Sea Tigers. There were around thirty of us at that camp. We were trained to swim for miles and also trained in handling weapons such as T56 and RPGs. The LTTE also gave me training as a medic, since I had done well in my studies.

We were taken to Puthukuduirippu in Mullaithivu after our training. We went to Pooneryn at the beginning of August in 2006. There we learnt that our armed wing members had attacked Muhamallai from a number of points and entered Jaffna. We were tasked with transporting wounded cadres across the Kilali lagoon to the Pooneryn beach and to treat them there. After that, we went to Kiranchi Sea Tiger base. We were tasked with transporting weapons and ammunition from Silavathurai to Kiranchi. Large vessels from our Sea Tiger wing provided protection for us while we were doing the unloading. We were confined to the Mullaithivu jungles, and had to depend on LTTE leaders to find out what was happening in the outside world.

The LTTE leaders constantly told us that the Sinhala army was slaughtering Tamil civilians. They said that many had died as a result of artillery and air attacks. My mind underwent an entire transformation as I heard these stories. I began to hate the Sinhalese.

I felt that it was more honourable to die as a suicide bomber for the Tamil cause, rather than become a bank official. So, I wrote a letter to our leader Velupillai Prabhakaran one day. I stated in the letter that I wanted to be a Black Tiger cadre. I handed the letter over to the administration section of the LTTE. Afterwards, I received a letter from Sea Tiger leader Soosai. He said that the leader had granted permission for me to become a Black Tiger. Thus, Soosai recruited me to the ‘Gangei Amaran’ underwater attack squad. We were given a rigorous eight months of training in the Mullaithivu seas. We were trained to swim underwater with oxygen tanks strapped to us, and also place explosives. After this training, we removed iron plates from a navy Dovra which had been sunk by the Sea Tigers.

Meanwhile, another group of persons who had completed their training with the unit prior to us went off on a mission. They were the ones who placed explosives under the navy vessel ‘Invincible’ which was anchored in the Trincomalee harbour.

One time, I saw the LTTE testing a submarine it had built. According to my knowledge, the vessel was constructed under the supervision of Prabhakaran’s son, Charles Anthony.

In the month of August 2008, Wimal Master, who was in charge of us, gave us a special message. He said that we were being taken to see Prabhakaran. A van came to our camp one day. Fifteen of us, including myself, boarded this van. There were three female LTTE cadres in the group. The van took us to another camp. We changed into our uniforms there. A while later, a van which had black-tinted windows arrived at the camp. We got into this van and were taken to another location. The guards who were at this location checked us very thoroughly. They even told us to take off our shoes. After subjecting us to this search, they took us to a hall. Soosai was also there. Around 8.30 p.m. Prabhakaran arrived at the hall. It was the first time I had seen him in person. He was dressed in jungle fatigues and had a pistol in a holster strapped to his waist. We first posed for a group photograph with him in our uniforms. Then, we changed into civilian clothes and posed for another photograph with him.

After the photographs, all of us sat down for dinner. The meal consisted of string hoppers and mutton. I don’t eat meat, so I ate string hoppers with some curry. We had ice cream for dessert.

We were the heroes: Prabhakaran gave a speech to us after we finished our dinner. During the speech, he emphasised that we were the heroes who safeguarded Eelam. At around 10 p.m. he and his guards left the hall. After a few days, we received the group photograph in which we posed with Prabhakaran wearing our civilian clothes. (The photograph in uniform is routinely only made public after the death of the Black Tiger.) I saw Prabhakaran a few months later. This was at a function to commemorate Great Heroes’ Day. Prabhakaran’s wife, Madhivadhini, son, Charles Anthony, Soosai, Swarnam, Pottu Amman and Banu were also there. Prabhakaran lit a lamp and made a speech on the occasion.

On 23 January 2009, Kandiyan, leader of the Black Tigers, instructed us to prepare for a special mission. Myself and another cadre prepared for the mission. The Black Tiger leader put us in a jeep and took us to the LTTE

base in Vishvamadu in Mullaithivu. Around 8.30 p.m. Soosai, along with Prabhakaran and his son, Charles Anthony, arrived at the site. As far as I know, Charles Anthony is in charge of the computer and technical division of the LTTE. Soosai explained a detailed plan listed in the computer. According to the plan, we were to swim underwater and blow up the Iranamadu sluice gate. According to the plan in the computer, there were 28 feet of water under the sluice gates. This is the deepest point in the tank. Dinesh Master told us that the tank bund will burst due to the pressure created after the sluice gate is blown up. He said that five thousand soldiers would perish after getting caught in a wall of water. Dinesh Master was the Tiger leader who directed this operation. He also told the two of us that the flooding from the burst tank bund will last for seven days and that three hundred Sea Tigers were standing by with boats to kill off soldiers who are trapped by the water. We were then given the supplies needed for the mission. We were given oxygen tanks, four bombs weighing 25 kilograms each and satellite phones. Dinesh Master told us that another group was waiting near the Iranamadu tank to aid us.

We left Vishvamadu village on the 24th for our mission. We first had to slip through the defence line running from the east of Iranamadu tank up to Kalmadu tank. Some of our group had already destroyed the Kalmadu tank bund at this time. The army attacked us with RPGs as we crossed it. So, we had to abandon the mission and go back to Vishvamadu and meet Soosai. Soosai then instructed us to blow up the Iranamadu sluice gate using time bombs. He said that we could escape safely as there is a fifteen-minute delay before the bombs explode. Though we arrived at the site on the 25th we did not receive a call from the others who came to assist us. So, we had no choice but to turn back yet again. On this occasion, Soosai informed us that the satellite phone of the Tiger cadre who came to assist us had fallen into the water. I was disturbed that the mission was a failure on two occasions. I remembered that I am someone with a good education. I was then confronted by my conscience. I realised that my feelings were starting to change. I asked myself what I am dying for.

However, Soosai asked us to go on the mission for a third time. We arrived on foot at the eastern shore of the Iranamadu tank and swam three kilometers to the western end. Soosai contacted us by satellite phone sometime later. He ordered us to fix the bombs on the sluice gates and commit suicide. As we set off in the direction of the sluice gates, we saw

two vessels of the navy patrolling the tank bund on either side. I felt that they would see us if we went near the sluice gates. I felt that my will to commit suicide was slipping. On the one hand, I could not go back and rejoin the organisation. This was because they will still force me to fight, though I had no desire to commit suicide.

I fought with my own thoughts for a few hours. The other cadre who came with me was also my age. But he did not have much education. Thus, I did not believe that he would agree with what I said. I asked him why we had to die for nothing. He in turn asked me what we should do then. I proposed that we hand ourselves over to the army. He agreed. We wrapped the explosives we had brought in around a tree half-submerged in water. We then buried the satellite phones in the ground and went in the direction of the A-9 road to meet the soldiers. We met soldiers on the way. They searched us and took us to a camp . . . In the end, I decided to live.

Niromi

In 1987, seventeen-year-old Niromi shocked her middle-class family by joining the Tamil Tigers, one of the first female soldiers to join the Tamil insurgent group. She was born in Kandy, a Sinhala majority town in Sri Lanka where she spent the first seven years of her childhood. Although she was Tamil, her extended family included Sinhalese. In 1978 her parents sent her to the northern Tamil city of Jaffna to live with her grandmother whom she barely knew. Tamil agitation was for equal rights between Tamils and Sinhalese and against the government's discriminatory policies. It was a time when the Sinhalese extremism in the south was also growing. There were boycotts, strikes and skirmishes. Tamil politicians were being shot and Tamil students being kidnapped.

The Tamil agitation grew more violent and on 23 July 1983, when Niromi was fourteen, the Tamil Tigers ambushed the army patrol in Jaffna and killed thirteen soldiers, the action that became the trigger of the widespread anti-Tamil riots which killed hundreds of innocent Tamil civilians and aggravated ethnic tensions in the country. Many young Tamils began to join the insurgency. By 1985 the situation had escalated into full-scale war in the north and east, with the government launching a military offensive on Jaffna to wipe out the rebellion. Niromi found herself living in constant fear. The Jaffna library where she spent most of the time was

burned down by the army. There was indiscriminate aerial bombing and artillery shelling, day and night, and daily movements were restricted by long periods of curfews. She spent many days in a home-built bunker studying for her exams. The Tigers' television station was broadcasting images of war, militant training, dead bodies and Tamil funerals. These images began to haunt her and she felt outraged that no one was being held to account, and that the outside world was doing nothing.

The government offensives increased in intensity and air raids became commonplace. Sometimes Niromi saw bodies strewn by the roadside on her way to school, or hanging from lamp-posts. She was dismayed by the sense of powerless-ness of her family and friends who did not support militant groups because they thought they were mostly run by uneducated, low-caste youth incapable of solving the Tamil problems. But she thought at least they were trying. The more she listened to the militants, the more she began to sympathise with the idea of an armed struggle which she thought was the only response. Niromi feared for her life and felt that if people were going to be killed or driven from their homes, then shouldn't they at least put up a fight? She talked about joining the insurgency with friends but few agreed with her, fearing that by doing so they would disgrace their families. Middle-class girls didn't do such things.

In May 1987, when Niromi was seventeen, the Sinhala government launched Operation Liberation, declaring all-out war against the Tamil militants on the Jaffna peninsula. By now, the Tigers had gained administrative control of the region, restricting government forces to their barracks. Niromi's mother decided that she should return to Kandy until the war was over. As they prepared to leave Niromi decided to run away to join the Tigers. She told her mother that she was going to her friend Ajantha's house to say goodbye. When she told her friend her plans, Ajantha also decided to join her and they set off together to the office of the Student Organisation of Liberation Tigers near Jaffna University. They were interviewed and initially the organisation was hesitant about recruiting middle-class girls but finally relented.

The leader of the Tamil Tigers' political wing, Thileepen, warned them: 'We gamble with our own lives and bury our friends; there'll be none of the comforts you are used to. I'm not convinced that you are suited to this lifestyle, but no one here is held against their will.' When Niromi's and Ajantha's families learned of their decision they came to plead with them

that they were ruining their lives and accused the Tamil Tigers of brainwashing them. However, the young women did not budge and joined the Tamil Tigers, being sent to work with members of the Tigers' female political wing at the Freedom Birds headquarters, where they met and befriended other female Tigers.

A few weeks later she and Ajantha were selected for military training and sent to an all-female camp in an outer suburb of Jaffna. They were some of the first female Tigers to receive military training. The LTTE leader, Prabhakaran, came to talk to them personally. The meeting was held in the camp office and although Probhakaran did not ask many questions, Niromi felt that he knew everything about her. He said, 'Most girls here come from rural areas. They are used to hard work, pounding rice and chopping firewood. Be in no doubt training is going to be harder for you.' The training regime was gruelling. The day began with two hours exercise followed by commando training. Afternoons were taken up by firing training and learning about explosives.

Prabhakaran visited the camp frequently and, a week after the Tigers' first suicide bombing attack by Captain Miller, expressed his desire to recruit them into the newly formed Black Tigers, the LTTE's suicide squad. He wanted to give women the same opportunity as men. Niromi knew that she could never do such a thing because she did not have the courage. The war was escalating, with civilians drawn into conflict, and the humanitarian situation was getting worse. This brought in the Indian intervention through the Indian Peacekeeping Forces (IPKF). There was an interruption to the war as a result of the peace deal between the Indian and Sri Lankan governments and the LTTE. The Tamil militant organisations were unhappy with certain aspects of the peace deal and began political agitation, including a hunger strike by a local LTTE commander Thileepan which led to his death. The peace deal began to unravel and war activities resumed, not only between the LTTE and Sri Lankan forces but also between the LTTE and IPKF.

Niromi became actively involved in the war and after five months in the jungle contracted malaria. Several of her fellow Tiger fighters were ill with dysentery and typhoid. A friend stayed by her side, nursing her and bringing medication and rice water in a rusty tin. Niromi felt broken physically and emotionally, constantly questioning the purpose of a war which she thought could never be won. She had believed the LTTE propaganda, convinced

that Tamil Eelam could be achieved within a year or so, but it was becoming clear to her that an armed conflict would resolve nothing. She recalled Thileepan telling her, ‘You are free to go home any time.’ She thought it was time to walk away while she could. One morning in June 1988, at a house near the forest where they had taken shelter following an attack on their hideout, Niromi approached her leader, Sengamalam, as he was washing his face and told him, ‘I want to go home’. He stopped drying his face and looked at her with alarm ‘Is someone giving you grief?’ She told him, ‘I just can’t cope any more, I am tired of this war. I am weak.’

Calmly he said he was sorry, that he was surprised she had lasted so long. ‘I must warn you,’ he told her, ‘your life will be in grave danger – from the Sri Lankan army, Indian forces, even rival organisations. Your name is on their wanted lists.’ Niromi did not care. She surrendered her rifle and kupple, and left their meeting. Before leaving the camp she went to say goodbye to her friend, who was shocked and began to cry. Consumed with shame she could hardly speak. She recalled her friend sobbing and saying, ‘I can’t believe you are leaving me, we have so much to achieve.’ Before she could reply, Sengamalam hurried her friend into the forest and Niromi never saw her again. Within two months of being reunited with her family she was sent to India for studies and a few years later, with help from a relative, she migrated to Australia.[3]

These two profiles were selected because they provide intimate insights into the motivations, recruitment, operational protocols and culture of the LTTE as an organisation. In the case of Narasch I was assured that all information was as narrated by him to the authorities. The original transcript was in Tamil and the translation used here is the official version. I have no reason to suspect the authenticity of the transcript but that is the best I can say. The profile of Niromi, albeit an abbreviated account, is also based on her own words.

Concluding remarks

Contrary to predictions by some observers that the LTTE will eventually succeed in realising its dream for an independent homeland for the Sri Lankan Tamils, that dream has been shattered. In May 2009 the Sri Lankan army defeated the LTTE fighters, killed most of its leaders, including Prabhakaran, and gained control of all LTTE-held territory in the northern part of the country. The victory has come at an enormous human cost. There

are now more than 250,000 refugees from the last LTTE-held territory living in camps run by the military. The conditions in these camps are dire. Almost all these refugees are Tamils and they are not free to move out because the government claims that they are being screened to weed out the LTTE fighters among them. There is little doubt that the LTTE has been defeated militarily in its twenty-six-year struggle for an independent Tamil homeland. This may herald an end of the Tamil Tigers' suicide bombing campaigns in the foreseeable future. However, it does not mean the defeat of the ideology which gave rise to the Tamil Tigers in the first place.

Studies by Cathleen Carley of Carnegie Mellon University in the United States have shown that when hierarchies and structures of centralised organisations are destabilised through isolation or elimination of the key leaders and command structures, they rapidly reform into a new hierarchy. In fact removal of the key leader (such as Velupillai Prabhakaran in the case of the LTTE) in a hierarchical organisation may lead to many other leaders emerging, each leading a new and separate organisation. Thus the destruction or destabilisation of one organisation may lead to the emergence of numerous others to carry on the work. The destabilisation of a hierarchal organisation may also lead to the mutation of the organisation into numerous cellular organisations which are harder to destabilise (Carley 2002; Carley, Lee and Krackhardt 2001).

It is thus possible that the Sri Lankan Tamils' struggle for equality will not end with the defeat of the LTTE by the Sri Lankan army. The destabilisation of the LTTE and its structures and the elimination of its leadership may lead the organisation to mutate into other forms, including through the emergence of autonomous cellular organisations of Tamil insurgents who may be inspired by LTTE ideals and ideology but operate as franchised and decentralised organisations carrying out terrorist attacks, including suicide bombings against the Sri Lankan state and its institutions. Cellular organisations are more effective because of the greater propensity of individual cell members to interact with each other, and also because cellular networks are very adaptive to changes in the external environment.

The LTTE legacy would be that its ideology was framed around ending the exclusion of the Sri Lankan Tamils from the national project. In the Sinhalese-dominated polity, the Tamils felt that they were denied equality of citizenship and full cultural rights. The LTTE succeeded in winning the support of Tamils, first, by framing its military tactics, including suicide

bombings by the Black Tigers, as the only alternative in a highly asymmetrical conflict with the Sri Lankan state and, second, by tapping into widespread feelings of humiliation and suffering caused by the counter-insurgency policies of the Sri Lankan government. Consequently its ideologues emphasised altruism in motivating and recruiting its footsoldiers. This was clearly shown in the defining of Tamil Tiger suicide attacks not as *thatkolai*, the Tamil word for suicide, but as *thatkodai*, meaning 'to give oneself', implying that in a suicide attack the Tamil Tiger gives him- or herself as a gift to the community (Hopgood 2005: 74–5; Strenski 2003).

The Black Tiger suicide bombing attacks also had an important theoretical sig-nificance: religion played no role in explaining them. This means that no religion, let alone a specific one like Islam, is a necessary part of the explanation of suicide bombing (Hopgood 2005: 76). However, there is one aspect of the Sinhalese–Tamil conflict at the heart of the civil war which involves religion. According to Robert Pape, the religious difference between the Sinhalese (who are predominantly Buddhist) and Tamils (who are predominantly Hindus) is 'a central component of the LTTE concept of self-sacrifice for national resistance and … it plays a key role in popular support for suicide terrorism' (Pape 2005: 150–1). Pape's argument is supported by Peter Schalk, a scholar of LTTE martyrdom. He notes that the self-understanding among the LTTE of its 'martyrdom' is that it is beyond religion, but the LTTE selectively revives religious concepts relating to a Hindu martyr cult. It uses the Tamil word *tiyakam* (abandonment) for 'martyrdom', which is rooted in the Hindu religion and means 'the voluntary abandonment of life in the very act of taking life, in the act of killing … a rather specific Indian form of martyrdom [with] roots in the last section of the Bhagavadgita' (Schalk 1997b).[4]

Many Sinhalese see the Tamil Tigers suicide bombings as cult suicide based on the devotion of the perpetrators to the LTTE leader, Prabhakaran. The logical extension of this type of reasoning is that once the LTTE and its leader have been eliminated, it would end such actions. Robert Pape argues, and I believe correctly, that those who see the LTTE as a cult isolated from Tamil society are 'off the mark' (Pape 2005: 140). This means that some type of militant action will continue even without the presence of the LTTE so long as the conditions that gave rise to the LTTE exist in Sri Lanka. But what form it may take is not yet clear. Of course if the Sri Lankan

government succeeds in developing genuinely inclusive policies, that would obviously change the whole political landscape.

I spent a week in mid-May 2009 in Colombo interviewing civil society leaders and government officials about future developments at the same time as the Sri Lankan army was carrying out mopping up operations in the north. While there was a general sense of relief that finally the LTTE had been defeated, there were muted indications that the next phase may involve the escalation of Sinhala chauvinism. That of course would not bode well for Sinhalese–Tamil relations. Soon after the military operations against the LTTE ended, the head of the Sri Lankan armed forces, General Sarath Fonseka, announced that the size of the Sri Lankan army would be increased by 50 per cent from 200,000 to 300,000 to ensure that the Tigers phenomenon would not rise again. This to me was an indication of the continuing militarisation of Sri Lanka eloquently described by Neloufer de Mel as an ideology, discourse and praxis which draws to itself and into its service forces of nationalism, patriarchy, globalisation, the arts, literature and popular culture, and memory. As an activity it absorbs agency, and adapts and transforms society (De Mel 2007). A common observation made by several people I interviewed was that Tamil marginalisation would continue and the Tamil–Sinhalese conflict would move from being a territorial to a non-territorial one.

Ironically, one factor which may have weakened the LTTE in recent years is its success in establishing a de facto state in the north since the 1990s. To maintain this de facto state it had to establish, finance and run not only the military operations but also its social, economic and physical infrastructures, such as schools, hospitals, roads, local government, police and courts. Then in the aftermath of 9/11, with the USA-led ‘War on Terror’, the LTTE was declared a terrorist organisation in a number of Western countries with substantial diaspora Tamil communities. As a consequence of this, the financial support it formerly received from abroad was prevented because of the legal prohibitions on financing terrorism and terrorist organisations. The LTTE had no choice but to turn to its own civilian population in the north and east of Sri Lanka for funding through taxation, tolls, levies and extortion. Taxation brings with it a degree of responsibility to heed the wishes of the populace.[5] The LTTE’s ability to continue fighting and hold out for all of the Eelam homeland was constrained by the fact that the people paying for the war were also those

suffering most from its perpetuation (Bloom 2005: 46). This situation created a degree of war weariness among the people which undermined support for the LTTE. This in turn led to the LTTE becoming oppressive against its own people.

8 Suicide bombings

Homicidal killing or a weapon of war?

In his influential treatise on war the eminent American political theorist Michael Walzer regards suicide bombings and terrorism as homicidal killing and morally worse than killing in war:

> Terrorists are killers on a rampage, except that rampage is not just expressive of rage or madness: the rage is purposeful and programmatic … the peculiar evil of terrorism is not only the killing of innocent people but also intrusion of fear into everyday life, the violation of private purposes, the insecurity of public spaces, the endless coerciveness of precaution.
>
> (Walzer 2004: 51)[1]

Walzer's writings have been very influential in shaping the debate on suicide bombings and bombers in the media. Walzer, however, is not alone in labelling suicide bombings as murderous killing.[2]

This chapter will examine whether suicide bombings are homicidal killing, as argued by Walzer, or a weapon of war. This examination will involve exploration of several interrelated questions. Is suicidal bombing a form of suicidal behaviour? If not, then should it be viewed as an act of murder or a weapon of war? To establish this we must ascertain the nature of war and killing in war, and distinguish war killing from murder. The answers to these questions would, I believe, lead to answering the question as to whether suicide bombing is a homicidal killing or a weapon of war. These questions are explored in the following discussion.

Suicide and suicide bombing

There is an emerging consensus among scholars that suicide bombing attacks are qualitatively different from suicides. After a comprehensive

review of relevant literature on the phenomenon of suicide bombing, Grimland, Apter and Kerkhof conclude that social processes such as group dynamic, indoctrination and political factors are decisive in analysis of this problem. They assert that in suicidal bombing, suicide is instrumental in the context of war, not in the context of psychopathology. Suicide bombing is instrumental in realising fatalities, and it is only one of many weapons used by terrorists. The act of killing in warfare is more important to understanding suicidal terrorism than the act of suicide (Grimland, Apter and Kerkhof 2006: 107).

In another comprehensive review of the topic, Townsend concludes that available evidence demonstrates that suicide terrorism has a range of characteristics which, on close examination, are shown to be different from other suicidal behaviour.

> Suicide terrorists are not truly suicidal and attempting to find commonalities between suicide terrorists and others who die by suicide is likely to be an unhelpful path for any discipline wishing to further understanding of suicidal behaviour. Equating actions and motivations of suicide terrorists with those of other suicides perhaps does something of a disservice to those individuals who die quietly; alone and with no murderous intent.
>
> (Townsend 2007: 47)

The British psychiatrist Nadia Dabbagh in a study of suicide in Palestine shows that suicidal behaviour in Palestinian society, like suicide in other societies, is caused by the relative degree of social integration, regulation and isolation, as well as social and cultural control and oppression of individuals in society. But suicide bombings by organisations like Hamas and Islamic Jihad are targeted acts of resistance and weapons of the weak against an unjust and hated occupier of what the Palestinians regarded as their homeland (Dabbagh 2005: 43–4).

Unlike suicide, which evokes feelings of pity and sadness for the victims, suicide attacks evoke emotions of repulsion, fear, anger and total disbelief that a human being can kill, in such a cold-blooded manner, innocent people who have done no harm to the perpetrator. A large discrepancy between suicide bombing attacks and suicides is that in suicide bombing the primary intention of the act is murder, whereas the primary characteristic of suicide

is the absence of murderous intent. In fact the terrorist's suicide can be viewed as a by-product of the attack. Typically suicide attacks involve victims who are unknown to the killer. Moreover, most suicide terrorist attacks are carefully planned well in advance with the explicit intention of killing others who have no prior relationship with the suicide bomber (Dabbagh 2005; Townsend 2007). Suicide bombing attacks are also different from homicide-suicide because of the temporal spacing of the acts of homicide and suicide. In suicide bombing the acts are simultaneous (Marzuk, Tardiff and Hirsch 1992; Barraclough and Harris 2002; Townsend 2007).

War and war killing

According to ethnographic evidence war, as organised lethal violence involving spatially and socially distinct groups, is caused by economic factors (land, resources and plunder), social factors (prestige, honour), revenge (for sufferings) and defence. The order of motives from most inclusive to least inclusive are: political control, economic gain, social status and defence (Wright 1942; Otterbein 1970). The motives for going to war appear to differ according to the nature of the political system. Centralised political systems (states and chiefdoms) go to war for the purposes of achieving political control, conquering and dominating a territorial domain and its inhabitants to extract economic benefits. In contrast, tribes, bands and non-state groups make war not to attain political control but for some combination of purposes which include revenge, defence, land, honour and prestige. There appears to be a relationship between the organisational characteristics of the entity and the motives and rationales for engagement in warfare (Kelly 2000: 121–61).

In modern political theory war is organised violence and an instrument of the state. It is a legal activity when it fulfils certain conditions such as self-defence, fulfilling a treaty obligation towards a state that is being attacked or a humanitarian intervention to safeguard the existence of a political community threatened with either the elimination of the people or the coercive transformation of their way of life. Neither of these latter actions is morally acceptable. Under these conditions war is legal and justifiable, but only as a method of last resort after all alternatives have been exhausted. Additionally, the conduct of war is always subject to moral criticism, must

not directly target civilians and economic infrastructures, and must be proportional.

> A morally strong leader is someone who understands why it is wrong to kill the innocents and refuses to do so, refuses again and again, until the heavens are about to fall. And then he becomes a moral criminal who knows that he can't do what he has to do – and finally does.
>
> (Walzer 2004: 45)

These criteria give legitimacy to certain types of violence and stigmatise other types under international law. But, as Talal Asad has argued, the irony of the liberal West's culture of war is, on the one hand, the state's need to legitimise organised violence against a collective enemy (including civilians) and, on the other hand, the humanitarian desire to save human lives (Asad 2007: 16). While both war and terrorism are very explicit forms of death dealing, this criterion makes killing in war legitimate and killing by terrorism illegal. According to Walzer, terrorism is not only illegal but morally worse than killing in war. It is worse even than the crime of murder because of the peculiar evil of terrorism which imposes an endless coerciveness of precaution in everyday life (Walzer 2004: 51).

Much of the criticism of terrorism follows from these fundamental precepts of war in political theory. In war and terrorism innocents are killed, but what liberal political theory condemns in war is excess and in terrorism its essence. But whether state armies kill only those who are legitimately killable is partly what the rules of war address (Asad 2007: 16). While war, according to Walzer, is the method of last resort, the militants carrying out acts of terrorism against civilians have not been through the necessary steps to justify their actions as being a last resort and are thus not coerced into that action. In his eyes, it is not so easy to reach the last resort. To get there one must indeed try everything and not just once but repeatedly; politics after all is an art of repetition (Walzer 2004: 53).

In short, war, an organised violence in which death of the 'other' is encoded in the planning, is the legitimate and legal prerogative of the state under certain conditions. Its legitimacy is grounded in the exclusive power of the state to impose punishments internally and externally. The violence is embedded in the very concept of liberty that is at the heart of liberal doctrine about the foundation of the political community which the state is

empowered to defend. The concept presupposes that the morally independent individual's natural right to violent self-defence is yielded to the state and that the state becomes the sole protector of individual liberties, denying to any agents other than states the right to kill at home and abroad (Tuck 1999). The right to kill is the right to behave in violent ways against citizens who break the original covenant and the uncivilised 'others' who pose a threat to the existence of civilised order, and their killing provides security. This is done in the name of self-defence. The justifications of pre-emptive and preventive wars (like the ones in Iraq and Afghanistan) practised by the modern state are embedded in this doctrine.

The doctrine of moral legitimacy and legality of war also stipulates that the state is coerced into taking this action as the method of last resort after all alternatives have been exhausted. Furthermore, state armies engaged in war do not target civilian non-combatants. Does this logic of war also apply to terrorists involved in suicide bombings? The following two case studies, one on Palestinian and the other on Sri Lankan terrorist organisations, may help us to answer this question.

Palestine

In the case of Palestine, terrorist organisations employing suicide bombings claim to be involved in retaliatory violence to defend their 'political community' whose very survival is being threatened by Israeli occupation and expansion. If this continues it would inevitably lead to the dispossession of the Palestinian homeland, amounting to elimination of them as a people and their way of life. The Palestinian organisations claim they are engaged in organised violence through suicide bombings only as the last resort and under absolute necessity.

For most Palestinians violence is the only option to achieve the goal of an independent state. A Palestinian recruiter and trainer of suicide bombers is quoted as saying, 'Jihad and resistance begin with the word, then with the sword, then with the stone, then with the gun, then with planting bombs, then transforming bodies into human bombs' (Bloom 2005: 27). As discussed in Chapter 4 the pervasive sense of powerlessness among the Palestinians has made violence an all-powerful symbol of honour. At a profoundly symbolic level, martyrdom is the final and irrefutable statement of group worth and dignity against, as seen by the Palestinians, an oppressive Israeli occupation. According to the late Hamas leader, Dr Abdul

Aziz Rantisi, a casualty of Israel's policy of targeted killing of Palestinian terrorist leaders, Hamas and Palestinian society in general believe that 'becoming a martyr through suicide bombing is among the highest if not the highest, honour' (Argo 2003: 13). As regards civilian deaths from Palestinian suicide bombings, there appears to be little concern over civilian immunity. For most Palestinians, there is no civilian immunity in Israel owing to the universal conscription of men and women. Any civilian is either a current, past or future soldier. From this perspective, all Israelis are complicit in the immoral and illegal occupation of the West Bank and Gaza (Bloom 2005: 40).

Finally, suicide bombing is only one of the weapons used by the three Palestinian organisations engaged in such attacks against Israel – Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Al'Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. These organisations have deep-rooted mass support in Palestinian society. Their violent confrontations with Israeli occupying forces are well organised and this especially applies to their suicide bombing operations, which are well planned before they are executed. From this account it would appear that Palestinian violence against Israel meets most if not all the attributes of war, except one: that it is carried out not on behalf of a state but on behalf of a 'political community' which perceives its very existence and way of life as under threat from Israeli occupation. Using Walzer's terminology, the Palestinian leaders confronted with a potential evil respond by doing evil for the protection of their political community (Walzer 2004).

Two most common explanations of Palestinian suicide bombings are, first, that they are acts of religiously motivated sacrifice in the form of a martyrdom operation and, second, that they are acts of secular immortality. They represent opposite ends of the sacred–profane continuum. As mentioned in Chapter 4 an eloquent exposition of the first explanation is to be found in the work of Ivan Strenski. Drawing on the work of the Durkheimian school he proposes that the phenomenon of suicide bombings is better understood through religious concepts of sacrifice and gift than through theories seeking to explain it as suicide. Sacrifice is not just a social deed but has a potent religious resonance that transforms it into something holy. In suicide bombing, Strenski argues, one sacrifices oneself as a gift to and for the nation (political community) that sanctifies it. All Palestinian suicide bombers believe they are giving their lives for the Palestinian

nation. Strenski's analysis thus implies that since sacrifice is the essence of religious subjectivity, violence is integral to it (Strenski 2003).

Following Talal Asad one can take at least two issues with Strenski's description of suicide bombing. First, his argument is contrary to Durkheim's position. Durkheim was the first theorist to identify the social determinants of suicide and he would most certainly have classified suicide bombing within the category of altruistic suicide. Second, his description of the motive in terms of sacrifice offers a religious model by means of which suicide bombings can be identified as 'religious terrorism'. That appellation defines the bomber as morally underdeveloped – and therefore pre-modern – when compared with people whose civilised status is partly indicated by their secular politics and their private religion, and whose violence is therefore in principle disciplined, reasonable and just (Asad 2007: 45).

The second explanation, describing Palestinian suicide bombings as acts of secular immortality, has been offered by May Jayyusi when she views different types of violent acts as manifestations of different kinds of subjectivities. Jayyusi links Palestinian suicide bombing to a particular type of political subjectivity formed in the context of the attackers' relationship to particular power structures. Drawing from Carl Schmitt's idea of 'the state of exception' and Giorgio Agamben's Homo sacer, she concentrates on developing a larger politico-ideological field which includes Israeli policies of occupation and settlements, Palestinian resistance and international developments such as the Iranian Revolution and the Oslo Accord (Jayyusi 2004).

Jayyusi argues that the Oslo Accord was an attempt to institute a local authority over the Palestinians on behalf of the occupying Israeli state. Under the Oslo Accord the entire Palestinian population was held as a hostage to the policing performance of the Palestinian Authority. As the overarching state power Israel was at once beyond the Palestinian zones and yet sovereign over them; the Palestinian Authority under these conditions was caught in an irresolvable contradiction. On the one hand, it was seeking national sovereignty and on the other, conceding it indefinitely to the occupying power by agreeing unconditionally to carry out its policing function. In this politico-ideological and power arrangement, something new emerged with the Oslo Accord for the Palestinian population, something Jayyusi calls 'an imaginary of freedom' (Jayyusi 2004).

This ‘imaginary of freedom’ made the Oslo Accord acceptable to the Palestinians in spite of the misgivings of many and resulted in the significant decline in support for militant Islamic movements. In 1999 more than 70 per cent of Palestinians supported the Palestinian Authority-led peace process and support for suicide bombings declined to 20 per cent. By 2003–4, as it became clear that the inherent contradictions of Oslo would not produce conditions of Palestinian liberation from Israeli occupation and paradoxically increased their daily humiliation at Israeli army checkpoints, while not stopping expansion of Jewish settlements, the attitudes towards the Palestinian Authority shifted dramatically. The Palestinian Authority was seen as unable to stand up to Israeli power, and its support among Palestinians plummeted to 22 per cent while support for suicide bombings increased to 75 per cent (Bloom 2005).

The consequence was a sense of outrage because Oslo had created the hope that conditions would change, but they never did. The Palestinian rage was the consequence of this blocking of the legal-political means of their liberation. As Arendt (1969) has pointed out, when legal-political means are blocked, the possibility of acting politically, which is part of what makes people individual and therefore human, is also blocked. That rage led to an action which offers them a secular form of immortality. The phenomenon of Palestinian suicide bombing is thus an expression of that secular immortality and not of religious zealotry.

Sri Lanka

As discussed in Chapter 7, ethnic antagonisms arose following the Sri Lankan Tamil minority’s agitation for economic, social and cultural equality. Sinhalese nationalism and Tamil ethnic chauvinism grew after independence when the Sinhalese nationalists denied the multi-ethnic and multi-religious character of Sri Lankan society and refused to accept the collective rights of minority groups. This discrimination became institutionalised in the new constitution in the 1960s which disenfranchised Tamils from government and other positions of authority, reducing their recruitment to government jobs from 41 per cent in 1949 to 7 per cent in 1963 while increasing Sinhalese representation in these jobs in the same period from 54 per cent to 92 per cent. A quota system was imposed on Tamil students entering universities.

The Tamils responded politically through the Federal Party and through non-violent protests or *satyagraha*, but these efforts failed to bring redress to meet their demands. By the 1970s, Tamils had started to agitate for a separate homeland and their protestations became increasingly violent. In the 1980s they won some concessions and political rights, but discrimination remained palpable. Among the organisations which emerged in this period was a radical group called Tamil National Tigers, under the leadership of Velupillai Prabhakaran, later renamed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The main aim of the LTTE was the establishment of a Tamil homeland in the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka.

The Sri Lankan government responded to increasing Tamil militancy by prom-ulgating the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) in 1979. Instead of mitigating it, the PTA escalated Tamil violence in the 1980s. The government responded with additional repressive counter-measures that led to a spiral of increasing brutality and tit for tat violence (Bloom 2005: 52, see also Chapter 7). In response to the murder of one of their commanders, LTTE operatives ambushed an army convoy in Jaffna, killing thirteen Sinhalese soldiers, and this triggered widespread mob violence, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of Tamils. Tamil prisoners, many of whom were LTTE cadres, faced brutal treatment while in prisons. New emergency regulations gave wide powers to security forces to kill and bury suspected terrorists without any judicial inquiries. The LTTE called these developments a pogrom against Tamils. After the riots the government banned the main Tamil political party, pushing Tamils to the LTTE as their primary voice.

The Tamil insurgency arose after the failure of other forms of political struggle. The powerful Sri Lankan state dominated by the Sinhalese majority employed the army to oppress the Tamil community. Gradually the traditional ‘homelands’ of the Tamil minority became ‘war zones’ in which life became increasingly harsh, unbearable and violent. This gave rise to a widespread perception among Tamils that their very existence as a distinct ethnic and cultural community was being threatened. The LTTE began to employ suicide bombings effectively from 1987 in response to these developments and as a method of last resort. Although the LTTE was finally defeated in early 2009 by the Sri Lankan armed forces, its defeat has not discredited the ideology which gave rise to the Tamil insurgency. Until the legitimate demands of the Sri Lankan Tamils for economic, social and

cultural equality are satisfied, there is every possibility that the ethnic violence will not disappear.

These case studies demonstrate that the violence of suicide bombings was the method of last resort in both cases. Using indicators of what constitutes war, from the above two case studies we can infer that the LTTE and Palestinian terrorist organisations using suicide bombings in their violent conflicts with the Sri Lankan and Israeli states respectively are engaged in organised violence akin to war. The objective in both cases is the protection of a political community and its way of life facing mortal threat from their adversary. In both cases violence is organised and planned in which the death of the enemy is encoded. Suicide bombings in these organised violent conflicts are employed as a weapon of war by the militarily challenged, and thus the resulting deaths of the combatants and civilians are akin to the casualties of war.

Surprisingly, in the case of war, Walzer (2004) does not apply the same stringent conditions to the state which he imposes on terrorists. Modern states have far greater capacity and capability to kill and destroy human lives than any terrorist organisation in the world. For example, the aerial bombing of German civilians by the Allied air forces during World War II was legitimate but suicide bombing is terrorism. And as terrorism, it is an evil in need not of analysis and understanding but of moral condemnation and firm practical response.

Walzer believes that suicide bombings in Israel are immoral and evil because they are part of the Palestinian mission to destroy a sovereign political community. The assaults of the Israeli army and air force in the West Bank and Gaza are, therefore, pre-emptive self-defence and thus legitimate and justifiable. (And by this logic the Sri Lankan army's attacks on the Tamils are legitimate and justifiable.) The construction of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in these terms is a typical example of how liberal intellectuals conceive of the difference between war and terrorism. The century-long history of the conflict, involving expansion on the one side and dispossession on the other, is set aside, and attention is directed instead at present feelings. For all their military strength, Israelis are portrayed as vulnerable, and for the Palestinians the years of occupation have been years of disgrace. The Jewish settler movement may be the functional equivalent of the Palestinian terror organisations but not their moral equivalent (Asad 2007: 22–5).

This construction also invests the Israeli and Sri Lankan armies with the aura of defenders engaged in a just war against Palestinian and Sri Lankan suicide bombers. The principle that a political community experiencing fatal attacks and facing 'the coercive transformation of their way of life' has the right to defend itself does not appear to apply to the Palestinian and Tamil responses. Their resistance is perceived as engaging in morally unacceptable violence, presumably because even after fifty years (and in the case of Palestinians, even longer) of unequal struggle they are not judged to have reached the state of the 'last resort' (Asad 2007).

Killing in war and terrorism

As mentioned above, the difference between war killing and suicide bombing is that war is a legally sanctioned act which confers legitimacy on the ensuing killing, but the killing perpetrated by unlicensed illegal terrorists is not legitimate. But what about the soldiers who are also taught to hate the enemy they are required to kill? The fact of killing being legally sanctioned is an abstract irrelevance. There are in fact remarkable similarities between war killing and terrorism.

Every war requires that the human killing machine be made efficient and effective. According to historian Joanne Bourke, basic military training is aimed at making soldiers extremely brutal.

> The most notorious training regimes were those conducted by the US Marine Corps, but even in the other branches of the armed forces, violence was a common component of military training. In all these training programmes, the fundamental process was the same: individuals had to be broken down to be rebuilt into efficient fighting men. The basic tenets included depersonalization, uniforms, lack of privacy, forced social relationships, tight schedules, lack of sleep, disorientation followed by rites or reorganization according to military codes, arbitrary rules, and strict punishment. These methods of brutalization were similar to those carried out in regimes where men were taught to torture prisoners: the difference resided in the degree of violence involved, not its nature.
>
> (Bourke 1999: 67)

Another account provided by Nordstrom describes the atrocities inflicted on civilians by the Sri Lankan soldiers in the war with the Tamil Tigers. A Sri Lankan army commander privately confessed to Nordstrom:

> It is crazy, it's completely crazy. I can't control my troops. It is awful up there. One of the soldiers (government, largely Sinhalese) is shot by a guerrilla (Tamil), or they run over a land mine, or a bomb explodes, and they go nuts. It's been building up and building up, and they just go wild. The guerrillas have long since melted away, and the soldiers turn their fury on the first available target. Of course, the only people around are civilians. They open fire on everyone, they destroy everything in sight, they rape, and torture people they catch on the street or in their homes, they lob bombs into homes and schools, markets and city streets. I've tried to stop them; I try to control the situation. I can't. None of us commanders can – though god knows some don't try. The troops just take off like this and there's no stopping them. We can't discipline them. We can't prosecute them. We can't dismiss them. We'd have no army left if we did. The situation up north is completely out of control, and there isn't a damn thing we can do about it.
>
> (Nordstrom 2004: 71–2)

One of the purposes of war is to wreak destruction on the enemy. Writing in 1927 about colonial warfare, US army captain Elbridge Colby noted:

> The real essence of the matter is that devastation and annihilation is the principal method of warfare that savage tribes know. Excessive humanitarian ideas should not prevent harshness against those who use harsh methods, for in being over-kind to one's enemies, a commander is simply being unkind to his own people.
>
> (Colby 1927: 285)

The napalm bombing during the war in Vietnam was devastating and the humiliation and torture committed in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq were anything but humanitarian acts. The aim of the increasingly sophisticated warfare technology now used by the USA and its allies in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is to identify its targets more accurately in order to minimise

collateral damage and above all to minimise their own casualties. ‘This humanitarian concern means that soldiers need no longer go to war expecting to die but only to kill’ (Asad 2007: 35).

The difference between war killing and terrorism has also been distinguished by the motives of the combatants. The terrorist makes his point by killing innocents intentionally, thus forcing his opponent to slaughter the innocent unintentionally (O’Donovan 2003). But the political theory of war does not fit the facts of history. World War II, with more than 35 million casualties, mostly civilians, is generally regarded as a just war for all the reasons which have been mentioned. But recent historical evidence casts dark shadows on the motives of its main architects. In *Human Smoke: The Beginnings of World War II, the End of Civilization*, the American author Nicholson Baker asserts that the version of this war we are carrying around in our heads is a false one. Using first-person accounts from diaries, newspapers and letters he shows that in October 1939 and in August 1940 negotiations could have changed the course of history. The book argues that the motivations of the Allied leaders were hardly pure. It is often mistakenly believed in the USA that that the country entered the war to save the Jews at risk (Baker 2008).

The facts Baker reveals about the Western leaders Roosevelt and Churchill (and about Hitler and Stalin) are very telling. The book shows that on several occasions Roosevelt stymied legislation to lift quotas for Jewish refugees. There were Jews escaping to England right up to the moment England declared war, but the effect of declaring war, Baker says, was to trap them where they were most at risk and most vulnerable. This belief that war sealed the fate of Jews remains a contentious one, but Baker is not alone arguing it. The British historian Tony Judt in his essay in the May 2007 issue of the *New York Review of Books* argues that, ‘Without World War II, there would have been no Holocaust’ (Judt 2008; Freeman 2008: 8–9). Using evidence from the diaries of Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies, Baker shows that Churchill really did feel blood-lust, but his main point is that violence begets more violence, which encourages vengeance, which encourages more killing, and much of it reflects the way a population is brainwashed by the media and war propaganda.[3]

In short, war and terrorism both kill civilians and combatants. The difference between war killing and terrorism is that under international law war is legally and morally sanctioned while acts of terrorism are not. But

soldiers too are trained to kill and to demonise the enemy through military training, and they go to war primarily to kill. War and terrorism are constituted according to different logical criteria, one taking its primary sense from the question of legality and the other from feelings of vulnerability and fear, and they are not, therefore, mutually exclusive. It is not true to say that terrorism is singularly evil because it kills civilians and inserts fear in the daily rhythm of life which imposes 'the endless coerciveness of precaution', because war, whether just or unjust, does that too (Asad 2007).

War killing and murder

To understand the nature of an act which, as noted earlier, invariably involves deaths of non-combatant civilians, one has to ask whether the resulting deaths are truly homicidal killings or casualties of war. Homicide is the killing of another person, either intentionally or unintentionally. In human societies the act of homicide is universally regarded as a crime and in many cases accorded capital punishment. The logic behind such capital punishment is the requirement to dispose of individuals who have committed this act which is regarded by members of the group to be harmful or threatening to them and to their society. War, on the other hand, is organised lethal violence between spatially different groups in which the deaths of other persons are envisioned in advance. In war, therefore, killing of members of the other group regarded as the enemy is viewed as a justified or justifiable act of killing and consequently is not regarded as murder deserving capital punishment (Otterbein 1986; Kelly 2000).

To determine whether a suicide attack and the resulting deaths of non-combatants are murderous killing or casualties of war requires delineating the boundaries between war and murder. While participants in some forms of altercations and disputes may employ deadly weapons to kill others, war is the only activity which entails lethal violence that is collectively organised and carried out. Another key, and possibly the unique, feature of war is 'that the deaths of other persons are envisioned in advance and this envisioning is encoded in the purposeful act of taking up lethal weapons' (Kelly 2000: 4; see also Bourke 1999).

As organised violence, war requires advance planning and involves a complex division of labour based on specialisation of different types of activities that contribute to warfare. The rational calculations, planning and

organisation make war instrumentally different from other related forms of violence such as brawls and riots which derive their nature from their affective spontaneity. War also differs from murder and other related forms of violence in that the use of deadly weapons and force is seen as entirely legitimate by the collectivity that resorts to war (Otterbein 1986: 1–47; Kelly 2000: 1–10; Walzer 2004; Grimland, Apter and Kerkhof 2006; McDermott 2006).

The moral appropriateness is integral to the collective nature of the activity of making war. Group members are explicitly recruited to the project of causing deaths of other persons on the grounds that it is legitimate and proper to do so (Walzer 2004; O'Donovan 2003). Because war is always collectively sanctioned, participation in war is regarded as an act of national pride and highly laudable. Male and female potential or actual 'killers' who die in war are recognised as national heroes and martyrs. Such characterisations of the fallen in war contrast sharply with murder, which is negatively valued by the social collectivity that constitutes the killer's or killers' reference group. It is consequently regarded as an illegitimate and criminal act warranting retribution not social recognition. Murder is culturally disapproved, stigmatising rather than prestigious, and falls somewhere along an evaluative scale that extends from regrettable to heinous.

Killing in war and murder are similar in several ways. Both involve deadly violence and bring grief to the affected parties. The punishment for murder and the punishment enacted on the enemy in war killing are regarded as morally appropriate, justified and legitimate actions constituting fulfilment of civic duty. But there is one very critical difference between punishment for murder and punishment of the enemy in war. The death penalty, once a universal punishment norm for murder, is only applicable to a specific individual, the murderer, whose death expunges the wrongdoer from society. War does not excise killers from society, but instead targets other individuals who are innocent of direct responsibility for prior killing. In war the killing of any member of the enemy group is considered legitimate.

War is grounded in the application of the principle of social substitutability and is thus governed by a distinctive logic that is entirely foreign to murder. In war, the killing of an individual is perceived as an injury to his or her group because the logic of war is predicated on group

responsibility, thus making any member of the killer's collectivity a legitimate target for retaliation. In war the anger generated by a prior killing or prior action is redirected to an entirely different individual sufficiently peripheral to be unsuspecting. The principle that one group member is substitutable for another in the context of war underwrites the interrelated concepts of injury to the group, group responsibility for the infliction of injury, and group liability with respect to retribution. War is thus cognitively, conceptually and behaviourally conducted between groups. Murder, on the other hand, is always conceptualised as deadly violence between individual members of the same collectivity (Kelly 2000: 5).

The universal consequence for murder has traditionally been capital punishment (and now life imprisonment in some countries) which is socially sanctioned and morally justified by the participants' community. It is also carried out after a socially sanctioned and organised process of adjudication by especially appointed members of the community. It can be concluded from the above discussion that there are remarkable similarities between killing in war and the conduct of capital punishment, and one crucial difference – as indicated in Table 8.1, which has been adapted from Kelly (2000) and Otterbein (1986).

Are the casualties from suicide bombing attacks murders or war killing? The foregoing discussion and observations would suggest that, sociologically and deontologically, suicide bombing attacks can be classified as a weapon of war and the resulting deaths as war casualties. The groups involved in organising and sponsoring suicide attacks in the modern world enjoy varying levels of support from their collectivity (see Pape 2005; Oliver and Steinberg 2005; Atran 2003; N. Hassan 2001; Bloom 2005; Grimland, Apter and Kerkhof 2006; McDermott 2006). They are engaged in conflict over the occupation of their homeland by a foreign army, as a result of which they feel socially and economically dispossessed and humiliated; the occupation of the homeland is seen as sacrilege and as a mortal threat to their political community and its sacred values and way of life (Atran 2006; Ginges *et al.* 2007). Like war, a suicide bombing attack is planned and its execution envisions in advance the deaths of other persons (Pape 2005; Bloom 2005; Hafez 2006; Gambetta 2005; Townsend 2007; Grimland, Apter and Kerkhof 2006; McDermott 2006). Like fallen soldiers in war, suicide bombers are regarded by their groups as martyred heroes

who have sacrificed their lives for the nation (Roberts 2005; Oliver and Steinberg 2005; Abdel-Khalek 2004; N. Hassan 2001; Hafez 2007b).

Table 8.1 Distinguishing attributes of capital punishment and war

		Capital punishment	*War*
1	Collectively sanctioned by participants' community	Yes	Yes
2	Morally justified in participants' viewpoint	Yes	Yes
3	Participants esteemed by their community	Yes	Yes
4	Entails organised, planned and premeditated attack(s)	Yes	Yes
5	Serves identifiable instrumental objectives (e.g. defence, revenge, excision, approbation)	Yes	Yes
6	Social substitution governs the targeting of individuals for lethal violence	No	Yes

Source: Kelly (2000); Otterbein (1986).

Good death, bad death

Why are some types of deaths received with moral revulsion, yet others are accepted as normal or heroic? Suicide bombings universally evoke a multiplicity of emotions ranging from disbelief and horror to anger, revulsion and condemnation. This is most likely the reason why characterisations of these acts as immoral, murderous killings by scholars like Michael Walzer are widely accepted and endorsed by the media, politicians and the general public. Are such emotional and moral reactions to the deaths of innocent people 'natural' human responses? If this is so, why then do equally horrifying deaths caused by natural disasters such as fires, earthquakes and accidents (air and car crashes) or death dealing by national armies fighting wars and terrorism evoke sadness but generally no moral revulsion? Human attitudes towards death – the physical end of the body – cover a wide spectrum of emotions including, for example, sadness, pain, anger, denial, approval and moral revulsion. There are some excellent studies that explore attitudes towards death and dying in human societies and the reasons behind the variations in them (Seal 1998; Bauman 1992; Glaser and Strauss 1968; Elias 1985; Kubler-Ross 1969; Ariès 1974; Timmermans 2005). Instead of summarising and reviewing these studies I would like to offer a typology of death which may shed some light on why suicide bombings evoke feelings of revulsion and anger among ordinary people.

According to the liberal doctrine, one of the fundamental conditions for the foundation of political community is the monopolistic control of violence by the state. This presupposes that the morally autonomous individual's natural right to violent self-defence is yielded to the state, making the state sole protector of life and liberty. In others words, for a viable society to exist, individuals must be disempowered from killing or murdering others and themselves. Society then empowers certain specific institutions to cause the death of others at home and abroad, making these institutions death brokers and managers of the trajectories of death and dying in society. As previously mentioned, the right to kill is the right to behave in violent ways against citizens who break the original covenant and the uncivilised 'others' who pose a threat to the existence of a political community and the maintenance of social order, and their killing provides security (Tuck 1999; Elias 1985). This is the main justification for wars as well as judicial killing in modern societies.

Death brokering refers to the activities of authorities which render death normatively and culturally appropriate. In modern and traditional societies, medical (healing) and religious institutions perform the primary death brokering functions. They control the death and dying process through their expertise by managing how people die and when. Medicine provides curative and therapeutic knowledge and a monopoly over determining the cause of death which legitimises its authority over how and when death might occur. Religion invokes the authority of the divine covenants pertaining to 'good' (religiously sanctioned) death. These two institutions are central in negotiating meanings and the cultural appropriateness of death and dying between the individual and society.

Good death invariably involves management of the dying process through symptom alleviation and attention to the religious, social and cultural needs of the dying and their loved ones to achieve the normative goal of impending death (Timmermans 2005; Kubler-Ross 1969). A good death, in other words, involves 'disempowering' the dying person in respect of all decisions over death and the dying process. A 'bad' death by the same logic is when these characteristics are absent and the individual has control over how and when to die or kill. For example, a death that is negotiated through therapeutic procedures administered by authorised medical personnel is a culturally appropriate death and thus a 'good' death, although the dying person more or less has no power over the dying process. I call

this ‘disempowered death’. Death that occurs under circumstances in which the dying person has some control over the dying process and the timing of death, a kind of ‘empowered death’, is a socially and culturally inappropriate death or ‘bad’ death. Good death is ‘normal’ and evokes appropriate human emotional responses mostly of grief and sadness. Bad death, on the other hand, is ‘abnormal’ and, therefore, stigmatised, and evokes a variety of emotional responses ranging from disbelief to anger and revulsion.

These responses are products of the normative structure of society which positively or negatively rewards acts depending on whether they conform to the accepted and permissible social and cultural norms or deviate from them. These perceptions, together with their emotional contents, are then internalised by individuals in the process of their socialisation and become part of social consciousness. When confronted with specific stimuli they automatically evoke the appropriate emotional responses. Thus a death occurring under medical supervision is seen as ‘normal’ and a ‘good’ death, and evokes emotional responses primarily of sadness, grief and acceptance. Suicide bombing, on the other hand, involves not only a type of stigmatised or ‘bad’ death, namely suicide, but also murder of innocent individuals, and evokes corresponding emotional responses which may include moral repulsion, disbelief and anger. However, within the suicide bomber’s own community, their and their victims’ deaths may be accepted, because of the particular cultural norms in play. They are the martyred heroes.




Figure 8.1 A typology of death

Figure 8.1 offers a typology of death and dying using the two variables I have mentioned above, namely the 'control' over the dying process and the timing of death, in other words how death occurs and when. The vertical axis indicates the relative presence of the key brokering institutions (medicine and religion) in managing and controlling the dying process, and the horizontal axis refers to the degree of control over the timing of death and the dying process. The resultant typology provides a framework to locate various types of deaths and dying processes in modern society. The reason why suicidal bombing is stigmatised and evokes the type of emotional responses which lie behind its characterisation as homicidal and immoral killing is that it combines two types of stigmatised (bad) deaths, suicide and murder. Other types of death can be placed in the appropriate place in this typology depending on the relative external control over the dying process and control over the timing of death. This is only a preliminary schema and is subject to further refinement depending on critical evaluation based on its efficacy in explaining the emotional responses to various types of death.

One conclusion that appears self-evident from this typology is that suicide bombing is a type of death and dying process which threatens the very survival of the political community because it violates a fundamental

tenet of the community's foundation and continued existence – that individuals must surrender their natural right to violence to the state, giving the state monopoly over violence. Because of this, suicide bombing carries a social stigma and evokes emotional responses ranging from disbelief and anger to moral repugnance. These responses would act as a kind of natural check on its occurrence, prevalence and survival in society. By the same logic, it would always provoke the state's strong retaliation against its perpetrators. This typology offers a plausible sociologically grounded explanation of the universal approval and disapproval of various types of death in human society.

Concluding remarks

Is suicide bombing homicidal killing or a weapon of war? In light of the above discussion we can, with some degree of certainty, say that suicide bombing is not suicide. There appears to be a consensus among scholars that suicide bombing is a different order of behaviour from suicide. Universally suicide carries a stigma, whereas suicide bombings, like war, carry the strong approval of the reference group.

What about the difference between war killing and suicide bombing? In political theory war is legally sanctioned, organised violence which confers legitimacy on the ensuing killing. But the killing perpetrated by suicide bombers is regarded as illegal because of its peculiar evil of targeting innocent civilians, and worse because it inserts fear and insecurity into everyday life, undermining the social order and subjecting society to the 'endless coerciveness of precaution'. It is also regarded as illegal because, unlike war, militants carrying out terrorism against civilians are not deemed to have reached the last resort and, therefore, are not coerced into action. I have argued that civilians die in war too – in fact, state armies are more capable and efficient killing machines than any terrorist organisation and that war also injects profound insecurities into the private and public spheres; additionally, soldiers also are taught to hate and kill enemy combatants and civilians. The fact of killing being legally sanctioned is an abstract irrelevance. There are, in fact, remarkable similarities between war killing and terrorism.

The case studies of Palestine and Sri Lanka provide evidence that the strategy of targeted suicide bombings was the method of last resort in both cases. Commenting on the rationality of terrorist organisations, Martha

Crenshaw points out that efficacy is the primary standard by which terrorism is compared with other methods of achieving political goals. Suicide terror is rarely, if ever, the strategy of first choice, but tends to follow other strategies deemed less effective through the process of trial and error. ‘Organizations arrive at collective judgements about the relative effectiveness of different strategies … on the basis of observation and experience, as much as on the basis of abstract strategic conceptions derived from ideological assumptions – allowing for social learning’ (Crenshaw 1990: 8).

As argued in Chapter 3 when a collective sense of justice is further aggravated by outrageous events and when all legal means of seeking redress are blocked, human beings react with rage and resort to violence. As Hannah Arendt has observed, to resort to violence when confronted with outrageous events or conditions is enormously tempting because of its inherent immediacy and swiftness in order to set the scales of justice right again (Arendt 1969: 63–4).

What drives suicide bombings in Palestine and Sri Lanka and elsewhere is unbearable suffering and the reaching out to immortality for the sake of the political community. As in the case of fallen soldiers, the death constitutes a triumph and a victory. In this respect the genealogy of the act is profoundly modern and ‘this worldly’, and not ‘other worldly’ as some who label it as a religious sacrifice argue.

The claim of liberal democracies that they have the right to defend themselves with nuclear weapons, which appears to be accepted by the international community, is in effect an affirmation that suicidal war can be legitimate. In this way the suicide bomber belongs in an important sense to a modern Western tradition of armed conflict for the defence of a free political community. In order to save the nation (or to found its state) by confronting a dangerous enemy, it may be necessary to act without being bound by ordinary moral constraints. Or as Walzer puts it:

> A morally strong leader is someone who understands why it is wrong to kill the innocent and refuses to do so, refuses again and again, until the heavens are about to fall. And then he becomes a moral criminal who knows that he can’t do what he has to do – and finally does.
>
> (Walzer 2004: 45)

By this reasoning, can the killing of innocents by taking one's own life be the final gesture of a morally strong leader (Asad 2007: 63)?

As regard to war killing and murder, it is argued that suicide bombing attacks are an act and a weapon of war because of the principle of substitutability which characterises war killing, where the deaths of non-combatant civilians could be regarded as casualties of war. However, under the International Laws of War, the attacks could most likely be classified as 'war crimes'. Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention defines war crimes as:

> Wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including … wilfully causing great suffering or serious injuries to body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of hostile powers, or wilfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial … taking of hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.

But this, of course, would apply not only to the groups organising and sponsoring suicide bombing, but also to the actions of the occupying armies and their military and political leaders.

Finally, suicide bombing represents stigmatised death dealing because of the threat it poses to the survival of the political community. While certain specific historical conditions may create conditions conducive to its occurrence and even allow it to gain support among some in the community, like other forms of stigmatised deaths, such as suicide and euthanasia, suicide bombing will remain no more than a rare event. Furthermore it will always provoke the state's strong retaliation against its perpetrators, which will act as a strong check on its occurrence and prevalence.

Epilogue

The evidence presented and discussed in the preceding chapters is intended to advance our understanding of the phenomenon of suicide bombing in the modern world by offering some important correctives. The evidence largely discredits explanations that ascribe the cause to the personality of suicide bombers and which assert that suicide bombings are acts of abhorrent violence perpetrated by psychologically impaired, morally deficient, bizarre, sick, crazy, uneducated and impoverished individuals. The public policies which take their cue from such explanations tend to focus on killing, restraining or incarcerating the deranged individuals in order to expunge them from society and not to focus on societal conditions which may have given rise to the phenomenon in the first place. The following are some of lessons of this and other recent studies which deserve our attention.

Suicide bombers are not mad

Apart from one demographic attribute – the majority of suicide bombers tend to be young males – recent studies have failed to find a stable set of demographic, psychological, socioeconomic and religious variables that can be causally linked to suicide bombers' personalities or socioeconomic origins. It is argued that labels such as mad, bad, sick, psychologically and morally impaired may be politically and possibly legally expedient, but they don't advance our understanding of the causes of the phenomenon of suicide bombings which can be used to devise preventive public policies. They in fact impede us from discovering its real nature, purpose and causes.

The process of becoming a suicide bomber is gradual and highly selective and acts as a screening mechanism to exclude psychopathological individuals. Candidates who exhibit signs of mental illness are rejected in the interest of group survival. Terrorist groups go to great length to recruit members whose behaviour appears to be normal and would not arouse suspicion. Potential members with visible signs of psychopathy would only

be a liability for the terrorist group, irrespective of their skills, and could not be relied upon to carry out the assigned mission. On the contrary, such individuals would be likely to botch the operation and sabotage the group by revealing its strategic plans and secrets if captured. Nor would their presence in the group be conducive to enhancing group solidarity. There is now a general consensus among researchers that, with the exception of a few rare cases, there is no apparent connection between violent militant activity and personality disorders. Typically most suicide bombers are psychologically normal and are deeply integrated into social networks and emotionally attached to their national communities (Silke 2007a; Sageman 2004; Atran 2003; Pape 2005; N. Hassan 2001; Bloom 2005; Asad 2007; Somasundaram 2010; Aggarwal 2010).

Astrategic weapon, tactic

Carefully designed and grounded studies that have significantly contributed to a better understanding of suicide bombings show that they are instrumental and strategic weapons used by well-organised terrorist groups. These groups represent the weaker party in asymmetrical conflicts that are related to the struggle for greater autonomy or liberation of what they regard as their ‘homeland’. The deployment of suicide bombings by sponsoring organisations is mainly determined by their cost effectiveness, versatility, lethality and tactical efficiency in reaching well-guarded high-value targets. Suicide bombings have high symbolic value because the willingness of the perpetrators to die signals high resolve and dedication to their cause. Among sympathetic constituencies, they serve as symbols of a just struggle, galvanise popular support, generate financial support for the organisation and become a source of new recruits for future suicide missions (Pape 2005; Bloom 2005; Hafez 2007b; Atran 2003; Gambetta 2005; Moghadam 2008; Somasundaram 2010). A number of studies have shown that suicide bombings serve the interests of the sponsoring organisation in two ways: by coercing an adversary to make concessions, and by giving the organisation an advantage over its rival in terms of support from constituencies. From this perspective, understanding the organisation’s logic is more important than understanding individual motivations in explaining suicide attacks (Pape 2005; Bloom 2005; Hafez 2007b). Contrary to the popular image that suicide terrorism is an outcome of irrational religious fanaticism, suicide bombing attacks are an intensely

political phenomenon (Gupta and Mundra 2005; Pape 2005; Bloom 2005; Asad 2007; Somasundaram 2010).

Driven mainly by politics, not religion

The five case studies in this book support findings of other recent studies that the driving force behind suicide bombings is *politics* and not *religion*, though in some cases religion can play a vital role in recruiting and motivating potential future suicide bombers, particularly when secular ideologies fail to bring about desired changes. The case studies show that in all cases the political conflict was over the autonomy or liberation of the 'homeland', and also reveal that suicide bombing was adopted as the weapon of last resort by the sponsoring organisations after long periods of protest, political agitation and other forms of non-violent methods had failed. Sometimes religious differences fuelled the conflict, but it was invariably in the context of an honourable survival of the political community.

According to Gambetta (2005), between 1981 and 2003 53 per cent of suicide missions were carried out by secular organisations and 35 per cent by religious (Islamic) organisations. The most suicide attacks in this period were sponsored by the secular Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.[1] In the case of Iraq many suicide bombers were radicalised by the Iraq war and not by religion (Hafez 2007b; Regan 2005). This also applied to suicide bombings in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Most of the suicide bombers tend not to be deeply religious. In the case of suicide attackers who carried out suicide missions worldwide between 1981 and 2003, Robert Pape was able to ascertain the ideological background of 83 per cent and found that only 43 per cent were religious (Pape 2005).

The case studies also indicate significant differences in the profiles of suicide missions and their outcomes. In Sri Lanka and Palestine–Israel suicide missions were well planned and carried out by terrorist organisations with well-established infrastructures for the recruitment and training of volunteers for future attacks. They had well-developed protocols for planning and executing suicide bombing attacks. Suicide attacks in Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan are not only a recent phenomenon, but are also not well planned and executed by the sponsoring organisations. These differences are reflected in the significant variations in the outcomes of suicide missions in terms of their lethality. In Iraq 9 per cent of all terrorist

attacks are suicide attacks compared with 4, 5 and 7 per cent in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Palestine–Israel respectively. The deaths caused by suicide attacks vary significantly in these countries. I have argued that these variations clearly can be attributed to the differences in planning and execution of the suicide attacks and the efficiency of the emergency services.

For the individual, participation in a suicide mission is not about dying and killing alone, but has a broader significance for achieving multiple purposes. These include gaining community approval, political success, liberation of the homeland; personal redemption and mark of honour, achieving an exalted status of martyr for the survival of the community; signalling unwillingness to accept subjugation, revenge for personal and collective humiliation, a symbol of religious or nationalistic convictions; guilt, shame, material and religious rewards, escape from intolerable everyday degradations of life under occupation, boredom, anxiety and defiance. Obviously the configurations of these purposes would vary and would be an outcome of specific circumstances of the political conflict behind the rise of suicide attacks as a tactic and a weapon (Gambetta 2005; Hafez 2006; Pedahzur 2005; Elster 2005; Pape 2005; Khosrokhavar 2005; El Sarraj 2002; N. Hassan 2001; Atran 2006; Somasundaram 2010).

Humiliation aids sub-culture of suicide bombing

Humiliation, revenge and altruism appear to play key roles at the organisational and individual levels in shaping the sub-culture promoting suicide bombings. Humiliation is a complex and intense emotional personal experience, when historically and culturally grounded definitions or perceptions of self-worth, self-respect and dignity are destroyed and revealed as apparently false and illegitimate affectations. Thus are created feelings of lowered self-respect, which in turn inspire a willingness to obey humiliating authority, overt rebellion or simmering resentment. The available evidence suggests that violence, the everyday degradations of occupation, harsh repression, a sense of collective grievances, torture, the violation of culturally grounded codes of honour and shame, massive economic and social dislocations, anxiety and helplessness are powerful means by which to inflict humiliation.

Besides a painful emotional sensation, humiliation is a potent technique of social control in traditional tribal societies as well as in their modern

counterparts. Some political theorists argue that humiliation is one of the principal modern modes of maintaining social order and hierarchy, and go so far as to suggest that it is becoming ever more prevalent (Miller 1993; Saurette 2006). Humiliation has been labelled as the central vice of modern societies. The prominent Israeli political philosopher Avishai Margalit argues that modern institutions play a central role in the production of humiliation. Humiliation arises from the maltreatment of people by society's institutions. A society whose institutions practise this could not be a decent and good society. Margalit describes a decent society as one in which the institutions do not humiliate its citizens, and a civilised society is one in which citizens do not humiliate each other (Margalit 1996; Lukes 1997).

Humiliation is different from fear. Fear is an instinctual emotional response to potential danger that can cause physical pain. Humiliation is an emotional process that seeks to discipline the humiliated party's behaviour by attacking and lowering their own and others' perceptions of whether they deserve respect. In Abu Ghraib prison the techniques – forced nudity, simulated sex with another man in front of a female, being made to bark like a dog and being photographed doing that – were intended not to inflict physical pain but to create total submission and obedience. These and other actions of the US prison guards at Abu Ghraib were disciplinary practices that worked on what it meant to be an honourable, self-respecting subject in Iraqi society. The intensely negative and visceral impact was that of stripping away and revealing as false the most prized self-perceptions and most valued bases of self-respect and dignity. The prison practices were designed to humiliate the subject, that is, make them feel unworthy, and to transform this feeling into a sense that motivates the subject to obey and act in deference to the humiliating authority (Saurette 2006; Hersh 2004; Physicians for Human Rights 2005).

These practices did not humiliate the prisoners alone but were felt and seen as humiliating by all Iraqis (see Hersh 2004). This was evident in the reactions that followed the publication of the prisoner abuse photographs. In the months following their release daily insurgent and suicide bombing attacks in Iraq increased dramatically (see Table 3.1 and Figure 3.2). Similarly, in Iraq, the Palestinian territories, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Afghanistan, counter-insurgency operations involving random house

searches, interrogations, arrests and other violations of human dignity are followed by an increase in suicide attacks.

Sometimes driven by revenge and retaliation

As noted in various chapters, violence and counter-violence permeates all aspects of daily life in war zones associated with suicide bombings. Ordinary routines of daily life we take for granted become harrowing, onerous and dangerous chores. The sense of personal security is replaced with a constant fear of unexpected death. Moral bases of social life are severely disrupted. The stripping of human dignity and the constant experience of humiliation appear to become a way of life. The following description of the Palestinian territories by the eminent American psychologist Scott Atran captured the reality of human conditions there in 2004:

> Life in the occupied territories has never been as bad. Northern Gaza is a charred battlefield and almost every West Bank town is ringed by guns, barbed wire, and concrete. The economy is lifeless, except for Ramallah, seat of the Palestinian Authority's dysfunctional ministries – and the NGOs that bring some activity. Palestinians are convinced that Israeli Army checkpoints – where people often wait for hours in shadeless no-man lands or long tunnels – are meant to break their will and drive them from the land. Israelis counter that they nab, on average, at least one suicide bomber a day at the checkpoints and that Palestinians confuse cause – suicide bombing – with effect – extreme vigilance to stop it.
>
> (Atran 2004)

The middle-class students at Al-Najah University in Nablus who provide more suicide bombers than any other demographic group in the Palestinian territories told Scott Atran, 'Martyrs give us dignity to free ourselves' (Atran 2004). Their attitudes underscored the collective sentiments of many Palestinian people.

In human societies such experiences evoke intense desire for revenge. Humans appear to have an incredibly strong sense of justice, and a desire for revenge is the darker side to this. Psychologists define revenge and vengeance as 'the infliction of harm in return for perceived injury or insult

or as simply getting back at another person' (Cota-McKinley, Woody and Bell 2001: 343). An important element of the desire for vengeance is the surprising willingness of individuals to sacrifice in order to carry out an act of revenge. Revenge has irrational and destructive consequences for the person seeking vengeance as well as for the target. One of them is that the person seeking vengeance is willing to compromise his or her own integrity, social standing and personal safety for the sake of revenge. Why are people willing to pay such high costs, and what ends are served by revenge?

Revenge can fulfil a range of goals, including righting perceived injustices, restoring the self-worth of the vengeful individual and deterring future injustice. It is also a response to the continuous suffering of an aggrieved community. At the heart of the whole process are perceptions of personal harm, unfairness and injustice, and the anger, indignation and hatred associated with the perceived injustice. In other words, the desire for revenge and the willingness to carry out violence are tied to the self-worth of the offended person and to a deterrent role against future injustices. Studies have revealed that some groups are more vengeance-prone than others; men hold more positive attitudes towards vengeance than women; and young people are more prepared to act in a vengeful manner than older individuals (Cota-McKinley, Woody and Bell 2001; Kim and Smith 1993). It is not surprising, then, to find that most suicide bombers are both young and male.

Personal histories of suicide bombers often contain accounts of encounters with the security forces or rival groups that involved threats, harassment, assaults and even deaths of those near and dear to the bomber. Many studies of suicide bombers reveal that the main motivating force for the suicide bombers seems to be the desire for spectacular revenge (Silke 2003, 2007a; Pape 2005; Bloom 2005; Hafez 2007b; N. Hassan 2001; Pedahzur 2005; Margalit 2003; Berko 2007; Somasundaram 1998, 2008b; El Sarraj 2002; Speckhard and Ahkmedova 2006; Gupta and Mundra 2005; Strenski 2003; Post and Denny 2002). On 4 October 2003, 29-year-old Palestinian lawyer Hanadi Jaradat exploded her suicide belt in the Maxim restaurant in Haifa, killing twenty people and wounding many more. According to her family, her suicide mission was in revenge for the killing of her brother and her fiancé by the Israeli security forces and for all the crimes Israel was perpetrating in the West Bank by killing Palestinians and expropriating their lands (Brym 2007). The main motive of many suicide

bombers in Israel is revenge for acts committed by Israelis (Margalit 2003). In the Israeli context, if revenge is the principal goal, the suicide bombers have succeeded in hurting Israel very badly, and not just by killing and injuring many civilians:

> A more far-reaching success is that Israel's leaders, in retaliating, have behaved so harshly, putting three million people under siege, with recurring curfews for unlimited periods of time, all in front of the world press and television, with the result that Israel may now be the most hated country in the world, which is hugely damaging to Israel, since the difference between being hated and losing legitimacy is dangerously narrow. Throughout the world, moreover, the suicide bombings have more often been taken as a sign of the desperation of the Palestinians than as acts of terror.
>
> (Margalit 2003: 8)

Similar observations have been made in the context of other sites of suicide bombings in the modern world (see Strenski 2003; Asad 2007; Hafez 2007b).

The motivations of vengeful actions have a strong altruistic component which manifests itself in the act of self-sacrifice for the sake of one's family, community or ideology. As has been noted in this and other studies of suicide bombers, in carrying out their actions they are aware that their vengeful action in the form of self-sacrifice will be recognised and celebrated by the community to which they belong. Vengeance through suicide bombing has an additional value: that of making oneself the victim of one's own act, and thereby putting one's tormentors to moral shame. The idea of the suicide bombing, unlike that of an ordinary attack, is, perversely, a moral idea in which the killers, in acting out the drama of being the ultimate victim, claim for their cause the moral high ground (Margalit 2003; also see Strenski 2003; Asad 2007).

In the face of apparent injustice and the absence of external redress, a personal motivation for revenge is very common and a wretchedly stable aspect of human nature. It is also true that this motivation will not be taken up by many of the aggrieved. But for some individuals, and in some circumstances, this motivation will provoke violence. There is nothing strange and bizarre about this. The desire for violent revenge and the

willingness to act on it are expected human reactions to certain situations (Silke 2003). Hannah Arendt takes an even stronger stance when discussing the human response to perceived injustices when legal means of seeking redress are blocked. She argues that under such conditions human beings react with rage and resort to the violence of revenge.

> Rage is by no means an automatic reaction to misery as such … Only where there is reason to suspect that conditions could be changed and are not does the rage arise. Only when our sense of justice is offended do we react with rage, and this reaction by no means necessarily reflects personal injury … To resort to violence when confronted with outrageous events or conditions is enormously tempting because of its inherent immediacy and swiftness … The point is that under certain circumstances – acting without argument or speech and without counting the consequences – is the only way to set the scales of justice right again … In this sense, rage and the violence that sometimes – not always – goes with it belong to the 'natural' human emotions, and to cure man of them would mean nothing less than to dehumanise or emasculate him.
>
> (Arendt 1969: 63–4)

Altruistically driven action

While suicide is an integral part of suicide bombing, its meaning and nature in this context are strikingly different from ordinary suicide. One of the main differences between the two acts is that in suicide bombing the primary intention of the act is to kill others who have no prior relationship with the suicide bomber, whereas the primary characteristic of suicide is the absence of murderous intent. In Durkheim's conceptual map (1951), suicide bombing would fall in the rare category of altruistic suicidal actions. These are distinct from other types of suicidal actions caused by personal catastrophes, hopelessness and psychopathologies which lead people to believe that life is not worth living. Altruistic suicides, on the other hand, involve valuing one's life as less worthy than the group's honour, religion, or some other collective interest. In its very essence altruism is a costly action which benefits others. Altruism is a fundamental condition

explaining human co-operation for the organisation of society and its cohesiveness (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003).

Using insights from rational choice theory, economists link suicide bombings to altruism as a form of intergenerational investment. Suicide bombing is stipulated as an extreme form of saving. The agent gives up any current consumption for the sake of enhancing the probability of his/her descendants to enjoy the benefit of the future public good. A recent study of Hezbollah suicide bombers shows that incidents of suicide attacks increase with current income and with the degree of altruism towards the next generation. The data also demonstrate that Hezbollah suicide bombers come from above-average wealthy families, and have an above average level of education. These two factors should have the opposite effect: while the higher-class origin of the bombers is consistent with the model, the higher education level of bombers and their higher accumulated human capital normally should act as deterrents to suicide bombing, but in this case they do not, suggesting that education level probably has an independent effect on the willingness to engage in suicide missions. Education affects deeply one's view of the world, enhancing sensitivity to the future, thus making educated people more sensitive to the fate of future generations (Azam 2005; Sayre 2009).[2]

Altruism is also not antithetical to aggression. In war soldiers perform altruistic actions by risking their lives for their comrades and country and also killing the enemy. Similarly, as noted in the introduction, the actions of historical personas like the Roman soldier statesman Cato, the martyr founder of the Shia sect of Islam, Husayn ibn Ali, at Kerbala in 680, the martyrs of Cordoba, Jewish Sicarii and the crucifixion death of Jesus Christ were altruistic suicidal missions. In more recent history, the actions of kamikaze pilots in World War II and the heroic deeds of the Victoria Cross awardees in the British Commonwealth are examples of military sacrifice.

Altruism can also be socially constructed in communities which have endured massive social and economic dislocations as a result of long, violent and painful conflict with a more powerful enemy. Under such conditions people react to perceived inferiority and the failure of other efforts by valuing and supporting ideals of self-sacrifice such as suicide bombing. Religiously and nationalistically coded attitudes towards acceptance of death stemming from long periods of collective suffering, humiliation and powerlessness enable political organisations to give people

suicide bombings as an outlet for their feelings of desperation, deprivation, hostility and injustice.

Paradoxically, actions such as suicide bombings invariably provoke a brutal response from the state authorities, because by injecting fear and mayhem into the ordinary rhythms of daily life they threaten and undermine the state's authority in providing security of life and property and in maintaining social order. And under such conditions the state can legitimately impose *altruistic punishments* to deter future violation of social norms threatening security and social order (Fehr and Gachter 2002). These include punishments meted out to the perpetrators and their supporters. The state-sanctioned military actions against the Palestinians, Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers, Iraqi insurgents and the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan are examples of these punishments. But recent experimental studies by Fehr and others have shown that altruistic punishments are only effective when they do not violate the norms of *fairness*. Punishments and sanctions seen as unfair, hostile, selfish and vindictive by targeted groups tend to have detrimental effects and instead of promoting compliance they reinforce recipients' resolve to non-compliance (Fehr and Rockenbach 2003; Fehr and Gachter 2002).

Counter-insurgency operations are aimed at increasing the cost of insurgency to the insurgents. They invariably involve eliminating leaders and supporters who plan suicide bombings and destroying insurgents' capabilities for mounting future attacks, restrictions on mobility, security checks and other violations of civil liberties. But there is mounting evidence that such harsh measures reinforce radical opposition and even intensify it. This is what is now happening in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Palestinians territories. It has also been the case in Sri Lanka and Iraq and other conflict sites. The most likely explanation of this is the one suggested by studies of *altruistic punishments* referred to above, that when collective sanctions and punishments are seen by the targeted populations to be violating the norms of *fairness* they become counter-productive. Instead of increasing the cost of insurgency they escalate the cost of counter-insurgency operations by increasing non-compliance and hardening resistance, which then creates the cycle of harsher and more dangerous counter-insurgency operations and more non-compliance and violent resistance.

The empirical validation of this is provided by a study of Hamas and Palestinian Jihad leaders. They were asked through in-depth interviews

whether five years (2000–5) of harsh Israeli repression involving targeted assassination of leaders, numerous arrests, raids on bomb-making facilities, demolition of houses belonging to family members of suicide bombers and so on, had affected their organisation's ability to conduct suicide bombing operations; 33 per cent said that it had increased and 42 per cent said it had not affected the organisation's ability, and 100 per cent said they would never be willing to recognise the legitimacy of the state of Israel. The Israeli policy had increased their resolve to conduct violent resistance (Brym 2007: 44–5; Brym and Araj 2006). Similar trends are emerging among the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban leaders (Rashid 2008a; Atran 2010).

Studies of social movements indicate that while state repression may reduce overt expressions of protests, it strengthens protest movements by successfully forging and encouraging alliances and cross-cutting coalitions among disparate resistance actors and groups, paving the way for greater solidarity and co-operation among them in future. These studies also reveal the continuing development of resistance movements even during the low points in their developmental cycle. More specifically, they suggest a *repression paradox*: state repression depresses collective action of a conventional and confrontational type, but fails to prevent unobtrusive mobilisations which can signal solidarity that becomes a powerful resource when opportunities arise. In other words, organisations and groups use adaptive strategies to cope with increasing coercion, but in the following stages they emerge stronger and more cohesive to mount greater resistance against state repression (Chang 2008; Weiss 2006; Tarrow 1998; Khawaja 1994). The developmental trajectories of some of the powerful terrorist insurgent organisations, including Hezbollah, Hamas, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Al Qaeda in Iraq, Al Qaeda, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Toiba, offer empirical validation of this phenomenon.

Countering suicide terrorism

The contention of this study is that the causes of suicide bombings lie not in individual psychopathology but in the broader human conditions. Suicide terrorism emerges under certain societal conditions, and understanding and knowledge of these conditions is vital for developing appropriate public policies and responses to protect the public from it. Profiling potential suicide bombers and conducting state-sanctioned repression do not appear

to be effective public policies. Profiling is expensive, ineffective and alienating. State-sanctioned repression is a boomerang. Instead of preventing it, repression escalates suicide terrorism, and where repression appears to have succeeded in its aim, the human and economic costs have created unprecedented humanitarian crises. The success thus may be a temporary reprieve rather than a lasting relief. Two of the most fertile environments for nurturing the sub-culture of suicide bombings are the refugee camps in the Palestinian territories, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the dehumanising treatment of prisoners in these and other countries. Strategies for eliminating or at least addressing the problems of economic deprivation, humiliation and related collective grievances in concrete and effective ways would have a significant and in many cases immediate impact on alleviating the conditions that nurture the sub-cultures of suicide bombings.

In the final analysis suicide bombings are carried out by community-based organisations. Strategies aimed at finding ways to induce communities to abandon such support may isolate terrorist organisations and curtail their activities. But ultimately strategies addressing and lessening the grievances and humiliations of populations that give rise to suicide bombing attacks are required for their elimination. Support for suicide bombing attacks is unlikely to diminish without tangible progress in achieving at least some of the fundamental goals that suicide bombers and those sponsoring and supporting them share.

Death is nature's assertion of mastery over culture. In nature death and dying are totally amoral events, meaning no more than the physical end of a biological organism. But in human cultures, death is embedded with symbols and meanings and classified as *good* and *bad* largely on the basis of the role of socially sanctioned death brokers in its occurrence. As argued in Chapter 8, in human society death occurring from acts such as suicide bombing may well be altruistically driven, but paradoxically remains stigmatised because it violates one of the fundamental social imperatives for the existence and survival of human society: that individuals are not empowered to take their or someone else's life. This stigma, I have argued, is a natural check that will restrain the diffusion of suicide bombings. From time to time certain historical conditions may be instrumental in giving rise to phenomena such as suicide bombings, and may even confer some form of community support, but like other forms of stigmatised deaths, suicide

bombings will remain a rare event. Furthermore, it will always provoke the state's strong retaliation against its perpetrators for violating the imperative norms which also act as a strong check on its occurrence, prevalence and diffusion.

Suicide bombings, by their very nature, are not only public acts but also acts of public performance in which bodies and ideologies become texts produced between author and audience. Exploration of the meanings of these texts requires critical theoretical, conceptual and hermeneutical tools which do not distort their meanings. This study is a modest contribution towards that goal.

Appendix A

Key:

SVA	suicide vehicular attack
SBA	suicide belt/bag attack
FFOC	foreign forces, officials and contractors
LSFPO	local security forces and public officals

Appendix A: Suicide bombing attacks worldwide, 1981–2006

Date	*Country*	*Location*	*Target*	*Weapon*	*Deaths*		*Group*
					min	***max***	
15-Dec-81	Lebanon	Beirut	FFOC	SVA	31	61	al-Dawah
11-Nov-82	Lebanon	Tyre	Missing	Missing	62	62	Hezbollah
18-Apr-83	Lebanon	Beirut	FFOC	SVA	60	64	Hezbollah
23-Oct-83	Lebanon	Beirut	FFOC	SVA	59	59	Hezbollah
23-Oct-83	Lebanon	Beirut	FFOC	SVA	242	242	Hezbollah
4-Nov-83	Lebanon	Tyre	FFOC	SVA	39	51	Hezbollah
12-Dec-83	Kuwait	Kuwait City	FFOC	SBA	6	8	Hezbollah
21-Dec-83	Lebanon	Beirut	FFOC	SVA	2	23	Hezbollah
16-Jun-84	Lebanon	South Lebanon	FFOC	SVA	5	6	Hezbollah/Amal
20-Sep-84	Lebanon	Beirut	FFOC	SVA	15	23	Hezbollah
5-Feb-85	Lebanon	Burj al Shimali	Missing	Missing	1	1	Hezbollah
8-Mar-85	Lebanon	South Lebanon	FFOC	SVA	12	13	Hezbollah
10-Mar-85	Lebanon	South Lebanon	Missing	Missing	13	13	Hezbollah
12-Mar-85	Lebanon	Ras al-Ain	Missing	Missing	1	1	Hezbollah
7-Apr-85	Lebanon	SLA Outpost	LSFPO	SVA	2	2	Hezbollah
9-Apr-85	Lebanon	Jezzin	FFOC	SVA	3	5	Hezbollah
9-May-85	Lebanon	South Lebanon	LSFPO	SBA	3	3	Hezbollah
25-May-85	Kuwait	Kuwait	LSFPO	SVA	1	6	Hezbollah/al-Dawah
15-Jun-85	Lebanon	Beirut	FFOC	SVA	24	24	Hezbollah
9-Jul-85	Lebanon	South Lebanon	LSFPO	SVA	23	24	Hezbollah
15-Jul-85	Lebanon	Kfar Tibnit	LSFPO	SVA	11	11	Hezbollah
17-Jul-85	Lebanon	Jezzin	Missing	SVA	8	8	Hezbollah
31-Jul-85	Lebanon	South Lebanon	FFOC	SVA	3	3	Hezbollah
6-Aug-85	Lebanon	SLA Outpost	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	Hezbollah
29-Aug-85	Lebanon	South Lebanon	LSFPO	SVA	16	16	Hezbollah
3-Sep-85	Lebanon	South Lebanon	LSFPO	SVA	8	38	Hezbollah
11-Sep-85	Lebanon	Hasbayah	Missing	Missing	1	1	Hezbollah
12-Sep-85	Lebanon	South Lebanon	LSFPO	SVA	22	22	Hezbollah

17-Sep-85	Lebanon	South Lebanon	LSFPO	SVA	31	31	Hezbollah
18-Sep-85	Lebanon	South Lebanon	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	Hezbollah
17-Oct-85	Lebanon	South Lebanon	LSFPO	SBA	7	7	Hezbollah
4-Nov-85	Lebanon	Arnoun (SLA outpost)	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	Hezbollah
12-Nov-85	Lebanon	Beirut	Civilians	SVA	6	6	Hezbollah
20-Nov-85	Lebanon	SLA Outpost	LSFPO	SVA	4	4	Hezbollah
26-Nov-85	Lebanon	Jezzin	LSFPO	SVA	21	21	Hezbollah
7-Apr-86	Lebanon	South Lebanon	Missing	Missing	2	2	Hezbollah
17-Jul-86	Lebanon	Jezzin	Missing	Missing	1	1	Hezbollah
20-Nov-86	Lebanon	South Lebanon	Missing	Missing	6	6	Hezbollah
5-Jul-87	Sri Lanka	Jaffna Peninsula	LSFPO	SVA	21	41	LTTE
11-Nov-87	Lebanon	Beirut	Infrastructure	Missing	7	7	Lebanese Liberation Front
14-Nov-87	Lebanon	Beirut	Infrastructure	Missing	8	8	Hezbollah
19-Oct-88	Lebanon	Metulla	Missing	Missing	9	9	Hezbollah
9-Aug-89	Lebanon	South Lebanon	FFOC	Missing	2	2	Hezbollah
31-Oct-89	Lebanon	Beirut	FFOC	Missing	1	1	People's Front for the Liberatic of Palestine
9-Nov-89	Lebanon	Missing	FFOC	Missing	1	1	Revolutionary Movement of Lebanon's Hezbollah
12-Jul-90	Sri Lanka	Trincomalee	LSFPO	SVA	7	10	LTTE
23-Nov-90	Sri Lanka	Manakulam	LSFPO	SVA	1	5	LTTE
24-Nov-90	Lebanon	South Lebanon	Missing	Missing	1	1	SBO
2-Mar-91	Sri Lanka	Colombo	LSFPO	SVA	19	20	LTTE
19-Mar-91	Sri Lanka	Silavathurai	LSFPO	SVA	6	6	LTTE
5-May-91	Sri Lanka	Trincomalee	LSFPO	SVA	6	7	LTTE
11-May-91	Sri Lanka	Kankesanthurai	LSFPO	SVA	6	6	LTTE
21-May-91	Sri Lanka	Madras, India / Sriperumbudur, near Chennai	LSFPO	SBA	2	20	LTTE
22-Jun-91	Sri Lanka	Colombo	Infrastructure	SVA	22	28	LTTE
15-Oct-91	Sri Lanka	Palliyagodella	Others	Missing	166	166	LTTE
17-Mar-92	Argentina	Buenos Aires	Infrastructure	Missing	30	30	Hezbollah

Appendix A Continued

Date	*Country*	*Location*	*Target*	*Weapon*	*Deaths*		*Group*
					min	***max***	
16-Nov-92	Sri Lanka	Colombo	LSFPO	SVA	2	8	LTTE
16-Apr-93	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Mehola Junction	LSFPO	SVA	2	3	Hamas
1-May-93	Sri Lanka	Colombo	LSFPO	SBA	24	25	LTTE
15-Aug-93	Egypt	Cairo	LSFPO	SVA	4	4	Unknown
12-Sep-93	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Gaza	LSFPO	SBA	1	1	PIJ
4-Oct-93	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Beit El	Civilians	SVA	1	1	PIJ
2-Nov-93	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Singil	Civilians	SVA	1	1	Hamas
11-Nov-93	Sri Lanka	Jaffna	LSFPO	Missing	0	0	LTTE
6-Apr-94	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Afula	Civilians	SVA	9	9	Hamas
13-Apr-94	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Hadera	Civilians	SBA	6	6	Hamas
18-Jul-94	Argentina	Buenos Aires	Civilians	Missing	85	97	Ansar Allah/Hezbollah
2-Aug-94	Sri Lanka	Palaly	Civilians	Missing	0	0	LTTE
19-Sep-94	Sri Lanka	Mannar Island	LSFPO	Missing	25	25	LTTE
19-Oct-94	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Tel Aviv	Civilians	SBA	17	23	Hamas
24-Oct-94	Sri Lanka	Colombo	LSFPO	SBA	54	60	LTTE
8-Nov-94	Sri Lanka	Vettilaikerni	LSFPO	Missing	0	0	LTTE
11-Nov-94	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Netzarim Junction	LSFPO	SBA	4	4	PIJ
25-Dec-94	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	LSFPO	SBA	1	1	Hamas
22-Jan-95	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Beit Lid Junction	Civilians	SBA	19	21	PIJ
30-Jan-95	Algeria	Algiers	Civilians	Missing	43	43	Armed Islamic Group in Algeria
18-Apr-95	Sri Lanka	Trincomalee	LSFPO	SVA	12	18	LTTE
16-Jul-95	Sri Lanka	Jaffna	LSFPO	Missing	1	1	LTTE
19-Jul-95	Panama	Panama City	Missing	Missing	42	42	Unknown
24-Jul-95	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Ramat Gan	Civilians	SBA	7	7	Hamas
7-Aug-95	Algeria	Boufarik	Civilians	Missing	9	9	Armed Islamic Group in Algeria
7-Aug-95	Sri Lanka	Colombo	Infrastructure	Conflicting reports	23	23	LTTE
21-Aug-95	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	Civilians	SBA	6	7	Hamas

3-Sep-95	Sri Lanka	Trincomalee	LSFPO	Missing	1	1	LTTE
10-Sep-95	Sri Lanka	Kankesanthurai	LSFPO	Other	1	4	LTTE
20-Sep-95	Sri Lanka	Kankesanthurai	LSFPO	Missing	1	4	LTTE
2-Oct-95	Sri Lanka	Kankesanthurai	LSFPO	Other	2	2	LTTE
17-Oct-95	Sri Lanka	Trincomalee	LSFPO	Other	7	10	LTTE
20-Oct-95	Croatia	Rijeka	LSFPO	Missing	2	2	Al-Gama'a al-Islamiy
20-Oct-95	Sri Lanka	Colombo	Infrastructure	Missing	23	23	LTTE
2-Nov-95	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Gush Katif	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	PIJ
11-Nov-95	Sri Lanka	Colombo	Others	SBA	4	25	LTTE
13-Nov-95	Saudi Arabia	Riyadh	FFOC	SVA	6	6	Al Qaeda
19-Nov-95	Pakistan	Islamabad	FFOC	SVA	17	17	Al-Gama'a al-Islamiy
5-Dec-95	Sri Lanka	Batticaloa	LSFPO	SVA	24	26	LTTE
11-Dec-95	Sri Lanka	Colombo	Infrastructure	SBA	19	19	LTTE
21-Dec-95	Pakistan	Peshawar	Civilians	Missing	46	46	Al-Jihad
30-Dec-95	Sri Lanka	Kalladi	LSFPO	SBA	1	1	LTTE
8-Jan-96	Sri Lanka	Batticaloa	Civilians	SBA	1	1	LTTE
31-Jan-96	Sri Lanka	Colombo	Infrastructure	SVA	92	94	LTTE
25-Feb-96	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Beit Lid Junction	Civilians	SBA	2	2	Hamas
25-Feb-96	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jersualem	Civilians	SBA	23	27	Hamas
3-Mar-96	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	Civilians	SBA	19	20	Hamas
4-Mar-96	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Tel Aviv	Civilians	SBA	16	21	PIJ
20-Mar-96	Lebanon	South Lebanon	Missing	Missing	2	2	Hezbollah
1-Apr-96	Sri Lanka	Vettilaikerni	LSFPO	SVA	11	12	LTTE
12-Apr-96	Sri Lanka	Colombo	LSFPO	Missing	0	0	LTTE
29-Apr-96	Pakistan	Lahore	Missing	Missing	53	53	Kashmir Separatists
25-Jun-96	Saudi Arabia	Dharan	FFOC	SVA	20	20	Missing
30-Jun-96	Turkey	Tunceli	Missing	SBA	10	10	PKK
3-Jul-96	Sri Lanka	Jaffna	LSFPO	SBA	21	38	LTTE
18-Jul-96	Sri Lanka	Mullaitivu	LSFPO	Other	35	35	LTTE
24-Jul-96	Sri Lanka	Dehiwala	LSFPO	Missing	63	63	LTTE
6-Aug-96	Sri Lanka	North Coast	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	LTTE

Appendix A Continued

Date	*Country*	*Location*	*Target*	*Weapon*	*Deaths*		*Group*
					min	***max***	
14-Aug-96	Sri Lanka	Kalmunai	Civilians	SVA	1	1	LTTE
25-Oct-96	Sri Lanka	Trincomalee	LSFPO	SVA	13	14	LTTE
25-Oct-96	Turkey	Adana	LSFPO	SBA	5	6	PKK
29-Oct-96	Turkey	Sivas	LSFPO	SBA	5	5	PKK
19-Nov-96	Pakistan	Islamabad	Missing	Missing	17	17	Egyptian Jihad
25-Nov-96	Sri Lanka	Trincomalee	LSFPO	SBA	1	2	LTTE
17-Dec-96	Sri Lanka	Ampara	LSFPO	SVA	2	2	LTTE
6-Mar-97	Sri Lanka	Trincomalee	Civilians	Other	0	0	LTTE
21-Mar-97	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Tel Aviv	Civilians	SBA	4	4	Hamas
1-Apr-97	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Kfar Darom	Civilians	SBA	1	1	PIJ
1-Apr-97	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Netzarim Junction	LSFPO	SBA	1	1	PIJ
19-May-97	Lebanon	Tyre, at sea	Missing	Missing	1	1	Amal
30-Jul-97	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	Civilians	SBA	15	17	Hamas
4-Sep-97	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	Infrastructure	Missing	9	9	Hamas
15-Oct-97	Sri Lanka	Colombo	Infrastructure	SVA	19	120	LTTE
19-Oct-97	Sri Lanka	North Coast	LSFPO	SVA	7	7	LTTE
28-Dec-97	Sri Lanka	Maagalle	LSFPO	SVA	0	0	LTTE
25-Jan-98	Sri Lanka	Kandy	Others	SVA	8	20	LTTE
6-Feb-98	Sri Lanka	Colombo	Infrastructure	SBA	9	11	LTTE
23-Feb-98	Sri Lanka	Point Pedro (Off)	LSFPO	SVA	48	89	LTTE
5-Mar-98	Sri Lanka	Colombo	Others	SVA	30	40	LTTE
12-Mar-98	Sri Lanka	Colombo	Civilians	Missing	50	50	LTTE
14-May-98	Sri Lanka	Jaffna peninsula	LSFPO	SBA	2	4	LTTE
19-Jul-98	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	Infrastructure	Missing	1	1	Hamas
7-Aug-98	Tanzania	Dar es-Salaam	FFOC	SVA	12	251	Al Qaeda
7-Aug-98	Kenya	Nairobi	Missing	Missing	214	214	Al Qaeda
17-Aug-98	Sri Lanka	Batticaloa	Infrastructure	Missing	1	1	LTTE
31-Aug-98	Algeria	Algiers	Infrastructure	Missing	26	26	Armed Islamic Group in Algeria

11-Sep-98	Sri Lanka	Jaffna	LSFPO	SBA	13	21	LTTE
29-Oct-98	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Gush Katif	LSFPO	SBA	2	2	Hamas
6-Nov-98	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	Infrastructure	Missing	1	1	PIJ
17-Nov-98	Turkey	Yuksekova	Missing	SBA	1	1	PKK
1-Dec-98	Turkey	Lice	Infrastructure	Missing	1	1	PKK
24-Dec-98	Turkey	Van	LSFPO	SBA	2	2	PKK
4-Mar-99	Turkey	Batman	Missing	SBA	1	1	PKK
15-Mar-99	Sri Lanka	Colombo	LSFPO	SBA	3	6	LTTE
20-Mar-99	Turkey	Van Province	Civilians	Other	1	2	PKK
27-Mar-99	Turkey	Istanbul	Civilians	SBA	1	1	PKK
5-Apr-99	Turkey	Bingol	Civilians	SBA	1	1	PKK
11-Apr-99	Sri Lanka	Colombo or Kandy	Civilians	SBA	1	3	LTTE
29-May-99	Sri Lanka	Batticaloa	Civilians	SVA	2	5	LTTE
5-Jul-99	Turkey	Adana	Civilians	Other	1	1	PKK
7-Jul-99	Turkey	Iluh	Civilians	Other	1	1	PKK
25-Jul-99	Sri Lanka	Trincomalee	Civilians	SBA	2	2	LTTE
29-Jul-99	Sri Lanka	Colombo	LSFPO	SBA	2	4	Missing
4-Aug-99	Sri Lanka	Vavuniya	LSFPO	SVA	11	13	LTTE
9-Aug-99	Sri Lanka	Vakarai	LSFPO	SBA	2	2	LTTE
28-Aug-99	Turkey	Tunceli	Civilians	Missing	1	1	PKK
2-Sep-99	Sri Lanka	Vavuniya	Civilians	SBA	4	4	LTTE
4-Sep-99	India/Kashmir	Jammu	Civilians	Missing	Missing	Missing	Unknown
18-Dec-99	Sri Lanka	Colombo	LSFPO	SBA	10	40	Missing
18-Dec-99	Sri Lanka	Colombo	Others	SBA	10	13	LTTE
29-Dec-99	Lebanon	Qlaia	Missing	SBA	2	2	Hezbollah
1-Jan-00	India/Kashmir	Surankote	Missing	Missing	12	12	Lashkar-e-Taiba
5-Jan-00	India/Kashmir	Haiderabad	Civilians	Missing	1	1	Kashmir Separatis
5-Jan-00	Sri Lanka	Colombo	LSFPO	SBA	7	17	LTTE
12-Jan-00	India/Kashmir	Anantang	Missing	Missing	Missing	Missing	Lashkar-e-Taiba
21-Jan-00	India/Kashmir	Srinagar	Missing	Missing	Missing	Missing	Lashkar-e-Taiba
4-Feb-00	Sri Lanka	Trincomalee	LSFPO	Missing	1	1	LTTE
16-Feb-00	China	Beijing	Civilians	Missing	1	1	Unknown

Appendix A Continued

Date	*Country*	*Location*	*Target*	*Weapon*	*Deaths*		*Group*
					min	***max***	
2-Mar-00	Sri Lanka	Trincomalee	LSFPO	SBA	2	4	LTTE
10-Mar-00	Sri Lanka	Colombo	LSFPO	Conflicting reports	21	28	LTTE
23-Apr-00	India/Kashmir	Srinagar	Missing	Missing	Missing	Missing	Jaish-e-Muhammad
17-May-00	Sri Lanka	Batticaloa	Others	Missing	29	29	LTTE
23-May-00	Sri Lanka	Missing	LSFPO	Missing	1	1	LTTE
2-Jun-00	Chechnya/Russia	Alkhan-Yurt	Civilians	Missing	3	3	Chechen Separatists
5-Jun-00	Sri Lanka	North-east coast	LSFPO	Conflicting reports	6	36	LTTE
7-Jun-00	Chechnya/Russia	Near Grozny/Alkhan-Yurt	FFOC	SVA	4	4	Black Widows/Ryiadh-as-Saliheen
7-Jun-00	Sri Lanka	Ratmalana, Colombo	LSFPO	SBA	2	27	LTTE
11-Jun-00	Chechnya/Russia	Alkhan-Kala	LSFPO	SVA	3	5	Chechen Separatists
14-Jun-00	Sri Lanka	Wattala	LSFPO	SVA	3	3	LTTE
26-Jun-00	Sri Lanka	North coast (between Point Pedro and Trincomalee)	Infrastructure	SVA	8	17	LTTE
2-Jul-00	Chechnya/Russia	Argun	Infrastructure	SVA	31	31	Missing
10-Jul-00	Sri Lanka	Trincomalee	Others	Missing	4	4	LTTE
4-Aug-00	Sri Lanka	Jaffna	LSFPO	Missing	Missing	Missing	LTTE
16-Aug-00	Sri Lanka	Vavuniya or Colombo	LSFPO	SBA	2	6	LTTE
15-Sep-00	Sri Lanka	Colombo	LSFPO	SBA	8	28	LTTE
2-Oct-00	Sri Lanka	Trincomalee	LSFPO	SBA	22	24	LTTE
5-Oct-00	Sri Lanka	Medawachchiya	Civilians	SBA	10	13	LTTE
12-Oct-00	Yemen	Aden / USS *Cole*	FFOC	SVA	18	28	Al Qaeda
19-Oct-00	Sri Lanka	Colombo	LSFPO	SBA	1	6	LTTE
19-Oct-00	Sri Lanka	Colombo	LSFPO	Missing	23	23	LTTE
23-Oct-00	Sri Lanka	Trincomalee	LSFPO	SVA	3	3	LTTE

26-Oct-00	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Gaza	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	PIJ
30-Oct-00	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	Missing	SBA	16	16	Hamas
2-Nov-00	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Missing	Missing	Missing	3	3	Al-Aqsa
6-Nov-00	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Rafah	LSFPO	Missing	1	1	Hamas
15-Nov-00	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Erez Crossing	LSFPO	Missing	1	1	Hamas
20-Nov-00	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Hadera	Civilians	SVA	3	4	Hamas
22-Dec-00	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Mehola Junction	Civilians	SBA	1	3	Al-Aqsa and PIJ and Hamas
25-Dec-00	India/Kashmir	Srinagar	Missing	SVA	9	10	Jaish-e-Muhammad
1-Jan-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Netanya	Civilians	SVA	11	36	Hamas
8-Feb-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Missing	Missing	Missing	5	5	Hamas
14-Feb-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Tel Aviv	Missing	SVA	9	9	Hamas
1-Mar-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Wadi Ara	LSFPO	Missing	2	2	Hamas
4-Mar-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Netanya	Civilians	SBA	3	4	Hamas
24-Mar-01	Chechnya/Russia	Mineralnye Vody/ Chechnya	LSFPO	SVA	18	21	Chechen Separatists
27-Mar-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	Civilians	SBA	1	2	Hamas
27-Mar-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	Civilians	SBA	1	1	Hamas/Democratic Front for th Liberation of Palestine
28-Mar-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Kfar Saba	LSFPO	SBA	3	4	Hamas
22-Apr-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Kfar Saba	Civilians	SBA	2	4	Hamas
23-Apr-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Yehuda	Missing	SVA	9	9	People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine
29-Apr-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Shavei Shomron	Civilians	Conflicting reports	1	9	Hamas
18-May-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Netanya	Civilians	SBA	5	6	Hamas
25-May-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Gaza	Civilians	SVA	1	3	Hamas
25-May-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Hadera	Civilians	SVA	2	2	PIJ
27-May-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Netanya	Missing	SVA	2	2	Hamas
29-May-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Tofah Checkpoint	LSFPO	Missing	2	2	Hamas
30-May-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Missing	Missing	Missing	9	9	PIJ
1-Jun-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Tel Aviv	Civilians	SBA	22	24	Hamas
17-Jun-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Gaza	LSFPO	Missing			PIJ

Appendix A Continued

Date	*Country*	*Location*	*Target*	*Weapon*	*Deaths*		*Group*
					min	***max***	
22-Jun-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Gush Katif	LSFPO	SBA	3	3	Hamas
2-Jul-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Gaza	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	Hamas
9-Jul-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Gush Katif	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	Hamas
10-Jul-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Kissufin	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	Hamas
16-Jul-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Binyamina	Civilians	SBA	3	6	PIJ
17-Jul-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	West Jerusalem	Missing	SBA	2	2	Al-Aqsa
22-Jul-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Haifa	LSFPO	Missing	1	1	PIJ
24-Jul-01	Sri Lanka	Colombo	Infrastructure	SBA	13	13	LTTE
2-Aug-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Beisan	Civilians	Missing	1	1	PIJ
6-Aug-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Tel Aviv	Missing	Other	1	9	Al-Aqsa
8-Aug-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Bekaaot Checkpoint	LSFPO	SVA	1	9	Al-Aqsa and Hamas
9-Aug-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	West Jerusalem	Civilians	SBA	16	16	Hamas
12-Aug-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Haifa	Civilians	SBA	1	1	PIJ
21-Aug-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	Missing	Missing	1	1	Al-Aqsa
4-Sep-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	LSFPO	SBA	1	1	Hamas
6-Sep-01	India/Kashmir	Budgam District	Missing	Missing	3	3	Jaish-e-Muhammad
9-Sep-01	Afghanistan	Khodja Bahauddin	LSFPO	SBA	2	3	Al Qaeda
9-Sep-01	Pakistan	North Pakistan	LSFPO	Missing	3	3	Al Qaeda
9-Sep-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Nahariya	Civilians	SBA	4	4	Hamas/Islamic Movement in Israe
9-Sep-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Beit Lid Junction	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	PIJ
10-Sep-01	Turkey	Istanbul	LSFPO	Missing	4	4	PKK
11-Sep-01	USA	Pennsylvania	Civilians	Missing	46	46	Al Qaeda
11-Sep-01	USA	Washington	LSFPO	Missing	191	191	Al Qaeda
11-Sep-01	USA	New York	Civilians	Missing	2,751	2,751	Al Qaeda
16-Sep-01	Sri Lanka	North	LSFPO	SVA	30	30	LTTE
1-Oct-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Missing	Missing	Missing	2	2	Missing
1-Oct-01	India/Kashmir	Srinagar	LSFPO	SVA	31	39	Jaish-e-Muhammad
4-Oct-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Afula	Civilians	Other	4	4	Hamas

6-Oct-01	Saudi Arabia	al-Hobar	Civilians	Missing	2	2	Unknown
7-Oct-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Kibbutz Shluhot	Civilians	SVA	2	2	PIJ
17-Oct-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Karni Crossing	LSFPO	Missing	1	1	Hamas/Abu Ali Moustafa Brigad
22-Oct-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Missing	Civilians	Other	1	1	PIJ
23-Oct-01	India/Kashmir	Awantipora Base	Missing	Missing	3	3	Lashkar-e-Taiba
26-Oct-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Hadera	Civilians	Other	5	7	PIJ
29-Oct-01	Sri Lanka	Colombo	LSFPO	SBA	3	7	LTTE
30-Oct-01	Sri Lanka	Point Pedro (Near)	Infrastructure	SVA	5	12	LTTE
4-Nov-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	French Hill	Civilians	Other	2	3	PIJ
8-Nov-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Baqa al-Sharqiya	Civilians	Other	1	1	Hamas
9-Nov-01	Sri Lanka	Batticaloa	LSFPO	SBA	1	1	LTTE
15-Nov-01	Sri Lanka	Batticaloa	Civilians	SBA	4	4	LTTE
25-Nov-01	Afghanistan	Mazar-a-Sharif	Missing	Missing	4	4	Taliban
26-Nov-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Erez Crossing/Gaza	LSFPO	SVA	1	2	Hamas/PIJ
27-Nov-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Afula	Civilians	Other	2	4	Al-Aqsa and PIJ
27-Nov-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Khanyounes	Civilians	Other	1	2	PIJ
29-Nov-01	Chechnya/Russia	Urus-Martan/Chechnya	LSFPO	SBA	2	3	Chechen Separatists
29-Nov-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Hadera	Civilians	SBA	4	4	PIJ
1-Dec-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	Civilians	SBA	12	12	Hamas
2-Dec-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Haifa	Civilians	SBA	16	16	Hamas
4-Dec-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	Civilians	SBA	1	1	PIJ
8-Dec-01	India/Kashmir	Baramulla	LSFPO	Missing	3	3	Lashkar-e-Taiba
9-Dec-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Haifa	LSFPO	SBA	1	1	PIJ
12-Dec-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Ganei Tal-Gush Katif	Civilians	Missing	1	1	Hamas
12-Dec-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Naveh Dekalem	Civilians	Missing	2	2	Hamas
12-Dec-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Qakqelia Rd	Civilians	Other	11	11	Hamas
13-Dec-01	India/Kashmir	New Delhi	LSFPO	Other	5	8	Jaish-e-Muhammad
15-Dec-01	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Tulkarm	LSFPO	Missing	1	1	PIJ
17-Jan-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Hadera	Civilians	Other	7	7	Al-Aqsa
22-Jan-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	Civilians	Other	4	4	Al-Aqsa
25-Jan-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Tel Aviv	Civilians	SBA	1	1	PIJ
27-Jan-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	Civilians	SBA	2	2	Al-Aqsa

Appendix A Continued

Date	*Country*	*Location*	*Target*	*Weapon*	*Deaths*		*Group*
					min	***max***	
30-Jan-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Tayibe	LSFPO	SBA	1	1	Al-Aqsa
5-Feb-02	Chechnya/Russia	Urus-Martan	Infrastructure	Missing	23	24	Missing
6-Feb-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Al-Hammrah Settlement in Jordan Valley	Civilians	Other	4	4	Al-Aqsa
6-Feb-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Maale Adumim	Civilians	Missing	1	1	Hamas
8-Feb-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Missing	Others	SVA	2	2	Missing
10-Feb-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Hebron	Civilians	Other	4	4	Hamas
16-Feb-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Karnei Shomron	Civilians	SBA	3	4	People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine/Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
17-Feb-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Hadera	LSFPO	SBA	2	2	Al-Aqsa
18-Feb-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Gush Katif	FFOC	Other	1	1	Al-Aqsa
18-Feb-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	LSFPO	Missing	2	2	Al-Aqsa
18-Feb-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Checkpoint north of Khanyounis	LSFPO	Missing	4	4	Al-Aqsa
19-Feb-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Mehola Junction	Civilians	SBA	1	1	Al-Aqsa
22-Feb-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Gaza	LSFPO	Missing	1	1	Al-Aqsa
25-Feb-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	Civilians	Other	1	4	Al-Aqsa
27-Feb-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Maccabim Junction Checkpoint	LSFPO	SBA	1	1	Al-Aqsa
2-Mar-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	Others	SBA	10	11	Al-Aqsa
5-Mar-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Tel Aviv	Civilians	Other	4	4	Missing
5-Mar-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Afula	Civilians	Missing	2	2	PIJ
7-Mar-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	Infrastructure	Missing	1	1	Hamas
7-Mar-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Ariel	Civilians	SBA	1	1	People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine and Al-Aqsa
7-Mar-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Karkur	LSFPO	Missing	1	1	PIJ

8-Mar-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Biet Hanina	Civilians	Missing	1	1	Missing
9-Mar-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Netanya	Civilians	Other	3	3	Al-Aqsa
9-Mar-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	Civilians	SBA	12	14	Hamas
14-Mar-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Between Ma'ali Mikhmas and Runiem Settlement	Others	Missing	2	2	Hamas
17-Mar-02	Pakistan	Islamabad	Civilians	Other	5	6	Missing
17-Mar-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Kfar Saba	Civilians	Other	1	1	Al-Aqsa
17-Mar-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	Civilians	Missing	1	1	PIJ
20-Mar-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Vadi Ara / near Om al-Fahim town	Civilians	SBA	8	8	PIJ
21-Mar-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	Civilians	SBA	4	4	Al-Aqsa
22-Mar-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Salem Checkpoint	LSFPO	SBA	1	1	Al-Aqsa
26-Mar-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	LSFPO	Missing	2	2	Al-Aqsa
27-Mar-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Netanya	Civilians	SBA	28	30	Hamas/Al-Qassam
29-Mar-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	Civilians	SBA	2	3	Al-Aqsa
30-Mar-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Tel Aviv	Civilians	SBA	1	2	Al-Aqsa
30-Mar-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Baqa al-Gharbiya	Others	SBA	3	3	Al-Aqsa
31-Mar-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Efrat	Civilians	SBA	1	1	Al-Aqsa
31-Mar-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Haifa	Civilians	SBA	16	17	Hamas/Al-Qassam
1-Apr-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	LSFPO	Missing	1	2	Al-Aqsa
2-Apr-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Baqa al-Gharbiya	Missing	SBA	1	1	Missing
10-Apr-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Yagur Junction	Civilians	SBA	9	9	Hamas and PIJ
11-Apr-02	Tunisia	Djerba	Others	Missing	20	20	Al Qaeda
12-Apr-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	Civilians	Missing	7	7	Al-Aqsa
19-Apr-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Gush Katif	LSFPO	Missing	1	1	PIJ
20-Apr-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Kalkilya	LSFPO	Missing	1	1	Hamas
7-May-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Rishon Lezion	Infrastructure	Missing	16	17	Hamas/Al-Qassam
8-May-02	Pakistan	Karachi	Civilians	Missing	14	14	Al Qaeda
8-May-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Megiddo Junction	Civilians	Missing	1	1	PIJ
19-May-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Netanya	Infrastructure	SBA	3	4	People's Front for the Liberatic of Palestine

Appendix A Continued

Date	*Country*	*Location*	*Target*	*Weapon*	*Deaths*		*Group*
					min	***max***	
22-May-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Rishon Lezion	Civilians	SBA	3	3	Al-Aqsa
23-May-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Tel Aviv	Civilians	SVA	1	1	Al-Aqsa
24-May-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Tel Aviv	LSFPO	Missing	1	1	Al-Aqsa
27-May-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Petah Tikva	Infrastructure	Missing	3	3	Al-Aqsa
5-Jun-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Megiddo Junction	Civilians	SVA	18	18	PIJ
11-Jun-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Herzliya	Infrastructure	Missing	2	2	Al-Aqsa
14-Jun-02	Pakistan	Karachi	FFOC	SBA	13	13	Al Qaeda
17-Jun-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Tulkarm	LSFPO	Missing	1	1	Al-Aqsa
18-Jun-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	Civilians	Missing	20	20	Hamas
19-Jun-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	Civilians	Missing	8	8	Al-Aqsa
17-Jul-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Tel Aviv	Civilians	SBA	5	7	Al-Aqsa and Al-Natheer
30-Jul-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	Civilians	SBA	1	1	Al-Aqsa
2-Aug-02	Afghanistan	Bagram	LSFPO	Other	1	1	Missing
4-Aug-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Miron Junction	Civilians	Missing	10	10	Hamas
6-Aug-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Umm el Fahm	Civilians	Missing	1	1	Al-Aqsa
18-Sep-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Umm al-Fahm	Civilians	SBA	2	2	Al-Aqsa and PIJ and Hamas
19-Sep-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Tel Aviv	Civilians	SBA	6	7	Hamas
2-Oct-02	China	Guilin	Civilians	Missing	2	2	Unknown
10-Oct-02	Chechnya/Russia	Grozny	LSFPO	Missing	26	26	Chechen Separatists
10-Oct-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Tel Aviv	Civilians	SBA	2	2	Hamas
11-Oct-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Tel Aviv	Infrastructure	Missing	1	1	Hamas
12-Oct-02	Indonesia	Bali	Civilians	Missing	301	301	Al Qaeda
21-Oct-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Tel Aviv	Civilians	SVA	16	16	PIJ
26-Oct-02	Chechnya/Russia	Moscow	Civilians	Missing	169	169	Missing
27-Oct-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Ariel	Civilians	SBA	4	4	Hamas
4-Nov-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Kfar Saba	Civilians	SBA	3	3	PIJ/Jerusalem Group (al-Fatah splinter)
7-Nov-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Qedumin	LSFPO	SBA	3	3	Missing

11-Nov-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Erez Crossing	LSFPO	Missing	1	1	PIJ
15-Nov-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Missing	LSFPO	Other	14	14	Hamas
21-Nov-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	Civilians	SBA	12	12	Hamas
22-Nov-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Gaza	LSFPO	Missing	1	1	PIJ
23-Nov-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Israeli waters	LSFPO	SVA	2	2	PIJ
27-Nov-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Gaza	Infrastructure	SVA	1	1	People's Front for the Liberatic of Palestine
28-Nov-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Beisan	Civilians	Other	8	8	Al-Aqsa
28-Nov-02	Kenya	Mombassa	Infrastructure	Missing	17	17	Al Qaeda
28-Nov-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Erez Crossing	LSFPO	Missing	1	1	People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine
19-Dec-02	Afghanistan	Kabul	FFOC	Other	1	1	Missing
27-Dec-02	Chechnya/Russia	Grozny	Infrastructure	SVA	74	86	Riyad Us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigades
28-Dec-02	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	Civilians	Missing	Missing	Missing	Hamas
5-Jan-03	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Tel Aviv	Civilians	SBA	24	25	Al-Aqsa and PIJ and Hamas
17-Jan-03	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	At sea near Doghot Settlement	Missing	SVA	Missing	Missing	Hamas
27-Jan-03	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	Missing	35	35	Ansar Allah
8-Feb-03	Sri Lanka	Sea	LSFPO	Missing	1	1	LTTE
9-Feb-03	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Gush Katif	LSFPO	Missing	4	4	PIJ
5-Mar-03	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Haifa	Civilians	SBA	16	17	Hamas/Jenin Martyr's Brigade:
22-Mar-03	Iraq	Halabja	Missing	Missing	7	7	Ansar Allah
29-Mar-03	Iraq	Najaf	Missing	Missing	5	5	Unknown
30-Mar-03	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Netanya	Civilians	SBA	1	1	PIJ
11-Apr-03	Iraq	Baghdad	Missing	Missing	3	3	Unknown
24-Apr-03	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Kfar Saba	Civilians	SBA	2	2	Al-Aqsa
30-Apr-03	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Tel Aviv	Civilians	SBA	4	4	Al-Aqsa and Hamas
8-May-03	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Gaza	LSFPO	Missing	1	1	Al-Aqsa
12-May-03	Saudi Arabia	Riyadh	Infrastructure	Missing	35	35	Al Qaeda
12-May-03	Chechnya/Russia	Znamenskoye/ Znamenskaya	Infrastructure	SVA	59	62	Riyad Us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigades

Appendix A Continued

Date	*Country*	*Location*	*Target*	*Weapon*	*Deaths*		*Group*
					min	***max***	
14-May-03	Chechnya/Russia	Iliskhan-Yurt	LSFPO	SBA	17	20	Associated with Shamil Basayev/ Riyadh Us-Saliheyn Martyr's Brigades
16-May-03	Morocco	Casablanca	Civilians	Missing	47	47	al-Assirat al-M
17-May-03	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Hebron	Civilians	SBA	3	3	Hamas
18-May-03	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	Civilians	SBA	1	1	Hamas
19-May-03	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Afula	Civilians	SBA	4	4	Al-Aqsa and PIJ
19-May-03	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Kfar Darom	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	Hamas
19-May-03	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	Civilians	SBA	7	8	Hamas
27-May-03	Iraq	Baquba	Missing	Missing	Missing	Missing	Ansar Allah
5-Jun-03	Chechnya/Russia	Mozdok	LSFPO	SBA	18	19	Riyad Us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigades
7-Jun-03	Afghanistan	Kabul	FFOC	SVA	6	7	Missing
11-Jun-03	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	Civilians	SBA	17	18	Hamas
19-Jun-03	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Moshav Sde Trumot	Civilians	SBA	2	2	PIJ
20-Jun-03	Chechnya/Russia	Grozny	Infrastructure	Missing	6	8	Missing
4-Jul-03	Pakistan	Quetta	Others	Missing	42	42	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
5-Jul-03	Chechnya/Russia	Near Moscow	Civilians	SBA	16	54	Chechen Separatists
7-Jul-03	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Yaavez	Civilians	Missing	2	2	PIJ
11-Jul-03	Chechnya/Russia	Moscow	Missing	Missing	1	1	Missing
27-Jul-03	Chechnya/Russia	South-east of Grozny	LSFPO	SBA	1	1	Missing
1-Aug-03	Chechnya/Russia	Mozdok (Northern Ossetia bordering Chechnya)	Infrastructure	SVA	36	51	Chechen Separatists
5-Aug-03	Indonesia	Missing	Infrastructure	Missing	17	17	Missing
12-Aug-03	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Tel Aviv	Civilians	SBA	2	2	Al-Aqsa
12-Aug-03	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Ariel	Civilians	SBA	2	3	Hamas
19-Aug-03	Iraq	Baghdad	Others	SVA	22	24	Missing

19-Aug-03	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	Civilians	SBA	19	21	Hamas
3-Sep-03	Chechnya/Russia	Pyatigorsk/Stavropol (northern Caucaus spa town)	Civilians	Missing	6	6	Missing
3-Sep-03	Iraq	Ramadi	Missing	Missing	2	2	Saddam Loyalists
9-Sep-03	Iraq	Irbil	FFOC	SVA	3	4	Missing
9-Sep-03	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	Civilians	SBA	7	8	Hamas
9-Sep-03	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Tel Aviv	LSFPO	SBA	7	8	Hamas
16-Sep-03	Chechnya/Russia	Mozdok/Ingushetia	LSFPO	Missing	4	4	Chechen Separatists
22-Sep-03	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	Missing	2	2	Al Qaeda
4-Oct-03	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Haifa	Civilians	SBA	20	22	PIJ
9-Oct-03	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	Missing	11	11	Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jiha
9-Oct-03	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Tulkarm	LSFPO	Missing	1	1	PIJ
12-Oct-03	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	Missing	9	9	Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jiha
14-Oct-03	Iraq	Baghdad	FFOC	Missing	2	2	Ansar Allah
28-Oct-03	Iraq	Fallujah	LSFPO	Missing	7	7	Saddam Loyalists
31-Oct-03	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	Missing	2	2	Unknown
3-Nov-03	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Kalkilya	LSFPO	Missing	1	1	Al-Aqsa
8-Nov-03	Saudi Arabia	Riyadh	Civilians	Missing	18	18	Al Qaeda
9-Nov-03	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Tulkarm	LSFPO	Missing	1	1	Al-Aqsa
12-Nov-03	Iraq	Nasiriyah	LSFPO	Missing	32	32	Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jiha
12-Nov-03	Iraq	Baghdad	Missing	Missing	3	3	Saddam Loyalists
20-Nov-03	Turkey	Istanbul	FFOC	Missing	28	28	Al Qaeda
20-Nov-03	Iraq	Kirkuk	Infrastructure	SVA	4	5	Ansar al-Sunna
22-Nov-03	Iraq	Baquba	Infrastructure	SVA	9	9	Missing
22-Nov-03	Iraq	Khan Bani Saad	Infrastructure	SVA	9	13	Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jiha
23-Nov-03	Iraq	Baghdad	Missing	Missing	3	3	Saddam Loyalists
5-Dec-03	Chechnya/Russia	Stavropol region north of Chechnya	Civilians	SBA	39	46	Black Widows/Ryiadh-as-Saliheen
9-Dec-03	Chechnya/Russia	Moscow	Infrastructure	SBA	6	7	Black Widows/Ryiadh-as-Saliheen
9-Dec-03	Iraq	Tal Afar	Missing	Missing	1	1	Saddam Loyalists

Appendix A Continued

Date	*Country*	*Location*	*Target*	*Weapon*	*Deaths*		*Group*
					min	***max***	
11-Dec-03	Iraq	Baghdad	Missing	Missing	2	2	Saddam Loyalists
12-Dec-03	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	Missing	8	8	Saddam Loyalists
14-Dec-03	Pakistan	Rawalpindi	LSFPO	Missing	1	1	Jaish-e-Muhammad
14-Dec-03	Iraq	Khaladiyah	LSFPO	Missing	18	18	Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jihad
15-Dec-03	Iraq	Al Hussainiya	Civilians	SVA	8	9	Saddam Loyalists
24-Dec-03	Iraq	Irbil	LSFPO	SVA	4	4	Missing
25-Dec-03	Pakistan	Karachi/ Rawalpindi	LSFPO	Missing	14	15	Jaish-e-Muhammad
25-Dec-03	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Petah Tikva	Civilians	Missing	5	5	People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine
27-Dec-03	Iraq	Karbala	Others	SVA	12	14	Saddam Loyalists
1-Jan-04	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	Missing	9	9	Saddam Loyalists
4-Jan-04	Iraq	Baquba	Infrastructure	Missing	6	29	Missing
6-Jan-04	Afghanistan	Kandahar	Civilians	SBA	15	17	Taliban
9-Jan-04	Iraq	Baquba	Others	Missing	6	6	Saddam Loyalists
10-Jan-04	Pakistan	Sialkot	Others	Missing	31	32	Missing
14-Jan-04	Iraq	Baquba	Infrastructure	SVA	2	3	Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jihad
17-Jan-04	Iraq	Baghdad	Missing	Missing	19	19	Saddam Loyalists
18-Jan-04	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Erez Crossing	LSFPO	Missing	5	5	Hamas
18-Jan-04	Iraq	Baghdad	FFOC	SVA	21	31	Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jihad
24-Jan-04	Iraq	Khaladiyah	LSFPO	Missing	4	4	Saddam Loyalists
27-Jan-04	Afghanistan	Kabul	FFOC	SBA	3	3	Taliban
28-Jan-04	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	2	6	Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jihad
28-Jan-04	Afghanistan	Kabul	FFOC	SVA	2	2	Taliban
29-Jan-04	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	Civilians	Missing	12	12	Al-Aqsa
31-Jan-04	Iraq	Mosul	Missing	Missing	4	4	Ansar al-Sunna
31-Jan-04	Iraq	Mosul	LSFPO	Missing	10	10	Ansar al-Sunna
1-Feb-04	Iraq	Irbil	Infrastructure	SBA	57	109	Ansar al-Sunna
6-Feb-04	Chechnya/Russia	Moscow	Civilians	SBA	39	42	Gazotan Murdash/ Riyadh-as-Saliheen

10-Feb-04	Iraq	Iskandariyah	LSFPO	Missing	56	56	Ansar Allah
11-Feb-04	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	47	48	Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jiha
16-Feb-04	Iraq	Baghdad	Missing	Other	2	2	Missing
18-Feb-04	Iraq	Hillah	Missing	Missing	12	12	Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jiha
22-Feb-04	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	Civilians	Missing	9	9	Al-Aqsa
23-Feb-04	Iraq	Kirkuk	LSFPO	SVA	8	11	Ansar al-Sunna
28-Feb-04	Pakistan	Rawalpindi	Others	Missing	1	1	Unknown
2-Mar-04	Iraq	Karbala	Civilians	SBA	102	121	Al Qaeda
2-Mar-04	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SBA	67	71	Ansar Allah
2-Mar-04	Pakistan	Quetta	Civilians	Missing	45	45	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
6-Mar-04	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Erez Crossing	LSFPO	Missing	3	3	Al-Aqsa
9-Mar-04	Turkey	Istanbul	Civilians	Missing	3	3	Islam Fundamentalist
14-Mar-04	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Ashdod	Civilians	Missing	9	9	Al-Aqsa
17-Mar-04	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	Missing	8	18	Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jiha
18-Mar-04	Iraq	Basra	Infrastructure	Missing	4	4	Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jiha
23-Mar-04	Iraq	Kirkuk	LSFPO	Missing	14	14	Missing
29-Mar-04	Uzbekistan	Tashkent	Infrastructure	Missing	5	5	Hizb-e-Tehrir
30-Mar-04	Iraq	Hillah	LSFPO	Missing	2	2	Saddam Loyalists
2-Apr-04	Iraq	Kirkuk	Infrastructure	Missing	3	3	Missing
6-Apr-04	Chechnya/Russia	Nazran	LSFPO	Missing	2	3	Riyad Us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigades
17-Apr-04	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Erez Crossing	LSFPO	Missing	2	2	Al-Aqsa
21-Apr-04	Saudi Arabia	Riyadh	LSFPO	Missing	11	11	Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jiha
21-Apr-04	Iraq	Basra	LSFPO	Missing	74	74	Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jiha
24-Apr-04	Iraq	Tikrit	FFOC	Missing	5	5	Missing
24-Apr-04	Iraq	Basra	Infrastructure	Missing	6	7	Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jiha
28-Apr-04	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Kfar Darom	LSFPO	Missing	1	1	Hamas
30-Apr-04	Iraq	Fallujah	LSFPO	Missing	3	3	Missing
6-May-04	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	SVA	6	7	Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jiha
7-May-04	Pakistan	Karachi	Others	Missing	16	16	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
17-May-04	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	8	8	Arab Resistance
22-May-04	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	4	6	Al Qaeda

Appendix A Continued

Date	*Country*	*Location*	*Target*	*Weapon*	*Deaths*		*Group*
					min	***max***	
1-Jun-04	Iraq	Baiji	FFOC	SVA	10	12	Saddam Loyalists
6-Jun-04	Iraq	Taji	Others	SVA	8	10	Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jihad
8-Jun-04	Iraq	Mosul	LSFPO	SVA	6	11	Saddam Loyalists
13-Jun-04	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	SVA	11	13	Saddam Loyalists
14-Jun-04	Iraq	Baghdad	FFOC	Missing	14	14	Al Qaeda (linked)
14-Jun-04	Iraq	Baghdad	Missing	Missing	6	6	Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jihad
17-Jun-04	Iraq	Balad	LSFPO	Missing	7	7	Missing
17-Jun-04	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	35	41	Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jihad
24-Jun-04	Iraq	Ramadi	Infrastructure	Missing	1	1	Al Qaeda (linked)
24-Jun-04	Iraq	Baghdad	Missing	Missing	5	6	Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jihad
24-Jun-04	Iraq	Mosul	LSFPO	Missing	63	63	Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jihad
24-Jun-04	Turkey	Istanbul	Civilians	Missing	5	5	Revolutionary People's Liberatio Party/Front
27-Jun-04	Iraq	Baghdad	Missing	SBA	2	4	Missing
4-Jul-04	Iraq	Baquba	LSFPO	Missing	3	3	Saddam Loyalists
6-Jul-04	Iraq	Baquba	LSFPO	SVA	13	13	Missing
6-Jul-04	Iraq	Khalis	Civilians	SVA	10	15	Ansar al-Sunna
7-Jul-04	Sri Lanka	Colombo	LSFPO	SBA	5	5	Missing
14-Jul-04	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	7	12	Missing
14-Jul-04	Iraq	Haye Al-Saif	LSFPO	Missing	2	2	Al Qaeda (linked)
17-Jul-04	Iraq	Mahmoudiyah	LSFPO	Missing	2	3	Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jihad
17-Jul-04	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	4	6	Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jihad
19-Jul-04	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	SVA	8	10	Saddam Loyalists
26-Jul-04	Iraq	Mosul	FFOC	SVA	3	4	Saddam Loyalists
27-Jul-04	Iraq	Baquba	Missing	Missing	1	1	Saddam Loyalists
28-Jul-04	Iraq	Baquba	LSFPO	SVA	70	71	Missing
28-Jul-04	Pakistan	Kohat	Missing	Missing	3	3	Al Qaeda
29-Jul-04	Uzbekistan	Tashkent	Civilians	SBA	2	10	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

30-Jul-04	Uzbekistan	Tashkent	FFOC	Missing	5	5	Hizb-e-Tehrir
31-Jul-04	Pakistan	Fateh Jeng	LSFPO	Missing	10	10	Al Qaeda
1-Aug-04	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	Missing	16	16	Al Qaeda (linked)
1-Aug-04	Iraq	Mosul	Infrastructure	SVA	4	6	Saddam Loyalists
5-Aug-04	Iraq	Mahawil	Infrastructure	SVA	4	6	Missing
5-Aug-04	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	Missing	6	6	Unknown
9-Aug-04	Iraq	Balad Ruz	LSFPO	SVA	7	8	Missing
22-Aug-04	Iraq	Baquba	LSFPO	SVA	2	3	Missing
24-Aug-04	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	4	5	Missing
24-Aug-04	Chechnya/Russia	Moscow	Civilians	SBA	44	89	Islambouli Brigades of Al Qaec
28-Aug-04	Iraq	Mosul	Missing	Missing	1	1	Unknown
29-Aug-04	Chechnya/Russia	Grozny	Infrastructure	SBA	1	1	Missing
31-Aug-04	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Beersheba	Civilians	SBA	18	18	Hamas
31-Aug-04	Chechnya/Russia	Moscow	Civilians	SBA	11	12	Riyad Us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigades
1-Sep-04	Iraq	Fallujah	Civilians	SVA	17	20	Missing
4-Sep-04	Iraq	Kirkuk	LSFPO	SVA	17	26	Unknown
6-Sep-04	Turkey	Siirt	Missing	Missing	1	1	Unknown
9-Sep-04	Indonesia	Jakarta	FFOC	Missing	11	11	Al-Gama'a al-Islamiya / Ring Banten
12-Sep-04	Iraq	Samarra	FFOC	SBA	4	5	Missing
14-Sep-04	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	SVA	46	48	Missing
17-Sep-04	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	Missing	2	2	Missing
17-Sep-04	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	SVA	6	13	Missing
18-Sep-04	Iraq	Kirkuk	Infrastructure	SVA	16	22	Unknown
19-Sep-04	Iraq	Samarra	Infrastructure	SVA	1	1	Missing
20-Sep-04	Iraq	Mosul	Missing	Missing	5	5	Unknown
22-Sep-04	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	Missing	1	1	Missing
22-Sep-04	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	Missing	12	12	Missing
22-Sep-04	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Jerusalem	Civilians	Missing	3	3	Al-Aqsa
22-Sep-04	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	6	12	Unknown
27-Sep-04	Iraq	Mosul	LSFPO	Missing	4	4	Missing

Appendix A Continued

Date	*Country*	*Location*	*Target*	*Weapon*	*Deaths*		*Group*
					min	***max***	
28-Sep-04	Iraq	Fallujah	LSFPO	Missing	2	2	Zarqawi
30-Sep-04	Iraq	Abu Ghraib	Infrastructure	SVA	2	2	Missing
30-Sep-04	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	Missing	11	11	Unknown
4-Oct-04	Iraq	Mosul	Missing	SVA	3	7	Missing
4-Oct-04	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SVA	5	7	Missing
4-Oct-04	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	SVA	11	14	Unknown
6-Oct-04	Iraq	Anah	LSFPO	Missing	11	11	Missing
6-Oct-04	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	15	16	Missing
10-Oct-04	Iraq	Baghdad	FFOC	Missing	1	1	Missing
10-Oct-04	Pakistan	Lahore	Others	SBA	5	6	Missing
10-Oct-04	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	Missing	8	8	Missing
10-Oct-04	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	SVA	9	18	Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jihad
10-Oct-04	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	Missing	6	6	Unknown
11-Oct-04	Iraq	Mosul	FFOC	SVA	1	4	Missing
13-Oct-04	Iraq	Mosul	FFOC	Missing	3	3	Missing
14-Oct-04	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	SVA	1	1	Missing
14-Oct-04	Iraq	Baghdad	Missing	Missing	11	11	Missing
15-Oct-04	Iraq	Qaim	FFOC	SVA	1	1	Missing
15-Oct-04	Iraq	Qaim	Civilians	Missing	11	16	Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jihad
15-Oct-04	Afghanistan	Kabul	Infrastructure	Missing	3	3	Taliban
16-Oct-04	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	Missing	11	11	Missing
17-Oct-04	Iraq	Mosul	Civilians	SVA	4	5	Missing
17-Oct-04	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	5	8	Missing
20-Oct-04	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	Missing	1	1	Missing
20-Oct-04	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	Missing	17	17	Unknown
21-Oct-04	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	Missing	12	12	Missing
23-Oct-04	Iraq	Ishaki	LSFPO	Missing	5	5	Zarqawi
23-Oct-04	Iraq	Khan al-Baghdadi	LSFPO	SVA	16	17	Zarqawi

24-Oct-04	Iraq	Karbala	LSFPO	Missing	1	1	Missing
25-Oct-04	Iraq	Mosul	LSFPO	Missing	2	5	Unknown
30-Oct-04	Iraq	Baghdad	FFOC	Missing	10	10	Missing
1-Nov-04	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Tel Aviv	Infrastructure	Missing	4	4	People's Front for the Liberatic of Palestine
2-Nov-04	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	SVA	5	7	Missing
3-Nov-04	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	Missing	1	2	Unknown
4-Nov-04	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SVA	1	1	Missing
4-Nov-04	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	SVA	4	4	Missing
4-Nov-04	Iraq	Tikrit	LSFPO	Missing	2	2	Unknown
4-Nov-04	Iraq	Fallujah	LSFPO	Missing	5	5	Zarqawi
6-Nov-04	Iraq	Samarra	LSFPO	SVA	43	43	Tanzim Qa-idat
6-Nov-04	Iraq	Baghdad	FFOC	Missing	3	3	Zarqawi
7-Nov-04	Iraq	Fallujah	FFOC	Missing	1	1	Missing
7-Nov-04	Iraq	Ramadi	FFOC	Missing	1	1	Zarqawi
7-Nov-04	Iraq	Baghdad	FFOC	Missing	2	2	Zarqawi
8-Nov-04	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SVA	2	4	Unknown
9-Nov-04	Iraq	Airport Road (Baghdad)	LSFPO	Missing	1	1	Missing
9-Nov-04	Iraq	Kirkuk	Infrastructure	SVA	2	3	Missing
11-Nov-04	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	Missing	20	20	Unknown
12-Nov-04	Iraq	Baghdad	Missing	Missing	10	10	Missing
13-Nov-04	Iraq	Hillah	LSFPO	Missing	2	2	Unknown
15-Nov-04	Iraq	Mosul	FFOC	SVA	1	1	Missing
16-Nov-04	Iraq	Khaladiyah	FFOC	Missing	2	2	Missing
17-Nov-04	Iraq	Baiji	FFOC	SVA	9	15	Missing
18-Nov-04	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	SVA	2	2	Missing
19-Nov-04	Iraq	Hillah	LSFPO	Missing	1	1	Missing
19-Nov-04	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	2	3	Unknown
20-Nov-04	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SVA	1	1	Missing
21-Nov-04	Iraq	Hillah	LSFPO	Missing	1	1	Missing
25-Nov-04	Iraq	Samarra	Infrastructure	SVA	1	1	Missing

Appendix A Continued

Date	*Country*	*Location*	*Target*	*Weapon*	*Deaths*		*Group*
					min	***max***	
26-Nov-04	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	Missing	3	3	Unknown
29-Nov-04	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	Missing	8	8	Missing
29-Nov-04	Iraq	Ramadi	LSFPO	Missing	10	13	Unknown
30-Nov-04	Iraq	Airport Road (Baghdad)	FFOC	SVA	1	1	Missing
30-Nov-04	Iraq	Naiji	FFOC	SVA	7	7	Missing
1-Dec-04	Iraq	Airport Road (Baghdad)	Missing	Missing	1	1	Missing
1-Dec-04	Iraq	Iskandariyah	LSFPO	Missing	2	2	Zarqawi
3-Dec-04	Iraq	Treibil	LSFPO	Missing	3	3	Missing
3-Dec-04	Iraq	Baghdad	Others	SVA	14	18	Unknown
4-Dec-04	Iraq	Mosul	Civilians	Missing	10	10	Missing
4-Dec-04	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	SVA	7	9	Unknown
11-Dec-04	Iraq	Baiji	FFOC	Missing	1	1	Missing
12-Dec-04	Iraq	Haditha	FFOC	Missing	1	1	Missing
12-Dec-04	Iraq	Tikrit	FFOC	Missing	2	2	Missing
13-Dec-04	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	SVA	12	14	Tanzim Qa-idat
14-Dec-04	Iraq	Baghdad	Missing	Missing	8	8	Unknown
19-Dec-04	Iraq	Karbala	Civilians	SVA	12	15	Missing
19-Dec-04	Iraq	Najaf	Civilians	SVA	53	54	Missing
21-Dec-04	Iraq	Mosul	FFOC	Missing	23	23	Missing
23-Dec-04	Iraq	Latifyah	LSFPO	Missing	10	10	Unknown
24-Dec-04	Iraq	Baghdad	FFOC	SVA	10	10	Unknown
27-Dec-04	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	14	16	Unknown
28-Dec-04	Iraq	Mualemeen	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	Missing
29-Dec-04	Saudi Arabia	Riyadh	LSFPO	Missing	5	5	Al Qaeda
29-Dec-04	Iraq	Samarra	Missing	Missing	2	2	Unknown
31-Dec-04	Iraq	Siniya	LSFPO	SVA	2	2	Missing

1-Jan-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	Missing	4	4	Ansar al-Sunn
3-Jan-05	Iraq	Balad	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	Missing
3-Jan-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	2	3	Missing
4-Jan-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	2	11	Tanzim Qa-ida
5-Jan-05	Iraq	Baghdad	FFOC	SVA	2	2	Missing
5-Jan-05	Iraq	Baquba	LSFPO	SVA	6	7	Tanzim Qa-ida
5-Jan-05	Iraq	Hillah	Infrastructure	SVA	15	21	Unknown
6-Jan-05	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Ganei Tal-Gush Katif	Civilians	Missing	2	2	Hamas
8-Jan-05	Iraq	Mahawil	Others	SVA	1	4	Missing
8-Jan-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	Missing	5	5	Unknown
10-Jan-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	SVA	4	8	Unknown
10-Jan-05	Iraq	Rubai'a	Missing	Missing	5	5	Unknown
11-Jan-05	Iraq	Tikrit	LSFPO	SVA	8	8	Tanzim Qa-ida
11-Jan-05	Iraq	Basra	LSFPO	Missing	2	2	Unknown
11-Jan-05	Iraq	Basra	LSFPO	Missing	3	3	Unknown
13-Jan-05	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Karni Crossing	LSFPO	Missing	10	10	Al-Aqsa
16-Jan-05	Iraq	Suwaira	Civilians	SBA	7	9	Unknown
17-Jan-05	Iraq	Ramadi	FFOC	SBA	3	3	Missing
17-Jan-05	Iraq	Baiji	Infrastructure	SVA	7	11	Unknown
18-Jan-05	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Gush Katif	LSFPO	Missing	3	3	Hamas
18-Jan-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	SVA	1	5	Unknown
19-Jan-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	2	2	Missing
19-Jan-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Others	SVA	1	1	Tanzim Qa-ida
19-Jan-05	Iraq	Baghdad	FFOC	SVA	2	3	Tanzim Qa-ida
19-Jan-05	Iraq	Baghdad	FFOC	SVA	2	3	Tanzim Qa-ida
19-Jan-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	SVA	18	19	Tanzim Qa-ida
20-Jan-05	Afghanistan	Sheberghan	Civilians	Missing	2	2	Unknown
21-Jan-05	Iraq	Basra	FFOC	SVA	0	1	Missing
21-Jan-05	Iraq	Youssifiyah	Civilians	SVA	11	13	Unknown
21-Jan-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Others	Missing	16	16	Unknown
23-Jan-05	Iraq	Hillah	Civilians	Missing	1	1	Ansar al-Sunn
24-Jan-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	1	2	Tanzim Qa-ida

Appendix A Continued

Date	*Country*	*Location*	*Target*	*Weapon*	*Deaths*		*Group*
					min	***max***	
26-Jan-05	Iraq	Sinjar	LSFPO	SVA	15	16	Tanzim Qa-idat
27-Jan-05	Iraq	Samarra	LSFPO	SVA	3	3	Missing
27-Jan-05	Iraq	Baquba	LSFPO	SVA	5	6	Tanzim Qa-idat
28-Jan-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	SVA	4	7	Missing
29-Jan-05	Iraq	Khanaqin	LSFPO	Conflicting reports	4	9	Unknown
30-Jan-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	SBA	9	9	Missing
30-Jan-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	Missing	1	1	Tanzim Qa-idat
30-Jan-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	Missing	1	1	Tanzim Qa-idat
30-Jan-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	Missing	1	1	Tanzim Qa-idat
30-Jan-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SBA	1	2	Tanzim Qa-idat
30-Jan-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	SBA	1	2	Tanzim Qa-idat
30-Jan-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SBA	1	2	Tanzim Qa-idat
30-Jan-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	Missing	2	2	Tanzim Qa-idat
30-Jan-05	Iraq	Mahawil	Civilians	SBA	3	5	Tanzim Qa-idat
2-Feb-05	Iraq	Mussayib	Infrastructure	Missing	19	19	Unknown
3-Feb-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	Missing			Unknown
7-Feb-05	Iraq	Mosul	LSFPO	SBA	12	12	Tanzim Qa-idat
7-Feb-05	Iraq	Baquba	Infrastructure	SVA	13	15	Tanzim Qa-idat
8-Feb-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SBA	21	21	Tanzim Qa-idat
11-Feb-05	Iraq	Balad Ruz	Others	Missing	12	12	Unknown
14-Feb-05	Lebanon	Beirut	Civilians	Missing	21	21	Support and Jihad
18-Feb-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	Missing	3	3	Unknown
18-Feb-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SBA	8	15	Unknown
18-Feb-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Others	Missing	10	10	Unknown
18-Feb-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Others	Missing	17	17	Unknown
19-Feb-05	Iraq	Baquba	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	Missing
19-Feb-05	Iraq	Samarra	Missing	SBA	2	2	Missing

19-Feb-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	Missing	1	1	Unknown
19-Feb-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SVA	4	5	Unknown
19-Feb-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	Missing	6	6	Unknown
19-Feb-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Others	Missing	7	7	Unknown
19-Feb-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SBA	17	19	Unknown
22-Feb-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	1	4	Unknown
24-Feb-05	Iraq	Kirkuk	LSFPO	SVA	2	2	Missing
24-Feb-05	Iraq	Iskandariyah	LSFPO	SVA	2	5	Unknown
24-Feb-05	Iraq	Tikrit	Infrastructure	SVA	14	15	Unknown
25-Feb-05	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Tel Aviv	Civilians	SBA	5	6	PIJ and Hezbollah and Al-Aqs
26-Feb-05	Iraq	Baghdad	FFOC	SVA	2	2	Missing
28-Feb-05	Iraq	Hillah	Civilians	SVA	125	136	Tanzim Qa-idat
28-Feb-05	Iraq	Mussayib	LSFPO	Missing	1	1	Unknown
2-Mar-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	8	8	Tanzim Qa-idat
3-Mar-05	Iraq	Baquba	LSFPO	SVA	1	2	Tanzim Qa-idat
3-Mar-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	7	7	Tanzim Qa-idat
7-Mar-05	Iraq	Balad	Civilians	SBA	6	10	Missing
7-Mar-05	Iraq	Baquba	LSFPO	Missing	3	11	Tanzim Qa-idat
9-Mar-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	SVA	2	4	Tanzim Qa-idat
10-Mar-05	Iraq	Mosul	Civilians	SBA	50	53	Prophet's Companions
12-Mar-05	Iraq	Sharqat	LSFPO	SVA	2	2	Missing
14-Mar-05	Iraq	Baghdad	FFOC	Missing	4	4	Unknown
15-Mar-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	Unknown
17-Mar-05	Iraq	Mosul	FFOC	SVA	1	2	Missing
19-Mar-05	Pakistan	Jhal Magsi	Civilians	Missing	50	51	Missing
19-Mar-05	Qatar	Doha	Infrastructure	Missing	1	1	Army of the Levant
20-Mar-05	Iraq	Mosul	LSFPO	SBA	1	3	Tanzim Qa-idat
20-Mar-05	Iraq	Fallujah	Missing	Missing	3	3	Unknown
21-Mar-05	Iraq	Samarra	Infrastructure	Missing	1	1	Unknown
24-Mar-05	Iraq	Ramadi	LSFPO	Missing	11	11	Islamic Army in Iraq
25-Mar-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	SVA	2	2	Missing
27-Mar-05	Iraq	Mussayib	LSFPO	SBA	2	2	Missing

Appendix A Continued

Date	*Country*	*Location*	*Target*	*Weapon*	*Deaths*		*Group*
					min	***max***	
28-Mar-05	Iraq	Mussayib	FFOC	Missing	5	5	Unknown
28-Mar-05	Iraq	Hillah	Civilians	SVA	6	7	Unknown
30-Mar-05	Afghanistan	Jalalabad	LSFPO	Missing	1	1	Taliban
31-Mar-05	Iraq	Samarra	Others	SVA	3	3	Missing
31-Mar-05	Iraq	Tuz	Infrastructure	SVA	2	5	Unknown
2-Apr-05	Lebanon	South Lebanon	Missing	Missing	Missing	Missing	Hezbollah
9-Apr-05	Iraq	Mosul	LSFPO	SVA	1	2	Missing
9-Apr-05	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Netzarim	Civilians	Missing	Missing	Missing	Hamas
9-Apr-05	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Kfar Darom	Civilians	Missing	Missing	Missing	PIJ
11-Apr-05	Iraq	Samarra	FFOC	SVA	2	3	Missing
12-Apr-05	Iraq	Baghdad	FFOC	SVA	4	5	Missing
12-Apr-05	Iraq	Tal Afar	LSFPO	SVA	4	5	Missing
13-Apr-05	Iraq	Baghdad	FFOC	SVA	5	5	Missing
14-Apr-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	13	18	Missing
14-Apr-05	Iraq	Mahawil	LSFPO	SBA	4	4	Unknown
15-Apr-05	Iraq	Baghdad	FFOC	Missing	0	0	Unknown
16-Apr-05	Iraq	Baghdad	FFOC	SVA	1	1	Missing
16-Apr-05	Iraq	Baghdad	FFOC	SVA	2	2	Missing
19-Apr-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	SVA	2	7	Al Qaeda Organisation in the Lan of Two Rivers
19-Apr-05	Iraq	Baghdad	FFOC	Missing	4	4	Unknown
20-Apr-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	2	3	Missing
22-Apr-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Others	Missing	9	9	Unknown
24-Apr-05	Iraq	Tikrit	Infrastructure	SVA	4	7	Unknown
25-Apr-05	Iraq	Ramadi	Missing	Missing	1	1	Unknown
29-Apr-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	5	5	Missing
29-Apr-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	5	5	Missing
29-Apr-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	5	5	Missing

29-Apr-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	5	5	Unknown
30-Apr-05	Iraq	Mosul	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	Missing
30-Apr-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	2	2	Missing
30-Apr-05	Egypt	Cairo	Civilians	Missing	1	1	Unknown
30-Apr-05	Egypt	Cairo	Civilians	Missing	2	2	Unknown
1-May-05	Iraq	Baghdad	FFOC	SVA	3	5	Unknown
1-May-05	Iraq	Tal Afar	Civilians	SVA	24	30	Unknown
2-May-05	Iraq	Mosul	FFOC	SBA	1	4	Missing
2-May-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	SVA	1	3	Unknown
4-May-05	Iraq	Irbil	Infrastructure	SBA	45	60	Ansar al-Sunn
5-May-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	Missing	1	1	Unknown
5-May-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	Missing	13	13	Unknown
6-May-05	Iraq	Tikrit	LSFPO	SVA	7	12	Unknown
6-May-05	Iraq	Suwaira	Infrastructure	Missing	16	16	Unknown
7-May-05	Iraq	Baghdad	FFOC	SVA	18	24	Missing
8-May-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Missing	Missing	22	22	Unknown
9-May-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	2	3	Missing
10-May-05	Iraq	Baghdad	FFOC	SVA	6	7	Missing
11-May-05	Iraq	Tikrit	Civilians	Missing	4	4	Unknown
11-May-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	Missing	12	12	Unknown
11-May-05	Iraq	Hawija	Infrastructure	SBA	20	35	Unknown
12-May-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	Missing	0	0	Unknown
12-May-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Missing	Missing	5	5	Unknown
13-May-05	Iraq	Baquba	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	Missing
14-May-05	Iraq	Mosul	Others	SVA	1	2	Missing
14-May-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	4	5	Missing
14-May-05	Iraq	Tuz	Others	SVA	4	5	Missing
15-May-05	Iraq	Baquba	LSFPO	SBA	5	5	Missing
16-May-05	Iraq	Syrian Border	FFOC	SVA	3	5	Missing
20-May-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SBA	2	2	Missing
23-May-05	Iraq	Samarra	FFOC	SVA	2	2	Missing
23-May-05	Iraq	Mahmoudiyah	Civilians	SVA	9	21	Missing

Appendix A Continued

Date	*Country*	*Location*	*Target*	*Weapon*	*Deaths*		*Group*
					min	***max***	
23-May-05	Iraq	Tal Afar	Civilians	SVA	33	35	Missing
23-May-05	Iraq	Tuz	LSFPO	SVA	5	5	Unknown
25-May-05	Iraq	Missing	FFOC	SBA	1	1	Missing
25-May-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	Missing
26-May-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	3	5	Missing
27-May-05	Iraq	Tikrit	LSFPO	SVA	3	7	Missing
27-May-05	Pakistan	Islamabad	Civilians	Missing	19	19	Unknown
28-May-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	Missing	14	14	Unknown
29-May-05	Iraq	Madaen	LSFPO	SVA	0	2	Missing
29-May-05	Iraq	Tuz Khormato	FFOC	SVA	2	2	Missing
29-May-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	SVA	2	2	Missing
30-May-05	Iraq	Hillah	LSFPO	SBA	27	31	Al Qaeda
31-May-05	Pakistan	Karachi	Others	Missing	5	5	Al Qaeda
1-Jun-05	Iraq	Mishada	Missing	SBA	1	1	Missing
1-Jun-05	Afghanistan	Kandahar	Civilians	Missing	20	20	Al Qaeda
2-Jun-05	Iraq	Baquba	LSFPO	SVA	4	5	Al Qaeda
2-Jun-05	Iraq	Tuz	Civilians	SVA	11	12	Ansar al-Sunna
2-Jun-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	Missing	0	0	Unknown
2-Jun-05	Iraq	Kirkuk	FFOC	SVA	2	4	Unknown
2-Jun-05	Iraq	Balad	Civilians	SBA	9	10	Unknown
3-Jun-05	Iraq	Mosul	LSFPO	SVA	2	2	Missing
7-Jun-05	Iraq	Hawija	LSFPO	SVA	10	13	Missing
13-Jun-05	Iraq	Tikrit	LSFPO	SVA	2	3	Missing
13-Jun-05	Iraq	Baghdad	FFOC	SVA	3	3	Missing
14-Jun-05	Iraq	Kirkuk	Civilians	SBA	20	23	Missing
15-Jun-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	8	10	Missing
17-Jun-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Missing	SVA	0	2	Missing
19-Jun-05	Iraq	Tikrit	LSFPO	SVA	2	2	Missing

19-Jun-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	3	14	Missing
19-Jun-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SBA	23	23	Missing
20-Jun-05	Iraq	Halabja	LSFPO	SVA	4	4	Missing
20-Jun-05	Iraq	Irbil	LSFPO	SVA	13	15	Missing
25-Jun-05	Iraq	Mosul	LSFPO	SVA	4	4	Missing
25-Jun-05	Iraq	Samarra	LSFPO	SVA	9	11	Missing
26-Jun-05	Iraq	Mosul	LSFPO	SBA	5	6	Missing
26-Jun-05	Iraq	Mosul	Civilians	SBA	9	16	Missing
26-Jun-05	Iraq	Mosul	Infrastructure	SVA	12	15	Missing
28-Jun-05	Iraq	Mussayib	LSFPO	SBA	1	3	Missing
28-Jun-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	4	5	Tanzim Qa-idat
1-Jul-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	SVA	1	1	Missing
2-Jul-05	Iraq	Hillah	LSFPO	SBA	8	9	Missing
2-Jul-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SBA	11	16	Missing
4-Jul-05	Iraq	Fallujah	LSFPO	SVA	3	3	Missing
7-Jul-05	UK	London	Civilians	SBA	7	8	Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades an Secret Organization of Al-Qaec in Europe
7-Jul-05	UK	London	Civilians	SBA	8	8	Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades an Secret Organization of Al-Qaec in Europe
7-Jul-05	UK	London	Civilians	SBA	14	14	Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades an Secret Organization of Al-Qaec in Europe
7-Jul-05	UK	London	Civilians	SBA	26	27	Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades an Secret Organization of Al-Qaec in Europe
10-Jul-05	Iraq	Fallujah	FFOC	SVA	1	1	Missing
10-Jul-05	Iraq	Kirkuk	LSFPO	SVA	3	4	Missing
10-Jul-05	Iraq	Mosul	LSFPO	SVA	5	5	Missing
10-Jul-05	Iraq	Syrian Border	Civilians	SVA	7	7	Missing
10-Jul-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SBA	20	26	Missing

Appendix A Continued

Date	*Country*	*Location*	*Target*	*Weapon*	*Deaths*		*Group*
					min	***max***	
12-Jul-05	Iraq	Baquba	Civilians	SVA	2	2	Missing
12-Jul-05	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Netanya	Civilians	SBA	3	5	PIJ
13-Jul-05	Iraq	Baghdad	FFOC	SVA	26	32	Missing
14-Jul-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	1	2	Missing
15-Jul-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Missing	SVA	1	1	Missing
15-Jul-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	11	11	Missing
16-Jul-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	3	3	Missing
16-Jul-05	Iraq	Mosul	Infrastructure	SBA	4	6	Missing
16-Jul-05	Iraq	Mussayib	Civilians	SBA	98	98	Missing
16-Jul-05	Sri Lanka	Jaffna peninsula	LSFPO	Missing	1	1	LTTE
17-Jul-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	Missing
17-Jul-05	Iraq	Mahmoudiyah	FFOC	SVA	6	6	Missing
17-Jul-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	SVA	5	7	Tanzim Qa-idat
20-Jul-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SBA	6	10	Missing
24-Jul-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	SVA	38	40	Missing
25-Jul-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	11	12	Missing
27-Jul-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	6	6	Missing
29-Jul-05	Iraq	Rabia	LSFPO	SBA	43	52	Missing
30-Jul-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	5	7	Missing
2-Aug-05	Iraq	Baghdad	FFOC	SVA	3	4	Missing
2-Aug-05	Iraq	Mosul	LSFPO	SVA	6	6	Missing
4-Aug-05	Iraq	Kirkuk	Civilians	SVA	2	4	Missing
4-Aug-05	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Shfaram	Civilians	Other	5	5	Shalhevet Gilad
9-Aug-05	Iraq	Baghdad	FFOC	SVA	3	6	Missing
10-Aug-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	6	6	Missing
13-Aug-05	Iraq	Baghdad	FFOC	SVA	1	1	Missing
14-Aug-05	Iraq	Mahawil	Missing	SBA	2	2	Missing
15-Aug-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SVA	1	1	Missing

15-Aug-05	Iraq	Diyala Province	Civilians	SBA	2	2	Missing
23-Aug-05	Iraq	Baquba	Infrastructure	SBA	5	5	Missing
28-Aug-05	Iraq	Mosul	FFOC	SVA	2	3	Missing
28-Aug-05	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Beersheba	Civilians	SBA	1	1	Al-Aqsa and PIJ
31-Aug-05	Iraq	Samarra	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	Missing
4-Sep-05	Iraq	Iskandariyah	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	Missing
5-Sep-05	Iraq	Hit	FFOC	SVA	8	8	Missing
7-Sep-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Missing	SVA	2	3	Missing
9-Sep-05	Iraq	Baghdad	FFOC	SVA	1	1	Missing
9-Sep-05	Iraq	Mahawil	LSFPO	SVA	3	3	Missing
14-Sep-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SVA	3	4	Missing
14-Sep-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	8	8	Missing
14-Sep-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SVA	11	11	Missing
14-Sep-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SVA	111	114	Missing
15-Sep-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	4	5	Missing
16-Sep-05	Iraq	Al-Haswah	LSFPO	SVA	3	3	Missing
16-Sep-05	Iraq	Tuz Khormato	Civilians	SVA	11	13	Missing
17-Sep-05	Iraq	Baquba	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	Missing
19-Sep-05	Iraq	Latifyah	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	Missing
19-Sep-05	Iraq	Mahmoudiyah	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	Missing
23-Sep-05	Iraq	Mussayib	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	Missing
23-Sep-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SBA	5	6	Missing
24-Sep-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	0	1	Missing
25-Sep-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	5	6	Missing
25-Sep-05	Iraq	Mussayib	Missing	SVA	6	6	Missing
25-Sep-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	7	10	Missing
27-Sep-05	Iraq	Baquba	Infrastructure	SBA	9	10	Missing
28-Sep-05	Iraq	Baquba	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	Missing
28-Sep-05	Iraq	Tal Afar	LSFPO	SBA	5	10	Missing
29-Sep-05	Iraq	Balad	Civilians	SVA	99	102	Missing
1-Oct-05	Indonesia	Bali	Civilians	SBA	20	20	DI, Noordin's Grou
4-Oct-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Missing	SVA	1	1	Missing

Appendix A Continued

Date	*Country*	*Location*	*Target*	*Weapon*	*Deaths*		*Group*
					min	***max***	
5-Oct-05	Iraq	Hillah	Civilians	SVA	24	36	Missing
6-Oct-05	Iraq	Baghdad	FFOC	SVA	2	2	Missing
6-Oct-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SBA	10	10	Missing
8-Oct-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	5	7	Missing
10-Oct-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	6	6	Missing
11-Oct-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	SVA	1	2	Missing
11-Oct-05	Iraq	Tal Afar	Civilians	SVA	29	30	Missing
12-Oct-05	Iraq	Tal Afar	Civilians	SBA	29	30	Missing
13-Oct-05	Iraq	Kirkuk	LSFPO	SVA	2	2	Missing
17-Oct-05	Iraq	Samarra	Civilians	SBA	2	2	Missing
20-Oct-05	Iraq	Khalis	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	Missing
20-Oct-05	Iraq	Baquba	FFOC	SVA	3	5	Missing
23-Oct-05	Iraq	Kirkuk	FFOC	SVA	1	1	Missing
23-Oct-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	4	4	Missing
24-Oct-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SVA	12	20	Tanzim Qa-idat
25-Oct-05	Iraq	Baghdad	FFOC	SVA	1	1	Missing
25-Oct-05	Iraq	Sulaymaniyah	LSFPO	SVA	3	4	Missing
25-Oct-05	Iraq	Sulaymaniyah	LSFPO	SVA	10	10	Missing
26-Oct-05	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Hadera	Civilians	SBA	6	6	PIJ
27-Oct-05	Iraq	Baghdad	FFOC	SVA	1	1	Missing
7-Nov-05	Iraq	Baghdad	FFOC	SVA	1	1	Missing
7-Nov-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	2	9	Missing
9-Nov-05	Iraq	Baquba	LSFPO	SVA	5	7	Missing
9-Nov-05	Jordan	Amman	Civilians	SBA	63	63	Al Qaeda (linked)
10-Nov-05	Iraq	Tikrit	LSFPO	SVA	6	10	Missing
10-Nov-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SBA	31	35	Missing
18-Nov-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SVA	7	8	Missing
18-Nov-05	Iraq	Khanaqin	Civilians	SBA	74	90	Missing

19-Nov-05	Iraq	Abi Saida	Civilians	SVA	19	50	Missing
22-Nov-05	Iraq	Kirkuk	LSFPO	SVA	21	22	Missing
24-Nov-05	Iraq	Mahmoudiyah	Others	SVA	20	31	Missing
26-Nov-05	Iraq	Samarra	Civilians	SVA	3	5	Missing
5-Dec-05	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Netanya	Civilians	SBA	6	6	PIJ
6-Dec-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SVA	3	3	Missing
6-Dec-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SBA	40	43	Missing
8-Dec-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SBA	29	33	Missing
18-Dec-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	Missing
19-Dec-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	2	2	Missing
23-Dec-05	Iraq	Balad Ruz	Civilians	SVA	10	10	Missing
26-Dec-05	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SVA	1	2	Missing
28-Dec-05	Iraq	Samarra	LSFPO	SVA	2	2	Missing
29-Dec-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	4	4	Missing
29-Dec-05	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Tulkarm	LSFPO	SBA	4	4	PIJ
30-Dec-05	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	3	3	Missing
1-Jan-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SVA	1	1	Unknown
2-Jan-06	Iraq	Baquba	LSFPO	SVA	5	8	Tanizm Qa-Idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn
4-Jan-06	Iraq	Muqdadiya	Civilians	SBA	32	37	Unknown
5-Jan-06	Afghanistan	Tirin Kot	LSFPO	SBA	11	11	Taliban
5-Jan-06	Iraq	Karbala	Civilians	SBA	49	64	Tanizm Qa-Idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn
5-Jan-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SVA	4	4	Unknown
5-Jan-06	Iraq	Ramadi	LSFPO	SBA	55	80	Unknown
7-Jan-06	Afghanistan	Jalalabad	LSFPO	SBA	1	1	Unknown
7-Jan-06	Iraq	Mosul	LSFPO	SBA	1	1	Unknown
7-Jan-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	Unknown
8-Jan-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	2	2	Unknown
8-Jan-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	3	3	Unknown
9-Jan-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SBA	29	31	Al Qaeda Organisation in the Lan of Two Rivers

Appendix A Continued

Date	*Country*	*Location*	*Target*	*Weapon*	*Deaths*		*Group*
					min	***max***	
16-Jan-06	Afghanistan	Spin Boldak	Civilians	SVA	22	23	Unknown
19-Jan-06	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Tel Aviv	Civilians	SBA	1	1	PIJ
19-Jan-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Others	SBA	14	22	Unknown
23-Jan-06	Iraq	Mahmoudiyah	Missing	SVA	1	1	Missing
23-Jan-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	3	5	Unknown
30-Jan-06	Iraq	Nasiriyah	LSFPO	SVA	2	2	Mujahidin Shura Council
1-Feb-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SBA	8	8	Missing
2-Feb-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SVA	10	10	Unknown
6-Feb-06	Pakistan	Bannu	LSFPO	SVA	7	8	Missing
7-Feb-06	Afghanistan	Kandahar	LSFPO	SBA	14	14	Taliban
8-Feb-06	Iraq	Ubaydi	LSFPO	SVA	3	3	Missing
9-Feb-06	Pakistan	Hannu	Civilians	Missing	24	41	Unknown
12-Feb-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SBA	1	2	Unknown
12-Feb-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SBA	5	5	Unknown
13-Feb-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SBA	4	11	Unknown
19-Feb-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SBA	1	1	Unknown
20-Feb-06	Iraq	Mosul	LSFPO	SBA	3	6	Mujahidin Shura Council
20-Feb-06	Afghanistan	Nagarhar	Others	SBA	1	1	Unknown
20-Feb-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SBA	13	13	Unknown
23-Feb-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SBA	12	14	Missing
24-Feb-06	Saudi Arabia	Abqaiq Oil Facility	Infrastructure	SVA	4	4	Al Qaeda
28-Feb-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SVA	7	7	Unknown
28-Feb-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SBA	22	24	Unknown
2-Mar-06	Pakistan	Karachi	FFOC	SVA	4	4	Unknown
6-Mar-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	2	2	Unknown
6-Mar-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	3	3	Unknown
10-Mar-06	Iraq	Fallujah	Civilians	SVA	3	12	Unknown
12-Mar-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SVA	59	59	Unknown

13-Mar-06	Iraq	Baghdad	FFOC	SVA	2	2	Unknown
15-Mar-06	Iraq	Baquba	LSFPO	SVA	2	4	Unknown
17-Mar-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SBA	1	3	Unknown
20-Mar-06	Iraq	Baquba	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	Missing
23-Mar-06	Iraq	Hit	LSFPO	SVA	8	8	Unknown
23-Mar-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	22	26	Unknown
27-Mar-06	Iraq	Tal Afar	LSFPO	SBA	40	41	Mujahidin Shura Council
27-Mar-06	Afghanistan	Kandahar	LSFPO	SBA	2	2	Unknown
28-Mar-06	Iraq	Iskandariyah	LSFPO	SVA	2	4	Mujahidin Shura Council
30-Mar-06	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Qedumin	Civilians	SBA	5	5	Al-Aqsa
30-Mar-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	2	2	Unknown
30-Mar-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	8	8	Unknown
31-Mar-06	Afghanistan	Zormat	LSFPO	SBA	1	1	Taliban
3-Apr-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SVA	9	10	Missing
5-Apr-06	Iraq	Fallujah	FFOC	SVA	3	4	Missing
7-Apr-06	Turkey	Ordu	Civilians	SBA	1	2	Unknown
7-Apr-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SBA	87	93	Unknown
11-Apr-06	Pakistan	Karachi	Civilians	SBA	57	58	Unknown
12-Apr-06	Iraq	Tal Afar	Civilians	SVA	3	4	Unknown
12-Apr-06	Iraq	Howaider	Civilians	SVA	32	32	Unknown
14-Apr-06	Iraq	Mosul	LSFPO	SVA	3	3	Unknown
16-Apr-06	Iraq	Mahmoudiyah	Civilians	SVA	8	11	Missing
17-Apr-06	Iraq	Ramadi	Infrastructure	SVA	3	6	Mujahidin Shura Council
17-Apr-06	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	Tel Aviv	Civilians	SBA	12	13	PIJ
20-Apr-06	Afghanistan	Zarai	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	Unknown
21-Apr-06	Iraq	Tal Afar	LSFPO	SVA	6	7	Unknown
24-Apr-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	4	4	Unknown
26-Apr-06	Algeria	Al-Jura	FFOC	SBA	1	1	Unknown Group/Sinai-base extremists
26-Apr-06	Egypt	Al-Shayk Zuwayd	LSFPO	SBA	1	1	Unknown Group/Sinai-base extremists
28-Apr-06	Iraq	Qaim	Infrastructure	SVA	3	3	Missing

Appendix A Continued

Date	*Country*	*Location*	*Target*	*Weapon*	*Deaths*		*Group*
					min	***max***	
1-May-06	Afghanistan	Kabul	Others	SVA	2	2	Unknown
2-May-06	Iraq	Ramadi	LSFPO	SVA	10	11	Unknown
3-May-06	Iraq	Fallujah	LSFPO	SBA	15	19	Unknown
4-May-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SBA	9	11	Unknown
7-May-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	2	2	Unknown
7-May-06	Iraq	Karbala	Infrastructure	SVA	5	22	Unknown
9-May-06	Iraq	Tal Afar	Civilians	SBA	23	25	Unknown
14-May-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Others	SVA	16	16	Unknown
17-May-06	Afghanistan	Kandahar	Others	SVA	1	1	Unknown
18-May-06	Afghanistan	Herat	Others	SVA	3	3	Unknown
20-May-06	Iraq	Qaim	LSFPO	SVA	5	6	Unknown
21-May-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SBA	12	13	Mujahidin Shura Council
21-May-06	Afghanistan	Kabul	Others	SVA	3	3	Unknown
23-May-06	India/Kashmir	Hyderpora	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	Hizbul Mujahidin
29-May-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	2	2	Unknown
1-Jun-06	Afghanistan	Farah	Others	SVA	1	1	Unknown
3-Jun-06	Iraq	Basra	Civilians	SVA	29	33	Unknown
4-Jun-06	Afghanistan	Kandahar	Others	SVA	3	4	Unknown
6-Jun-06	Afghanistan	Band-e-Sarda	Others	SBA	1	1	Unknown
12-Jun-06	Iraq	Tal Afar	Infrastructure	SVA	5	5	Unknown
13-Jun-06	Iraq	Kirkuk	Infrastructure	SVA	1	1	Mujahidin Shura Council
13-Jun-06	Iraq	Kirkuk	Infrastructure	SVA	1	1	Mujahidin Shura Council
13-Jun-06	Iraq	Kirkuk	LSFPO	SVA	2	2	Mujahidin Shura Council
13-Jun-06	Iraq	Kirkuk	Infrastructure	SVA	4	4	Mujahidin Shura Council
13-Jun-06	Iraq	Kirkuk	LSFPO	SVA	5	6	Mujahidin Shura Council
16-Jun-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SBA	11	14	Unknown
17-Jun-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	9	10	Missing
17-Jun-06	Iraq	Mahmoudiyah	LSFPO	SVA	4	5	Mujahidin Shura Council

19-Jun-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	4	4	Missing
20-Jun-06	Iraq	Basra	Civilians	SBA	1	3	Unknown
25-Jun-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	2	2	Unknown
26-Jun-06	Iraq	Baquba	Civilians	SVA	17	25	Missing
26-Jun-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SBA	5	5	Unknown
27-Jun-06	Iraq	Kirkuk	Infrastructure	SVA	4	4	Unknown
28-Jun-06	Iraq	Baquba	Civilians	SVA	4	4	Unknown
29-Jun-06	Iraq	Kirkuk	Civilians	SVA	5	8	Unknown
1-Jul-06	Iraq	Mosul	LSFPO	SVA	3	3	Unknown
3-Jul-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	Unknown
3-Jul-06	Afghanistan	Kandahar	LSFPO	SBA	2	2	Unknown
5-Jul-06	Iraq	Mosul	LSFPO	SVA	3	3	Unknown
6-Jul-06	Iraq	Kufa	Civilians	SVA	12	13	Unknown
10-Jul-06	Iraq	Kirkuk	Infrastructure	SVA	5	6	Unknown
10-Jul-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SVA	8	9	Unknown
11-Jul-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SBA	18	18	Mujahidin Shura Counc
12-Jul-06	Afghanistan	Khost	Civilians	SBA	2	2	Unknown
12-Jul-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SBA	8	9	Unknown
13-Jul-06	Iraq	Abi Saida	LSFPO	SVA	6	7	Mujahidin Shura Counc
13-Jul-06	Iraq	Mosul	LSFPO	SVA	6	6	Unknown
14-Jul-06	Pakistan	Karachi	LSFPO	SBA	3	4	Missing
14-Jul-06	Afghanistan	Khost	LSFPO	SBA	1	1	Unknown
14-Jul-06	Pakistan	Abbas	LSFPO	SBA	3	3	Unknown
14-Jul-06	Iraq	Mosul	LSFPO	SVA	5	6	Unknown
15-Jul-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	Unknown
15-Jul-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	3	3	Unknown
16-Jul-06	Iraq	Tuz Khormato	Civilians	SVA	26	27	Mujahidin Shura Counc
18-Jul-06	Iraq	Kufa	Civilians	SVA	59	60	Mujahidin Shura Counc
21-Jul-06	Iraq	Samarra	LSFPO	SBA	1	1	Unknown
21-Jul-06	Iraq	Fallujah	LSFPO	SVA	7	7	Unknown
23-Jul-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SBA	34	34	Unknown
24-Jul-06	Iraq	Samarra	LSFPO	SBA	2	2	Unknown

Appendix A Continued

Date	*Country*	*Location*	*Target*	*Weapon*	*Deaths*		*Group*
					min	***max***	
25-Jul-06	Iraq	Samarra	LSFPO	SBA	2	2	Unknown
29-Jul-06	Iraq	Qaim	LSFPO	SBA	1	1	Unknown
30-Jul-06	Iraq	Mosul	LSFPO	SVA	2	2	Unknown
3-Aug-06	Iraq	Hadhra	LSFPO	SBA	10	11	Mujahidin Shura Council
3-Aug-06	Afghanistan	Panjwayi	Civilians	SVA	22	22	Unknown
6-Aug-06	Pakistan	Hub	Others	SBA	1	1	Unknown
6-Aug-06	Iraq	Tikrit	Civilians	SBA	10	11	Unknown
7-Aug-06	Iraq	Samarra	LSFPO	SVA	11	11	Unknown
9-Aug-06	Iraq	Habbaniyah	LSFPO	SVA	4	4	Unknown
11-Aug-06	Pakistan	Dargai	LSFPO	SBA	43	44	Missing
19-Aug-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Others	SVA	2	2	Unknown
23-Aug-06	Iraq	Mosul	LSFPO	SBA	1	1	Unknown
23-Aug-06	Iraq	Mosul	LSFPO	SBA	2	2	Unknown
24-Aug-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SBA	3	3	Unknown
27-Aug-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	16	17	Mujahidin Shura Council
27-Aug-06	Iraq	Kirkuk	Infrastructure	SVA	3	3	Unknown
27-Aug-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Others	SVA	3	3	Unknown
27-Aug-06	Iraq	Kirkuk	LSFPO	SVA	9	11	Unknown
28-Aug-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	SVA	3	4	Unknown
28-Aug-06	Afghanistan	Lashkar Gah	Civilians	SBA	18	18	Unknown
31-Aug-06	Pakistan	Qalat	LSFPO	SBA	2	2	Taliban
31-Aug-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	SBA	3	3	Unknown
3-Sep-06	Iraq	Mosul	LSFPO	SBA	3	4	Mujahidin Shura Council
6-Sep-06	Pakistan	Yaqobi	LSFPO	SBA	3	3	Taliban
7-Sep-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SBA	4	4	Unknown
7-Sep-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	13	13	Unknown
9-Sep-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	2	3	Mujahidin Shura Council
10-Sep-06	Afghanistan	Gardez	LSFPO	SBA	4	4	Taliban

10-Sep-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	3	4	Unknown
11-Sep-06	Afghanistan	Hisarak	LSFPO	SBA	7	7	Unknown
11-Sep-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SBA	16	17	Unknown
14-Sep-06	Iraq	Tal Afar	LSFPO	SBA	2	2	Mujahidin Shura Counc
16-Sep-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	2	2	Unknown
16-Sep-06	Iraq	Ramadi	LSFPO	SVA	4	4	Unknown
17-Sep-06	Iraq	Kirkuk	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	Unknown
18-Sep-06	Iraq	Ramadi	LSFPO	SBA	4	4	Unknown
18-Sep-06	Pakistan	Kabul	LSFPO	SVA	4	4	Unknown
18-Sep-06	Pakistan	Herat	Civilians	SBA	11	12	Unknown
18-Sep-06	Somalia	Baidoa	LSFPO	SBA	11	11	Unknown
18-Sep-06	Iraq	Tal Afar	Civilians	SBA	21	22	Unknown
19-Sep-06	Iraq	Sharqat	Civilians	SBA	21	21	Unknown
20-Sep-06	Iraq	Samarra	Civilians	SVA	2	2	Unknown
20-Sep-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SBA	8	8	Unknown
20-Sep-06	Iraq	Tal Afar	Civilians	SBA	22	23	Unknown
25-Sep-06	Iraq	Ramadi	LSFPO	SBA	8	8	Unknown
26-Sep-06	Iraq	Jurf al-Sakhar	LSFPO	SBA	3	3	Unknown
27-Sep-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Infrastructure	SBA	5	6	Unknown
28-Sep-06	Iraq	Kirkuk	LSFPO	SBA	2	2	Unknown
30-Sep-06	Iraq	Tal Afar	LSFPO	SVA	3	3	Unknown
3-Oct-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SBA	3	4	Unknown
4-Oct-06	Iraq	Ramadi	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	Unknown
6-Oct-06	Pakistan	Khost	LSFPO	SBA	2	2	Taliban
9-Oct-06	Iraq	Jordanian Border	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	Unknown
9-Oct-06	Iraq	Tal Afar	LSFPO	SBA	2	2	Unknown
14-Oct-06	Iraq	Qaim	Civilians	SBA	8	9	Unknown
15-Oct-06	Iraq	Kirkuk	Civilians	SVA	3	3	Islamic State of Iraq
15-Oct-06	Iraq	Tal Afar	LSFPO	SBA	5	14	Islamic State of Iraq
15-Oct-06	Iraq	Kirkuk	Civilians	SBA	3	4	Unknown
15-Oct-06	Iraq	Kirkuk	LSFPO	SBA	5	6	Unknown
16-Oct-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SVA	20	21	Unknown

Appendix A Continued


Date	*Country*	*Location*	*Target*	*Weapon*	*Deaths*		*Group*
					min	***max***	
17-Oct-06	Iraq	Kirkuk	LSFPO	SBA	2	2	Unknown
17-Oct-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SBA	3	3	Unknown
18-Oct-06	Pakistan	Argun	Others	SBA	1	1	Unknown
19-Oct-06	Iraq	Mosul	LSFPO	SVA	12	13	Islamic State of Iraq
19-Oct-06	Pakistan	Khost	LSFPO	SBA	2	2	Unknown
21-Oct-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SBA	5	5	Unknown
22-Oct-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SBA	4	4	Unknown
25-Oct-06	Pakistan	Farah	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	Unknown
25-Oct-06	Iraq	Baquba	LSFPO	SBA	3	3	Unknown
30-Oct-06	Iraq	Kirkuk	LSFPO	SBA	4	4	Unknown
31-Oct-06	Pakistan	Andar	LSFPO	SBA	2	2	Taliban
31-Oct-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SVA	23	24	Unknown
1-Nov-06	Iraq	Ramadi	LSFPO	SBA	7	7	Unknown
4-Nov-06	Pakistan	Karachi	Civilians	Missing	57	58	Missing
7-Nov-06	Pakistan	Khost	LSFPO	SBA	1	1	Unknown
7-Nov-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SBA	17	18	Unknown
8-Nov-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	3	3	Unknown
9-Nov-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SBA	5	6	Unknown
9-Nov-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SVA	9	10	Unknown
11-Nov-06	Iraq	Zaghinya	LSFPO	SBA	3	3	Islamic State of Iraq
12-Nov-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SBA	35	37	Islamic State of Iraq
14-Nov-06	Iraq	Tikrit	LSFPO	SBA	1	1	Unknown
15-Nov-06	Pakistan	Golbahar	Others	SBA	1	1	Unknown
15-Nov-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SBA	3	4	Unknown
17-Nov-06	Pakistan	Peshawar	LSFPO	SBA	1	1	Missing
17-Nov-06	Pakistan	Peshawar	LSFPO	SBA	1	1	Unknown
18-Nov-06	Iraq	Haditha	LSFPO	SVA	2	2	Unknown
19-Nov-06	Iraq	Kirkuk	Civilians	SBA	3	4	Unknown

19-Nov-06	Iraq	Hillah	Civilians	SBA	22	23	Unknown
20-Nov-06	Iraq	Ramadi	LSFPO	SBA	2	2	Unknown
22-Nov-06	Iraq	Anbar Province	LSFPO	SVA	3	3	Unknown
23-Nov-06	Iraq	Suwaira	LSFPO	SVA	3	3	Unknown
24-Nov-06	Iraq	Tal Afar	Civilians	SBA	23	24	Unknown
26-Nov-06	Afghanistan	Paktika	Civilians	SBA	15	16	Taliban
26-Nov-06	Pakistan	Paktika	Civilians	SBA	16	16	Taliban
26-Nov-06	Iraq	Iskandariyah	LSFPO	SBA	8	9	Unknown
28-Nov-06	Iraq	Kirkuk	LSFPO	SBA	2	2	Unknown
28-Nov-06	Pakistan	Herat	Others	SVA	2	2	Unknown
29-Nov-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	2	2	Unknown
29-Nov-06	Iraq	Samarra	LSFPO	SVA	5	5	Unknown
1-Dec-06	Sri Lanka	Colombo	LSFPO	SVA	1	1	LTTE
3-Dec-06	Pakistan	Bannu	Others	SBA	2	2	Unknown
3-Dec-06	Iraq	Mosul	LSFPO	SVA	2	3	Unknown
3-Dec-06	Iraq	Kirkuk	LSFPO	SBA	4	4	Unknown
5-Dec-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	8	8	Unknown
6-Dec-06	Pakistan	Kandahar	FFOC	SBA	9	9	Taliban
6-Dec-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SBA	3	3	Unknown
9-Dec-06	Iraq	Karbala	Others	SVA	6	6	Unknown
10-Dec-06	Iraq	Rabia	Infrastructure	SVA	1	1	Unknown
11-Dec-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SBA	2	2	Unknown
12-Dec-06	Iraq	Radwaniya	LSFPO	SVA	2	2	Islamic State of Ira
12-Dec-06	Pakistan	Helmand	LSFPO	SBA	9	9	Taliban
12-Dec-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SVA	70	70	Unknown
13-Dec-06	Iraq	Kirkuk	Infrastructure	SVA	11	11	Unknown
14-Dec-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	2	3	Unknown
20-Dec-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SVA	11	12	Islamic State of Ira
21-Dec-06	Iraq	Baghdad	LSFPO	SBA	16	16	Islamic State of Ira
22-Dec-06	Pakistan	Kabul	LSFPO	SBA	1	1	Unknown
24-Dec-06	Iraq	Muqdadiya	LSFPO	SBA	8	8	Unknown
25-Dec-06	Iraq	Ramadi	LSFPO	SBA	4	4	Islamic State of Ira

Appendix A Continued

Date	*Country*	*Location*	*Target*	*Weapon*	*Deaths*		*Group*
					min	***max***	
25-Dec-06	Iraq	Baghdad	Civilians	SBA	3	4	Unknown
28-Dec-06	Iraq	Mosul	LSFPO	SBA	2	3	Islamic State of Iraq
29-Dec-06	Iraq	Khalis	Civilians	SBA	10	10	Unknown
30-Dec-06	Iraq	Tal Afar	LSFPO	SBA	5	6	Unknown
Missing	Chechnya/Russia	Chechnya	Missing	Missing	1	Missing	Missing

Appendix B: Islamic sects and sectarian groups in Pakistan



Notes

Introduction

1 In three different locations in south-east Asia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries anti-colonial Muslim resistance movements resorted to suicide attacks. These occurred on the Malabar Coast of south-western India, in the Philippines and in Aceh on northern Sumatra in Indonesia. Over the span of almost two centuries these campaigns lasted a few decades (Dale 1988).

1 Global trends in suicide bombing, 1981–2006

1 I was able to obtain the database developed by Professor Diego Gambetta when I was an official visitor at Nuffield College, University of Oxford, in October–December 2007. This afforded me the opportunity to work with Professor Gambetta. I am grateful to him for giving me access. The Hafez, Pape and Pedahzur databases are included in their respective studies. I am also grateful to Bruce Hoffman and Scott Atran for assistance and advice about the MIPT database.

2 In all there were 140 incidents in which more than one attacker was recorded as involved, but I suspect this number to be an underestimate.

3 Author's personal interviews with Federal Investigation Agency Pakistan staff in Islamabad, April 2006, confirmed this pattern in Pakistan as well.

2 Explaining suicide bombings

1 Rage can be self-destructive in other ways. In a brilliant essay on rage Australian academic Germaine Greer describes the effects of two hundred years of humiliation, exploitation and neglect to which the Aboriginal Australians have been subjected. On any one day 6 per cent of Australian Aboriginal men between the ages of twenty-five and thirty are in prison. In any year a quarter of all Aboriginal men will be involved with the correctional services. Twenty-two per cent of the Australian prison population is Aboriginal although this ethnic group comprises less than 1.5 per cent of the Australian population. Transgressive behaviour like sexual assault, rape, child neglect and abuse, alcohol abuse, petrol sniffing and domestic violence are rampant in the Australian Aboriginal populations. Greer suggests that rage is the masculine response to endemic humiliation and grief is the feminine. Flagrantly transgressive behaviour is a form of last-ditch resistance to alien authority. The person who is powerless, speechless and helpless has no outlet but to smash things and people. Rage prompts us to assault others and it is also the force that pushes us to lay violent hands on ourselves. Anyone trying to understand what is happening to Aboriginal men, why it is that they drink themselves into insanity and death, why they rape and maim the people who love them, why they so often throw their lives away, needs to understand the role played by rage (Greer 2008).

3 Suicide bombings in Iraq

1 The website on which this Arabic document was posted was closed down within two weeks and therefore only hard copies are available. I was fortunate to get a copy from Mr Hussain Haqqani, who is now Pakistan's ambassador to the United States.
2 Also available from the author.
3 OSC, 'Al-Zarqawi uses Western press, poetry to criticise US, encourage "mujahidin"', 11 May 2005, cited in Hafez (2007b: 160).
4 All quotes are from Peraino (2008).
5 The following biographies are based on Peraino (2008).
6 This biographic account is based on Ghosh (2005).
7 Excerpted from the transcript of the video *Baghdad Badr Attacks* (SITE Institute 2006).

4 Suicide bombings in Israel and Palestine

1 After reviewing the history of Jewish–Muslim relations, historian Bernard Lewis concludes that in general the theology of Judaism and that of Islam are far closer to each other than either is to Christianity. Jews have lived under Islamic rule for fourteen centuries and in many lands and, while it is difficult to generalise about their experience, although they were never free from discrimination they were rarely subjected to persecution, as the case was with Christians. In contrast to Christian anti-Semitism, Muslim attitudes towards Jews were not historically ones of hate and fear but rather inspired by the contempt that Muslims had towards non-believers. Unlike European philosophers of the Enlightenment, who at one time or another gave vent to anti-Semitism, nothing comparable can be found in the writings of great philosophers in classical Islam (Lewis 1986: 117–29; also see Hassan 2009).
2 For example, in a statement to the *Sunday Times* of 15 June 1969, then Prime Minister of Israel, Mrs Golda Meir, declared: 'There is no such thing as Palestinian people … It is not as if we came and threw them out and took their country. They did not exist.'
3 See Smith (2004: chapter 10), for accounts of PLO terrorist attacks.
4 For a good account of intifada see Peretz (1990) and Smith (2004: chapter 10).
5 The first suicide bombing incident in Israel was carried out not by a Palestinian but by a Japanese. In May 1972 three members of the Japanese Red Army, an affiliate of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, arrived in Tel Aviv by air from Paris to help their Palestinian comrades. Their carry-on bags were stuffed with machine-guns and hand grenades. After disembarking at Tel Aviv airport they began an armed assault on anyone in sight, killing twenty-six people, most of them Puerto Ricans on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land. Israeli guards killed one of the attackers, and a second blew himself up, thus becoming the first suicide bomber in the modern history of the Israeli–Arab conflict. The third attacker, Kozo Okamoto, was arrested, tried and jailed until the mid-1980s, when in a prisoner swap he was handed over to Palestinian militants in Lebanon's Beka'a Valley. In 2000 Okamoto abandoned his secular Marxist politics and converted to Islam (Brym 2007: 41).
6 Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research: www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2004/p13a.html.
7 According to Hafez, Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades is an umbrella organization consisting of various militias that sprang from the ranks of Fatah and the ranks of the Palestinian Authority and operates in several towns and refugee camps (Hafez 2006: 95–6).
8 This information is based on two published interviews with two Hamas military commanders, Salah Shahda and Muhammad al-Dief, on www.alqassam.info. See also N. Hassan (2001) and Barr (2001).
9 These include chapter 2, al-Baqara; chapter 3, al-Imran; chapter 8, in-Anfal; chapter 9, al-Tawba; chapter 55, al-Rahman; and chapter 103, al-Asr (N. Hassan 2001).

10 Exactly how many suicide bombings have been launched is not known. One estimate indicates that, between 2000 and 2005, nearly six hundred suicide bombing missions were launched in Israel from the occupied terrories but that fewer than 25 per cent succeeded in reaching their targets. Israeli counter-terrorism efforts thwarted three-quarters of them by killing or arresting the operators before the mission was completed (Brym 2007).
11 However, according to Israeli government figures, which 'include all hostile attacks', suicide bombings have made up only 0.5 per cent of such attacks by Palestinians against Israelis since the beginning of the Al-Aqsa intifada but account for half of all deaths (Margalit 2003).
12 For a detail account of Hamas, PIJ and AMB instrumental reasoning, see Hafez (2006: 31–2).
13 All these may amount to war crimes under the international conventions.
14 These accounts appeared in a series of articles in a London-based journal, *Falistin al-Muslima* (Islamic Palestine), and are summarised from Hafez (2006: 26).
15 Hiba's profile was compiled from FUSTD records.
16 Copy of the transcript translated by Ted Thornton is available from the author.
17 On the detrimental effects of sanctions and punishment on human behaviour see Fehr and Gachter (2002) and Fehr and Fischbacher (2003).

5 Suicide bombings in Pakistan

1 On Zia's Islamisation programme, see Hassan (1985 and 2007); Nasr (1994); Iqbal (1986); Ahmed (1992); Weiss (1986).
2 See Appendix B for sectarian divisions in Pakistani Islam, and for further detail see Rana (2004).
3 Established in 1985, this organisation was dedicated to physically eliminating the nettle-some presence of the Shias. Orginally established under the name Anjuman Sipah-i-Sahaba (ASS), when the organization's members realised what the acronym meant in English the name was changed to Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan.
4 Personal interviews with Pakistani intelligence officers, Islamabad, January, April 2007.
5 Personal interviews with Federal Investigation Agency officers in Islamabad, January and April 2007.
6 Interviews with members of Federal Investigation Agency, Islamabad, April 2007.

6 Suicide bombings in Afghanistan

1 Personal interviews, January 2007.

7 Suicide bombings in Sri Lanka

1 The Sri Lankan army is predominantly (95 per cent) Sinhalese. This was not always the case. In 1956, 40 per cent of the armed forces were Tamil but by 1970 this proportion had declined to 1 per cent. Tamils are now virtually excluded from the army and police (Smith 1997; Pratap 2001; Swamy 2003).
2 The caste structure of the Sri Lankan Tamils is unlike that of India. The hierarchal pyramid is inverted, and there is no Brahman caste of numerical significance. The highest caste traditionally has been the Vellalar, and they were estimated to be 50 per cent of the total population within Jaffna peninsula. Among the rest, the Karaiya were around 10 per cent and the Kviyar, the Palar and Nalavar were each between 7 and 9 per cent (Roberts 2005: 70).
3 Adapted from *Daily Mirror* (2009). The material also appeared in the Telegraph.co.uk as an article entitled 'Life as a female Tamil Tiger guerrilla relived by one of first female soldiers' on 8 May 2009.
4 Similar arguments have also been made by Roberts (2005: 22–3).

5 This point is made by Tilly (1992).

8 Suicide bombings: homicidal killing or a weapon of war?

1 Also see Walzer (2006). This chapter has benefited from the ideas discussed in Asad (2007).

2 In a recent study based on interviews with failed suicide bombers incarcerated in Israeli prisons, psychologist Anat Berko repeatedly argues that casualties of suicide bombers are deliberate murder victims. This study purports to offer an original, authoritative and empirically grounded account of the inner worlds of suicide bombers, but the interpretation of the interview data is highly problematic. The intellectual stance, that casualties of suicide bombers are deliberate murder victims, is repeated throughout the book. Time and again the jailed Palestinian suicide bombers and their dispatchers tell Berko that the brutal, oppressive and illegal occupation of their homeland was the springboard of their actions, but their voices appear not to carry much weight in her analysis and interpretations (Berko 2007).

3 In an article in the *New York Times*, David Barstow exposes how the Pentagon exploits ideological and military allegiances of the popular media, especially the television analysts of the Iraq war, to generate favourable news coverage (Barstow 2008). Mark Kurlansky in his review of the book *Human Smoke* in the *Los Angeles Times* states that *Human Smoke* ‘could help the world to understand that there is no Just War, there is just war …’ (Kurlansky 2008).

Epilogue

1 It is likely that since 2003 this proportion has changed in favour of Islamic organisations. However, in Iraq, the site of a majority of such attacks since 2003, most of the suicide attacks remain unclaimed and therefore it is difficult to ascertain the affiliation of sponsoring organisations, although it is likely to have shifted in favour of religious (Islamic) organizations. However, even then the goals of many of these organisations are largely secular.

2 For a critique of the rational choice model, see Tosini (2009).

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